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Abstract 
''`ýýThe current thesis aims to clarify some aspects of the relationship between biology and 
social bonds. The central task is to demonstrate that, despite clear problems of some 
past approaches claiming to represent biology, there is non-reductive compatibility 
between the perspective from cultural approaches documenting processes of social 
bonding in humans and the perspective from basic biological theory. In demonstrating 
this compatibility, the thesis also attempts to contribute to delineating the utility and 
limits of applying insights from biology to understanding aspects of human social 
behaviour, and to sociological study in general. The areas of social bonding and social 
relationships under focus are mainly at the level of individuals and primary social 
groups, rather than a structural-functional approach often employed in classical 
sociology of the family and comparative sociology. 
The thesis initially reviews recent cultural approaches to understanding social bonding, 
and notes the potential academic value of a clarification of the association between 
social kinship and physical ('related by blood') kinship. In reviewing biological theory 
on social bonding and social behaviour, it is argued that classic sociobiological 
interpretations of this biological theory are erroneous in some crucial respects, and a 
different interpretation is argued for. Evidence on processes mediating social bonding in 
social mammals and particularly in primates is reviewed. It is demonstrated that 
circumstantial, social and contextual 'cues' typically mediate the formation of primary 
social bonds in these species, not genealogical relationship per se, and that these 
findings are compatible with basic biological theory. In the human case, it is 
demonstrated that the current interpretation of biological theory is also compatible with 
established disciplines closely associated with detailing mechanisms of social bonding 
(such as attachment theory). The consensus here is again that social bonds are mediated 
by various social and contextual cues rather than genealogical relationship per se. 
Contemporary cultural approaches to describing processes of social bonding are 
investigated and found to be also compatible with the present interpretation of 
biological theory. With this basic compatibility demonstrated, the possible implications 
for analyses of patterns of social bonding in human societies is discussed. Delineating 
the scope of the biological perspective underlines the importance of analysing 
sociological and cultural influences on patterns of social bonding, including historical, 
economic and political factors. This is illustrated with some examples. 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
1.1 The Role of Theory 
Greater understanding of the commonalities and distinctions between human cultures is 
as important a goal of academic research as ever; in particular, how changing local 
circumstances affect cultural practices. Disciplines most closely concerned with 
investigating and describing the variety of human cultures and their features, have 
identified inherent problems in some previous concepts of `human nature' (e. g. 
Schneider 1984) that mainly European and American anthropologists and comparative 
sociologists have traditionally applied to other cultures. These problems have led to 
doubts about the validity of purportedly objective concepts of human `universals' and 
thus a general move away from cross-cultural comparative study. 
For these reasons, the place of theory in social sciences has become problematic. There 
is a tension between testing theoretical positions and avoiding potentially value-laden 
enquiry as Moore (1999) suggests; 
"... D'Andrade argues that any claim anthropology might have to moral authority 
`rests on knowing empirical truths' (D'Andrade, 1995,402), and thus one should 
keep moral and objective models separate... [T]he purpose of an objective model is 
to gain a surer understanding of what is actually happening (D'Andrade 1995,408). 
Other anthropologists decry this suggestion and point out that there is no such thing 
as value-free enquiry, and therefore it is impossible to keep moral and objective 
models separate. This debate is of course a version of an older debate... "(Moore 
1999,13) 
As Moore's review notes, the eschewing of theory on this basis now characterises much 
of anthropology. But she also points out that anthropology implicitly makes certain 
assumptions (about human capacity for meaning and culture) which are themselves 
theoretical in nature; 
"But, a theoretical claim that people everywhere have the capacity to create meaning 
and that this is a defining feature of human agency is based on a pre-theoretical 
commitment. This pre-theoretical commitment is of a very particular kind in the 
sense that it is ontological rather than epistemological: in other words, it implies 
something about the nature of being human that is believed to be universally true. 
The problem for anthropology is that in spite of the impact of post-modem theorising 
on the discipline and a political commitment to eschewing homogenising and 
exclusionary meta-theories, the discipline still has to engage with theories that are 
about the commonalities - and not just the differences - between all human beings. 
The impetus for this is not just the dialogue that must exist between socio-cultural 
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anthropology, biological anthropology, psychology, linguistics and other cognate 
endeavours in recognition of the fact that humans have biological capacities and an 
evolutionary history, but also the political and humanist project of recognising and 
valorizing the fact that humans everywhere are human. This does not, of course, 
imply that those things that are shared are realised in the same way. " (Moore 
1999,17) 
In the absence of this dialogue, there is a possibility that more biologically orientated 
disciplines (with a concomitant lack of social scientists' knowledge of the actual 
diversities of human behaviours and practices) will attempt to advance hypotheses 
about human universals in the gaps left over by social scientists' methodological 
caution. Because these hypotheses derive from a tradition less aware of cultural 
particulars, they in turn may again make the error of advancing a view of `human 
nature' that derives mainly from within the practitioners' own cultures, whilst not 
recognizing the particularities of this view (see section 1.6 for examples). Meanwhile, 
social scientists, particularly ethnographers have compiled an unparalleled corpus of 
information about the actual range of human behaviour. I would therefore argue that, 
with this privileged position, the ability and responsibility lies with those familiar with 
this corpus to contribute to hypotheses about `commonalities between all human 
beings'. Put differently, whilst the trend and desire for homogenising `meta-theories' 
exists within academic life, social scientists must contribute to ensure the premises of 
such theories are as `objective' as possible. 
1.2 The Traditional Connection: Biology, Reproduction and Kinship 
I will argue that previous Sociobiological approaches to explaining human behaviour 
have not been compatible with ethnographic evidence because they misinterpreted and 
misrepresented fundamental biological theory (see chapters two and three). The main 
problems were; a particular teleological interpretation of the basic theory and; an 
agnosticism on the form of individual behaviour per se in favour of a focus on overall 
(`structural') social patterns. More importantly, anthropology through the 1960s and 
1970s (culminating in Schneider 1984) identified a set of false, biologically-framed yet 
culturally-specific concepts about `kinship' that had dogged the study of social 
relationships and interaction. These cultural conceptions, held both by anthropologists 
and by sociobiologists, included a focus on `relatedness by blood' (what the biologists 
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called `genetic relatedness') including purported local ideas of this. The long 
prominence of `descent' models and their forebears exemplified this approach. 
Some of the same assumptions that anthropology managed to identify and remove from 
its analysis remain largely unidentified by sociobiologists and others relying on 
hypotheses derived from basic biological theory. These include assumptions about the 
normalcy of the nuclear family and the universality of focus on males and related 
factors such as `paternity certainty' and, most importantly, the supposed centrality of 
`true' genetic connections in social relationships in humans. 
Sociobiological hypotheses emerged at precisely the time (the mid 1970s) that 
anthropology was increasingly unburdening itself of these assumptions. This timing, 
and the fact that these hypotheses were not only incompatible with ethnographic data, 
but also overly simplistic and heavy handed (and rode roughshod over many subtleties 
(e. g. Sahlins 1976), further alienated the main stream of anthropology from biology in 
general, and contributed to the current gulf between the disciplines. The following two 
chapters will demonstrate how sociobiological hypotheses typically rely on a 
misinterpretation of basic biological theory. This section will review the 
anthropological perspective on the place of `biology' in the study of social behaviour. 
Schneider's 1984 A Critique of the Study of Kinship described in detail the problems 
with the anthropological study of kinship. In one way or another, anthropology had, 
since Morgan, viewed social bonds and interaction in humans though the lens of 
`kinship'. Schneider's critique deconstructed the concept of `kinship' and demonstrated 
that in utilising it, anthropology had uncritically conflated one the one hand, the study 
of social bonds and social behaviour and on the other, notions of biological (or `blood') 
relatedness; 
"The purpose of this book is to make explicit and examine carefully the implicit and 
explicit assumptions and presuppositions about kinship, and to evaluate them 
carefully. "(Schneider 1984,39) 
"There is general agreement that there is such a thing as "kin-based society, " though 
just exactly how this is defined may vary from scholar to scholar. With a few 
exceptions there seems to be general agreement that an important aspect of the 
definition of kinship is its entailment in biological and/or social 
reproduction. "(Schneider 1984,43) 
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"For Radcliffe-Brown, as for Maine and Morgan before him, "the chief source of 
social cohesion is the recognition of kinship" (Radcliffe Brown 1950: 43)... There 
may be a further corollary here in some views that is lacking in others - that there is 
a quality, which is both social and biological, to kinship which gives it its special 
force. Certainly for Morgan (1870: 10) the actual bonds of blood relationship had a 
force and vitality of their own quite apart from any social overlay which they may 
also have acquired, and it is this biological relationship itself which accounts for 
what Radcliffe-Brown called "the source of social cohesion". "(Schneider 1984,49) 
This underlying reference to the concept of bonds of blood, established by Morgan, had 
continued (through Radcliffe-Brown and others) upto the time of Schneider's writing. 
However, there were incompatibilities between this notion and the ethnographic 
evidence. For example, from before Morgan, it was acknowledged that, even in the case 
of the closest social ties, bonds of blood are not in fact necessary (Maine 1861, on the 
`legal fiction' of `adoption', see Schneider below). Mounting ethnographic evidence 
later demonstrated these incompatibilities clearly. For example, what Euro-American 
culture has traditionally designated as `adoption' may not be distinguished by many 
cultures, nor even applicable. In some Inuit societies, anywhere between 25 to 70 
percent of children may live away from blood parents in an `adoptive' social 
arrangement (Guemple 1979, see also Brady 1976, Terrell& Modell 1994 and chapter 
8). Partly because in such cultures `adoption' is an unknown concept, the high 
frequency of `non-blood' primary social bonds has often gone underemphasized, and 
underreported in ethnographic summaries (Goody 1969). An ignorance of such realities 
caught out sociobiologists in their attempts to explain human social patterns (Sahlins 
1976). When one sociobiologist later took a closer look at Inuit culture, she had to 
concede that theory clashed with the evidence; 
"It is also clear that some of the elements of Inuit adoption are difficult to explain 
from an evolutionary perspective. For example, parents do not always bias 
investment in favor of their own offspring. Spencer (1959) describes a woman who 
risks her life and the life of her unborn child in order to avoid abandoning her 
adopted son. Guemple (1979) also remarks on the fact that adopted infants 
sometimes receive better treatment than natural children. Some of the motives that 
prompt people to adopt are also difficult to explain. In some cases, affection for 
children appears to provide a sufficient motive to adopt. Other individuals adopt a 
large number of children as a means of establishing prestige or status. Even if such 
cases are not common, they suggest that evolutionary principles may account for 
only some of the observed variation in adoptive behaviour. " (Silk 1987,328) 
The point about adoption is that it clearly demonstrates that social bonds are 
constructed, and that this may in fact be independent of genealogical relatedness. 
Schneider himself emphasised a distinction between the notion of a social relationship 
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as intrinsically `given' and unalienable (`from birth'), and a social relationship as 
created, constituted and maintained by a process of interaction, or `doing' (Schneider 
1984,165). Schneider used the example of the citamangen / fak relationship in Yap 
society, previously commonly interpreted essentially as a `father / son' relationship, to 
illustrate the problem; 
"The crucial point is this: in the relationship between citamangen and fak the stress 
in the definition of the relationship is more on doing than on being. That is, it is more 
what the citamangen does for fak and what fak does for citamangen that makes or 
constitutes the relationship. This is demonstrated, in the ability to terminate 
absolutely the relationship where there is a failure in the doing, when the fak fails to 
do what he is supposed to do; and second, in the reversal of terms so that the old, 
dependent man becomes fak, to the young man, tam. 
The European and the anthropological notion of consanguinity, of blood relationship 
and descent, rest on precisely the opposite kind of value. It rests more on the state of 
being, on the sharing of certain inherent and therefore inalienable attributes, on the 
biogenetic relationship which is represented by one or another variant of the symbol 
of "blood" (consanguinity), or on "birth, " on qualities rather than on performance. 
We have tried to impose this definition of a kind of relation on all peoples, insisting 
that kinship consists in relations of consanguinity and that kinship as consanguinity 
is a universal condition. The genealogical grid of consanguineal relations is regarded 
as a universal statement of relations of substance, more generally, of being, of 
inherent quality, while performance, forms of doing, various codes for conduct, 
different roles, are seen as variables, secondary, attached as different possible 
meanings to the fundamental set of signs which the genealogical grid, as relations of 
being or substance, represent. "(Schneider 1984,72) 
This distinction between `being' a blood (or `genetic') relation per se and the 
significance of the process or performance which makes the relationship has been one 
of the central concepts of kinship studies since Schneider, and finds a parallel in the 
current thesis. The following sections will illustrate more detail of Schneider's 
argument. It is also worth noting how those subsequently working in the area of kinship 
have themselves interpreted Schneider's impact; 
"The crux of Schneider's (1984) argument was that anthropologists had founded the 
domain of "kinship" on the notions of human reproduction and the biologically 
defined relatedness of their own Euro-American culture. Human reproduction and 
notions of biological relatedness cannot be presumed to elsewhere structure people's 
social relationships, and Schneider himself very clearly doubted that they do so. His 
criticism was sweeping, covering not only anthropologists who, like Scheffler 
(1973), explicitly referred to human reproduction in their definitions of kinship, but 
to all anthropologists, who, since Morgan, explicitly or implicitly grounded kinship 
in biological relations even when they described cases of "kinship" locally 
formulated in some other terms. Schneider concluded that "kinship" as conceived in 
anthropology could not be meaningfully studied cross-culturally. "(Galvin 2001,110) 
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Schneider's critique is widely acknowledged to have marked a turning point in 
anthropology's study of social relationships and interactions (Collier and Yanagisako 
1987; Carsten 1991,1995,2000; M. Strathem 1992; Holy 1996; Schweitzer 2000). The 
undefined label or domain formerly known as `kinship' has largely been avoided ever 
since. 
Notice that Schneider's critique uses `biological' mainly to refer to the concepts of 
procreation and `blood' relatedness; 
"However it was figured, the reproductive relationship was taken as the central 
feature of kinship. Kinsmen, then, were those who were related through "real" 
biological ties... For Morgan kinship consisted in the knowledge of the existence of 
relationships of human reproduction. Before the facts of reproduction were known 
there could be no kinship... The major modification was in the shift of emphasis 
from the social recognition of biological bonds arising out of procreation to the 
sociocultural aspects themselves, ostensibly giving the real or putative existence of 
the ties lesser, if any importance... But the concept of adoption demonstrates that the 
ultimate reference remained biological. That is, it is the sociocultural attribution of 
meaning to the biological relationship (real or putative) which is the central 
conception of kinship. Without the biological relationship there is nothing. Indeed, 
without the biological relation it is called "fictive kinship, " presumably following 
Maine (1861: 27), who argued that where no actual biological relationship exists it 
can be treated as if it does by a legal fiction, as in adoption. This is only another way 
of bringing in the biological facts... "(Schneider 1984,54) 
Schneider's argument is persuasive. However, his critique of the biological referent to 
social bonding needs to be clearly understood as a critique of these pseudo-biological 
concepts, and not a critique of biology itself (see also Feinberg 2001). Schneider was 
not claiming that genetic relationships between individuals do not exist, he was 
questioning their cultural value and questioning the basis of claims of their necessary 
connection to actual social relationships; 
"It is possible, even probable, that the facts of genetic relationship, like colour, are 
the same the world over and can be defined in precise, scientifically established 
terms. Different degrees of genetic relationship can be specified with respect to 
ascendants and descendants. In this respect, a genealogy which is in fact a statement 
of genetic relationship, or even a statement that has a high likelihood of being as 
close to the real genetic relations as possible, can be regarded as equivalent to the 
wavelengths that define the colour spectrum. But Barnes in 1964 made it perfectly 
clear, if it had not been perfectly clear before, that there was a radical difference 
between genetic relations as defined by the criteria of "science" and what are 
culturally regarded as kinship systems. " (Schneider 1984,124-125) 
He also makes this distinction elsewhere; 
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"I have said that the American `kinship' system has two distinctive features, shared 
biogenetic substance and diffuse, enduring solidarity. I have said elsewhere that 
these derive from the master symbol of coitus and that each is a facet of this act. The 
last few pages of my book, American Kinship, make the point that the biological 
elements have a symbolic significance. They constitute an integrated set of symbols 
in the sense that they are a model for how life, in certain of its aspects, is constituted 
and should be lived. The symbols are `biological' in the sense that the culturally 
given definition of the symbol system is that it is derived from the facts of biology as 
a process of nature itself. But it is fundamental to our understanding that we 
appreciate that these biological elements are symbols and that their symbolic 
referents are not biology as a natural process at all. [Schneider here adds in a note] It 
is even a moot question as to whether the symbols derive from the facts of nature and 
the facts of biology as these can be determined scientifically. What is indisputable is 
that the symbols are formed of elements which in native culture are defined as 
biological, particularly as aspects of the reproductive process. What is disputable is 
whether they in fact derive from, or mirror, or are models formed after the scientific 
facts of biology. I do not think that they are, but this subject is best left to another 
time. " (Schneider 1972,45,62) 
"I stress that the genealogical relationship must be culturally "recognized" or 
culturally constituted, for it is hard to see how it could serve as a language or idiom 
if it were not given clear cultural formulation. We believe that all mammals have real 
biological relationships which can be stated in genealogical form. But where such 
biological relationships are given no social or cultural value whatsoever, or are 
treated as irrelevant or non existent, or are not recognized to exist, it is hard to see 
how they could be treated as a language of any sort. " (Schneider 1984,62) 
One of Schneider's main concerns was that justification for the (supposed universal) 
privileging of the procreative `blood' relationship in social ties was never actually given 
by kinship theorists, although their concept of `kinship' frequently made reference to 
`biology' and `natural facts'. This point is made repeatedly in his Critique; 
"Let me put the problem in a different way. Of all of the imaginable and of all the 
well-known features of folk-cultural theories of reproduction, what reason do 
Scheffler and Lounsbury have for insisting that kinship relations are those predicated 
on birth and on the relation between sexual intercourse and reproduction and further 
have the character of indissolubility? Scheffler and Lounsbury offer neither 
explanation nor rationale for these three remarkable a priori conditions of their 
definition. In fact, they are simply bringing our biology (I do not mean genetics) 
back into what is presumed to be their (the natives') cultural theory of reproduction, 
and so they restore the Morganian definition. "(Schneider 1984,118) 
"Is kinship a privileged system? Does its special privilege reside in its roots in 
biology or sexual reproduction? If so, just how? Spiro answers none of these 
questions for us. Neither does Malinowski. "(Schneider 1984,139) 
"The privileged position of kinship has been argued by functionalists of many 
particular persuasions, from Malinowski through Talcolt Parsons, as one which is 
based on its vital functions. In the absence of a clear and compelling demonstration 
of precisely what those vital functions are and how they determine or constrain 
specific cultural forms, functionalism must be dismissed as failing to resolve that 
issue. The question of whether kinship is a privileged system and if so, why, remains 
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without a satisfactory answer. If it is privileged because of its relationship to the 
functional prerequisites imposed by the nature of physical kinship, this remains to be 
spelled out in even the most elementary detail. " (Schneider 1984,163) 
Schneider demonstrated clearly that no convincing justification had been made in 
reference to biological `constraints' (the Sociobiological argument included, since it too 
didn't fit the ethnographic evidence, see above). Notice that, despite common 
interpretations (see for example, Galvin 2001, above) Schneider was not saying that 
comparative study of `kinship' (as social ties) is impossible (Feinberg 2001), just that 
the genealogical element intrinsic to the established concept of `kinship' must be 
removed; 
"The matter is quite simple. Given the definition of kinship as genealogy, by 
definition genealogy has priority over related phenomena. If this definition proves 
inadequate to the study of some societies, then we are forced to three alternatives. 
We can exclude the societies to which the definition of kinship does not apply, we 
can change the definition of kinship, or we can abandon the whole notion of kinship. 
But we cannot smuggle in new criteria by which kinship is defined, such as sharing 
land or altruism, and still think we are dealing with kinship as genealogical or 
biological relatedness. " (Schneider 1984,131) 
Schneider's references to sharing land and altruism will become clearer in later chapters 
(chapters 8 and 7, respectively). As well as not denying the possibility of comparative 
study, and neither criticising biology as a discipline, Schneider was also "explicitly not 
speaking of "kinship" at a psychological level" (Schneider 1972,39). This has left open 
the option for ethnographers to investigate the psychological processes involved in 
social bonding, and such perspectives are more common that they used to be (cf. 
Carsten 2000, see section 1.7), as later chapters will illustrate. 
The present research is intended to demonstrate that cultural approaches to `kinship' 
are not only compatible with "the scientific facts of biology" (as Schneider himself 
suggested they should be), but also that such ethnographic data is vital for the 
(empirically narrow) biological and psychological perspectives on human social and 
emotional bonding processes. 
Assumptions about the necessary significance of genetic relatedness that dogged former 
approaches (in both anthropology and sociobiology) are not accurate in their claims to 
be "models formed after the scientific facts of biology" (again, as Schneider believed). 
The current interpretation of the biological position instead emphasises a continuity 
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with psychological mechanisms that mediate social bonding, in particular, `attachment' 
mechanisms. Past interpretations of `biological facts' have often suggested that 
`biological forces' are pervasive and omnipresent (giving rise to the charge of biological 
determinism), and that, at some level, all human behaviour can be understood as the 
means to a `biological goal'. The current approach thoroughly rejects any such 
teleological claims; biological processes have no `goals' (but humans can have). This 
approach therefore emphasises that, in human societies, "the biological facts are... but 
one of the conditions, like ecology, [political] economy, demography etc., to which 
kinship systems must adapt. " (Schneider 1984,139, see chapter 9 for discussion). 
1.3 Historical Aspects of Social Sciences' Relationship with Biology 
1.3.1 Social Darwinism and Race Theory 
In this section I will discuss some other aspects of sociology and anthropology's 
relationship with biology, but this can in no way be a thorough review. I focus mainly 
on those areas relevant to the current focus on kinship and social bonding. 
We have seen (above) that much of the study of social relationships was from the start 
approached via the framework of biological relatedness. But Biology's relationship with 
early social science covered more that just kinship. Prior to Boas, cultural variations 
between societies were usually ascribed to purported different innate (`biological') 
potentials. Added to this, the notion of progressive `social evolution' from a `primitive' 
promiscuous state to a `civilised' one was also popular, providing, for example, the 
reasoning for Morgan's focus on an analysis of `classificatory' versus `descriptive' 
kinship terminology. 
The supporters of strong `social evolution' theories attempted to give them justification, 
credibility and respectability by suggesting that they were derived from an increasingly 
influential theory of a mechanism of biological evolution (Darwin 1859). However, as 
`social evolution' and `Social Darwinism' ideas gained momentum, Darwin and others 
who were involved with the biological work clearly stated that their own ideas about 
`Natural Selection' were properly understood to be applicable only to biological forms, 
that is, the physiological and behavioural characteristics of individual organisms, and 
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explicitly not to human societies and cultures through notions of human `social 
evolution'. More importantly, the derivation of any `moral values' modelled on the 
(blind and inherently amoral) process of biological evolution was strongly warned 
against (Huxley 1893, see below). Yet these warnings went unheeded by contemporary 
social evolution theorists, such as Herbert Spencer. 
Spencer's ideas, perhaps sometimes now taken out of context (Sahlins 1960), were well 
received in an age where members of some societies had an interest in justifying 
interference and often exploitation of other societies and their resources. Using an 
influential natural scientific theory (Darwin's theory of the evolution of biological 
species by Natural Selection) as a political and moral justification for some human 
groups to dominate others was a slight of hand which went far beyond descriptive 
natural science. This attempted extrapolation from the `fact' of biological evolution to a 
political/moral position was, and remains an instance of the 'naturalistic fallacy', in this 
case, seeking to base morality and value on a blind and mindless material process (what 
Huxley, below, calls the `cosmic process'). As well as the same caution about 
conflating `fact' and `value' being given by Moore (see above), maintaining this 
distinction has long been the position of many real biologists. Perhaps most notably, T. 
H. Huxley (`Darwin's Bulldog' and colleague) was provoked to express his views 
precisely by the rise of Spencer's `Social Darwinism'; 
"Social progress [as a humanist project] means a checking of the cosmic process at 
every step and the substitution for it of another, which may be called the ethical 
process... it requires that the individual should not merely respect, but shall help his 
fellows. It repudiates the gladiatorial theory of existence.... Let us understand, once 
and for all, that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic 
process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it. " (Huxley 1893). 
Huxley, though methodologically sceptical about natural selection (Lyons 1999), was a 
close colleague and friend of Darwin, whose theory was a considerable contribution to 
illuminating the workings of the 'cosmic' process and exposing its amorality. Not 
surprisingly, to medically inclined evolutionary biologists, natural selection in its 
`blindness', should be seen as a force to be wary of, or put another way; 'Mother Nature 
is a wicked old witch' (Williams, quoted in Ridley 1997). But 'Social Darwinism' 
essentially modelled morality on this mindless process. 
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Around the same time, `Race theory' similarly made claims to scientific objectivity, by 
making reference to the new theories of biological evolution. These unwarranted claims 
of a direct association with Darwin's work in turn sometimes gave the latter a bad 
name, such that the two are still today often believed to be somehow connected; 
"The race theory was firmly anchored in the new science of biology by evolutionary 
ideas which suggested that some races were more primitive than others, and 
therefore more animal-like, or `theromophic', in bodily form, mental ability, and 
moral development. The theory measured each race against the supposedly more 
advanced, the northern Europeans. " (Carrithers 1996,394, emphasis added) 
From the full content of his review, it is clear that Carrithers has a subtle understanding 
of the current biological position. The point is that it is quite easy, when looking at the 
history of social science, to perceive a picture of biology itself as inevitably promoting 
notions of e. g. racial differences or fixed genetic potentialities, as well as a downplaying 
of developmental / environmental / social / cultural factors on behaviour. This was 
never an accurate portrayal of core biological theory, and better reflects cultural values 
justified in vague reference to `biology' (e. g. Schneider 1980, and above). Today the 
biological position is clear enough; 
"We now have a vast array of molecular data which speaks so eloquently towards 
our recent African origin within the last 200,000 years or so. This African origin was 
followed by approximately 100,000 years of further diversification within Africa, 
followed by subsequent migrations and dispersals throughout the rest of the world 
within the last 100,000 years. Such a shallow history precludes the creation of 
biologically based racial typologies. It similarly forestalls claims of deeply rooted 
biological differences between populations. Rather than recoiling from the study of 
biological variation, anthropologists and other scientists should widely disseminate 
the results of their studies. Such data clearly refute folk theories of the differences 
between peoples and clearly demonstrate the unity of humankind. " (Disotell 2000, 
23-24) 
It was against the then current intellectual climate in which `race theory' and `Social 
Darwinism' were prominent, and proclaimed by advocates as `scientific', that Boas 
advanced a culturally relativistic approach; 
"Boas broke the evidently seamless simplicity of this theory... He argued that there 
is no reason to think that other `races' (or, more accurately, other ways of life) are 
less moral or less intelligent than northern Europeans, and so there is no single 
standard for evaluation... [F]ield research would reveal forms and patterns in human 
life ... so various, 
he argued, that they could not have arisen from uniform process of 
social or cultural evolution but must rather be the fruit of complex local historical 
causes. " (Carrithers 1996,394) 
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These ideas were introduced by Boas in his The Mind of Primitive Man in 1911, and 
further developed by his equally influential students, including Sapir, Benedict, 
Kroeber, Mead (and through the latter and Kluckholn, handed on to the likes of 
Schneider, see e. g. Schneider and Handler 1995). These anthropologists empirically 
demonstrated the great plasticity of human culture. 
1.3.2 Biology, Gender, Roles 
Another trend in early comparative sociology (e. g. Westermark 1891) was the attempt 
to define an `essential form' of the human family, assumed to be fundamental and 
universal, which employed notions of what kinds of arrangements are `natural'. Such 
discussions in turn often invoked `parental roles' which were defined according to the 
sex of parent. Assuming a state of `primitive promiscuity' where paternity was 
indeterminable, the rise of the nuclear family had been tied to the development of 
monogamous marriage (Morgan 1877, Engels 1884). Amongst others, Malinowski 
(1913) suggested a distinction between social and physical `kinship'; whereas the bond 
between an infant and its `mother' is usually physical as well as social, he suggested, 
the role of the father is essentially social, and may or may not be physical. 
As Schneider pointed out (see above) later functionalists followed this distinction 
between the roles of the mother and father, and regarded the mother-child dyad (or 
`matricentral cell') as `natural' and given. The `given-ness' of the `maternal' bond - 
arising from the high frequency of the correlation between what could, after 
examination, be deconstructed into `child's social and emotional bonding figures' and 
`the female having given birth' was not adequately examined. Although some later 
functionalists (e. g. Spiro 1977) noted this distinction (Schneider 1984,138-139) in 
general few of the features (psychological, interactional) of the `matricentral cell' were 
closely investigated within anthropology (e. g. Carsten 2000, and see chapters 8 and 9). 
The investigation of this aspect of the supposedly `natural' was taken up psychologists 
and attachment theorists (e. g. Bowlby 1969), and the growth of knowledge in this area 
was taken up by a later generation of anthropologists precisely to question the notion of 
the natural `matricentral cell'. 
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For Fortes (1959), the naturalness of the mother-offspring relationship was at the heart 
of his distinction between the `female' domestic domain and the male political domain. 
This conception of the natural roles of males and females (and the simple model of 
domestic/public spheres) has since been heavily criticised. Fortes' position has been 
taken as an example of a deep gender bias in anthropology, and some aspects of the 
purported `naturalness' of sex-roles and male-female bonds (e. g. female dependence on 
male hunting) have been challenged using data from primatological studies and 
biological theory. I here review some of the ways in which the status quo regarding the 
given-ness of `natural' gender roles and related categories, and especially the 
explanatory focus on males, have been questioned by anthropologists by invoking 
biological data (i. e. evidence from other primates). Initially, such biological `facts' were 
used to cast doubt on some dominant assumptions about what is `natural' or `given'. 
Later, however, some (Yanagisako and Collier 1987) questioned this whole focus on 
ideas of what might or might not be `natural' since an emphasis on 
historical/evolutionary referents itself seemed to reinforce an impression of `natural' 
constraints. The following sections illustrate this move through primate data to a non- 
biology-invoking position. 
Slocum (1971) pointed out the male bias in anthropology; "Anthropology, as an 
academic discipline has been developed primarily by white western males, during a 
specific period in history. "(Slocum 1975 [1971], 37). She goes on; 
"There is a strong male bias in the questions asked, and in the interpretations given. 
This bias has hindered the full development of anthropology as "the study of the 
human animal"... I am going to demonstrate the Western male bias by re-examining 
the matter of evolution of Homo sapiens from our nonhuman primate ancestors. In 
particular the concept of "Man the Hunter"... Hunting cannot explain its own origin. 
It is much more logical to assume that as the period of infant dependency began to 
lengthen, the mothers would begin to increase the scope of their gathering to provide 
food for their still dependent infants. The already strong primate mother-infant bond 
would begin to extend over a longer time period, increasing the depth and scope of 
social relationships, and giving rise to the first sharing of food. It is an example of 
male bias to picture these females with young as totally or even mainly dependent on 
males for food. Among modern hunter-gatherers, even in the marginal environments 
where most live, the females can usually gather enough to support themselves and 
their families. " (Slocum 1975 [1971], 37-43 emphasis in original) 
Slocum's point is that, in the reconstruction of human evolution, "male bias exist not 
only in the ways in which the scanty data are interpreted, but in the very language 
used"(Slocum1975 [1971], 38). She puts forward an equally plausible suggestion, 
supported by primate evidence available at the time, focussing on females and their 
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social bonds with their offspring. At the same time, Kathleen Gough (1975(1971)) also 
used primate data and that from hunter-gatherer groups to question some assumptions 
about the origins of the family and the relationship between sedentary agriculture and 
monogamous arrangements. Like Slocum, she suggested that; 
"All primates share characteristics without which the family could not have 
developed... Childhood is longer, the closer the species are to humans. [In 
Chimpanzees] the long childhood and maternal care produce close relations between 
children of the same mother, who play together and help tend their juniors until they 
grow up. "(Gough 1975,55) 
Adrienne Zihlman (1981) made similar points about the male-bias in anthropology as 
well as in theories of human evolution. Thus, as well as charging those promoting the 
concept of "man the hunter" (e. g. Lee and deVore 1968), she similarly criticises 
sociobiological theories in respect to their claim to explain aspects of human evolution, 
for their similar male-bias; 
"[A]t the same time, Wilson's Sociobiology uncritically emphasizes male 
dominance, male fitness and male reproductive success... The concepts of parental 
investment and mate choice, pillars on which sociobiology is founded, are never in 
this book applied to female mammals or primates. Though Wilson mentions that 
maternal care is prolonged in higher primates and humans, and that social 
relationships are to some extent matrilineal, these facts play no essential role in his 
theoretical formulation of human societies today or yesterday. The intellectual 
tradition of Wilson's emphasis on male reproductive success appears as a barrier... 
for incorporating women into human evolution. "(Zihlman 1981,84) 
The assumptions and biases of biologically based analyses will be investigated more 
fully below (chapter three), and the role of such biases in obscuring productive insights 
discussed. Like Gough, Zihlman (1993) draws on primate data on female-offspring 
relationships, particularly noting the frequent occurrence of food-sharing within such 
relationships in Chimpanzee groups, especially compared to the low frequency of food 
provision by males. Since these studies, further primate data has become available, 
sometimes lending support, sometimes raising further questions about such analyses. 
The point is that social scientists have at times successfully used biological data to 
support arguments that questioning some of social science's own (as well as biology's) 
long-standing assumptions. 
Later theorists have adopted a more cautious approach, and have suggested that an 
appeal to biological data or analytical categories, e. g. of child-rearing/the domestic 
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domain versus the public domain, may simply reveal "our tendency to rediscover 
gendered dichotomies" (Yanagisako and Collier 1987,49). They suggest that the 
feminist perspective first challenged male-bias in anthropology (as above), then 
questioned whether male-dominance was indeed a cross-cultural universal, and rejected 
it as a `natural fact' and redefined it as a social fact (ibid, 14). Yanagisako and Collier's 
innovation was to suggest that the (cultural) categories of `male' and `female' and the 
social and cultural processes by which they are constituted should themselves be 
investigated. Though they do not doubt that men and women are different (ibid, 48), 
they thus emphasise the value of cultural analysis to help discover the lenses through 
which these categories and concepts are constructed. In this respect, Schneider's various 
critiques of the cultural values inherent to the concept of `kinship' were an important 
influence; 
"Just as Schneider (1968) questioned, rather than took for granted, the meanings of 
blood, love and sexual intercourse in American kinship and their influence on the 
construction of categories of relatives, so we have to question the meanings of genes, 
love, sexual intercourse, power, independence, and whatever else plays in to the 
symbolic construction of categories of people in any particular society. " (Yanagisako 
and Collier 1987,41) 
Yanagisako and Collier's questioning of the `social use' and cultural meaning of these 
categories can also benefit from knowledge of "scientific facts of biology", which 
demonstrate that a simple and clear division between two `discrete' sexes is not always 
present (see e. g. Cucciare 1981 for an early review). Biological facts can thus help in 
drawing a distinction between what, if any, biological dispositions are really `given' and 
which are socially and culturally constructed. Thus, whilst Yanagisako and Collier 
acknowledge male and female differences, they call for a consideration of how these 
differences are understood and misunderstood and used (and misused) in the cultural 
construction of gender categories. They reject an insistence on the `naturalness' and 
possibly therefore `rightness' of the social/cultural roles associated with biological 
differences. Huxley (above) had this very distinction in mind when he criticised `Social 
Darwinism'; questioning the institutionalisation of social categories and associated 
prescriptive moralities based on unexamined `natural facts'. 
As an example of this which is relevant to the current research, and to Schneider's 
points about `kinship'(above), recent work examining varieties of care-giving to 
dependent infants and children demonstrates the flexibility of what are usually taken to 
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be fairly fundamental aspects of `natural' roles. While an extended developmental 
period and reliance on care-givers may perhaps be a `biological need' of the dependent 
infant; the corresponding role of care-giver/s need not be fulfilled by any particular sex 
of nurturer (Geiger 1996). It could be argued that the traditional Euro-American cultural 
category of `the role of the mother' as sole primary caregiver derives from a 
combination of, on the one hand these (relatively inflexible) needs of the infant; and on 
the other the (culturally specific) social structure and typically isolated living 
arrangements of individuals. Research in other cultures (Tronick et al 1985, and see 
chapters 7 and 8) suggests that the Euro-American pattern of a single (and female) care- 
giver may be only one out of many possible arrangements. A superficial cultural 
interpretation of the `natural facts' can suggest a great deal more rigid picture of 
dispositions and processes than emerges from a clear investigation of the actual 
biological facts (as Schneider suggested). 
1.4 Deconstructing `Kinship'; Genealogy or Social Bonds? 
The main focus of the current research is on social bonding behaviours, and the 
commonalities between the ethnographic evidence and the (basic and correctly 
interpreted) biological position regarding these behaviours. This section and the 
following will very briefly illustrate how studies of social behaviour have progressed in 
ethnography since the assumptions that were intrinsic to `kinship' were identified (see 
section 1.2 above). Although this work will be reviewed and discussed more fully later 
(chapters 8 and 9), what emerges from this quick review is that the study of social ties is 
alive and well. As mentioned above, Schneider has successfully shown that the concept 
of `kinship' had been a conflation of what should properly be two separate concepts, 
`social bonds' and `biological relatedness'. Future analysis would thus have to consider 
these two factors independently (if at all). Anthropologists of different inclinations have 
recently emphasized one or other of these two components that made up the old notion 
of `kinship', and in a sense, each emphasising their continuity (albeit having 
incorporated Schneider's critique) with anthropological tradition and ethnographic data; 
"For Schneider (1984: 200-201) the central question is: Given our definition of 
kinship, do other people have it, and what value and meaning do they give to it? I 
would suggest, by contrast, that the central question should be: how do the people we 
study define and construct their notions of relatedness and what values and meaning 
do they give them? It seems to me that we would do better to use the term "kinship" 
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to characterise the relatedness that people act and feel. In this way we may arrive at a 
new and much more flexible approach to the study of kinship in 
anthropology. "(Carsten 1995,236). 
This recasting the phenomena to be studied as `relatedness' was later criticised as too 
broad a target as to be useful since, on its own; 
"[T]he concept of relatedness does not specify what precisely `relatedness' is meant 
to involve, how it is to be defined and how it should be distinguished from any other 
kind of social relationship... to avoid equating the concept of relatedness with any 
kind of social relationship [`friends, neighbours, citizens, fellow-worshipers, 
producers and consumers, members of the same ethnic group'], those who advocate 
its usefulness restrict it to relationships which resemble those of traditionally defined 
kinship. Replacing the concept of kinship with that of relatedness thus amounts in 
practice to a semantic solution to the difficulties involved in the definition of kinship. 
But renaming a phenomenon does not solve the problems involved in its 
conceptualisation. " (Holy 1996,168). 
Holy's critique of Carsten's shifting the discussion to `relatedness' echoes Schneider's 
critique of the concept `relationship system' (Schneider 1984,111) as used by Needham 
(1971) and Maybury-Lewis (1965). As Holy makes clear, he instead favours a position 
which maintains the traditional guiding principle of shared substance 
('consubstantiation') to explain the social connections ('relatedness') between people; 
"The current debate about how kinship should be conceptualised and defined has 
made it abundantly clear that in many cultures the system of relationships, which 
resemble what we would commonsensically call `kinship', is not necessarily based 
on the tracing of genealogical connections. What the debate about the culturally 
specific extra-genealogical conceptualisations of kinship seems not to have 
sufficiently appreciated is that genealogical relations, which are central to the 
traditional anthropological definition of kinship, are a specific Western way of 
imagining relatedness among people resulting from their sharing of substance and its 
transmission over generations... [T]o be meaningful as a concept, kinship has to be 
understood as a culturally specific notion of relatedness deriving from shared bodily 
and/or spiritual substance and its transmission. " (Holy 1996 170,171) 
If the concept of `kinship' was, as Schneider suggested, a conflation of `biological 
relatedness' and `significant social bonds and interactions' there would seem to be two 
elements that one might wish to investigate (independently of each other). For Holy, the 
connectedness-by-consubstantiation (of which the Euro-American `genealogical 
relatedness' is one cultural form) remains of interest and he suggests that this is the 
`universal' concept which deserves preserving. 
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On the other hand the alternative emphasis that Holy ascribes to Carsten (1995) and 
Bouquet (1993) of `relatedness' is as a concept that `does not presuppose that 
genealogical relations are necessarily the most important' (Bouquet 1993,157), but 
which does give a sense of the focus on social bonds and interactions. Of course, in 
having this emphasis, as Holy points out, and Carsten (2000) concedes, this conversely 
has the weakness of not delineating which category of `relationships' are considered 
significant. But, having suggested that the two elements that made `kinship' should in 
fact not be conflated, unless one entirely recasts the way that these two supposedly 
universal aspects are in fact correlated/covariant (or not), one must keep the two 
elements separate. 
At the same time, it seems that Holy's notion is not really a move away from the 
`genealogical view' critiqued by Schneider. He suggests that each society will create a 
set of conditions by which individuals will consider themselves related, through sharing 
substance, and their essence to be transmitted between the generations. However, where 
the concepts of substance and consubstantiation do appear in ethnographies, they 
typically do not signify inalienable `being'; on the contrary they involve the individual's 
continuous transformation throughout the life span by coming into contact with ever 
changing influences in the environment (e. g. Ingold 2000, Storrie 2003, see chapter 8). 
This use is very different from the eternal, down-the-generations `consubstantiation' as 
used in the "Western way of imagining relatedness". Because of such ambiguities, some 
theorists have suggested that the concept may not be a helpful one (e. g. Thomas 1999, 
Carsten 2000). In sum, in maintaining the emphasis on "the state of being, on the 
sharing of certain inherent and therefore inalienable attributes... on qualities rather than 
on performance" (Schneider 1984,72) Holy's position appears to ignore the essence of 
Schneider's critique. 
1.5 A Continuing Appeal to `Natural Facts' by Social Scientists 
Not everyone accepted all elements of Schneider's critiques. Some of those whose use 
of `kinship' he criticised have nevertheless continued essentially along the same lines as 
before (e. g. Scheffler 2001, Goodenough 2001). In a recent review of the history of the 
study of kinship, in the introduction to his recent edited volume, Schweitzer concludes 
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by emphasising the need for more dialogue between cultural and `biological' 
approaches; 
"I believe that the issue of the relationship between kinship and biology still awaits a 
balanced answer. While the last twenty years were characterised by extreme 
positions - with the complete decoupling of kinship and biology by culturalist and 
feminist approaches, on the one hand, and the reduction of everything to biology by 
sociobiology, on the other hand - none of these positions is entirely satisfying. After 
all, while it has become evident that biology alone is insufficient for a 
comprehensive understanding of what kinship is and does, it is equally hard to 
maintain that kinship has nothing to do with biology and procreation. " (Schweitzer 
2000,16) 
However, Schneider's point was not that `kinship' has nothing to do with biology and 
procreation (see above). His point was, on the one hand that, unless we can demonstrate 
that the culture in question explicitly values these aspects, we cannot claim their bonds 
form `because of the natural facts'; and such cultural valuation was, in reality, rarely 
demonstrated. On the other hand, it is not enough to make vague appeal to biology and 
procreation, `kinship' theorists must justify this proposition (if indeed it could be 
justified); just what exactly does `kinship' have to do with biology and procreation? 
Goodenough (2001) included a discussion of the `natural basis' of kinship ties, 
appealing to the notion that; "As a group, a mother and her children constitute a natural 
isolate in a human community as against other such mother-child groups. As the 
members of such a group look primarily to one another for mutual support, emotional 
bonds develop among them" (Goodenough 2001,206). Whilst this account perhaps 
gives more detail than some previous appeals to `the natural facts', it doesn't really 
explain in any detail how things work or why they should work in this way. Recall that 
Schneider felt that the appeal to the natural facts of biology that the concept of `kinship' 
was based on were inadequate and he doubted that such concepts could be claimed to be 
"models formed after the scientific facts of biology" (see above). Any discussion of the 
purported relationship between social bonding and `blood' would have to provide much 
more detail than Goodenough does, and in doing so, may or may not support his 
position. 
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1.6 Continuing Ambitions of Sociobiology's Heirs 
Other approaches exist which claim to represent the scientific facts of biology, and 
claim to provide an alternative framework which can (reductively) encompass all of the 
social sciences. Evolutionary Psychologists have the goal of replacing established social 
science perspectives which, it is claimed, rely on what is labelled a `Standard Social 
Science Model' (SSSM) (Tooby and Cosmides 1992). Evolutionary Psychologists 
criticise in particular claims of the flexibility of human culture, as Pinker demonstrates 
in his summary of the alleged `three key fallacies' of the `SSSM'; 
"Me first is John Locke's doctrine of the tabula rasa, the Blank Slate: that the human 
mind is infinitely plastic, with all its structure coming from reinforcement and 
socialization. " (Pinker 1999,191) 
Pinker uses the below extract from Mead (1935) which, he aims to show, demonstrates 
commitment to a fallacious `blank slate' concept; 
"We are forced to conclude that human nature is almost unbelievably malleable, 
responding accurately and contrastingly to contrasting cultural conditions... The 
members of either or both sexes may, with more or less success in the case of 
different individuals, be educated to approximate [any temperament]. (Margaret 
Mead, Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies, 1935, Pinker 1999,191) 
Pinker goes on to say that; 
"The doctrine of the Blank Slate, which justifies the dismissal of people's stated 
wants as an artifact of a particular time and place and thereby licenses the top-down 
redesign of society, is a totalitarian's dream. " (Pinker 1999,201) 
The other two alleged `fallacies' of the SSSM are also given; 
"The second belief is Jean-Jacques Rousseau's doctrine of the Noble Savage: that 
evil comes not from human nature but from our social institutions.... We see the 
doctrine as well in the popular image of native peoples living in peaceful coexistence 
with the ecosystem and with one another. " (Pinker 1999,191-192) 
"The third doctrine is what Gilbert Ryle called the Ghost in the Machine: the belief 
that we are separate from biology, free to choose our actions and define meaning, 
value, and purpose. " (Pinker 1999,192) 
Pinker, whose familiarity with the range of human cultures described in ethnographic 
material is never demonstrated, thus succinctly sums up his understanding of social 
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science perspectives. But what new insights into understanding the diversity of human 
cultures, can Evolutionary Psychologists actually contribute? Pinker gives the following 
account; 
"The emerging picture is that our genetic program grows a brain endowed with 
emotions and with learning abilities that were favored by natural selection. The arts, 
humanities, and social sciences, then, can be seen as the study of the products of 
certain faculties of the human brain. These faculties include language, perceptual 
analyzers and their esthetic reactions, reasoning, a moral sense, love, loyalty, rivalry, 
status, feelings toward allies and kin, an obsession with themes of life and death, and 
many others. As human beings share their discoveries and accumulate them over 
time, and as they institute conventions and rules to coordinate their often conflicting 
desires, the phenomena we call "culture" arise. " (Pinker 1999,188) 
The majority of Evolutionary Psychologists have generally avoided revisiting 
anthropological data on social bonds. However there are some who subscribe to Tooby 
and Cosmides' critique of the social sciences (Daly and Wilson 1996,23), and have 
worked on kinship and social bonding. Daly and Wilson have particularly looked at 
step-parental families (in North American and British society), and have attempted to 
apply biological theory to their data. However, the interpretation of biological theory is 
no different from the incorrect interpretations of other sociobiologists, in this case, 
Alexander (1979) (see chapters 2 and 3 for a review); 
"Hamilton replaced the classical Darwinian conception of organisms as evolved 
reproductive strategists with the notion that they have evolved to be nepotistic 
strategists (Alexander, 1979). One implication of this theory is that any socially 
complex species is likely to possess psychological adaptations tending to soften 
potentially costly conflicts among genetic relatives.... The general rule is that the 
intensity of conflict is adjusted nepotistically in relation to available cues of kinship. 
There is no obvious reason why human beings should be an exception. " (Daly and 
Wilson 1999,63 emphasis in original) 
"Evolutionary thinking led to the discovery of the most important risk factor for 
child homicide-the presence of a stepparent (Daly & Wilson, 1996). Parental efforts 
and investments are valuable resources, and selection favors those parental psyches 
that allocate effort effectively to promote fitness. The adaptive problems that 
challenge parental decision making include both the accurate identification of one's 
offspring and the allocation of one's resources among them with sensitivity to their 
needs and abilities to convert parental investment into fitness increments.... 
Stepchildren were seldom or never so valuable to one's expected fitness as one's own 
offspring would be, and those parental psyches that were easily parasitized by just 
any appealing youngster must always have incurred a selective disadvantage. "(Daly 
and Wilson 1999,64,65 emphasis in original) 
However, similar research undertaken in different a different society (Sweden) finds 
very different social patterns, which contrast sharply with Evolutionary Psychologists 
claims to be giving an objective, ('biologically accurate') view of `human nature'. The 
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researchers involved suggest that Daly and Wilson do not pay enough attention to 
cultural factors; 
"In summary, our results do not support the conclusion that step-parenthood is the 
most important risk factor for child homicides in families (Daly & Wilson 1998). 
Furthermore, the differences in risks between Canada and Sweden suggest that 
cultural factors influence patterns of child homicide. " (Temrin et al 2000,945) 
Subscribing to the Sociobiologists's interpretation of biology theory, it is no surprise 
that Evolutionary Psychologists have, for the most part, avoided attempts to apply their 
hypotheses to the ethnographic evidence on `kinship' (but see Daly et al 1997, 
discussed in chapter 3.5 below). Unfortunately, established anthropologists themselves 
have returned to some elements of the earlier sociobiological ideas on `kinship' (Bloch 
and Sperber 2002). Bloch and Sperber's account carefully eschews the interpretation of 
biological influence as a kind of teleological force, which characterised some early 
sociobiological approaches. However, like sociobiologists, they too follow a simplistic 
interpretation of the basic biological theory, (which requires careful interpretation 
lacking in all these analysis, see chapters 2 to 6); 
"The potential contribution of kin altruism to what is known as "inclusive fitness" 
favors the emergence of a disposition to helpful behaviour adjusted to genealogical 
distance between the altruist and the beneficiary. For such a disposition to exert 
itself, the organism must have the possibility of discriminating kin from nonkin and, 
among kin, degrees of relatedness... Let us accept, as a hypothesis, that there is an 
evolved disposition to try to differentiate people in a way sensitive to their degree of 
genealogical relatedness to self. It is most unlikely that such a disposition would be 
such as to cause the individual to seek actual genealogical information. It would 
rather be a disposition merely to seek whatever available information might indicate 
relatedness to self. Now, such a disposition would favor the cultural stabilization of 
systems of representation providing for such ego-centered differentiation without 
determining their exact nature. " (Bloch and Sperber 2002,730-731) 
As is clear in the extracts, all these interpretations claim that biological theory predicts 
that humans will engage in social behaviour on the basis of identifying their genetic 
relatives. Later chapters attempt to demonstrate an alternative model formed from the 
scientific facts of biology. It is clear that Schneider's questions about what precisely is 
the relationship between the facts of biology and the social ties which characterise 
`kinship' have yet to be answered. Simplistic interpretations (Sociobiology and 
Evolutionary Psychology) of fundamental biological theory (see chapters 2-6) have not 
derived hypotheses that are able to account for the evidence. Unconvinced by such 
approaches, many kinship theorists (see Schweitzer, above) nevertheless feel that 
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kinship must have something to do with procreative ties. The current thesis attempts to 
contribute to these debates, and to show where and how cultural and biological 
perspectives may be compatible. 
1.7 A Broader Conception of 'Biology' 
Recent ethnographic accounts of social bonding emphasise cultural conceptions, and 
don't privilege procreative links or `blood ties'. Nevertheless, Carsten (1995) suggests 
that social connections may be constituted by a variety of processes in which 
`biological' and `social' processes may be indistinguishable; 
"Ideas about relatedness in Langkawi show how culturally specific is the separation 
of the "social" from the "biological" and the latter to sexual reproduction. In 
Langkawi relatedness is derived both from acts of procreation and from living and 
eating together. It makes little sense in indigenous terms to label some of these 
activities as social and other as biological. "(Carsten 1995,236) 
More recently, Carsten has edited a volume Cultures of Relatedness (2000), a central 
theme of which she suggests; 
"[I]s the relationship between the `biological' and the `social'. If `biology' or 
`nature' has been the grounding for the `social' in the West, and this relationship 
now appears to have been `destabilised', can we put our understanding of this 
process of destabilisation to work in studies of non-Western cultures? What kind of 
relevance does this breaching of our foundational certainties have for how we 
understand and compare relatedness cross-culturally? ... The chapters which 
follow 
suggest not only that biology does not everywhere have the kind of foundational 
function it has in the West, but that the boundaries between the biological and the 
social which, as Schneider demonstrated, have been so crucial in the study of kinship 
are in many cases distinctly blurred, if they are visible at all. These new 
understandings may force us to conclude that kinship needs to be reinvented in a 
post-modern, or - to use Bruno Latour's (1993) term - `non-modern' spirit. "(Carsten 
2000,3) 
As will be illustrated in later chapters (chapters 7 and 8), some ethnographers are 
finding that the processes that create social bonds as deriving not from genealogical 
connections (Schneider's `being'), but from nurturing, `sharing' and other processes 
(`doing'). What, if any, is the connection between such processes and `the biological'? 
In his work on Separation and Reunion in modern China Stafford (2000) reviews 
psychologists' work on the processes of forming social attachments and responses to 
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separation, in both humans and other primates. The existence of such social instincts 
across species, Stafford suggests, may have implications for cross-cultural research on 
`relatedness' (amongst other things); 
"... Bowlby argued that attachment behaviour in humans and other animals is 
instinctive, i. e. that evolutionary pressures have selected this psychological trait.... 
Now: might Bowlby's realist approach - which defines these behaviours as universal 
and instinctive, which examines their consequences through naturalistic observation, 
and which stresses their central role in intensifying human relatedness - be a useful 
starting point for anthropologists?... Extrapolating from the work of Myers [on 
emotions], one could make the case that all anthropological discussions of 
relatedness - e. g. the accounts by Malinowsky, Mauss, and a great many others of 
the ways in which gift exchange and reciprocity, or commensality and the sharing of 
`substance', help to constitute human relatedness - are also by definition, dealing 
with intractable problems of attachment and separation in social life. ' (Stafford 2000, 
12,24 emphasis in original) 
Here is a focus on the universality of the psychological tools that give rise to 
attachment, and the suggestion that attachment mechanisms and associated emotions are 
involved with `relatedness' and social life. Stafford, following Bowlby, traces these 
instincts to other primates. Could it be that through these kinds of investigation of basic 
`biological facts' (those observable in humans in common with other species) useful 
insights might potentially emerge? A similar point is made by Carrithers at the 
conclusion of a brief review of debates over nature and culture in social science; 
"Humans do vary greatly in their cultural endowments and those endowments bear 
heavily on their behaviour; yet humans, like other animals, came into being through 
forces best described as Darwinian. It follows then that humans evolved to have 
culture, so to speak: our big brains with their ability to manipulate symbols, along 
with our abilities to use our own respiratory tracts for speech, comprise the 
Darwinian heritage that makes us the culture-bearing animal par excellence. This 
much might be admitted by even a very reductionist biologist or a very doctrinaire 
cultural anthropologist. What is only now coming to light, however, is a subtler 
picture, which shows that we have evolved not in the first instance as culture-bearing 
animals, but as social animals. Studies of childhood cognitive and emotional 
development, and comparative studies of other primates, show that beneath and 
around the stuff of culture, there stands a scaffolding of social abilities and a 
distinctly social intelligence. We can learn culture because we come richly equipped, 
even as the smallest infant to enter into conscious and responsive social relations 
with our fellows. We become culturally knowledgeable because we first become 
socially knowledgeable, able to grasp and react to the moods and intentions of those 
around us in a way recognisably akin to, but a good deal more powerful than, that of 
our primate cousins. "(Carrithers 1996,395-6) 
What these various observations suggest, is that for many ethnographers actively 
involved in documenting culturally specific concepts and practices, certain kinds of 
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`instincts' appear to operate. Can an account be found which demonstrates that biology, 
psychology and the ethnographic findings on social ties are essentially compatible? 
Once the `biology' is delineated, this facilitates a clearer focus on the varieties of 
`kinship' (i. e. patterns of social interaction) as practiced in different cultures and the 
variety of processes which lead to that variability. If the biological factors can be clearly 
defined, understood and held constant in an analysis, the role of historical, economic, 
cultural and other factors, mentioned by Schneider (section 1.2, above) in shaping and 
forming practices of social bonding in different societies, can potentially be seen more 
clearly. 
1.8 Summary 
It is important to notice that the claim of the current research is not that an 
understanding biological factors can explain everything that is interesting about social 
patterns in human societies. The approach is not reductive. The claim is rather that a 
thorough investigation of the `biological facts' can be useful mainly though allowing 
change in focus in how social bonding instincts operate; away from confusion about the 
place of genealogy in social ties, and onto the processual aspects of social bonding. It is 
the variety of forms that these underlying processes take, and the variety of `kinship' 
patterns they give rise to in different cultures, that is the interesting area for 
ethnographic study, as work such as Carsten's has already suggested. My suggestion is 
thus explicitly not that anthropologists should try to find `biological' processes or 
mechanisms operating in aspects of human behaviour, but rather should investigate how 
different cultural, political economy and other `particular' factors influence social 
bonding patterns. 
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Chapter Two - Evolutionary Biology Theory 
2.01 Introduction 
The last chapter suggested that the conflation between conceptions of `social ties' and 
`blood relatives' which characterised anthropological approaches to the study of 
`kinship' (Schneider 1984) has had a parallel in treatments of social relationships 
claiming to be based on `biological facts', especially sociobiological approaches 
emerging in the 1970s. This chapter will review basic biological theory, and some 
discussions relevant to interpretation of the theory. I will suggest that biological theory 
cannot be interpreted to necessarily predict that individual organisms will cooperate 
with genetic relatives. The following chapter will review the classic sociobiological 
interpretation of biological theory, and highlight some errors. 
The basic theoretical position in biology, `Inclusive Fitness' theory (Hamilton 1964), is 
by now widely employed for modelling the evolution of social behaviours. I will argue 
(as others have, e. g. Dawkins 1982) that the basic model is powerful as a treatment of 
the selection pressures on genes and behavioural dispositions, but needs careful 
interpretation. I will suggest that some errors of sociobiological applications have 
stemmed from an over ambitious attempt to apply Inclusive Fitness theory too directly 
to the outcomes of animal behaviour, and particularly to that of humans. This ambition 
was partly fuelled by a misunderstanding of the scope of the basic theory. 
The chapter begins by describing how biological theory creates a working definition of 
`social behaviour' (section 2.02). Then an introductory overview (section 2.03) of the 
current critique of common interpretations of the basic theory is given (readers 
unfamiliar with the basic theory may wish to refer back to this later). The main content 
of the chapter is then broken down into two halves; Part 2.1 describes basic Inclusive 
Fitness theory, as I interpret it. Part 2.2 reviews various treatments of the theory, 
including Hamilton's original papers, with the aim of demonstrating that the 
interpretation set out in part 2.1 is fair and justified. The chapter ends (2.2.5) by briefly 
looking at some more `in depth' issues of interpretation (dealt with more fully by 
chapters 4 to 7). The aim here is to equip the reader with enough knowledge to 
understand the critique of early sociobiological hypothesis which is conducted in the 
next chapter. 
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It may be worth noting that, just as with Darwin's original work on natural selection, 
(see chapter one) which sought to explain how biological evolution occurs, Hamilton's 
model was an attempt at illuminating a biological phenomenon which needed a 
theoretical treatment; the evolution of social behaviour patterns. It was intended to 
describe a process, rather than to make claims about the desirability or moral value of 
that process (such as `Social Darwinism' interpreted Darwin's Natural Selection). 
As mentioned in chapter one, an additional part of the confusion in the application of 
Inclusive Fitness theory to humans is due to terminology. The theory has often been 
identified with `kin selection', which has confusing connotations for anthropological 
application. Although I avoid the term `kin selection' here, preferring to discuss basic 
Inclusive Fitness theory (Hamilton 1975, Dawkins 1982), the term does occur in some 
of the references cited. 
2.02 Social Behaviour in the Evolutionary Biology Framework 
The `Modem Synthesis' (of Darwinian evolutionary biology and Mendelian genetics), 
with its roots in the 1920s and 1930s, is the established theoretical framework within 
which to understand biological evolution. According to this perspective, the 
evolutionary process is driven by a mechanism of Natural Selection acting, via 
differential reproductive success (or `fitness'), on gene frequencies. To express this in 
more contemporary phrasing; natural selection acts on the differential reproductive 
success of heritable factors (genetic material, genes); genes whose presence positively 
covaries with reproductive success tend to be preserved by natural selection (Price 
1970, more below). As well as affecting genes that influence organisms' physical 
characteristics, genes influencing behaviours too are subject to these same selective 
pressures. 
The contribution to reproductive success of both physical and behavioural 
characteristics cannot operate (or be considered) in abstraction from their environmental 
context. No characteristic can be said to evolve per se in abstraction from the 
environment it typically encounters. To the extent that environments change, 
established characteristics previously `selected for' can subsequently decrease in 
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frequency (be `selected against'). Variations in effects are initially produced by random 
genetic mutations and recombination (e. g. via sexual reproduction). Genes and 
characteristics become established in a species only as a result of the statistical 
reproductive consequences ('covariance with reproductive success') of their effects in 
their typical environment, and obviously cannot be said to pursue these effects as goals. 
This goes for behavioural as well as physical characteristics, but it is surprising how 
often biological analyses are accompanied by notions of `progress', and a seeming 
assumption that certain characteristics are a goal of the biological process. (See also 
Huxley 1893, chapter 1.3.1). 
The relevance (or `visibility') of social interactions and social behaviours to natural 
selection comes when such behaviours may have consequences for the ultimate 
reproductive success of the organisms (and thus the genes) involved, both those genes 
in the social `actor' and genes in the recipient/s of the effects of the behaviour. Thus, in 
order to analyse the evolution by natural selection of any underlying genetic basis to 
species-typical forms of `social behaviour' we have to adopt a formal view of the 
behaviour in terms of its typical effects on reproductive success. A broad definition of 
social behaviour becomes « interactions which have consequences for the 
reproductive success of individuals involved». The utility of such a broad definition is 
that it allows the consideration of the evolution of any characteristic which is expressed 
in an interaction between individuals. 
Within biology, the established approach to understanding the evolution of such social 
behaviour, via natural selection acting on genes that influence it, is encapsulated by 
Inclusive Fitness Theory (where fitness refers to reproductive success), first formulated 
by Hamilton in the early 1960s (Hamilton 1963,1964) and elaborated and refined 
through subsequent work (e. g. Price 1970, Hamilton 1970,1972,1975, Grafen 1985, 
Queller 1992, Frank 1997). Hamilton, trained in the quantitative genetics techniques of 
the `Modern Synthesis', produced a way of understanding how the mechanism of 
Natural Selection acts on the frequency of genes and characteristics that have effects 
that can be considered `social' in the sense of the above definition (1964). The available 
tools of quantitative genetics did not suit an analysis of interaction between individuals 
very well, and the formal core of Hamilton's early (1964) model contained some 
inaccuracies (Hamilton 1996) (for more on the traditional `Modem Synthesis' approach 
to social behaviour, see below). Subsequent refining of the basic formulation of the 
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mechanism of Natural Selection by Price (1970) allowed Hamilton to formulate a more 
straightforward and accurate analysis (1970,1972,1975, see below). 
Inclusive Fitness Theory, through various refinements, is now well established and 
serves as a guide to analysis of the evolution of social behaviours of a huge variety of 
living organisms. This quantitative approach to analysing the evolution of 
unreciprocated ('altruistic') social behaviours was supplemented in the early 1970s by 
separate work on reciprocal (exchange) social behaviour by Robert Trivers (Trivers 
1971,1972,1974), but the latter will not be analysed here. Inclusive Fitness theory, 
although widely used, has not been successfully applied to human social behaviour 
(Hamilton 1996). I will argue that the apparent clash with the empirical evidence on 
humans results from common misinterpretations of the theory (exemplified by early 
human sociobiological approaches, specific examples of which are reviewed in chapter 
three). 
2.03 Summary of the Present Critique 
In this chapter, and in the next, I will attempt to demonstrate that, despite many 
clarifying discussions from leading theorists (section 2.2.5 below) about how Inclusive 
Fitness theory should be interpreted, too often the implications of the basic theory are 
not correctly understood. The significance of this critique will become clearer after the 
fundamentals of the theory, and the common interpretations of it, have been discussed 
later in the chapter. However, to serve as a guide, I here set out some fundamental 
points that are relevant to evolutionary biology as a whole, as well as to the correct 
interpretation of the theory, and outline what I believe should be focussed on. Many of 
these points are repeated in an expanded form in the following sections. The critique of 
sociobiological applications to human behaviour will be illustrated by examples in the 
next chapter. 
As mentioned above, Inclusive Fitness theory is too often interpreted to mean that social 
behaviour per se is a goal of evolution. This kind of teleological error is not uncommon 
in evolutionary biology but is particularly relevant in this case. As an extension of this 
(and of key relevance to the focus of the current thesis, see Chapter 1), Inclusive Fitness 
theory is often interpreted to imply that genes (or even individual organisms) are 
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selected to find ways of actively distinguishing the identity of close genetic relatives `in 
order to' engage in social behaviours with such individuals. The rationale for this is that 
by doing so they would benefit the "Inclusive Fitness of the individuals (and genes) 
involved". 
This approach misunderstands the basic idea of evolution by natural selection, which 
explicitly rejects teleology, instead proposing a passive, consequential and undirected 
biological process. Notions of `individual inclusive fitness' can only be metaphorical 
extensions of the basic description of selection pressure, and need to be very carefully 
employed; they have been central to the misinterpretation (see also Dawkins 1976, 
1982). In particular, there needs to be a careful distinction made between the notion that 
there is an evolutionary `selection pressure for' genes relevant to social interactions to 
have certain kinds of effects (such as effects which statistically meet the Inclusive 
Fitness criterion); and the simple sounding but incorrect notion that genes or individuals 
are 'selected to achieve a goal of Inclusive Fitness, reflected in the form in which 
social behaviours are expressed. The latter notion makes the error of taking too literally 
the metaphorical short-hand way of understanding Natural Selection; confusing a 
description of evolutionary selection pressure for a description of the expression of 
behaviour. Inclusive Fitness theory simply specifies a necessary condition, or 
`criterion, ' for the evolution of social behaviours within a species. What forms of social 
behaviour might meet this criterion are not specified by the theory. However, very often 
the theory is interpreted as specifying a rule governing the expression of social 
behaviour, in particular, that organisms `have evolved to' direct such behaviour towards 
genetic relatives. This is not correct. 
The notion that social behaviour itself is a goal of the evolutionary process, and the 
further notion (mistakenly attributed to Inclusive Fitness theory) that genetic relatives 
(having somehow identified one another) will attempt to engage in these social 
behaviours, both disregard any consideration of the typical environments and contexts 
within which the evolutionary process occurs. Evolution by natural selection focuses 
explicit attention on the environment, yet consideration of selective pressure due to 
environment is too often foregone in the operationalisation of Inclusive Fitness theory. 
Being a theory about an evolutionary process and statistically typical outcomes in 
evolutionarily typical environments, investigating how Inclusive Fitness theory applies 
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to a given species must begin with an analysis of the evolutionarily typical ecological 
niche and demographics of that species. The ecological niche occupied by the species in 
question may or may not provide any significant context of interaction between 
individual organisms, particularly interactions beyond one-off mating encounters 
(sexual species). If the basic `life history' and niche of the species under study does not 
lead to significant encounters between individual organisms, then selection pressure for 
characteristics which are `social' (according to the above definition, section 2.02) will 
be weak or non-existent. For species occupying such niches, species-typical `social 
behaviour' characteristics are thus not expected to have evolved (see also Sherman 
1980, below). Consideration of the statistical probability and patterns of interaction of 
individuals in typical past (`evolutionarily significant') environments must come into an 
investigation of `evolved social behavioural tendencies'; i. e. those posited to now be 
species-typical, and which are under investigation as such. 
A context of interaction must be present before `social behaviours' which are expressed 
in that context are selected for (such behaviours could in principle be `selfish' or 
`cooperative'). Inclusive Fitness theory outlines the details of the selection pressure that 
applies where such a context does exist. The insights of this theory become relevant if 
such `potential' exists, and the theory's particular insight is to point to consideration of 
the statistical associations of replica genes in such a context (more below). This non- 
teleological interpretation of Hamilton's theory, placing emphasis on ecological context 
and `potential', is sometimes referred to. As Silk (2001) put it; 
"The role of kinship [genetic relatedness] in the daily lives of animals depends on the 
demographic composition of the groups in which they live. Kin selection [inclusive 
fitness] will only be an important force in the evolution of social behaviour if 
animals find themselves in situations where they have an opportunity to fulfil the 
predictions of Hamilton's rule. At a minimum, kin must be available. The number, 
availability, and degree of relatedness among kin will depend on how groups are 
constructed in nature. " (Silk 2001,77). 
Consideration of the typical interaction context occurring in past (evolutionarily 
significant) environments needs to be guided by a consideration of the relevant 
demographics of the species (Sherman 1980,1981, Tang-Martinez 2001, see later 
quotes in section 2.1.6). Does the ecological niche lead to the clustering of individuals 
in groups or are individuals typically solitary? Much `socioecology' research (reviewed 
in chapters 4 and 5) has suggested that a fundamental influence on demographic 
patterns is the type and distribution of primary food sources and patterns of predation. 
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For consideration of any patterns of statistical association of replica genes, typical 
patterns of dispersal, mating system, litter size (and other demographic variables) need 
to be taken into account. The importance of investigating these variables will be further 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5. 
2.1 Part One: Hamilton's Inclusive Fitness Theory 
2.1.1 Theories of Social Behaviour prior to Inclusive Fitness theory - Species 
Selection and Group Selection 
At the time of Hamilton's innovation, the predominant existing framework within 
biology for explaining social behaviour was that it could evolve by selection due to its 
`benefit to the group'. Hamilton (1996) gives the following example from 
Wigglesworth's (1964) `the life of insects'; 
"Insects do not live for themselves alone. Their lives are devoted to the survival of 
the species whose representatives they are... We must now stand back and look at 
the insect as a member of the `population' or `species' to which it belongs. Indeed 
we have reached the heart of the matter - the aim and purpose (so far as we can 
understand them) of the life of insects. " (Wigglesworth 1964, cited in Hamilton 
1996,22) 
This `species-advantage' reasoning had been popular since before the mechanisms of 
heredity were understood through Mendel's work. However, since the `Modem 
Synthesis' (or as Hamilton below refers to it, `Neodarwinism') had placed the spread of 
genes via their effects on individual reproduction as the central mechanism of evolution, 
strictly, social behaviours needed to be made sense of in this light or an alternative 
formal framework advanced. However, many biologists continued to refer to group- 
level benefits as the explanations for the evolution of individual social behaviour, 
despite the rejection of this mode of reasoning by leading theorists (Fisher 1958, Wright 
1948, cited in Hamilton 1996 (1963)). At the same time, these group-selection 
perspectives were not formalised with models demonstrating the selection pressures for 
gene frequency change. Hamilton summarised this dualism in a later review; 
"Until the advent of Mendalism uncritical acceptance of group selection could be 
understood partly on grounds of vagueness about the hereditary process. For 
example, courage and self-sacrifice could spread by cultural contagion and, in so 
spreading, modify heredity as well [if inheritance were `Lamarkian']. But in the 
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event neither the rediscovery of Mendel's work, nor the fairly brisk incorporation of 
Mendelism into evolutionary theory had much effect. From about 1920 to about 
1960 a curious situation developed where the models of `Neodarwinism' were all 
concerned with selection at levels no higher than that of competing individuals, 
whereas the biological literature as a whole increasingly proclaimed faith in 
Neodarwinism, and at the same time stated almost all its interpretations of adaptation 
in terms of `benefit to the species'. The leading theorists did point out the weakness 
of this position, but on the whole concerned themselves with it surprisingly little. " 
(Hamilton 1996 [1975], 331) 
There are great difficulties with the idea that all forms of social behaviour evolve solely 
via their impact on the group's reproductive advantage ('group selection'), which will 
emerge below. A simultaneous problem was that the classical theory of the modem 
synthesis only allowed for the spread of genes via an individual's own direct 
reproduction to be considered and calculated in a gene's frequency change. Because of 
this perspective, the classical theory had no established method for accounting for (i. e. 
quantifying and analysing) the effects of individuals' interactions on each other's 
reproduction. This meant that the classical theory effectively could not analyse the 
selective pressure on `social behaviour' as we have defined it. Hamilton identified this 
explanatory gap, and suggested that it was partly due to this discrepancy that informal 
group selection arguments were often employed to fill the void. (`Social behaviour' was 
in a sense treated as a property of the group, not as an individual behavioural 
characteristic). Here is his analysis of the situation from his 1963 paper; 
"It is generally accepted that the behaviour characteristic of a species is as much the 
product of evolution as the morphology. Yet the kinds of behaviour which can be 
adequately explained by the classical theory of Natural Selection are limited. In 
particular this theory cannot account for any case where an animal behaves in such a 
way as to promote the advantages of other members of the species not its direct 
descendants at the expense of its own. The explanation usually given for such cases 
and for all others where selfish behaviour seems moderated by concerns for the 
interests of a group is that they are evolved by Natural Selection favouring the most 
stable and co-operative groups. But in view of the inevitable slowness of any 
evolution based on group selection compared to the simultaneous trends that can 
occur by selection of the classical kind, based on individual advantage, this 
explanation must be treated with reserve so long as it remains unsupported by 
mathematical models. "(Hamilton 1996 [1963], 6) 
`Individual advantage' here simply means the conventional notion of an individual's 
reproductive success. The classical theory suggested that genes will gain in frequency 
(spread) depending upon their effect upon individual reproductive success. The 
possibility of natural selection acting on gene frequencies via `group selection' requires 
differential survival and reproduction of groups associated with variance in gene 
frequencies (Price 1970, Hamilton 1975). This differential reproduction at the group 
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level (treated now as a composite of all the various genes within it) is what `group 
selection theory' proposed to be the major cause of changes in the frequency of genes at 
the meta-population level (e. g. the species level). In other words, under the traditional 
group selection perspective on social behaviour, all those social behavioural 
characteristics observed to be species-typical, (to the extent they have some genetic 
underpinning - the `phenotypic gambit', Grafen 1982) are proposed to have evolved 
`mainly due to' their benefit to the group's reproduction. What precisely is meant by a 
`group' is itself in need of some analysis, and comparatively few species live in 
`groups' as the term is generally understood (this will be considered further below). 
Those groups which contain individuals bearing such genes are assumed to out- 
reproduce those that don't, and this is proposed to be a more important influence on 
what genes/behaviours become species typical than selection acting on genes via 
differential individual reproductive success within the group. A necessary component of 
the view that such genes could spread via group-selection is that any marginal cost to its 
own reproductive success that a bearer of such gene might suffer relative to other 
individuals in the group, is outweighed by the extra-reproduction that comes to such 
individuals from being a member of such a group. This would be the case if the group 
containing the `altruists' survives whilst groups without altruists die-out, or shrink; such 
that (despite the trend `within the group') the group itself is effectively out-reproducing 
the other groups. The balance of selective forces (treated quantitatively only later by 
Price 1970) is assumed to have the net result that the individual behaviour evolves to 
put the interests of `reproduction of the group' above those of the individual. 
In the above quote, Hamilton noted that the group-selection reasoning is usually 
invoked without careful quantitative argument or formal models. Hamilton's `Inclusive 
Fitness' models (1964,1970,1972,1975) provide the analytical and conceptual tools 
for deconstructing what we mean by the evolution of `social behaviour'. As we have 
defined it here (section 2.02 above), social behaviour could take on a range of forms, 
but the more general `altruism to any member of your group' is undefined in terms of 
the size/constitution of the group as well as what degree of altruism we have in mind 
(see `Hamilton's rule', section 2.1.5 below). Thus one of the advantages of Inclusive 
Fitness theory is that it forces analysts to think carefully and quantitatively about what 
kind of `social behaviour' is under study (or being treated as `species typical') in terms 
of what is the genetic association of the `group' (or individual) it typically benefits and 
what `degree' of altruism is involved. 
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I discuss the details of Hamilton's model further below. In order to introduce it, I first 
review his analysis of the quantitative problems that accompany the group selection 
model, since these are the problems his own model was designed to clarify. Some of the 
key variables that he considered to be involved in the evolution of social behaviours are 
apparent in Hamilton's (1963) review of a (rare) treatment of the possibility of 
generalised altruism evolving by group selection, that had been given by Haldane 
(1932); 
"Haldane supposed an increment to group fitness (and therefore the rate of group 
increase) proportional to its content of altruistic members and showed that there 
could be an initial numerical increase of a gene for altruism provided the starting 
gene frequency was high enough and the individual disadvantage low enough 
compared to the group advantage conferred. He concluded that genetic altruism 
could show some advance in populations split into 'tribes' small enough for a single 
mutant to approximate the critical frequency. He did not, however, sufficiently 
emphasise that ultimately the gene number must begin to do what the gene frequency 
tends to do, ex hypothesi, from the very first; namely to decrease to zero. The only 
escape from this conclusion (as Haldane hints) would be some kind of periodic re- 
assortment of the tribes such that by chance or otherwise the altruist became re- 
concentrated in some of them. " (Hamilton 1996 [1963], 6-7) 
As noted above, within the classical theory, the analytical tools for weighing selective 
effects at the intra-group level (individual disadvantage) versus effects from inter-group 
differential reproduction (group advantage) did not exist. Yet, Hamilton here 
demonstrates that a consideration of the reproductive trend at both levels is necessary to 
understand the trend at the meta-population level and thus which genes/behaviours are 
likely to become species typical. This essence of what variables need evaluating was 
fully clarified by Price (1970) who was influenced by Hamilton's papers (Hamilton 
1996). 
To summarise Hamilton's deconstruction; assuming a high starting frequency, the local 
frequency of a gene `for generalised altruism' within a social group comprised of a 
number of individuals of differing genotypes (for the gene locus under consideration) 
will always be declining (based on our definition of the reproductive effects of the 
gene), to the benefit of alternative alleles. However, its actual number may nevertheless 
be increasing. Only within more highly concentrated sub-groups could a gene 
encouraging generalised altruism maintain such an increase in actual-numbers and 
`individual disadvantage' be outweighed by `group advantage'. But when the gene 
eventually drops below the critical frequency within a group, the actual numbers of the 
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gene will also decrease. Thus the need for regular group restructuring (of a non-random 
kind) referred to by Hamilton, to maintain the critical frequency. Additionally, for this 
process to maintain the gene at significant frequencies at the meta-population level, we 
must posit that the process of non-random re-concentration is going on across all sub- 
populations. 
Essentially Haldane's argument becomes; if only the initial conditions could be 
arranged, and the necessary regular biased re-association occur, such a gene could 
spread. Clearly this suggestion begs the question of how such initial conditions could 
realistically occur, and further; what do we mean by generalised altruism if we are 
simultaneously posit that it regularly re-associates itself with `its own kind'? 
This brings us back to the relevance of Price's insights and Hamilton's quantitative 
models. The necessity for `concentration' of a gene in a group is obviously key. Price 
and Hamilton approach this via consideration of the frequency of a gene in a group, or 
more accurately the variance in frequency of a gene in a group relative to the effects the 
presence that gene has on the reproductive success of that group (Price 1970). This is 
calculable for any size of group (or population) and even for any number of sub- 
populations within a larger population (which might be the entire species, Hamilton 
1975). More on this below. 
This consideration of gene's frequency within the group of interest further suggests the 
importance of clear thinking about what one means by a `group'. Depending on how we 
define our group, a gene may be at higher or lower `concentrations' (in the sense of 
frequency of the gene in the group). Are there any regularly occurring `groupings' 
which have the necessary characteristic of an elevated frequency of the gene? This in 
turn forces us to consider what kinds of social behaviour we are interested in. Are we 
talking about the `social behaviours' genes express in cells in the context of a 
multicellular (perhaps clonally related) body? More likely we are thinking of types of 
social behaviours expressed by individual organisms in the context of interactions with 
other individuals (this is the focus of the application of Inclusive Fitness theory to 
human social behaviours). We may for example be thinking of social behaviours 
expressed in infant mammals in the context of communal feeding within a `group' of 
litter-mates. The discussion above suggested the importance of considering the typical 
patterns of interaction, regularly occurring `grouping contexts' and thus the `potential' 
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for the evolution of `social behaviours' in a species. In short, Hamilton highlighted the 
importance of defining the `group' of interest (that which the behaviour is expressed 
within) carefully. In particular; what is the evolutionarily typical relative frequency of 
the relevant gene / behaviour in the group within which the behaviour is expressed? 
2.1.2 Hamilton's Inclusive Fitness Theory 
Although Hamilton had shown that the framework that understood all social behaviour 
as evolving due to `group selection' had weaknesses, he nevertheless had to advance 
some framework within which to understand the evolution of the varieties of social 
behaviour which clearly exist in nature. Hamilton's next published paper (1964) was 
actually written before the 1963 paper (Hamilton 1996), and its focus is narrower than 
both the latter and his subsequent papers on Inclusive Fitness theory. However, since it 
included a discussion of the possible applications to empirical study, it has tended to be 
the treatment most often cited. It essentially employs the mode of analysis 
demonstrated by Hamilton above, especially in respect to the actual frequency change 
of the gene that influences the `social' behaviour, and the need for consideration of the 
probability that the recipients of the behaviour are typically genetically `its own kind'. 
In this early paper, Hamilton illustrated his point about `gene concentration' by 
focussing more narrowly on the evolution of social behaviours between close genetic 
relatives (what biologists call `relatives by recent common descent'). This focus on 
close genetic relatives, although an approximately accurate rule of thumb for Inclusive 
Fitness theory in practical terms, actually obscures the wider theoretical point - that it is 
the statistical association of replica genes, however occurring, which is key (e. g. 
Hamilton 1975, Grafen 1990, Frank 1995). Later papers would build a more general 
(and strictly correct) model (as we will see below); 
"Sacrifices involved in parental care are a possibility implicit in any model in which 
the definition of fitness is based, as it should be, on the number of adult offspring. In 
certain circumstances an individual may leave more adult offspring by expending 
care and materials on its own offspring already born than reserving them for its own 
survival and further fecundity. A gene causing its possessor to give parental care will 
then leave more replica copies in the next generation than an allele having the 
opposite tendency, The selective advantage may be seen to lie through benefits 
conferred indifferently on a set of relatives each of which has a half chance of 
carrying the gene in question. " (Hamilton 1996 [1964], 31-32) 
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Hamilton's initial novel suggestion is to view the selective advantage (given the 
species' possibility of `care'), even in the familiar parent-offspring case, as coming 
from the gene (and behaviour) whose expression resulted in a benefit to individuals 
with a greater than average probability of carrying the gene. This genetic relatedness 
between parent and offspring would provide an instance of `association with its own 
kind' that Hamilton (above) had shown to be necessary (section 2.1.1). This is a novel 
point since complex social behaviour between parent and offspring (although in fact 
quite rare outside mammals and birds) is assumed to be `natural', without consideration 
of the conditions under which it might potentially evolve (e. g. a context of interaction), 
and an analysis of the relevant selection pressure. Hamilton continues; 
"From this point of view it is also seen, however, that there is nothing special about 
the parent-offspring relationship except its close degree and a certain fundamental 
asymmetry. The full-sib relationship is just as close. If an individual carries a certain 
gene the expectation that a random sib will carry a replica of it is again one-half. 
Similarly, the half-sib relationship is equivalent to that of a grandparent and 
grandchild with the expectation of replica genes, or genes 'identical by descent' as 
they are usually called, standing at one quarter, and so on. "(Hamilton 1996 [1964], 
32) 
Hamilton notes that a distribution of replica genes potentially covers a wider circle of 
individuals than just the parent and offspring. Looking at things in this way, it is easy to 
see that the expression of a gene in the grouping context of an interaction between such 
relatives may impact upon replicas of the gene promoting the behaviour. Hamilton 
suggests that, rather than natural selection acting on genes for their effect on an 
individual's reproductive success, rather, the selection pressure is on a gene's typical 
effects on the `net' reproductive success across all replicas - its `Inclusive Fitness'. He 
gives a summary of the technique he uses in his abstract; 
"Making use of Wright's coefficient of relationship as the measure of the proportion 
of replica genes in a relative, a quantity is found the means of which incorporate the 
maximising property of Darwinian fitness. This property is named 'inclusive 
fitness . "(Hamilton 1996 [1964], 31) 
The quantitative genetics tools available for describing the probability that individuals 
are genetically `of the same kind' were somewhat limited, since, as we saw above, this 
form of analysis was unusual. Wright's coefficient was one measure readily to hand, but 
one that Hamilton's later analyses (especially after Price 1970) would eschew in favour 
of a more correct measure of the statistical association (Hamilton 1970,1972) which 
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selection pressure acts upon. The weakness of this early paper was that it described the 
selection pressure in such a way as to suggest that it is being `a genetic relative' which 
is central to the operation of Inclusive Fitness, rather than just being a special case of 
the more general qualification. This focus on genetic relatives is one reason why 
Hamilton's theory came to be known as `kin selection' (kin here meaning `genetic 
relative'). In fact, as Hamilton was later to state (1975, see below) Inclusive Fitness 
theory is much broader than `kin selection'. 
Recalling Hamilton's review (1963, as above) of Haldane's treatment of the selection 
pressures at work for generalised altruism evolving within a stable group, we saw that a 
crucial barrier to selection was that a gene for generalised altruism in a large-scale 
grouping context may or may not target alternative alleles as well as targeting its own 
likely replicas. In doing so such a gene may tend to diminish its net (over all replicas) 
reproduction. This will depend on the comparative frequency of the gene in that `group 
context', such that, when considering the selection pressure on any particular 
gene/behaviour the typical context the behaviour is expressed within becomes critical. It 
is this extended form of accounting for a gene's likely effects on the reproduction of its 
replicas to which Hamilton now gives the name `inclusive fitness'. He proposes to 
investigate the possibility for positive selection of a gene via its effects on replicas 
through the interaction of genetic relatives, since genetic relatives (if they are reliably 
present) tend to comprise a `group' with an above average frequency of such a gene. 
Hamilton discusses this by analysing how the behaviour of a bearer (denoted as `A') of 
such a gene might impact on the reproduction of other individuals (and genes) within a 
group; 
"Every effect on reproduction which is due to A can be thought of as made up of two 
parts: an effect on the reproduction of genes identical by descent with genes in A, 
and an effect on the reproduction of unrelated genes. Since the coefficient `r' 
[Wright's coefficient of relationship] measures the expected fraction of genes 
identical by descent in a relative, for any particular degree of relationship this 
breakdown maybe written quantitatively... "(Hamilton 1996 [1964], 35) 
Without trying to reproduce his attached mathematical models here, the mode of 
Hamilton's analysis is clear; the effects of a gene influencing social behaviour can be 
analysed in terms of their impact on replica copies of the gene, relative to their impact 
on alternative alleles in the population. It is on the basis of this relative contribution to 
its own replicas' reproduction that, Hamilton suggests, a gene will be selected or not. 
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2.1.3 So What is Genetic Relatedness? 
The coefficient of relationship in the 1964 paper was used to quantify the probability of 
`a' replica gene being carried by the recipient of a social act. Hamilton employed 
Wright's `coefficient of relationship' to provide this probability. Hamilton's later papers 
re-identified his quantification of genetic association with a `regression coefficient' of 
relatedness, rather than with Wright's narrower correlation coefficient (Hamilton 1970). 
Strictly speaking his use of Wright's coefficient was inaccurate for the purpose he 
intended it; as a tool for analysing general selection pressures on genes via their 
influence on social interactions. 
A regression coefficient reflects the selective pressures more correctly because it is a 
measure of the comparative variance in frequency of a gene between the host 
expressing the gene and the recipients of the gene's effect. Wright's coefficient was 
closer to a correlation coefficient (Michod and Hamilton 1980), which, although 
accurately giving the probability of a two individuals sharing a gene by recent common 
descent, doesn't include consideration of the `mean' (average) frequency of that gene in 
the population of interest. This makes it suitable only for limited application with 
somewhat unrealistic assumptions (e. g. no homozygosity / `inbreeding'). The variance 
in frequency from the `mean' (the standard deviation) is important because, in selection 
terms, it is not enough for the behavioural effect of the gene simply to benefit another 
copy of the gene. In order to spread (increase in frequency) and become species-typical, 
the behaviour should affect recipients whose own frequency of the gene is marginally 
higher than the existing (`mean') gene frequency in the population. Were a gene's effect 
to fall upon an individual/group with lower than mean gene frequency, the effect can 
only diminish the frequency of the gene in the next generation. This was Hamilton's 
(1963) essential critique of Haldane's model. Here is an example of Hamilton's own 
discussion of his use of the coefficient of relatedness; 
"The original argument was based on a supposedly infinite population in which the 
total average relatedness of an individual to other members of the population was 
zero. With realistic finite populations this is not quite the case; the criteria for ideally 
adaptive behaviour are then more complex and involve consideration of the general 
average relatedness. I report here a synthesis of unpublished work by Price and my 
results... "(Hamilton 1996 [1970], 178) 
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and again; 
"What is R in equation (1)? On the basis of a particular outbred model, Hamilton 
(1963,1964) claimed that Wright's (1922) `coefficient of relatedness' was the 
required R. However, later, giving a heuristic development but no further model, 
Hamilton (1971,1972) modified his identification of R with Wright's coefficient by 
claiming that equation (1) requires, in principle, a regression coefficient of 
relatedness of genotype of recipient on genotype of altruist, whereas Wright's 
coefficient is the corresponding correlation coefficient. Such a correlation coefficient 
will often be the same but differs when the interactants are inbred to different 
extents. " (Michod & Hamilton 1980,694-695) 
2.1.4 Inclusive Fitness Theory's Quantification of various Coefficients of 
Relatedness 
In this section, we look briefly at the quantitative values Inclusive Fitness theory 
typically attributes to genetic relatives. The value of `r' represents, as discussed above, 
the frequency of a gene in a potential recipient of social behaviour, relative to the 
frequency of the gene in the actor. Its method of calculation can be found in Hamilton 
1970, or Hamilton 1972 (see also Wright 1922, Haldane and Jakayar 1962 for 
background). Wright's coefficient, was designed as measure of the probability of a 
replica gene being present in the recipient, relative to the actor (and was fairly accurate 
for rare recessive lethal genes problematic in selective breeding). The regression 
coefficient incorporates this value, but weighs it by the background (average or `mean') 
frequency of the gene in the population, which gives the frequency of the gene in the 
recipient before the additional probability of `identity' deriving from genealogical 
relationship is even considered. This consideration of the average frequency of the gene 
is relevant to the valuation of the reproductive success of the actor, since it will affect 
the chance the gene has a `second copy' in him, apart from the putative copy that we are 
positing that the two individuals have a probability of sharing due to their close 
genealogical connection (Hamilton 1970). 
Taking into account the background frequency of the gene on the population of interest, 
the regression coefficient is therefore not strictly a fixed value for any particular class of 
genealogical relationship across all frequencies. The value of `r' in diploid species, with 
strictly no inbreeding, approximates to values of 0.5 between parent and offspring 0.25 
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between half siblings; 0.5 between full siblings; 0.25 between grandparent/ grand- 
offspring; 0.125 between `cousins'. Degree of inbreeding is influenced by such 
variables as typical patterns of exogamy, size of the effective breeding population, 
migration rates etc. For example, the actual coefficient of relatedness between what are 
apparently cousins then depends on the coefficient of relatedness between the two sets 
of parents of those cousins since, under inbreeding, this may not be zero. Amount of 
inbreeding influences the frequency of gene in a population, and can be also be indexed 
by a coefficient. As Hamilton (1972) notes; 
"[W]e do not yet know how to calculate [the relatedness coefficient] and 
[background gene frequency] precisely in a population that is undergoing selection, 
and difficulties in the interpretation of genomic inclusive fitness also remain in cases 
of inbreeding. " (Hamilton 1996 [1972], 273) 
2.1.5 Hamilton's Rule 
Hamilton's analysis centred around a gene's potential `effect on the reproduction of 
genes identical by descent with genes in A' (1964,35; see the full quote above) and he 
noted that the coefficient of relatedness gives the expected frequency of identical genes. 
The other factor that requires consideration when weighing `Inclusive Fitness' is 
therefore the net `effect' of the behaviour itself on the reproduction of the two - the 
`cost' to the actor's reproductive success and the benefit to that of the recipient of the 
behaviour. In order to simplify the analysis it is assumed that costs and benefits to 
reproductive success are simply `additive' (for discussion see e. g. Altmann 1979, 
Grafen 1984,1985), i. e. that the `units' of reproductive success by which we quantify 
the relative costs and benefits are equivalent. 
Hamilton found a way of expressing the selection pressure on the relationship of these 
variables of `relatedness' `cost and `benefit' in his simplified `rule' for the selection 
pressure faced by genes for their typcial Inclusive Fitness effects. This is known as 
Hamilton's rule which, thanks to its apparent simplicity, represents the single most 
popular conceptualisation of Inclusive Fitness Theory. 
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As suggested, the rule essentially states that, in addition to the coefficient of relatedness 
between the actor and recipient's of an act, selection will depend on the cost-benefit 
ratio of the act, or what Hamilton calls `the ratio of gain' (denoted by {k} 
below)(Hamilton 1996 [1964], 45). Hamilton thus asks; 
"How large must {k} be for the benefit to others to outweigh the risk to self in terms 
of inclusive fitness?... [O]f actions which are detrimental to individual fitness, only 
those for which -k>1/r will be beneficial to inclusive fitness. This means that for a 
hereditary tendency to perform an action of this kind to evolve the benefit to a 
sibling must average at least twice the loss to the individual, the benefit to a half-sib 
must be at least four times the loss, to a cousin eight times, and so on. "(Hamilton 
1996 [1964], 45) 
The arrangement of variables in `Hamilton's rule' can be any variation on Hamilton's 
notation here, so long as mathematical equivalence is maintained. Different 
formulations may highlight different aspects of the condition, and facilitate the 
understanding of the condition from a different perspective. The key point is that the 
calculation of `ratio of gain' (of benefit to recipient relative to cost to actor) must 
supplement the value of the regression coefficient of relatedness. Hamilton's above 
formulation can also be stated as; the Benefit (B) multiplied by probability of there 
being another copy through common descent (coefficient of relatedness, `r') should be 
greater than the cost (C) and written; Br>C or Br-C>O (Hamilton 1987). 
2.1.6 What Kinds of Social Behaviour? 
It is important not to lose track of what Hamilton's rule refers to. As I have set out 
earlier in the chapter, Inclusive Fitness theory is best interpreted as a description of the 
selection pressure faced by genes for their `social' effects. Because Hamilton's rule is 
simply a condition (or what he later referred to as a `criterion', Hamilton 1987) for the 
evolution of social behavioural effects, potentially there are any number of different 
kinds of social behaviours which might meet the criterion. 
We saw above that, in order for any behaviour to have a `social' effect, the individual 
must express the behaviour in a context of interaction with other individuals. Only in 
those species whose ecology and niche lead to circumstances where individuals 
experience regular interaction would we expect any social behavioural effects to 
potentially evolve. As Sherman (1980) reminds us, Inclusive Fitness theory is only 
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relevant where the possibility for interaction exist (note that Sherman's `nepotism' here 
refers to social behaviours); 
"To understand any species' pattern of nepotism, two questions about individuals' 
behavior must be considered: (1) what is reproductively ideal?, and (2) what is 
socially possible? With his formulation of "inclusive fitness, " Hamilton suggested a 
mathematical way of answering (1). Here I suggest that the answer to (2) depends on 
demography, particularly its spatial component, dispersal, and its temporal 
component, mortali . Only when ecological circumstances affecting 
demography 
consistently make it socially possible will nepotism be elaborated according to what 
is reproductively ideal. For example, if dispersing is advantageous and if it usually 
separates relatives permanently, as in many birds (Nice 1937: 180-187; Gross 1940; 
Robertson 1969), on the rare occasions when nestmates or other kin live in 
proximity, they will not preferentially cooperate. Similarly, nepotism will not be 
elaborated among relatives that have infrequently coexisted in a population's or a 
species' evolutionary history. If an animal's life history characteristics (Stearns 
1976; Warner this volume) usually preclude the existence of certain relatives, that is 
if kin are usually unavailable, the rare coexistence of such kin will not occasion 
preferential treatment. For example, if reproductives generally die soon after zygotes 
are formed, as in many temperate zone insects, the unusual individual that survives 
to interact with its offspring is not expected to behave parentally. " (Sherman 1980, 
530, underlining in original) 
Many more examples and evidence illustrating Sherman's cautionary points appear in 
chapters 4 and S. The ecological niche and demographic possibilities typically occurring 
are crucial factors in how Inclusive Fitness theory applies to the social behaviour 
characteristics of any particular species. 
Furthermore, for species which display a wide range of social behaviours, such as social 
mammals, interactions may occur in a variety of different contexts or what Hamilton 
(1964,49 see below 2.2.2) calls "distinct behaviour evoking situations". Not all these 
situations will comprise the same group of recipients of a potential social behaviour. 
The coefficients of relationship in each situation might be quite different between 
interactions in the context of (for example); a sleeping nest or burrow; the local site in 
which the wider social group is encountered; and individuals (or groups) encountered 
on the peripheries of a home range, during extended foraging or migration etc. The 
selection pressure on social behaviours in each of these contexts should thus be 
understood to vary "according to the coefficients of relationship appropriate to that 
situation. " (Hamilton 1964,49). 
In sum, it should be clear that for a given species (whose ecological niche and 
demographics provide the `potentials' for the evolution of social behaviours), there may 
be a range of species-typical social behaviours whose evolution can be analysed using 
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the framework of Inclusive Fitness theory. Amongst these, the behaviours expressed 
most frequently will be those associated with the context that an individual most 
frequently finds itself within. Although this context may change over the life-cycle of 
an individual, at each developmental stage social behaviours appropriate to the typical 
interaction patterns (and coefficients of relatedness) in that particular context will be 
shaped by selection pressure for their Inclusive Fitness effects. For example, at the 
infant stage in solitary-living mammal species, there is a fairly reliable initial grouping 
context; that of the reproductive female and the infant (and any litter mates). 
2.1.7 Current Focus; Primary Social Relationships 
In the current research thesis only a limited range of social behaviours are looked at 
from the perspective of `the biological facts' (see chapter 1). This narrowing of focus is 
necessary because potentially any behaviour that is describable as `social' is amenable 
to an analysis from within the Inclusive Fitness theory framework. The key focus will 
thus be on the "behaviour evoking situations" most relevant to the study of human 
`kinship'. 
As suggested by the analysis in chapter 1, the important question is what is the 
relationship between `genealogy' and social behaviours; whether an evolved behaviour 
must necessarily, in any given instance, lead to social bonds and cooperation between 
`close genetic relatives'. I will make what I think is a reasonable assumption: If forms 
of social behaviour typically expressed in the adult-offspring relationship do not operate 
via identifying `genetic relatedness' per se; social behavioural mechanisms typically 
accompanying more distant relationships (with weaker selection pressure) are not more 
likely to be mediated by actual identification of genetic relatedness. 
This focus in the chapters ahead on the mechanisms of social bonding that have evolved 
to correlate with close genetic relationship should not taken as a statement that these are 
the only forms of social behaviour that Inclusive Fitness theory is applicable to. 
Behaviours which contribute to the survival and reproduction of larger demographic 
groups are harder to analyse and define, but are in principle also treatable with an 
Inclusive Fitness theory analysis (see Hamilton 1975, below). Because the extinction 
(or survival) of sub-populations of species or `groups' occurs over a much greater time 
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scale than individual reproduction, measuring the strength of selection for social 
behaviours which have reproductive benefits for the group as a whole ('group 
selection') are difficult. As Eibl-Eibesfeld puts it; 
"[W]e have to distinguish between short- and long-term effects of selection. Changes 
brought about by individual selection may affect fitness of a closed population in 
competition with others and what may be selected for in the short term by individual 
selection may, in the long run, lower the fitness of the group... Thus far the 
discussion has focused too narrowly upon short-term effects of selection. " (Eibl- 
Eibesfeld 1989,93) 
This potential for different selection pressures acting on the frequency of genes at 
different levels over different time scales is made clear by Price's treatments of 
Inclusive Fitness theory, which, as we have seen, are acknowledged (by Hamilton 
amongst others) to be accurate formal models. The point is, as set out above, despite 
some common conceptions, the theory does not exclude the possibility that genes 
promoting social behaviour receive positive selection outside the isolated interactions of 
close-genetic-relatives ('kin'). Inclusive Fitness theory allows for consideration of all 
the selective effects involved, both those arising as a result of recent common ancestry 
and others (Wilson and Sober 1994, Sober and Wilson 1998). In the current thesis, I 
will be focussing on interactions typical to `close genetic relatives'. Hamilton clarified 
the potential breadth of application Inclusive fitness theory in a later paper; 
"Because of the way it was first explained, the approach using inclusive fitness has 
often been identified with `kin selection' and presented strictly as an alternative to 
`group selection'. But the foregoing discussion shows that kinship should be 
considered just one way of getting positive regression of genotype in the recipient, 
and that it is this positive regression that is vitally necessary for altruism. Thus the 
inclusive-fitness concept is more general than `kin selection'. Haldane's suggestion 
about tribe-splitting can be seen in one light as a way of increasing intergroup 
variance and in another as a way of getting positive regression in the population as a 
whole by having the groups which happen to have most altruists divide most 
frequently. In this case the altruists are helping true relatives. But in the assortative- 
settling model, it obviously makes no difference if altruists settle with altruists 
because they are related (perhaps never having parted with them) or because they 
recognise fellow altruists as such, or settle together because of some pleiotropic 
effect of the gene on habitat preference. " (Hamilton 1996 [1975], 337) 
Frank also sets out the generality of Inclusive Fitness theory; 
"Hamilton (1964a, b), in his original formulation of kin selection, described genetic 
similarity in terms of genes identical by descent. Hamilton (1970) reformulated kin 
selection by explicit derivation from the Price equation; this derivation is often 
regarded as the first modem treatment of inclusive fitness (Grafen 1985)... Price's 
covariance equation shows that what matters is not common ancestry, but statistical 
associations between the genotypes of donor and recipient. Those associations often 
arise because individuals that live near to each other tend to have common ancestors. 
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But natural selection is indifferent to the cause of the statistical associations... " 
(Frank 1995,375) 
As Frank notes, it is the statistical associations between the genotypes of actor and 
recipient that matter. As well as Inclusive Fitness theory, broader analytical frameworks 
for the evolution of social characteristics exist (e. g. Frank 1998) that can allow for 
a more general analysis (for example where genealogical relationship may not 
necessarily be present). Nevertheless, here too, statistical association (of phenotypes) is 
a key component of the analysis. Inclusive Fitness theory can thus be seen as one 
particular and well established method for studying such associations. As Frank (above) 
also points out, in species where these associations do arise (which always requires first 
and foremost that a context for interaction exists) typically the genetic association is a 
straightforward result of genetic relatives tending to live near to each other. This is 
Frank's interpretation of Inclusive Fitness theory; as I have argued, it is statistical 
associations that are key. Is this interpretation shared by others? 
2.2 Part Two: The Interpretation and Application of Inclusive Fitness Theory 
2.2.1 Introduction 
I have set out the basics of Inclusive Fitness theory as I understand it. The theory 
describes the selection pressure that acts on the evolution of `social behaviours' - those 
behaviours expressed in the context of an interaction which impact the reproductive 
success of the parties involved. 
This interpretation strongly rejects the idea that `cooperation between replica genes' is a 
teleological goal, instead focussing on the fundamental contexts of interaction provided 
by the basic ecological niche occupied by a species. For social behaviours to evolve and 
be shaped by selection pressure for their Inclusive Fitness effects thus does not 
necessarily require nor entail that organisms actively distinguish `real genetic relatives', 
selection simply requires statistical associations between genotypes of donor and 
recipient. For example, if an individual is regularly exposed to a demographic context 
typically composed of genetic relatives, and if a gene promoting social behaviour is 
expressed in a way "appropriate to that situation" then the behaviour will tend to benefit 
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replica genes. In such a case there is no need for `positive powers of discrimination' 
(Hamilton 1987) of genetic relatedness. Dawkins makes a similar point in his 
suggestion that; 
"If families [genetic relatives] happen to go around in groups, this fact provides a 
useful rule of thumb for kin selection: `care for any individual you often see'. " 
(Dawkins 1979,187) 
Notice that Dawkins' example points out the need for demographics to provide an 
opportunity for interaction. If, as Dawkins suggests, the social behaviour is cued by the 
social context (in this case a simple `familiarity rule'), then the Inclusive Fitness 
criterion is achieved indirectly; via indirect cues which statistically correlate with 
genetic relatedness, rather than by any direct identification of genetic relatives. The 
`rule of thumb' will evolve because this context of relatedness is typical ('reliable') 
enough for the rule to meet the Inclusive Fitness criterion. The odd chance event by 
which the `group' of interest is not in fact just close genetic relatives will not 
significantly change the long-term selection pressures on the `rule of thumb' behaviour. 
In the following chapters I will be investigating basic demographic patterns in mammals 
and primates; especially those that evidence suggests are both regular and will 
statistically correlate with certain coefficients of relatedness. The typical grouping 
context within which individuals are likely to have encountered others of particular 
degrees of `relatedness' will be carefully investigated, in order to analyse the potential 
for situational cues to mediate the expression of social behaviours. 
The remainder of this chapter will further review Hamilton's original papers, as well as 
other key Inclusive Fitness theory papers by Dawkins and others, including how 
Hamilton's ideas were interpreted, taken up and utilised by those studying social 
behaviour. We will note some ambiguities in Hamilton's own 1964 account, many of 
which were influential. Fortunately, Hamilton's later papers clarified Inclusive Fitness 
theory and even pointed out some of his own previous inaccuracies (e. g. Hamilton 
1987). 
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The main objective in the following sections is to demonstrate that Hamilton's and 
other theorists' discussions of the theory point strongly to the interpretation given in the 
first part of this chapter. 
2.2.2 Interpretation as Individual Behavioural `Goal' or Selection Pressure on 
Genes? 
This section will review discussions bearing on whether Inclusive Fitness theory should 
more properly be interpreted as a general rule for what to expect to see in individual 
behaviour, or a formal description of the selection pressure on genes. The relevance of 
this distinction is important for an assessment of early sociobiological hypotheses 
(reviewed in chapter 3). 
As we saw above, Hamilton's 1964 paper was the most under-developed of his 
treatments of the theory, and certainly relative to his later papers contained inaccuracies. 
Nevertheless, because it included a non-mathematical discussion of the possible 
applications of some of the theoretical points covered by the more mathematical 
treatment, it was this paper which had the greatest initial impact on biologists interested 
in studying social behaviours. 
Many who subsequently subscribed to Inclusive Fitness theory did not pay too much 
attention to the underlying details of the argument, but rather took the short form of the 
theory - Hamilton's rule - and used this as the guide in the analysis of animal behaviour. 
The rule Br>C was typically understood not as the criterion describing selection 
pressure for the evolution of social behaviour tendencies, but rather as a guide to `what 
to expect' of an individual organism's social behaviour, without abiding the numerous 
caveats about `appearances' and `circumstances' (as set out by Hamilton 1964 and 
others below). In this section I will argue that this usage can lead to a completely 
erroneous operationalisation of the underlying theory, and thus misdirected analyses. 
I have argued in the previous discussion that Hamilton's focus was fundamentally on 
the selection pressures that genes face for social behavioural effects. Certainly the value 
of the theory is the potential insight into the evolution of social behaviours as they are 
performed by individual organisms (and thus the dynamics of social behaviour within 
groups), but the process by which this comes about must be understood via the selection 
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pressures operating on frequencies of genes for their `Inclusive Fitness effects' and 
must include an analysis of other (e. g. demographic) factors. In truth, Hamilton's own 
numerous descriptions of the potential application to the study of behaviour that his 
theory provides may have contributed to the emphasis on `an individual's inclusive 
fitness' at the expense of the selection pressure on genes. He was aware that the focus 
of interest in his analysis would be what it meant for our understanding of the social, 
aid-sharing behaviour of organisms (Hamilton 1996). This dualism between pure theory 
and its application, perfectly understandable, nevertheless made it easy for incautious 
readers to oversimplify the implications of his analysis. 
The following sections draw upon extracts from Hamilton's papers, and those of other 
theorists, to demonstrate that the notion that individuals seek to maximise their own 
inclusive fitness (a usage thoroughly reviewed in the following chapters) is erroneous. 
Hamilton himself conceded that certain aspects of his 1964 paper contained 
inaccuracies (Hamilton 1996) and later papers corrected these. One of the most 
important inexact suggestions ('recognition genes', see below) although not strictly an 
error (since it was only a suggestion) was properly corrected by Hamilton in 1987, but 
not before the idea had influenced the way that many people interpreted Inclusive 
Fitness theory. (This misunderstanding is perhaps the most important basis for the 
misplaced notion that `individuals are selected to cooperate' with genetic relatives). 
Note how Hamilton presented the utility of his idea in his opening abstract; 
"A genetical mathematical model is described which allows for interactions between 
relatives on one another's fitness. Making use of Wright's coefficient of relationship 
as the measure of the proportion of replica genes in a relative, a quantity is found the 
means of which incorporate the maximising property of Darwinian fitness. This 
property is named 'inclusive fitness'. Species following the model should tend to 
evolve behaviour such that each organism appears to be attempting to maximise its 
inclusive fitness. " (Hamilton 1996 [1964], 31) 
The word `appears' in the final sentence is obviously critical, and involves other- 
things-being-equal assumptions, such as the resemblance of current demographic 
arrangements to those in which the behaviour evolved within. At the same time, even to 
the untrained reader, Hamilton (as already cited above, section 2.1.2) was clear about 
the selection pressure on genes which underlies the evolution of these behaviours; 
60 
"A gene causing its possessor to give parental care will then leave more replica 
copies in the next generation than an allele having the opposite tendency, the 
selective advantage may be seen to lie through benefits conferred indifferently on a 
set of relatives each of which has a half chance of carrying the gene in question. " 
(Hamilton 1996 [1964], 31-2) 
Particularly in his 1964 papers, Hamilton switches often between discussing the process 
of genetic selection and the potential effects on the individual organism's behaviour. A 
summary paragraph at the end of Hamilton's central section `The Model' demonstrates 
the distinction between the genetic model itself and its potential consequences for 
understanding individual behaviour; 
"Actually, in the preceding mathematical account we were not concerned with the 
inclusive fitness of individuals as described here but rather with certain averages of 
them which we call the inclusive fitness of types. But the idea of the inclusive fitness 
of an individual is nevertheless a useful one. Just as in the sense of classical selection 
we may consider whether a given character expressed in an individual is adaptive in 
the sense of being in the interest of his personal fitness or not, so in the present sense 
of selection we may consider whether the character or trait of behaviour is or is not 
adaptive in the sense if being in the interest of his inclusive fitness. " " (Hamilton 1996 
[1964], 38) 
Whereas the first part of the 1964 paper was more technical in focus, the second part 
turns to a non-technical account. However, in order that those not following the 
mathematical account (most readers, since, as he admitted (1996), the maths is very 
long-winded) should interpret his theory correctly, he makes it clear that his model is 
fundamentally about the selection pressures on genes; 
"In brief outline, the theory points out that for a gene to receive positive selection it 
is not necessarily enough that it should increase the fitness of its bearer above the 
average if this tends to be done at the heavy expense of related individuals, because 
relatives, on account of their common ancestry, tend to carry replicas of the same 
gene... " (Hamilton 1996 [1964], 47) 
He later `hazards' "the following unrigorous statement of the main principle that has 
emerged from the model"; 
"The Social behaviour of a species evolves in such a way that in each distinct 
behaviour-evoking situation the individual will seem to value his neighbours' fitness 
against his own according to the coefficients of relationship appropriate to that 
situation. "(1964 [1996], 49) 
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Properly interpreted, this `statement' gives a helpful summary of how the Inclusive 
Fitness theory can be applied to an analysis of the evolution of behaviour. Notice the 
word `seem'; the individual does not in fact tailor its social behaviour to genetic 
relatedness of recipients as a goal; behaviour which is appropriate to the (evolutionarily 
typical) relatedness of individuals typically encountered in that situation/context is 
selected for. Hamilton, writing for a theoretical journal, could reasonably expect that 
readers would understand the distinction between appearances ('seems') and the 
fundamental process involved. Unfortunately, individual-level inclusive fitness, pursued 
`as a goal' became the way many people thought about social behaviour, the shorthand 
way of thinking about what for Hamilton was strictly a selection process for 'genetic 
inclusive fitness'. It was taken away in this shorthand form and applied to species 
behaviour'in the field'. 
In his (later written) 1963 paper he again refers, unambiguously, to selection pressures 
on genes; 
"[T]he ultimate criterion which determines whether G [a gene] will spread is not 
whether the behaviour is to the benefit of the behaver but whether it is to the benefit 
of the gene G; and this will be the case if the average net result of the behaviour is to 
add to the gene pool a handful of genes containing G in higher concentration than 
does the gene pool itself. " (1996 [1963], 7) 
Overall, it should be clear, with a little caution, that Hamilton's theory concerns the 
selection pressures that genes face. At the same time, the ideas obviously have 
interesting implications for how biologists understand the evolution of social behaviours 
now observable in individual organisms. But the two are separate; proposed selection 
pressure and potential phenomena to be explained. To imagine that the phenomena 
itself is somehow a `goal' of individual organisms, is to deeply misunderstand the 
blindness of the evolutionary process. 
2.2.3 The Importance of Considering Typical Past Environments 
I have suggested that a careful understanding of Hamilton's papers should leave no 
confusion as to the causal processes involved. The selection pressure relevant to what 
behaviours might evolve is made unambiguous in this extract from his 1971 paper; 
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"The evolutionary outcome of [selection for inclusive fitness] might well be that A 
appeared in his social behaviour to value his relative's fitness against his own 
according to weightings given by [the regression coefficient of relatedness]. He 
would always value a unit of fitness in a relative less than a unit of his own fitness 
except in the special case in which the individual is clonal (as in the case of an 
identical twin): then [the coefficient] = 1. In humans, twinning is too rare for any 
special social adaptations to have arisen upon this relationship... " (Hamilton 1996 
[1971], 210) 
This point about the rarity of twinning in humans demonstrates that a particular 
instance of an association of replica genes (in this case a coefficient of relatedness of 
1.0) is irrelevant to consideration of the evolution of behavioural propensities. If one is 
interested in analysing a species-typical behaviour, an analysis of the typical past 
selection pressures on the genes that constitute the species is key. Neither genes nor 
individuals should be assumed to pursue goals of inclusive fitness maximisation nor 
actually `value' other individuals' fitness on the basis of their actual genetic relatedness 
per se. A consideration of the social encounters regularly occurring in past 
environments is obviously necessary, and therefore a consideration of typical 
demographic patterns and such like. 
Dawkins (1979) makes a very similar point about the relevance of past selection 
pressures in his paper about common misunderstandings of Hamilton's theory. Under 
the common misunderstanding labelled `Altruism is necessarily expected between 
members of an identical clone', he notes that; 
"There are races of parthenogenetic lizards the members of which appear to be 
identical descendents, in each case, of a single mutant female (Maynard Smith 1978). 
The coefficient of relatedness between individuals within such a clone is 1. A naive 
application of rote-learned kin selection theory might therefore predict great feats of 
altruism between all members of the race. [This misunderstanding is] tantamount to a 
belief that genes are god-like. Genes for kin altruism spread because that are 
especially likely to help copies of themselves rather than of their alleles. But 
members of a lizard clone all contain the genes of their original founding matriarch. 
She was part of an ordinary sexual population, and there is no reason to suppose that 
she had any special genes for altruism. When she founded her asexual clone, her 
existing genome was `frozen', a genome that had been shaped by whatever selection 
pressures had been at work before the clonal mutation. " (Dawkins 1979,193) 
This passage emphasises that expression of positive social behaviours is not a goal of 
individuals or genes. The selection pressure for Inclusive Fitness that a genes faces is 
dependent on the existence of `potential' -a typical context of interaction. This means 
that genes and behaviours that are now species typical must be understood to have 
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evolved in past environments, and the effects of their expression in any given current 
instance can only reflect selection pressures in typical past environments. 
2.2.4 What Kinds of Behaviour and what Kinds of Situation? 
This brings us on to the next key point which has been misunderstood by those applying 
insights from Inclusive Fitness theory, especially those involved in early attempts to 
apply it to humans. 
If one is analysing a behaviour which is taken to be `species-typical' at the time of 
analysis, the selective context under which that behaviour has evolved is the sum of all 
past environments that the genes and the behaviour have been expressed in. In reality 
this is obviously an indefinitely long backwards extending continuum, and is not 
directly observable. However, the relevant selective environments can be indirectly 
hypothesised by making assumptions about the similarities and differences between the 
species' current environment (or ecological niche) and those of the past. Comparison 
between observable fundamental demographic patterns of closely related species may 
also assist in this investigation. 
We have seen that in any particular species `social behaviour' can take many forms, be 
expressed in narrower or wider demographic contexts, and involve different levels of 
cost and benefit to actors and recipients (see above section 2.1.5). What kinds of social 
behaviour did Hamilton himself consider would most straightforwardly reflect the 
selection pressure on social behaviours hypothesised by his theory? In this section we 
will consider some of Hamilton's suggestions, as well as those of other related theorists. 
Remember Hamilton's summary statement; 
"The Social behaviour of a species evolves in such a way that in each distinct 
behaviour-evoking situation the individual will seem to value his neighbours' fitness 
against his own according to the coefficients of relationship appropriate to that 
situation. "(1964 [1996], 49) 
To put our question differently, which behaviour-evoking situations (with what typical 
coefficients of relationship) might best reflect selection pressure for Inclusive Fitness 
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effects? Unfortunately, there were one or two inconsistencies in Hamilton's own initial 
discussion of these possibilities, which led to a great deal of later confusion (see below). 
However, his own suggestions included the following; 
"Tinbergen investigated the ability of herring gulls to recognise their own chicks by 
observing their reaction to strange chicks placed amongst them. He found that during 
the first 2 or 3 days after hatching, strange chicks are accepted, but by the end of the 
first week they are driven away... . During the 
days which follow hatching, the chicks 
become progressively more mobile and the chance that they will wander into 
neighbouring nest-territories must increase. Therefore it seems a reasonable 
hypothesis that the ability to discriminate `own young' advances in step with the 
chance that without such discrimination strange chicks would be fostered and the 
benefits of parental care wasted on unrelated genes. Supporting this hypothesis are 
the findings quoted by Tinbergen of Watson and Lashley on two tropical species of 
tern: `the Noddies nesting in trees do not recognise their young at any age, whereas 
the ground-nesting Sooties are very similar to herring gulls in that they learn to 
recognise their own young in the course of four days. ' House sparrows will accept 
strange young of the right age placed in the nest but after the nestlings have flown 
`they will not, in normal circumstances, feed any but their own young'. " (Hamilton 
1996 [1964], 53-54) 
Tinbergen's work was a cornerstone to the field of ethology, along with that of Konrad 
Lorenz. Both studied mechanisms of bonding operating in early development, as would 
typically occur between parent and offspring, illustrated here by Tinbergen's work on 
gulls. Ethologists' work on `imprinting', the mechanism whereby infants typically 
attach to a parent has also been influential in studies of attachment mechanisms 
operating in mammals and primates, as will be discussed in later chapters. Hamilton 
here focuses on social bonding that occurs in particular and reliable contexts; he 
suggests that social behaviours can reliably `track' genetic relatives if circumstantial 
cues that tend to correlate with genetic relatedness mediate social bonding. ('Track' 
here means by-and-large maintain the correlation with genetic relatedness specified in 
the Br>C criterion). 
As we saw above, Dawkins makes a similar point to Hamilton; that social behaviours 
can be mediated by straightforward contextual rules of thumb; 
"Animals cannot, of course, be expected to know, in a cognitive sense, who their 
relatives are, and in practice the behaviour that is favoured by natural selection will 
be equivalent to a rough rule of thumb such as `share food with anything that moves 
in the nest in which you are sitting. ' If families happen to go around in groups, this 
fact provides a useful rule of thumb for kin selection: `care for any individual you 
often see'. " (Dawkins 1979,187) 
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Following on from Hamilton and Dawkins, what have other theorists suggested about 
the mechanisms by which genes might effectively come to `track' genetic relatives? The 
following section takes up this question. 
In sum, both Hamilton and later Inclusive Fitness theorists like Dawkins suggest that 
social behaviours that meet the Inclusive Fitness criterion can be mediated by cues such 
as context and familiarity. To the extent that social behaviours can be contextually cued, 
this further highlights the importance of considering the typical past demographic 
patterns relevant to a species; later chapters conduct such an analysis (chapters 5 and 6). 
2.2.5 "Tracking Relatives" by Context or Positive Powers? 
In this final section of Chapter 2, we conduct a brief review of what Inclusive Fitness 
theorists have said about possible mechanisms which effectively track relatedness. This 
introduction will enable the reader to assess the validity of sociobiological hypotheses 
applied to humans, reviewed in the next chapter (chapter 3). This is a fairly complex 
area and a fuller analysis of what mechanisms do appear to operate in the human case 
will be conducted in chapters 4 to 7. This section thus serves as a brief introduction to 
some of the issues. 
In the following passage Hamilton (1964), whilst demonstrating his now familiar 
`shorthand' use of the individual perspective to illustrate potential behaviours (see 
discussion, section 2.2.2), further emphasises the context of social behaviours and the 
need to consider who the behaviour targets. However, Hamilton also introduces the 
suggestion that behaviours which achieve the necessary `bias' towards relatives via 
`recognition', might do this either via `active recognition' or circumstantially; 
"The selective advantage which makes behaviour conditional in the right sense on 
the discrimination of factors which correlate with the relationship of the individual 
concerned is therefore obvious. It may be, for instance, that in respect of a certain 
social action performed towards neighbours indiscriminately, an individual is only 
just breaking even in terms of inclusive fitness. If he could learn to recognise those 
of his neighbours who really were close relatives and could devote his beneficial 
actions to them alone an advantage to inclusive fitness would at one appear. Thus a 
mutation causing such discriminatory behaviour itself benefits inclusive fitness and 
would be selected. In fact, the individual may not need to perform any discrimination 
so sophisticated as we suggest here; a difference in the generosity of his behaviour 
according to whether the situations evoking it were encountered near to, or far from, 
his own home might occasion an advantage of a similar kind. " (1996 [1964], 51) 
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A contextual rule of thumb which causes a social behaviour to tend to be expressed 
`near the home', rather than far from it is clearly of the type discussed by Dawkins and 
Hamilton in the previous section. But what sort of more `sophisticated' forms of 
possible discrimination did Hamilton have in mind? Following his discussion of the 
circumstantial rule of birds feeding young in their own nest (previous section), 
Hamilton makes a further point; 
"In situations where the relationship is not variable, for example, between the 
nestlings in an arboreal nest, there remains a discrimination which, if it could be 
made could greatly benefit inclusive fitness. This is the discrimination of those 
individuals which do carry one or both of the behaviour causing genes form those 
which do not. Such an ability lies outside the conditions postulated in Part I [his 
mathematical treatment] but the extended meaning of inclusive fitness is obvious 
enough. That genes could cause the perception of the presence of like genes in other 
individuals might sound improbable; at simplest we would need to postulate 
something like a supergene affecting (1) some perceptible feature of the organism, 
(2) the perception of that feature, and (3) the social response consequent upon what 
was perceived. " (Hamilton 1996 [1964], 54) 
It is this supplementary suggestion about what have come to be called `recognition 
genes' which has been highly influential in the application of Inclusive Fitness theory. It 
is likely that Hamilton did not work through these possibilities very thoroughly before 
making this suggestion in 1964, since he himself would later come to effectively 
withdraw the suggestion and point out other reasons why such a gene would in fact be 
unlikely to evolve (Hamilton 1987, see below), particularly in the context of 
interactions between individual organisms of a diploid species. Such `recognition 
genes' could evolve without modification in the context of interactions between clonal 
cells in a multi-cellular body. 
It is important to note that direct genetic recognition of genetic relatives between 
individual organisms is not a prediction of Inclusive Fitness theory. Even at the time of 
his initial mentioning it, Hamilton himself makes this clear when he says that this is an 
`extended meaning' of inclusive fitness `lying outside the conditions postulated in part 
I' (the first, theoretical part of the 1964 paper). I classify the idea that `recognition 
genes' will evolve as a teleological error of the type already discussed. Hamilton does 
not actually make this error. As we will see below, his 1987 treatment clarifies that 
recognition genes are in fact in principle extremely unlikely to be sustained by natural 
selection. 
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Nevertheless, I discuss Hamilton's suggestion here, because this interpretation of the 
implications of Inclusive Fitness theory, and similar interpretations have become very 
common place, and in becoming so have unfortunately obscured the more simple 
behavioural mechanisms whereby genes might effectively `track' their likely replicas. 
We have seen that genealogical relatedness is considered the commonest way of getting 
the reliable statistical association at the genetic level required for a social behaviour to 
evolve, but strictly other possibilities exist, such as `recognition genes' or pleiotropic 
genes which also cause a habitat preference such that -Chose that bear them tend to 
congregate and differentially interact. Grafen (1984) makes clear why the sustained 
presence of such genes would be unlikely; 
"The other way for r [the regression coefficient of relatedness] to be raised in groups 
besides common ancestry is preferential assortment. If altruists share a preference for 
certain micro habitats, then altruists will tend to be in groups with other altruists and 
that is all that is required to make r positive according the definition above. There are 
a number of reasons why preferential assortment is not a plausible source of genetic 
similarity in nature. They are based on the fact that while common ancestry provides 
relatedness that is the same for all loci, preferential assortment only causes 
relatedness that is the same at the loci that cause it and at closely linked loci. It is 
unlikely that the locus for altruism is closely linked to the loci for habitat preference. 
Even if it were, there would be selection at unlinked loci to suppress the altruism; for 
while the r at the altruism locus may be positive, the r at unlinked loci is zero and 
Hamilton's rule applies equally to both sorts of loci. Finally there would be selection 
for a `free-rider' allele (if one arose) at a locus unlinked to the altruism locus. It 
would have the effect of creating the same habitat choice as the altruists, whether or 
not its bearer was an altruist. For all these reasons, the only plausible cause of 
genetic similarity between group members is common ancestry. " (Grafen 1984,79) 
Maynard Smith (1976) makes a relevant point in his discussion of the conditions under 
which we might useful consider behaviour to have evolved via `group selection' rather 
than at the level that he (Maynard Smith 1964) labelled `kin selection' (in deliberate 
contrast to group selection); 
"If, for example, animals behave with an equal degree of altruism to all their 
"neighbours"... and if on average animals are related to their neighbours, then I 
would regard this as an example of kin selection. It is not a necessary feature of kin 
selection that an animal should distinguish different degrees of relationship among 
its neighbours, and behave with greater altruism to the more closely 
related... "(Maynard Smith 1976,282 emphasis in original) 
Maynard Smith continues; 
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"Apart from relatedness, there are other possible reasons why members of a [group] 
might resemble each other genetically. If individuals of like genotype tend to 
associate together, either because they are attracted to one another, or because they 
are attracted by common features of the environment, or because they are survivors 
of a common selective force, then altruism can be selected for. Before invoking this 
mechanism, however, it is important to remember that if an altruistic allele a is to 
replace a selfish allele A, then the members of a trait-group must resemble one 
another at that locus. If they are not related in the normal sense, this would require 
that the altruistic locus have pleiotropic effects determining association. Thus, these 
other reasons for genetic similarity between neighbours seems likely to be 
unimportant compared by identity by descent. "(Maynard Smith 1976,282 emphasis 
in original) 
The point Maynard Smith makes is that statistical association of genotypes due to the 
clustering of those of recent genealogical connection will tend to be a more important 
than clustering of like genotypes for other reasons, even though the latter would be 
possible in principle. Again, these points made by Maynard Smith and Grafen are 
relatively easily understood if the distinction between genes and individuals is kept 
clear. `Kin' (here explicitly used to mean genetic relatives) are, on average, equally 
related at all loci consistently, generation after generation, such that all genes (at all loci 
across the genome) face equal selection pressure for Inclusive Fitness effects. A 
`recognition gene' may be able to evolve the necessary components to signal, recognise 
and trigger a social behaviour, especially if we allow that a few tightly linked genes 
might achieve this effect. However, it remains the case that whilst such a gene would be 
prompting the individual to identify and bias social behaviours towards individuals with 
replica genes, all other genes in the actor would be suffering a `fitness cost'. There are a 
number of other ways to consider why such `recognition alleles' would in fact be very 
unlikely to evolve effects of the sort hypothesised, all of which require a clear 
understanding of the details of Inclusive Fitness theory. This leads Dawkins who had 
previously (1976) dubbed recognition alleles as `Green Beard genes' to comment that; 
"Some of the suggested [genetic] outlaws that I shall now come to are, frankly pretty 
improbable. I make no apology for this. I see them as thought experiments. They 
play the same role in helping me think straight about reality as imaginary trains 
travelling at nearly the speed of light do for physicists.... The green beard effect is 
not a mechanism for the recognition of kin. Rather, kin recognition and 'green- 
beard' recognition are alternative ways in which genes could behave as if 
discriminating in favour of copies of themselves... [I]t is clear that genes mediating 
altruism towards close kin, and favoured by conventional kin-selection pressure, are 
definitely not outlaws. All the genes in the genome have the same statistical odds of 
gaining from the kin altruism behaviour, for all have the same statistical odds of 
being possessed by the individual benefited. A `kin-selection' gene is, in a sense, 
working for itself alone, but it benefits the other genes in its genome as well. There 
will therefore be no selection in favour of modifiers [other genes] that suppress it. " 
(Dawkins 1999 [1982], 143-149) 
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Dawkins concludes thus; 
"The green-beard effect may be implausible, but it is instructive. The student of kin 
selection who first understands the hypothetical green-beard effect, and then 
approaches kin selection theory in terms of its similarities to and differences from 
`green beard theory', is unlikely to fall prey to the many tempting opportunities for 
error that kin selection theory offers (Dawkins 1979a). Mastery of the green-beard 
model will convince him that altruism towards kin is not an end in itself, something 
that animals are mysteriously expected to practice in accordance with some clever 
mathematics that field workers don't understand. Rather, kinship provides just one 
way in which genes can behave as if they recognised and favoured copies of 
themselves in other individuals. Hamilton himself is emphatic on this point... " 
(Dawkins 1982,153) 
Dawkins goes on to quote Hamilton's point that Inclusive Fitness theory is more 
general than "kin selection" (Hamilton 1975, see end of section one of this chapter). 
Grafen makes some similar points in his (1990) discussion of some of the conceptual 
problems accompanying `kin recognition' theory; 
"The requirements for genetic similarity to select consistently for altruism are first, 
continuing similarity in time as gene frequencies change and the altruistic trait 
spreads through the population; and, second, the similarity must hold through a large 
enough fraction of the genome, as it must be expected that modifiers will arise at 
distant loci. These conditions are not met by the local and transient additional 
similarity imposed by the process of ['green-beard'] matching at the matching locus 
itself. " (Grafen 1990,53) 
Hamilton's thoughts on this become more clear as in his later papers, and he 
specifically discussed these matters in a 1987 paper, this time with further deliberations 
accompanied by conclusions in line with what other theorists (such as the others in this 
section) have suggested; 
"[S]uppose that a root connection is made [between two trees] and that subsequently 
one tree is dying for want of water, to which the other has limited access. Suppose 
the other supplies the dying tree with water at a benefit-for-cost ratio far more 
generous than the limit set by the kin selection criterion [Br>C] based on pedigree 
relatedness. The helping tree as a result sets less seed and the helped tree sets more 
seed - but the `more' is not enough to fulfil the criterion except at the recognition 
locus and possibly at loci very nearby. Suppose this happens again and again in 
instances of such paired trees. If now, elsewhere in the genome, a mutant gene arises 
that blocks the outward sap flow at this benefit-for-cost ratio, then that gene is 
advanced. This is easily seen by the kin-selection principle. Thus as regards its action 
as a potential donor, the genome evolves to suppress a `green-beard' transfer. Effects 
of this kind would therefore be transitory and be unable to evolve into regular 
adaptations. If such aid is given regularly through root grafts, it is likely to be 
established on some basis either of typical kin selection or else of reciprocation. " 
(Hamilton 1987,421,424) 
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It is interesting to note (as per Dawkins 1982) that an individual-level interpretation of 
Inclusive Fitness theory is inadequate to analyse the selection pressures at work in such 
cases, and Hamilton's use of a gene-level perspective on the selection pressure from the 
inclusive fitness criterion [Br>C] here is unambiguous. 
These discussions demonstrate that interpreting Inclusive Fitness theory can be 
complicated, particularly in the area of `tracking genetic relatedness'. This has given 
rise to a whole area of research known as `kin recognition theory', which will be 
revisited in more detail in chapter 4. For now it is enough to note that the theory itself is 
a description of the selective pressure on the evolution of social behaviours. The next 
chapter reviews how sociobiological hypotheses claiming to represent Inclusive Fitness 
theory have been applied to humans. 
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Chapter Three - Sociobiological Treatments of Kinship 
3.01 Introduction 
This chapter reviews a number of past treatments of human social behaviour which 
have been advanced in reference to evolutionary biological theories. As suggested at the 
end of the first chapter, the approaches of most interest are those of sociobiology, in 
particular the `Darwinian Anthropologists', who have explicitly approached the subject 
in reference to an interpretation of Inclusive Fitness theory. I will argue that the 
interpretation of the theory utilised in these approaches is erroneous. 
Other schools drawing on biological theory in application to human behaviour include 
Evolutionary Psychology as well as gene-culture `Dual Transmission' theories. The 
latter, including work by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981), Richardson and Boyd 
(2001) Lumsden and Wilson (1983) and others, mainly focus on the co-evolution of 
genes and culture, and have not attempted to apply Inclusive Fitness Theory to 
individual human social behaviours specifically (Hewlett 2001). For this reason the 
current review will not discuss gene-culture models. Evolutionary Psychology has 
officially adopted a different emphasis from the Darwinian Anthropology, especially an 
investigation of proximate mechanisms and, in a sense, the school stemmed from a 
critique of Darwinian Anthropology's interpretation of Inclusive Fitness theory, which 
will be discussed below. However, in general Evolutionary Psychology has not paid 
particular attention to individual social behaviour or broader patterns of social 
interaction in traditional societies (Hewlett 2001); the areas of traditional interest to 
anthropology. The exceptions here are Daly and Wilson (Daly et al. 1997), whose work 
was briefly sampled in chapter 1 (section 1.6), and whose rare excursions in to 
Anthropology essentially repeat the claims of the Darwinian Anthropologists reviewed 
here (see section 3.5) 
In reviewing the early Darwinian Anthropology treatments of human social behaviour, 
the focus here is on the premises (section 3.2) of their positions which demonstrate the 
misinterpretations first discussed in chapter two. First however, an overview is given of 
the genesis of Darwinian Anthropology and the various derivative treatments. 
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3.02 Darwinian Anthropology - Overview 
In the 1970s and 1980s a number of attempts were made to apply new insights about the 
evolution of social behaviour derived from Inclusive Fitness theory to certain 
classificatory ethnographic phenomena described by anthropologists and comparative 
sociologists over the previous hundred years (see chapter 1). In particular, explanations 
were offered for `kinship' patterns; unilineal descent (matrilineal and patrilineal descent 
groups), and phenomena such as the avunculate (the `mother's brother'). These 
Darwinian Anthropology approaches all followed essentially the same format and 
assumptions, and were initiated by Richard Alexander's early paper discussing potential 
application of Inclusive Fitness theory (here conceptualised as `kin selection') to human 
data (Alexander 1974; Greene 1978; Kurland 1979; Irons 1979; Gaulin & Schlegel 
1980, Flinn 1981, Hartung 1985). 
As noted in the first chapter, these analyses suffered a number of problems. The 
tradition in anthropology for conceptualisations of human social behaviour as large 
scale structural phenomena (e. g. the descent theorists) was on a downhill slope, if not 
quite redundant (see chapters 8 and 9). Nevertheless, had the analyses been productive, 
this would not have mattered and the approach may have attracted interest. The greater 
difficulty was that these approaches mistook the anthropological class `kin' with its 
namesake in biology and attempted to translate `kin' into `genetic relative' by 
suggesting that human social interactions always reflect individuals' attempts to 
maximise their own individual `inclusive fitness'. 
We saw in chapter two that this `individual goal' interpretation of the theory is 
problematic. Biologists themselves (Dawkins 1976, Gould & Lewontin 1979, Kitcher 
1985) have been critical of some interpretations of Inclusive Fitness theory, including 
the Darwinian Anthropology approach. Kitcher's criticism in particular targeted these 
attempts to explain human kinship patterns for (as he saw it) an over-reliance on the 
existence of a hypothesised `general purpose mechanism' of individual inclusive fitness 
`maximisation', in addition to pointing out shortcomings in explaining the empirical 
details. The latter part of this chapter (section 3.5 below) will review Kitcher's critique 
and his suggestion of the need to focus on intermediating (or `proximate') psychological 
or behavioural mechanisms. 
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Other biologists who strongly believe that human behaviour is amenable to evolutionary 
biological analyses also criticise Darwinian Anthropology approaches to applying 
Inclusive Fitness theory to humans (Symons 1989). The main criticism here resembles 
that of Kitcher; this approach assumes that individuals continue to maximise their 
"individual inclusive fitness" in all present environments, whilst ignoring analysis of 
evolved mechanisms selection pressure has acted on in past environments. This is the 
position taken up by Evolutionary Psychology, but it is not clear that this school 
actually advances hypotheses about human social behaviour any different from those of 
the Darwinian Anthropologists (section 3.5). 
3.03 Summary of Critique 
For clarity I here set out the `errors' of early Darwinian Anthropology, many of which 
have been introduced in Chapter two. Section 3.2 (below) will attempt to illustrate these 
errors by examples from the treatments. 
Firstly, as suggested above, these approaches understood Inclusive Fitness theory to 
imply that individuals will behave in a way which maximises `their inclusive fitness'. 
We saw in chapter two that this is necessarily a simplified interpretation of the theory, 
and that any reference Hamilton made to individual inclusive fitness was intended as a 
guide to the other-things-being-equal "appearances" of behaviour (evolved tendencies 
tuned to typical features of past environments). The theory implies simply that genes 
face selection pressure to have effects which, in the environments in which they have 
existed (always past environments from the point of view of current behaviour) by-and- 
large meet the Inclusive Fitness criterion. 
Secondly, Darwinian Anthropology, in taking the individual level perspective made 
theorists particularly prone to forms of anthropocentrism; particularly in interpreting 
Inclusive Fitness theory to involve `male interests' or sometimes `female interests', for 
what is correctly the evolutionary selection pressure on genes which (except Y 
chromosome and cytoplasmic genes) pass through both sexes in mammals. (Hartung's 
work (reviewed below) is an interesting case in point here, since he initially did focus 
on selection pressure on genes (1976), but later used an individual level perspective 
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(1985), and since has regretted this step (1997)). Further, the individual perspective 
involved certain assumptions about the universal evolved behaviour of human males 
(ardent) and females (coy). This influenced further assumptions about proposed 
(evolved, species-typical) bonding norms between males and females, and thus `normal' 
connections between a male and `his offspring', reinforced by a limited perspective 
apparently derived from monogamous cultures. These perspectives led to the 
assumption that human males have long been selected to achieve individual inclusive 
fitness by investing in `their offspring' (Male Parental Investment) in a way assumed to 
be qualitatively equivalent to female-offspring interaction. 
It should be clear from chapter two that - even in we accept for the moment, for the sake 
of argument, an `individual' interpretation of Inclusive Fitness theory - equivalence 
between `what is expected' of males and females can only be valid if evolutionarily- 
typical `grouping contexts' of interaction between male-and-offspring and female-and- 
offspring are correspondingly symmetrical. This position is unsustainable along side the 
evidence from mammals (see chapters 4 to 6). 
Further, in making the assumption that `individuals maximise their Inclusive Fitness', 
Darwinian Anthropology regarded the actual intermediating `proximate' behavioural 
mechanisms of social behaviour as a "black box"; operating via an unexamined general 
purpose mechanism (see Kitcher section 3.5). Surprisingly, this remains the case with 
Evolutionary Psychology treatments of anthropological `kinship' data. As was 
suggested in chapter two, misunderstanding this point led crucially to a misplaced 
assumption that `kin discrimination' must be somehow unerring and achieved precisely, 
rather than meeting the Inclusive Fitness criterion via behavioural mechanisms sensitive 
to mediating cues that have typically (in past environments) correlated with genetic 
relationship. Kitcher makes the point that the operation of such `proximate' behavioural 
mechanisms might actually be straightforward (see section 3.6). 
The current thesis will investigate the possibilities for the operation of such mechanisms 
by considering likely demographic features of evolutionarily significant environments, 
not simply by considering those evolutionary environments unique to humans, but more 
fundamental demographic conditions relevant to closely related species also (see 
chapters 4 to 6). As well as paying little attention to ethnographic evidence and 
anthropological perspectives, Darwinian Anthropology did not generally benefit from 
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comparative primatological evidence, which was particularly surprising for an 
evolutionary-biologically grounded approach. The deep evolutionary history of 
mammals and primates, and demographic factors such as the evolutionarily typical 
"grouping contexts" of female-infants and maternal-siblings was not considered 
relevant. One notable exception was Kurland (1977) who had in fact investigated social 
behaviours in primates, but not with a view to the variables suggested here 
(unsurprisingly since the interpretation of biology theory was different), and he thus 
saw no similarities to evolved human behaviours. 
3.1 Darwinian Anthropology 
3.1.1 Genesis and Core Hypotheses 
Richard Alexander (1974,1979) was one of the first to suggest ways in which Inclusive 
Fitness theory might be applicable to human social behaviour, particularly in relation to 
some long standing phenomena traditionally discussed by anthropologists. His 1974 
paper provoked a number of other treatments whose aim was to recast various aspects 
of human behaviour in terms of "individual inclusive fitness maximisation" and this 
school soon came to be referred to as Darwinian Anthropology. Fox (1996), for 
example, gives this account; 
"Largely under the influence of Alexander (1974), a school of sociobiological 
thought emerged which took as is central precept the maximisation of reproductive 
success. Its main assumption is that such maximisation... can explain a whole range 
of human mating and kin-related behaviours. "(Fox 1996,814) 
Alexander was working on these ideas some time prior to his 1974 paper, and his 
influence on others is illustrated by John Hartung; 
"It was December of 1972 and I went on my motorcycle. Just as I thawed out, about 
fifty minutes into his talk, R. D. Alexander explained mother's-brother's-sister's-son. 
There was hope. " (Hartung, quoted in Betzig 1997) 
Clearly Alexander's ideas stimulated interest in investigating some of the patterns of 
social behaviour that anthropology had long been describing, notably areas of what 
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anthropology had called `kinship' (see chapter one). Alexander had raised a number of 
possibilities - his paper is wide ranging and touches on a large number of general issues 
raised by the application of Hamilton's theory to animal behaviour. His starting position 
regarding the application of Inclusive Fitness theory to human social behaviour is that; 
"Although human societies are groups of variously related individuals within which 
genetic relationships are universally rather well understood, a more or less general 
rejection by social scientists of the idea that nepotism is related to the reproductive 
history of humans has stifled attention to the correlations between genetic 
relationship and the likelihood of altruism. " (Alexander 1974,372) 
Alexander goes on to discuss cousin marriages from the perspective of a balance 
between inbreeding and outbreeding (Alexander 1974,373), and then continues; 
"Similarly, the phenomenon of "mother's brother" as the adult male responsible in 
certain ways for some children is at least sometimes prominent in polygynous 
societies in which confidence of paternity is quite low. Low confidence of paternity 
may result from (for example) living arrangements; as an extreme case wives may 
live separately from husbands... Genetically speaking, a man's sister's offspring are 
on the average 1/8 to'/a like him... his spouse's offspring, on the other hand, may be 
V2 like him or (depending on her fidelity) totally unlike him. As confidence of 
paternity diminishes, therefore, a man's sister's offspring become relatively more 
important to his reproduction, and a woman's brother becomes a more likely 
candidate for parental behaviour for her offspring that may otherwise suffer from a 
lack of paternal assistance. " (Alexander 1974,373) 
This initial hypothesis of Alexander's formed the basis for a number of subsequent 
research efforts. Implicit in this perspective (and many later developments of it) are a 
number of assumptions. There is the assumption that (universally) males' levels of 
confidence about paternity are a centrally important influence on social organisation. 
The perspective assumes that patterns of bonding between males and females `usually' 
have a certain character; that they are `spouses' to each other and that offspring of the 
female are `normally' offspring of the male she is with `depending on her fidelity'. 
Subsequent Darwinian Anthropologists (reviewed below) partially recognised that this 
was a highly limited perspective on the norms of male-female bonding in humans. 
Alexander's hypothesis also assumed that the default behaviour of a human male (given 
the relatedness correlates of the `normal' male-female bond) is to `parentally invest' 
(Trivers 1972), and that normal human infants would suffer from a lack of paternal 
assistance. A derivation, not made explicit by Alexander is that the avunculate should 
be correspondingly absent in `high confidence of paternity' societies, where males 
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`should be' investing in their wives' offspring (in the knowledge that these are their 
offspring). 
It is equally possible that many of these premises about supposedly sex-specific evolved 
dispositions are in fact derived from a particular view of the `family man' gender role of 
males in industrial societies. Indeed, this suggestion is in fact made by one of the 
Darwinian Anthropology treatments (see quote from Irons 1979, section 3.2.4 below). 
These premises resemble the `man the hunter' concept (see section 1.3.2) which 
includes the idea of a male's contribution to child rearing, also known as the `hunting 
hypothesis' (Hawkes et al 2000, Hewlett 2001); 
"[T]his hypothesis suggests that many aspects of human social organisation 
(patrilocality, sharing, monogamy, nuclear family) were consequences of big game 
hunting. Males hunted game to provide for the nuclear family; from a life history 
perspective, they were investing energy into male parental effort" (Hewlett 2001, 
101) 
As well as the criticisms of this idea citing commonalities with primate species in which 
the female (and maternal relatives) reared infants without male assistance (see chapter 
1), recent evidence reviewed later (section 3.2.2), also supports the view that many of 
the assumptions of this hypothesis may be unsafe. 
Nevertheless, these possibilities discussed by Alexander were taken up and developed 
by a number of later researchers in the 1970s and 1980s. These treatments assumed the 
validity of Alexander's basic idea, and thus relied on a similar set of assumptions about 
the deep roots of `male parental investment' in human nature, and the norms of bonding 
between males and females. The first section below is restricted to a brief overview of 
how Alexander's idea was developed through to Hartung's 1985 paper, after which 
these treatments tailed off (but see Daly and Wilson, section 3.5). The following section 
then identifies and critiques in more detail the assumptions and premises of this 
Darwinian Anthropology approach in general, as outlined in the first chapter, many of 
which continue to underlie proclaimed `evolutionary biological' treatments of human 
behaviour. 
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3.1.2 Darwinian Anthropology Developments of Alexander's Hypothesis 
The common theme running through all the extensions of Alexander's hypothesis is the 
attempt to reformulate the initial premise about a male's genetic connection to his 
wife's offspring into a form that might account for the relatively common incidence of 
avuncular relationships documented in ethnographic accounts. Under the original 
formulation, a man would only do better to invest in his sister's offspring when his 
`certainty of paternity' (the chance that he is the actual father) is below the `paternity 
threshold' of approximately 0.265 (a wife's child is actually his child only 
approximately %4 of the time). In reality - and what Alexander had apparently not 
appreciated in the 1974 paper (but had by 1979) - the avuncular relationship occurs not 
only when paternity is comparatively uncertain, but also when `it is practically certain' 
(Fox 1985,675) as had long been appreciated by anthropologists and comparative 
sociologists (see section 3.2.3). Thus the emphasis in subsequent Darwinian 
Anthropology treatments on progressively redefining of the `paternity threshold' in 
ways that make it closer to realistic `levels of paternity' in the societies in question. This 
section follows the developments of the `internal logic' of the basic hypothesis in these 
treatments, emphasising the continuities between them. Most clear is the focus on `true 
genetic relatedness' as the organising force for social patterns. 
The first published reworking of Alexander's idea was that of Greene (1978), although 
Kurland was conducting related work at the same time, published slightly later as a 
book chapter (Kurland 1979). Greene discusses Inclusive Fitness theory and 
Alexander's suggestions about the avunculate, and introduces an element that (what she 
calls) the `Alexander-Kurland model' doesn't distinguish. She suggests that placing a 
value on `uncertainty of paternity' derived from the proportion of the time that a 
woman's husband is actually the biological father does not necessarily give a full 
account of the `genetic relatedness' of the situation. Alexander and Kurland's 
treatments had incorporated the diluted `relatedness' between a (maternal) brother and 
sister due to their own common paternity being `uncertain'. Greene suggests that this 
need not be the case because there is a chance that a female may be `consistently 
unfaithful' with the same male, or a closely related male, so that the various fathers of 
the brother and sister may themselves be related. This tinkering allows the `paternity 
threshold' below which the avunculate `makes sense' to be adjusted up by a few 
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percentage points, towards levels that appear more realistic against the ethnographic 
record. 
Kurland's (1979) treatment takes in the point about low certainty of paternity also 
diminishing the brother-sister relatedness, and finds a "probability threshold" of 0.268 
below which a man should invest in his sister's children. Kurland admits that this seems 
low compared to ethnographic reports, and that the avunculate is prominent at levels 
above this. Like Greene, Kurland has a `work around' and suggests that in societies 
where marriages are serial and paternity probability is low, a wife's household may 
consist of a number of children who are known to be unrelated. The probability 
threshold should thus be interpreted as the chance that a given child of the wife is the 
child of the male doing the investment and this probability will be affected by previous 
reproductive history. If the nature of that investment means it cannot be directed to 
specific children in the wife's `brood' (`non-partible investment'), Kurland suggests, a 
male should be expected to preferentially invest in his sister's children. Essentially, 
Kurland is adjusting the Darwinian Anthropology claim by suggesting that societies in 
which the avunculate is prominent may regularly feature female-orientated families in 
which maternal siblings are (unambiguously) the products of a series of relationships 
the female has had with males over her reproductive career. This is an interesting 
suggestion but one which, in essence, introduces a quite different set of assumptions 
about the strength of typical spousal bonds between males and females. 
Even though these possibilities concerning variable spousal bonding `norms' are 
logically required to be a feature of human societies for the overall argument to work, 
they are simultaneously not allowed to challenge the fundamental Darwinian 
Anthropology assumptions on the norms of human nature. That is, the central issue (and 
major premise) continues to be - males' purportedly evolved desire for significant 
parental investment in their own genetic offspring (to maximise their `individual 
inclusive fitness'), and the hypothesis remains that social cooperation amongst 
matrilineal relatives (including the avunculate) arises because of low probability of 
paternity. Further Darwinian Anthropology assumptions about dependent and 
independent variables are discussed in a later section. 
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In the same edited volume as Kurland, Irons (1979) also discusses many of the same 
features of human societies, drawing on Darwinian Anthropology theory, and refers to 
the three treatments discussed so far; 
"As long as paternity certainty is less than perfect, a man is more closely related to a 
sister's children than to a brother's children... Kurland (chapter 6) discusses how low 
paternity probability diminishes average relatedness through all male links, and thus 
shifts the optimal recipients of kin effort. The effect of paternity probability is 
especially relevant to the issue of Nayar men investing in the sister's children rather 
than the wife's (i. e. sambandham partner's) children. Greene (1978) has shown that 
men will be on average more related to sister's children than to wives' children if 
paternity probability falls below a value of 2- 3%2 or approximately 0.268. "(Irons 
1979,189) 
Gaulin and Schlegel (1980) define paternal confidence as `probability that a man is 
genitor of his wife's children'(Gaulin & Schlegel 1980,302) thus incorporating the 
possibility raised by Kurland that offspring may be present from the female's previous 
unions. They conduct a cross-cultural code based statistical analysis of the coincidence 
of the avunculate with levels of paternity certainty. They even look at societies in which 
there may be `some form of culturally sanctioned wife sharing' (Gaulin & Schlegel 
1980,302). On the basis of these tests, they actually found that; 
"[In] low paternal confidence societies there is no tendency for the mother's brother 
to be important as either caretaker or educator for children of either sex during either 
early or late childhood. "( Gaulin & Schlegel 1980,304) 
They did find some correlation, but without significance (p=0.72 - 0.93). The 
discrepancy came not from the lack of societies with low paternal confidence but from 
the lack of strong avuncularity. They modified the hypothesis to suggest that high 
confidence leads to high investment in a wife's children, but that low confidence leads a 
man to channel his investment elsewhere (Gaulin & Schlegel 1980,304-305). 
Elsewhere could be maternal kin, non-official suspected offspring (perhaps of another 
woman) or investment in personal social gain. When looked at in this way they 
conclude; 
"Our findings are consonant with the idea that cultural patterns leading to heavy 
male investment in wife's children are common only where mating patterns make it 
likely that such investment benefits bearers of the male's genes" (Gaulin & Schlegel 
1980,308). 
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However, they don't suggest any causal direction to the correlation. They are quick to 
point out that; 
"[F]or any of our findings, the direction of causality could as plausibly go from 
investment patterns to paternal confidence, in that where a man knows that he will be 
expected to investing his wife's children, he will make an effort to ensure that they 
are his own. "( Gaulin & Schlegel 1980,305) 
At the same time as Gaulin and Schlegel were conducting their cross-cultural analysis, 
Flinn (1981) also conducted an empirical study, on the basis that; 
"Alexander's explanation of the mother's brother phenomenon has subsequently 
been discussed by Greene, Irons and Kurland. However, as yet no comprehensive 
empirical analysis of Alexander's resolution has been conducted. "(Flinn 1981,444) 
Flinn's analysis finds that: 
"Alexander's resolution of the mother's brother phenomenon is consistent with 
cross-cultural data on both inter and intra-societal variability. However, several 
aspects of the mother's brother phenomenon remain problematical. First, confidence 
of paternity is probably not less than 1/3 [his threshold] in some of the societies in 
which the mother's brother phenomenon is prevalent. Second, conjugal ties in 
societies with uterine kinship biases are notoriously fragile - among the Nayar 
"marriage was the slenderest of ties" (Gough 1961a: 357), among the Cewa, 
"marriage ties sit loose" (Richards, 1950: 233). The adaptive significance of this 
correlation has not been examined. Third, the environmental (social and physical) 
conditions influencing confidence of paternity and hence family structure have not 
been examined. "(Flinn 1981,446) 
To account for the prevalence of the avunculate even where the paternity threshold is 
exceeded, Flinn suggests that pressure from matrilineal `kin' could be a factor, and this 
would be higher where residence was matrilocal, since the matrilineal kin group would 
be more "corporate" (Flinn 1981,447) under such conditions. Thus Flinn is suggesting 
that, where matrilineal groups are strong, a man's investment in his own offspring 
might become secondary, regardless of certainty of paternity (apparently, in fact, 
regardless of consideration of `his individual inclusive fitness interests'). Flinn also 
suggests that the mother's brother might exist in patrilineal societies because he could 
be an independent and disinterested advisor in cases of conflict between paternal kin 
(Flinn 1981,450). Flinn's discussion takes in some wider variables which will be 
discussed further below. 
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Hartung's 1985 paper is in many ways `truer' to the `Alexander/Kurland model' than 
the intervening treatments. His analysis is centrally focussed on the association between 
certainty of paternity and investment bias favouring matrilineal kin. For Hartung; 
"The hypothesis follows that matrilineal inheritance is a cultural trait that evolved in 
response to low probability of paternity... "(Hartung 1985,661) 
"The paternity hypothesis was rescued and made explicit in the context of modem 
evolutionary theory by Alexander in 1974. Over the next 10 years this provided the 
impetus leading to numerous theoretical refinements and scholarly and empirical 
investigations (Flinn 1981; Gaulin & Schlegel 1980; Greene 1978; Hartung 1981b; 
Kurland 1979). " (Hartung 1985,663) 
Hartung situates the hypothesis of Alexander within a broader trend in the history of 
comparative sociology and anthropology of the `paternity hypothesis' for matrilineality, 
which although not theoretically grounded in biology, noted a correlation between 
matrilineal investment and various conditions contributing to low `certainty of 
paternity'. This will be discussed in greater detail below (section 3.2.3). Hartung's 
innovation is in two areas. First, he suggests that previous models have only considered 
matrilineal bias as a `strategy' of males, without considering the `interest' of females. 
Further, he suggests that, rather than looking simply at an individual's relatedness to his 
first generation direct descendents, one should consider that certain forms of `parental 
investment' might be passed down the generations as inheritance. Thus, he argues, for a 
given level of `uncertainty of paternity', as well as a man's relatedness to his first 
generation putative offspring, relatedness to second generation descendants, third 
generation and so on all need to come into the calculation. This long-term way of 
viewing things means that a given level of paternity uncertainty could be argued to be 
more detrimental to the male's inclusive fitness when contrasted with the maternity 
certainty of matrilineal heirs. On this basis Hartung calculates that the `paternity 
threshold' should thus be 0.46 (rather than 0.265). Further, he suggests that the long 
term interests of females also need to be considered; as grandparents, females should 
favour investment through daughters whenever certainty of paternity is less than 1.0. 
Overall, this further elevates the `paternity threshold' at which all individuals (i. e. the 
society as a whole) will turn to the "matrilineal solution to uncertainty of paternity", 
thus avoiding the apparently unrealistically low earlier thresholds. 
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3.2 Premises of the Darwinian Anthropology Treatments 
The last section gave an overview of how the central hypothesis of `paternity 
uncertainty' common to all treatments was developed. Some additional assumptions 
implicit in this hypothesis were noted, and it was suggested that many of these may be 
somewhat less empirically valid than the Darwinian Anthropology treatments required 
them to be. In the following sections the various premises of this position are further 
investigated particularly in reference to their implicit interpretation of Inclusive Fitness 
theory, as discussed in chapter two. 
3.2.1 The Focus on Individuals' Strategies 
Alexander's ambivalence about whether to focus on the reproductive success of 
individuals or their genes was a key target (Dawkins 1976,1989) for Dawkins' later 
influential reminder (derived from Hamilton) that selection pressure on gene 
frequencies should be central to evolutionary biology analyses (Dawkins 1976,1982, 
1989, see chapter 2). At certain points of his discussion Alexander appears to grasp that 
Inclusive Fitness theory is centrally about selection pressure on genes; 
"Nepotism involves altruism between relatives, the potential for a genetic tendency 
to spread existing because assisted individuals are likely to be carrying it to the 
degree that their genotypes are expected to overlap that of the altruist (Hamilton 
1964,1972)" (Alexander 1974,337) 
However, in other sections Alexander clearly follows an individual-level interpretation 
of the theory. Dawkins' criticism of Alexander picks up on his application of an 
`individual' perspective to of the dynamics of parent-offspring relationships. There are a 
few examples of this in Alexander's 1974 paper. In the following passage, for example, 
Alexander's concluding thoughts highlight the logical intractability of looking at these 
evolutionary dynamics in terms of individuals; 
"Siblings are often the closest relatives within a population, and they are often one 
another's closest competitors as well. Thus the extremes of cooperation and 
competition may both be represented in their interactions. It will be useful to know 
when these interactions evolved because they increased the reproduction of the 
involved individuals and when they evolved because they increased the reproduction 
of their parents. " (Alexander 1974,340) 
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Dawkins quotes from one of Alexander's later passages to illustrate the problem; 
"Suppose that a juvenile mutates in such fashion as to cause an uneven distribution 
of parental benefits in its own favour, thereby reducing the mother's overall 
reproduction. A gene which in this fashion improves an individual's fitness when it 
is a juvenile cannot fail to lower its fitness more when it is an adult, for such mutant 
genes will be present in an increased proportion of the mutant individual's 
offspring. " (Alexander, 340) 
Dawkins suggests that; 
"Alexander's argument... erred through looking at things from the point of view of 
an individual... I believe this kind of error is all too easy to make when we use the 
technical term `fitness' [of individuals]. This is why I have avoided using the term in 
this book. There is really only one entity whose point of view matters in evolution, 
and that entity is the selfish gene. " (Dawkins 1989,137 emphasis in original) 
Alexander's analysis demonstrates how a focus on individual fitness can obscure the 
underlying process, which can be clarified by reference to Inclusive Fitness selection 
pressure on gene frequencies (see chapter 2). Note that it is unclear why Dawkins 
applied a moral concept to the amoral genetic process (see chapter 1.3.1 for more). Also 
worth noting is that gene frequency analysis should not prejudice the extent to which 
selection pressures on groups can influence the evolution of a species' behaviours. 
Recall that Price's (1970) model allows for the analysis of selection pressures operating 
over multiple scales (see chapter 2.1.7). 
It is worth emphasising that, undoubtedly, it is the behaviour of individual organisms 
(as individuals and in groups) that all students of social behaviour are keen to study and 
understand. The rationale of the analysis of selection pressure on genes is not to suggest 
that the behaviour of individuals is not of interest. It is that the evolution of basic 
behavioural tendencies is not necessarily best understood as being a function of 
"individuals pursuing their inclusive fitness". Rather such tendencies may be better 
understood via the influence of selective processes acting on the frequency of genes via 
their covariance with reproductive success. This is not simply a brief, unimportant 
mistake at the theoretical level; Alexander's discussion is dominated by this `individual- 
strategy' perspective on genetic relatedness; 
"Indeed, a man's sister's offspring, because of the high confidence of maternity, will 
be his closest relatives in the next generation whenever confidence of paternity is 
very low. Thus, if paternity is correctly ascertained only'/4 of the time, then a man's 
85 
spouse's offspring will average 1/8 like him (and 3 of 4 will be totally unlike him), 
while his sister's offspring will average 5/32 like him, and all will approach this 
degree of overlap. "(Alexander 1974,373) 
Regardless of the weaknesses of this interpretation of Inclusive Fitness theory, it was 
this perspective, and these discussions of how a male might best maximize his individual 
inclusive fitness that were taken away by subsequent Darwinian Anthropologists, as 
suggested at the beginning of the chapter. This is problematic both in the concept of an 
`individual strategy' itself, and for the fact that it inevitably has to focus the analysis on 
the strategies of individual males or females, or both. Most of the Darwinian 
Anthropology treatments focussed on the strategy of males, as Hartung (1985) pointed 
out. This was typical of sociobiological approaches (see Zihlman 1981, chapter 1.3.2) 
The following excerpts from the various treatments demonstrate this focus on individual 
strategies, and the usual focus on males' strategies. 
Greene (1978) frames the situation in a way that on the one hand acknowledges genes 
are involved, but at the same time seems to suggest that the clearest perspective is to 
view genes mainly as the vehicles for individual strategies. Such incremental steps 
effectively submerges selection pressure on genes and allows the focus on 
circumstances whereby individuals maximise their inclusive fitness; 
"Since natural selection operates through the representation of genes in succeeding 
generations, one individual can pass on its own genes either by reproducing or by 
helping a relative (with whom some genes are shared by common descent) to 
reproduce. Thus, if two individuals are sufficiently related, one of them may further 
its own ultimate reproductive success by helping the other, even at some apparent 
personal cost "(Greene 1978,151) 
Taking this perspective then leads Greene smoothly into discussions of how a male 
should further his own ultimate reproductive success under conditions of low certainty 
of paternity by helping maternal sister's offspring. 
Kurland's (1979) analysis suggests that; 
"A group-level analysis is the rule in social anthropology. Evolutionary biology 
takes the gene as the proper level of functional analysis of behaviour 
(Dawkins 1976). "(Kurland 1979 157,158) 
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It is encouraging to see Kurland focus on a gene frequency analysis as fundamental to 
evolutionary biology theory, but he appears to have misunderstood the Inclusive Fitness 
theory position on the significance of demographic groups (see chapter 2.1.6). 
However, as with others, he soon ignores any further implications of the `selection 
pressure on genes' interpretation and the `interests' of individuals come to dominate the 
discussion; 
"The optimal female investment strategies may sometimes be at odds with male 
strategies. And indeed, a woman and her matrilineal relatives may attempt to coerce 
her husband into acting in ways that increase her inclusive fitness at a cost to his. 
Disagreements between kin and affine over a male's investment behaviour may lead 
to conflict over, among other things, inheritance or residence. "(Kurland 1979,166, 
167) 
Kurland also discusses the `reproductive interests' of the grandparents, and points out 
that, in viewing their grand-offspring as instances of reproductive success to whom they 
are equally related, where there is any doubt (at all) over relatedness through males, 
they would prefer their son to aid a daughter's reproduction of grandchildren for them 
rather than to attempt to reproduce himself (Kurland 1979,167-168). We have seen that 
Hartung expanded on this perspective in his 1985 treatment. Kurland points out that this 
may be a potential source of conflict since the male himself will only prefer to invest in 
sister's offspring below the paternity threshold. 
Irons makes it clear that his understanding of Inclusive Fitness theory is that individuals 
will employ inclusive fitness maximising strategies; 
"This paper has explored reasons for variation in kinship institutions on the 
assumption that such institutions are generated by the interaction of related 
individuals pursuing mixed strategies of nepotism and reciprocity"(Irons 1979,209) 
Similarly, here is Flinn's reading of the relevance of Hamilton's contribution; 
"Current biological models of family and kinship behaviour are largely based on 
Hamilton's' (1964) theory of the evolution of social behaviour by kin selection (see 
also West-Eberhard, 1975). Kin selection theory explains how tendencies to help 
related individuals survive and reproduce (referred to as "altruism") can be adaptive, 
that is, favoured by natural selection. Hamilton proposed that it is adaptive for an 
individual (the "altruist") to assist another individual (the "recipient") when 
k>1/r... Kin selection theory proposes an ultimate reason for behavioural tendencies 
such as assisting a brother during an axe fight (Chagnon and Bugos, 1979), leaving 
inheritances to offspring, and other potentially altruistic behaviour. "(Flinn 1981 
439,440) 
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Flinn's reference to Chagnon's work is interesting and this work is discussed briefly in 
the final section of this chapter. We noted in the last chapter that Hamilton never 
mentioned `kin selection' until the term (coined by Maynard Smith to highlight the 
problems with the established `group selection') had become established (see e. g. 
Hamilton 1975, chapter 2.1.7). _Gaulin and 
Schlegel's (1980) paper continues the basic 
trend; 
"The essence of sociobiological theory is that individuals act as if attempting to 
maximize the representation of their genes in future generations. " (Gaulin & 
Schlegel 1980,301) 
However, Gaulin and Schlegel do the reader the service of making the background 
assumptions underlying the Darwinian Anthropology position more explicit, as the next 
section discusses. 
We saw above that Hartung also explicitly relies on an analysis of the strategic interests 
of male and females acting to maximise their own reproductive success; 
"Inheritance to sister's sons ensures a man's biological relatedness to his heirs, and 
matrilineal inheritance has been posited as a male accommodation to cuckoldry -a 
paternity strategy - at least since the 15`h century. However, longitudinal analysis of 
the cumulative effect of female extramarital sex indicates that matrilineal inheritance 
is most advantageous for women and would more accurately be considered a 
grandmaternity strategy... [I]t becomes clear that the enhanced association between 
inherited wealth and a benefactor's genes is much greater for females. " (Hartung 
1985,661) 
3.2.2 Male Parental Investment 
Gaulin and Schlegel (1980) give two very useful distillations of the background 
premises of the Darwinian Anthropology position; 
"[Females'] best reproductive strategy is often to provide care to those offspring they 
do produce. Males, on the other hand, can generally select one of two reproductive 
strategies or a mix of both. The first is to invest their resources in specific offspring. 
The second is to mate as widely as possible with little investment in any single 
offspring, given that at least some of these offspring may survive with maternal 
investment alone. The former strategy is an effective way to increase male 
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reproductive success only if males aim investment at bearers of their own genes. 
When genetic relatedness is ambiguous, the latter strategy is often superior. " (Gaulin 
& Schlegel 1980,301-2) 
"Applying parental investment theory to human society, we can say that a man may 
emphasise either high investment in offspring or broad procreation, and the 
distribution of his reproductive effort between these strategies can shift over his life 
cycle. Given the existence of family and kin group, whatever their composition may 
be, the majority of men in every society invest in children, whether they be a wife's, 
sister's, lover's, adoptive or some combination... Kurland, following Alexander, has 
tried to explain some of the cross-cultural variance in male investment strategies. 
These sociobiologists argue that if the "typical" man, in any society, is clearly the 
genitor (= biological father) of his wife's children, then these offspring are the most 
efficient recipients of his investment, in terms of the net effect of the investment on 
the spread of his genes. If paternity is more ambiguous, then it may be more efficient 
for him to invest in his sister's children. " (Gaulin & Schlegel 1980,302) 
Partly thanks to Gaulin and Schlegel's explicit statement of the hypotheses, we can 
identify a rough set of premises that accompany these Darwinian Anthropology 
treatments: 
1- Notice the understanding of the teleology of the evolutionary process; it is 
argued that - because acting in some way (investing in his wife's children if 
paternity is reliable) would be more `efficient' (for individual inclusive fitness 
maximisation) - it is predicted that this should occur in individual cases. 
2- Parental Investment Theory (Trivers 1972), as well as Inclusive Fitness theory, 
is employed to suggest that (universally) males always benefit their "inclusive 
fitness" by putting effort into investing in their own offspring (but only when 
they can be certain of paternity). In fact, as G&S note, parental investment 
theory simply predicts a general trade-off between `parental effort' and `mating 
effort', but the latter is in fact scarcely considered by Darwinian Anthropology. 
The familiar teleological error is made with Trivers theory as with Hamilton's. 
Being a theory within evolutionary biology, Trivers insight is fundamentally 
about the selection pressure acting over evolutionary time, not primarily a 
description of facultative strategy choice expected to be exhibited by 
individuals. The first extract above (Gaulin & Schlegel, 301) suggests that 
individual males' strategies will adjust to certainty of paternity `in real time', 
whereas the more influential selective context to consider is the long term 
ecological and demographic factors typical of the history of the species. 
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3- Aiding non-descendant genetic relatives is an alternative route to individual 
inclusive fitness (and female links are `reliable'). 
Also; 
Because it is clear that, in contemporary human populations, sometimes males do 
contribute resources towards their wife's offspring, (this being classified as male 
parental investment) and sometimes they don't, an explanation is required. The 
Darwinian Anthropologists add a final fact to their premises; 
4- Some conditions will lead to low "certainty of paternity" 
Then the Conclusion: 
5- A male will invest in his sister's children when certainty of paternity is low. 
The avuncular relationship is assumed to be equivalent to a male's `parental investment' 
instincts -a efficient alternative outlet for his need to express parental investment when 
his own certainty of paternity is low, and a male's best inclusive fitness maximising 
strategy under these circumstances. 
Clearly the argument highlights `certainty of paternity', but is variability of certainty of 
paternity really at the centre of variations in human social organisation? We have 
already looked at the use of the concept of goal-directed `individual strategies'. Is male 
resource contribution to a female's offspring best understood as being purely as a `Male 
Parental Investment' strategy? 
Nowhere does the Darwinian Anthropology position register what anthropologists had 
long appreciated as a necessary distinction between social fatherhood and biological 
fatherhood (see also Fox (1985), section 3.2.3) and what this might suggest about the 
`norms' of the relationship between a male and children. Fraser gave an early example 
of this distinction; 
"To the Central Australian father (fatherhood) means that a child is the offspring of 
the woman with whom he has the right to cohabit, whether he has actually had 
intercourse with her or not. To the European mind, the tie between a father and his 
child is physical; to the Central Australian, it is social. " (Fraser 1910 vol. 1,336 cited 
in Schneider 1984,101). 
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Schneider recounts that the distinction was later made explicit by Malinowski (1913, 
1930); 
"The family, for Malinowski, consists in a woman and the children she bears along 
with the man with whom the woman and the children are in a more or less stable 
relationship... So too, the relationship between father and child is based on the 
relationship between a man and the woman who bears the child, and this socially 
sanctioned relationship makes him eligible to be the social father. " (Schneider 1984, 
134) 
This suggests that a significant social relationship that might exist between a male and 
children ('biological' offspring or not) is principally mediated via a stable relationship 
between the male and the female caring for those children. The avuncular role as a 
`social father' is easily understood within this perspective. This perspective is even 
supported by evidence from EuroAmerican culture. Lamb (1997) reviews the evidence; 
"Belsky et al. (1984), Lamb and Elster (1985), and Dickie and Matheson (1984) all 
reported that father's interactions with their infants were influenced by the ongoing 
quality of interaction with their partners much more profoundly than mother's 
behaviour was. " (Lamb 1997,119) 
Other evidence suggests that, when the male-female relationship is positive and 
interaction between the pair frequent, males are much more involved with (Belsky et al 
1989), are less aggravated by, and have warmer feelings towards infants (Easterbrooks 
& Emde 1988). In short, psychological perspectives on parent-child relationships (even 
drawn from industrial, monogamous studies) suggests that `genealogical' connection 
may not be what mediates the social relationship that the Darwinian Anthropologists 
designate as `male parental investment'. 
Even in other areas of research that adopt a biological perspective, using concepts such 
as the parental effort / mating effort trade-off, male interaction with infants is not 
necessarily interpreted as `parental investment'. After extensive field studies, many 
primatologists prefer to characterise male involvement with a female's infants as 
`mating effort'. Stone summarises the questioning of the `paternity certainty' view 
within biological approaches and notes that this interpretation is now increasingly 
applied to the human case; 
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"Among multi-male, multi-female species, males participate somewhat in infant care 
-a finding that some researchers have interpreted not as parental investment but as a 
means of gaining sexual access to the mother (Smuts 1985). Indeed, Smuts and 
Gubernick (1992) suggest that, among primates generally, male care of infants is 
better understood as a mating strategy than as a parental investment strategy linked 
to "paternity certainty. " According to this view, a male cares for a female's infants in 
order to befriend the mother and increase his chances of mating with her. If this 
hypothesis can be extrapolated to human evolution, male care of infants may have 
emerged from male-female "friendships" rather than from conditions of greater 
"paternity certainty. " Hewlett (1991) concurs with this view and suggest by 
extension that, in human evolution, greater male care of offspring came about as a 
result of stronger social bonds between males and females. " (Stone 1997,31) 
More recent biological work on human `reproductive strategies' also questions many of 
the Darwinian Anthropology assumptions, and suggests that a biological analysis of the 
`role' of human males in connection with a female and offspring also should include the 
influence of mating effort, not only parental effort (Hawkes et al 1998,2001; Hrdy 
1999,2000; Marlowe 1999,2001). Note that any teleological interpretation of the social 
relationship (e. g. positing a `reproductive strategy' of mating effort) struggles to 
accommodate the case of avuncular relationships. 
Within the Darwinian Anthropology treatments, the contradictory stance that a male 
`normally' parentally invests in his offspring, yet is proposed not to in the many 
societies where the avunculate is present, reaches a high point in Kurland's discussion 
of `paternity ignorance'. Kurland implies that men who don't `parentally invest' are 
essentially `cheating the system'. The insinuation is that participants `must really know' 
about paternity and this leads Kurland to the statement that; 
"Behaviourally, promiscuity belies the articulated ignorance... Of course, for males, 
paternity ignorance represents a rather impressive "smokescreen" for increased 
promiscuity. Thus, one male response to the low paternity probability induced by 
paternity ignorance is simply to increase the number of matings, thereby increasing 
the number of offspring reared by others. " (Kurland 1979 173,174) 
Kurland seems to imply that the `smokescreen' is deliberate in the pursuit of the 
`strategy'; he certainly offers no alternative suggestion as to how this `strategy' is 
pursued. Conscious or not, mating effort by males is certainly considered a feature of 
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most mammals, but Darwinian Anthropologists do not consider this alternative 
biological perspective in the human case. 
Kurland misses a key point; differences between the reproductive behaviour ('strategy') 
of human males and females both between and within societies itself requires analysis. 
Even though mating effort and the availability of mating opportunities is usually top of 
the list when analysing male mammals' reproductive strategies, a possibility such as 
reduced mating opportunities (coming perhaps from institutionalised monogamy and 
the formal recognition of paternity) in some societies is not believed to be relevant. In 
their commentary on Hartung's paper, Thornhill & Thornhill (1985) illustrate these 
oversights; 
"The assumption of both Hartung's hypothesis and the hypothesis it proposes to 
displace is that matrilineal inheritance is an accommodation by males (although for 
Hartung directed by females) to what they perceive as a bad situation, namely 
reduced confidence of paternity. This assumption ignores the advantage males gain 
when freed from allocating large amounts of reproductive effort to securing paternity 
certainty and to parenting. This freedom allows males to expend more effort in 
pursuing frequent mating opportunities with multiple females. That matrilineal 
inheritance accommodates this sort of allocation of mating effort may be perceived 
by males as a good thing. " (Thornhill and Thornhill 1985,680) 
Although this perspective also suffers from positing too much real-time strategising to 
males, (again echoing the concept of `individual inclusive fitness'), unlike the 
Darwinian Anthropology position, the Thornhills do not assume that male behaviour 
has evolved to primarily seek to invest in `their' offspring. 
3.2.3 The Sexual Relationship 
We saw in the excerpt from Alexander's paper above, that social patterns such as the 
avunculate were assumed ultimately to arise or not `depending on her fidelity'. That is - 
it is assumed that `certainty of paternity' is the central issue, is always to be traced to 
female sexual behaviour, and is the ultimate cause of linearity patterns. Kurland draws 
on some anecdotal evidence; 
"Although adultery is exceedingly difficult to quantify, for obvious reasons, 
ethnographies of matrilineal groups report that the practice is common, frequent, or 
as it is often coyly put, not infrequent. There is typically, therefore, a great concern 
with marital fidelity, and jealousy may run 
high... Many patrilineal societies present 
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a marked contrast - for example, the Nuer (Evans-Pritchard 1940,1956), the Dinka 
(Deng 1972), the Tikopia (Firth 1936), the Yanomamo (Chagnon 1968,1974) and 
the Akwe-Shavante (Maybury-Lewis 1967). In these, adultery appear to be not only 
much less tolerated and more severely punished, but also less frequent. " (Kurland 
1979 159,160) 
On the one hand Kurland is saying that concern over paternity is characteristically high 
in matrilineal societies ('despite the apparent norms' - see material from Hartung, 
below), and seems to suggest patrilineal societies distinguish themselves by tolerating 
infidelity less. Fox (1993) suggests the opposite reading of the Nuer position and 
reminds us of the well supported and long standing (see section 3.2.2) anthropological 
distinction between `pater' (social father) and `genitor' (procreative father) ; 
"In many patrilineal societies... it is known that the pater is not the genitor... 
Consider the Nuer for example. Evans-Pritchard (1951) documents quite clearly that 
intercourse between a woman and a man of her husband's patrilineage is regarded as 
of no account -a "peccadillo". There are no punishments. As long as the genitor 
comes from the same patrilineage no harm is done. " (Fox 1985,674) 
According to Fox, the connection between levels of certainty of paternity and 
matrilineal or patrilineal groups (the long-standing `paternity hypothesis' referred to by 
Hartung) should have been buried long ago; 
"For most anthropologists Sydney Hartland had totally undermined these 
speculations in The Legend of Perseus (Hartland 1894-96), and had given the death 
blow in the prophetically titled Primitive Paternity (Hartland 1909-10). One would 
have thought that this title alone would have sent the paternity confidence mafia 
rushing to the dusty shelves, but the work remains unrecognised. Let us consider the 
final paragraph of Primitive Paternity (vol. 1, p 325) for its startling contemporary 
relevance: 
Motherright then is not merely found where paternity is uncertain but also where it is 
practically certain. Fatherright in the other hand is found not merely where paternity 
is certain, but also where it is uncertain and even where the legal father is known not 
to have begotten the children... It follows therefore that the uncertainty of paternity 
cannot be historically the reason for the reckoning of descent exclusively through the 
mother. " (Fox 1985,674, quoting Harland 1909-10,325) 
The Nuer case clearly nullifies Kurland's suggestion about the universal seriousness of 
sexual infidelity in patrilineal societies. Fox's comments here actually came as 
commentary on Hartung's 1985 paper. Hartung, like Kurland and Alexander is 
unambiguous about the causal relationship between paternity certainty and linearity. He 
also has no confusion about what state of affairs gives rise to paternity uncertainty; 
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"[A]lthough the establishment of matrilineal inheritance may require extremely high 
levels of female extramarital sex, once established it is likely to be maintained at 
levels of p [paternity certainty] that reasonably characterise many societies in the 
ethnographic record... Matrilineal inheritance is a cultural trait that evolved in 
response to low probability of paternity. " (Hartung 1985,661) 
So for Hartung `female extramarital sex' is the prime cause of all of these derivative 
patterns as described in classical ethnography. Hartung quotes a number of historic 
accounts documenting the correlations between matrilineal social organisation and 
`female extramarital sex'. In the 15th century, Barbosa comments on the Nayar of south 
west India; 
"[The women] do not have fixed husbands, and are very free and at liberty in doing 
what they please... [a man's] children that are born are not held to be his sons ... the 
children are not accountable for more than as children of their mothers. "(Barbosa 
1866 trans. p105-106, cited in Hartung 1985) 
What is interesting here is that Hartung is quoting a passage that makes his own framing 
of the situation as `female extramarital sex' appear to be a misinterpretation of the 
society's norms (and also casting doubt on Kurland's clams of `concern with marital 
fidelity'). Hartung notes De Charlevoix's (1744) documentation of a similar 
arrangement amongst the North American Huron Indians; 
"Hurons may part by mutual consent; this is done without any noise, and the parties 
thus separated are at liberty to enter into new engagements. These indians cannot so 
much as conceive how men should make any difficulty about it: `My wife and I (said 
one of them to a missionary, who endeavoured to bring him to a sense of the 
indecency of this sort of separation) cannot live in peace together; my neighbour is in 
exactly the same sort of situation, we have agreed to exchange wives and are all four 
perfectly well satisfied: now what can be more reasonable than to render one another 
mutually happy when it can so easily be brought about, and without hurting 
anybody? "' (De Charlevoix 1744, Vol. 2; 23,50, quoted in Hartung 1985) 
The norms of male-female bonding are clearly different from what are formally 
recognised in societies where monogamous, sexually exclusive `marriage' is the norm. 
The use of the same language and conceptual system ('wife', `marriage', `extramarital') 
to describe what are clearly two very different sets of norms may be problematic here. 
For example, in the following encyclopaedic account (again cited in Hartung) giving an 
explanation of the `cause' of matrilineal inheritance the use of the (clearly awkward) 
concepts of `husband' and `marriage' is particularly striking; 
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"[Women] are allowed by law of the country to marry as many husbands as they 
please. It is from this custom of women marrying so many husbands, and quitting 
them again at pleasure, that the children derive their pedigree from their mothers; it 
being impossible to know their true fathers... What is most surprising, and shows the 
force of custom, this female polygamy is not attended with the least disorder or 
jealousy; for if one husband sees the arms [armaments] of another at the lady's door, 
he is satisfied that the place is taken up; and rests contented until he fords the coast 
clear. It is some consolation, however, to the men, under this female usurpation, that 
their marriage-engagements are only during pleasure, and that whenever the parties 
are weary of each other, they part as freely as they meet. "[Modern Universal History 
1759, Vol. 6 p561] 
Yet Hartung justifies the perspective (that social patterns are caused by `female 
extramarital sex') by the suggestion that these variously described patterns of male- 
female bonding are best understood as aberrations from a biological norm, which are 
sustained by culture; 
"Sexual restriction of females is often put forth as a near universal component of 
human nature (Daly, Wilson & Weghorst 1982), but, as recognised by the authors of 
the Modern Universal History in 1759, the power of cultural phenomena is suggested 
by the association between matrilineal inheritance and a relative lack of sexual 
jealousy... " (Hartung 1985,669) 
"Wife exchange is a rare but not isolated cultural practice (most common among 
Eskimos and arctic Indians, see Murdock 1967)" (Hartung 1985,669) 
Where it occurs, lack of sexual jealousy (and `wife exchange') can only be explained as 
a cultural deviation from a supposedly `biological norm' of monogamy. The possibility 
that `monogamy' itself (and attendant concepts) is also culturally specific is not 
investigated. In fact, `wife exchange' at some level occurs in some 30% of human 
societies (Hrdy 2000, Broude 1994), and exclusive lifetime monogamy between a male 
and female characterises very few societies. There are cultures in which an individual 
enters into multi-male multi-female bonded society marked by ceremonies which 
strongly challenge the idea of sexual exclusivity as `normal' (e. g. Hrdy's 1999 summary 
of `initiation' in the South American Canela). Flinn also lists societies where 
monogamous "marriage" is not the norm; 
"Among the Truk, "extramarital affairs are practically universal" (Schneider, 
1961: 213). Among the Ashanti, "The high incidence of adultery among women is... 
no new thing, as the elaborate scale of adultery damages, which forms part of the 
traditional legal code, shows" (Fortes, 1950: 275). Among the Dobu, "fidelity is very, 
very rare. Typically his wife will commit adultery with a village 'brother', he with a 
village `sister"' (Fortune, 1963: 277). Among the Nayar, "It is not certain how many 
husbands a woman might have at one time; various writers of the fifteenth to 
eighteenth centuries mentioned between three and twelve" as well as receiving 
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"occasional fleeting visits" (Gough 1961a: 358). Thus the adage "no Nayar knows his 
father" (ibid: 364)" (Flinn 1981,445) 
Unsurprisingly, the same adage went for the Canela society discussed by Hrdy. Like 
Kurland and Hartung, Flinn does not allow mounting evidence, that the formal 
conception of the bond between men and women in such societies might be 
fundamentally different from that pervasive in monogamous cultures, to question the 
fundamental premises of the Darwinian Anthropology perspective. Flinn is however 
more cautious in applying other concepts of male-female bonding norms; thus 
"divorce" receives inverted commas; 
"The high frequency of "divorce" (i. e. dissolution of the conjugal or mating 
relationship) may in itself result in lowered confidence of paternity, or be the 
consequence of infidelity. " (Flinn 1981,448) 
Although their intention is not to question the assumed biological norms of male-female 
bonding that their own model relies upon, between them these treatments amply 
demonstrate that sexual bonding norms are non-exclusive in many societies. Overall, is 
such a substantial incidence of non-exclusive sexual relationships in various human 
societies really best understood as a culturally imposed (Hartung 1985) straying away 
from a more natural (and adaptive) pattern of sexual exclusivity? 
If one focuses on sexual behaviour per se as the primary cause of all subsequent social 
patterns, further analysis of the circumstances that might also shape patterns of sexual 
behaviour are obscured. Circumstances surrounding the different bonding norms of 
males and females in different societies are nowhere addressed by Hartung, Kurland or 
Alexander. Rather, linearity patterns and all related social features are assumed to arise 
from the proposed independent variable - sexual behaviour. 
3.2.4 Assumptions about Prime Causes of Lineal Social Systems 
Kurland finishes his paper with a claim of an open-minded position regarding the 
causality involved; 
"The paternity threshold model predicts how idealised human actors ought to 
respond to given levels of paternity certainty. However, this model may give the 
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impression that low paternity probability "causes, " for example, the avunculate. Not 
only is this an absurd use of mechanical causation, but it is equally reasonable to 
conclude that the avunculate "causes" low paternity probability. These aspects of 
human sociality and biology do seem to correlate, but clearly this association must 
be mediated by a host of biological, demographic, economic, and psychological 
variables that are at present rather imperfectly understood. "(Kurland 1979,175) 
Notice that the `ought' of the first sentence gives a clear impression of the `goal- 
directed' interpretation of inclusive fitness theory used by Darwinian Anthropologists. 
The final sentence is a statement of the official Darwinian Anthropology agnosticism 
regarding mediating `proximate mechanisms' which will be reviewed more thoroughly 
in the next section, and is relevant to the approach taken in the current research. Despite 
these words of caution about the causality involved, Kurland relies on assumptions of 
`default positions' for human social group organisation; 
"Thus where promiscuity is more prevalent, more tolerated or more easily 
achieved... there will be lower levels of paternity certainty. There will be a 
concomitant emphasis on the avunculate and other matrilateral relationships as 
evidenced by investment patterns, residence, and other forms of social behaviour. " 
(Kurland 1979,157) 
"The present model lends some support to Murdock's (1949) contention that 
matrilocal-matrilineal societies easily revert to patrilocal-patrilineal societies. The 
paternity threshold (=0.265) is low, and thus may be easily realized. This low 
paternity threshold easily leads to the emergence of patrilineal, patrilateral, or 
patrilocal patterns that are, in fact found in many matrilineal groups. Once the 
paternity threshold has been passed, only a radical alteration in residence, male 
mobility, promiscuity or female choice will bring the average paternity probability 
again below a fourth. Thus it is not too surprising that only 15 per cent of societies in 
Murdock's (1957) sample are matrilineal. " (Kurland 1979,176) 
Despite Kurland's claims of open-mindedness, the default position is assumed to be one 
of patrilineal society (notice `revert'). The default mating set-up is assumed to be one 
where males and females are formally bonded and a male's connection to his offspring 
is high (centrally important because of the assumption of male parental investment). It 
is therefore concluded that matrilineal systems are necessarily characterized by low- 
certainty of paternity because this is the primary cause of matrilineal organization, and 
because such organization is only sustained whilst the factors creating this low paternity 
certainty remain in place. Thus, ultimately, a male's certainty of paternity (via `female 
promiscuity') is assumed to dominate all other variables of social organisation. Kurland 
makes explicit the assumptions of the approach, without investigating those 
assumptions. 
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We have seen Hartung's ideas about the centrality of `female extramarital sex' causing 
matrilineal inheritance. He also has ideas about the link between matrilineal inheritance 
and linearity patterns in general; 
"Given anthropology's traditional emphasis on lineality, inheritance to sister's sons 
has been seen as a consequence of reckoning one's lineage through female ancestors. 
The opposite could be the case; i. e. matrilineality may be a consequence of 
inheritance to sister's sons, and changes in lineality systems may generally follow 
changes in inheritance patterns. " (Hartung 1985,669) 
In marked contrast to Hartung and Kurland's exclusive focus on `female promiscuity', 
Irons, refreshingly, does not put this as prime cause. Instead, he suggests that analysis of 
patterns human social behaviour should take into account a number of variables; 
"[T]he variation in the specific activities which individuals are able to carry out in a 
particular environment to increase their own and their allies' reproductive success, 
and the magnitude of the effect of these activities on reproductive success. 
Environmental constraints and opportunities define an optimal pattern of investment 
and this, in turn, defines an optimal pattern of residence, rules for inheritance of 
property, the nature of marriage contracts, and other social patterns governing 
relationships among primary allies. " (Irons 1979,208) 
Irons defines `environment' as "everything external to an individual which affects his or 
her inclusive fitness. Other individuals and their expected modes of behaviour are often 
the most salient feature of the environment when it is defined in this way. "(Irons 1979, 
184). Irons also notes unusual social patterns in societies characterised by unusual 
resource conditions, and, refreshingly, brings in consideration of what anthropologists 
would identify as local or perhaps even cultural factors influencing the behaviour of 
males (and females); 
,, In contrast to female behaviour, male behaviour is more variable from one society 
to another. This reflects a greater variation for males than for females in the optimal 
pattern of investment among mating effort, parental effort and other kin effort ... 
[I]n 
industrial societies male and female investment patterns have come to resemble one 
another. Both sexes are characterised by low fertility, high parental investment in a 
few offspring, and little kin effort other than parental effort. "(Irons 1979,205) 
In an interesting reversal of perspective on the necessity of bonding between males and 
females, Irons goes on to suggest that the variables may in fact be related in the 
following manner; 
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"It might seem at first glance that women would always be interested in securing 
males investment for their children and that a husband who is convinced he is related 
to her children by'/z would always be a more reliable investor than a brother who can 
be related by no more than '/.. However, this would not be the case if a cooperative 
group of related females is more effective at rearing children than a husband-and- 
wife pair or a polygynous group consisting of one husband and several unrelated 
females. This is apparently the situation faced by Tiwi women [a society Irons 
discusses in the paper]. Given this condition, women may not be willing to do 
anything for a husband which disrupts the effectiveness of a cooperative group of 
related females. This could easily mean a woman would be unwilling to move at 
marriage or to tolerate a husband who interferes in the relations between herself and 
her co-resident female kin. This condition may underlie uxorilocality and frequent 
divorce in many societies. If the value for child rearing of a related group of females 
is very high and the value of male assistance in child rearing very low, women may 
be reluctant to move at marriage, disinclined to value marriage once conflict emerges 
between a husband and wife, and setting little store in fidelity as a means of giving a 
man paternity confidence. " (Irons 1979,210-211) 
Here Irons is placing reproductive resources available to females, (and thus female 
residence patterns) centrally, male-female bonding and other demographic patterns 
peripherally. 
We saw that Flinn attaches some relevance to the fact that matrilineal groups are more 
`corporate', and thus influential when residence is matrilocal, although he had a slightly 
different view of how this might fit into the larger picture. In fact, Flinn mainly follows 
the Kurland/Hartung emphasis for the causal chain leading to linearity patterns. 
Nonetheless, in discussing the correlates of matrilineal inheritance systems, Flinn 
documents a number of the variables whose casual relationship fits Irons' scheme, 
especially the possibility that females may not place a high value on being tied to one 
male; 
"[T]here are some societies in which confidence of paternity appears to be greater 
that the 1/3 threshold, but the frequency of divorce is high (i. e. typically an 
individual will have been divorced three four or more times in a lifetime). In such 
societies, the parental role of the father is usually reduced compared to the parental 
role of the father in societies with low rates of divorce. This is especially true if the 
offspring remain with the mother after separation. " (Flinn 1981,448) 
Here, Flinn has come across a correlation that cannot easily be explained by the 
`Alexander resolution'; if males are confident of paternity and have a universal 
tendency to invest in their own offspring, why should they not do so? Flinn himself has 
some ideas about causality, although the first is essentially the Alexander hypothesis; 
`Biological theory suggests the following reasons: First, altruism dispensed by a man 
to his offspring might be utilised by his offspring's uterine half-siblings who are 
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unrelated to him... (see also Kurland 1979). The second reason ... is the potential 
impediment to parental behaviour caused by the separate residence of father and 
offspring. If the distance between residences is such that the cost of parental 
behaviour is greatly increased or makes appropriate parental behaviour difficult... 
then coresiding sister's children may become more advantageous recipients of a 
male's altruism. " (Flinn 1981,448-449) 
In these two excerpts, Flinn has noticed certain conditions surrounding the tendency of 
males to discontinue "investment in offspring". Flinn suggests that the physical distance 
between the male and the offspring may exert too high a cost even for a male who is 
certain the offspring are his. Such occurrences are difficult to account for under a `Male 
Parental Investment Strategy' model. The perspective which emphasises the importance 
for the male's relationship with the mother of the children (e. g. the anthropological 
`pater', and see above 3.2.2) can easily accommodate such evidence. 
3.3 The move towards Anthropological Hypotheses of `Descent' 
Although some of the Darwinian Anthropology treatments have mentioned the 
relationship between residence patterns and `lineality' patterns, this relationship and the 
factors influencing it are secondary to the `certainty of paternity' factor in their models. 
The prominence of `descent' conceptions of `kinship' (social bonding patterns) were in 
fact in decline within anthropology by this time (see chapters 8 and 9). Nevertheless the 
association between `residence' and/or subsistence options and `kinship' had long been 
part of anthropological analyses of social patterns. In this section we find that some of 
the Darwinian Anthropology treatments mention these analyses (whilst still 
emphasising `investment strategies'), and by 1985 (in commentary on Hartung) many 
were suggesting that it might be worth paying more attention to these perspectives. 
Taking a. leaf out of Irons' book, Flinn (1981) goes on to note ecological and 
subsistence resource influences on variation in the pattern of social relationships; 
"Morgan (1870) Tylor (1889), Spencer (1967), Lowie (1920), among others 
championed the relative role of men and women in subsistence as relevant to family 
structure and kinship organisation. When women are the primary providers, they 
suggested, residence is likely to be matrilocal and kinship matrilineal... [As] a 
woman's economic and social position relative to her mate's increases, the 
importance of her mate's economic and social contribution to her offspring may 
decrease... As the ability of males to reciprocate in the conjugal relationship 
diminishes, family structure is likely to become increasingly "matrilfocal" (and 
usually but not necessarily uterine kin biased - see Gonzales, 1970). When males 
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have little contribution to make to the family, women may gain from a short-term, 
multiple-mate strategy (Gonzales 1969; Stack, 1975). "(Flinn 1981,450-452) 
Later, under a section titled `Residence: An Adaptive Choice? ' Flinn considers this 
association further; 
"Linton... states that "matrilineal descent is normally linked with matrilocal 
residence, patrilineal with patrilocal"... This hypothesis, in terms of a biological 
theory, suggests a functional association between the flow of altruism, residence, and 
kinship behaviour. If the biological basis for this hypothesis is valid, then the 
potential altruism an individual is likely to receive in a given location should be a 
criterion for residence choice. If a male child receives the most altruism from his 
mother's brother, avunculocal residence is expected if co-residence enhances the 
benefits derived. If the flow of altruism changes over an individual's life-history, 
then different residences at different life history stages are predicted... Predictably, 
socio-economic status affect residence choice, as "men of wealth and distinction are 
able to reverse the usual rules of residence" (Richards, 1950: 248) keeping their 
wives and putative offspring - of whose paternity they are likely to be relatively 
certain - resident with them. In general, patterns of residence appear to be associated 
with the flow of altruism, although the direction of causality is difficult to 
determine. " (Flinn, 453-454) 
As Irons suggested, there may be an alternative way to view the situation: Where 
females can be self-sufficient in an environment, daughters might simply remain in their 
natal group (matrilocal residence) and need not attach themselves to a husband, since 
they can get assistance from other local females. In turn, males do not need to commit 
themselves to one female, and overall, `paternity confidence' is not emphasised. This 
perspective, outlined by Irons (above), mirrors a well established anthropological 
position that had, by this time, been clearly set out by cross-cultural anthropologists 
working on the ontogeny of descent groups (more below), perhaps most notably by 
Ember and Ember (1971,1975, see Pasternak et al 1997 for a review). 
Gaulin and Schlegel also noted the influence of residence and are generally careful 
about specifying causality; 
"The most significant distribution that we find is between paternal confidence and 
residence, where high paternal confidence appears with father-centred residence... 
whereas mother-centred or mother's-brother-centred residence is more likely in low 
paternal confidence societies. Thus fathers are more likely to exert authority in 
households where they are more likely to be the genitors of the wife's children, and 
less likely to do so where they are not. An alternative explanation is that where males 
exert authority over the households in which their children live, they are more able to 
make certain of their paternity of these children than men who do not have the same 
degree of household authority. " (Gaulin & Schlegel 1980,304-305) 
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By the time of his commentary on Hartung's 1985 paper, Kurland had become much 
more interested in possible ecological factors contributing to `certainty of paternity': 
"[W]hat is cause and what is effect in the association between the avunculate and 
paternity?... What kind of ecologies foster low or variable paternal probabilities? By 
specifying some of the ecological factors associated with matriliny or low paternal 
probability, we might begin to flesh out the proximate costs and benefits associated 
with alternative marital and inheritance strategies, and thus begin to understand the 
ultimate benefits and costs associated with the concomitant reproductive and 
nepotistic strategies. " (Kurland 1985,675-676) 
Reunited in the same commentary, Flinn was by now also keen to suggest that 
subsistence factors needed to be investigated; 
"The environmental determinants of probability of paternity and inheritance 
strategies are an important area for further analysis. This is where evolutionary and 
ecological hypotheses may have the most to offer students of human social 
behaviour. Murdock (1949), Aberle (1961), Gough (1961), Hiatt (1980), and other 
anthropologists have hypothesised that subsistence strategies may affect patterns of 
kinship and inheritance. Their arguments are compatible in many respects with 
models from behavioural ecology (e. g. Krebs and Davies 1978). Humans exhibit a 
wide range of mating and inheritance patterns, providing a useful empirical base for 
comparative analysis of evolutionary and ecological hypotheses... Studies of cultural 
change in matrilineal societies (e. g. Fuller 1976; Gough 1961) also indicate that 
change is initiated by individuals pursuing mating and kinship strategies that are 
influenced by economic concerns... The corporate nature of kin groups tends to 
break down with modernisation and the accompanying individual ownership of 
property (Fuller 1976; Gough 1961). "(Flinn 1985,673-674) 
But this perspective is little different from the established anthropological perspective 
mentioned above (although the latter doesn't hypothesize `mating and kinship 
strategies' or `certainty of paternity'). In fact, in the same commentary, Lancaster gives 
an overview of just such an account of the typical ecological/subsistence correlates of 
lineal groups, starting with matrilineality; 
"Women contributed very substantially to the food supply. The scale of village life 
was small. Women could be star players in the socio-political arena while raising 
large families and tending the family gardens... But in areas where better soils and 
climates gave rise to denser populations and civilisations supported by intensified 
peasant exploitation of a restricted land base, human organisation developed a 
different set of adaptive rules. The need to fight for scarce land, the need to add male 
to female labour in a more productive type of agriculture, and increased socio- 
political scale all combined to elevate the importance of male over female roles... 
Now the problem with Hartung's argument is that he erroneously uses strategies 
(wealth inheritance, control of female sexuality) and concepts (cuckoldry) associated 
with the peasant adaptation to interpret patterns (such as matriliny) associated with 
the [non-peasant] tribal world. Contrary to Hartung's view, extramarital sex as only 
been highly restricted for women in the peasant and post-peasant worlds. Only in 
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those worlds has there been a marked tendency, and need, for men to transfer wealth 
to their sons. " (Lancaster 1985,676-677) 
Lancaster thus gives an overview of the anthropological position given more extensive 
treatment by Ember and Ember (1971,1975 and others). Hartung describes Lancaster's 
commentary as `an authoritative sounding panoramic view of prehistory is given in the 
"you are there" style. ' (Hartung 1985,686). However, a number of these suggestions 
are resonant with the ideas of Irons and the later ideas of Flinn (1985 above) as well as 
the large number of anthropologists listed by Flinn. 
Nevertheless, as discussed in chapter one (see also chapter 7) a more fundamental 
problem with the lineage perspective had been identified by anthropologists. Indeed, as 
we saw in chapter one, the whole way in which social organisation was understood in 
anthropology was being revised by accounts such as Schneider's (1984). In particular, 
the long-standing assumption that kinship is predicated (directly or indirectly) on 
genealogy was itself being questioned. 
In a sense then, Darwinian Anthropologists were in search of a phenomena that required 
their perspective. Not only was the Darwinian Anthropology emphasis on the genetic 
relatedness at the heart of `kinship' totally out of tune with anthropology's critiques of 
the connection between genealogy and `kinship'; the (now declining) interest in the 
association between residence, subsistence and male-female bonding patterns was well 
modelled by traditional anthropological approaches and required few of their concepts. 
Were connections with biology to be made, it seemed that behavioural ecology (which 
is largely independent of Inclusive Fitness theory) might be more compatible with an 
analysis of residence and lineality patterns than the Darwinian Anthropology models. 
3.4 Proximate Mechanisms 
Alexander's original paper did not discuss the psychological or behavioural 
mechanisms whereby, as he saw it, individuals end up accurately tracking their optimal 
`individual inclusive fitness' maximising strategies. In fact, this agnostic position has 
characterised early sociobiological positions in general, not merely Darwinian 
Anthropology treatments of the avunculate and matrilineality patterns. So important has 
this discrepancy been, that another school making reference to evolutionary biology has 
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grown up in the space left over - Evolutionary Psychology. Their critique of Darwinian 
Anthropology on this basis will be sampled briefly below. First, however, the avoidance 
of discussion of proximate mechanisms in the treatments we have come across so far is 
illustrated. 
Kurland makes a number of introductory comments explaining the focus of his 
treatment; 
"It is not the purpose of this paper to trace the phylogeny of the avunculate from 
some reconstructed ancestral nonhuman primate society... [I]n this paper, I attempt 
to explicate this aspect of human kinship and social organisation in terms of basic 
evolutionary biological principles. Such a functional explanation of the avunculate 
can indicate only why such behaviour is biologically adaptive, that is, specify its 
ultimate causes in the process of natural selection. Functional explanations of 
behaviour rest on such evolutionary arguments. This does not imply that the many 
previous explanations about the proximate psychological or economic causes of 
human kinship behaviour are incorrect or irrelevant.... Evolutionary biologists who 
study the evolution of sociality are concerned with the predication or explanation of 
how behaviour maps onto the environment, not how genes map into behaviour. For 
an evolutionary biologist who investigates social behaviour, the particularly salient 
environmental stimuli relevant to explanations of an actor's behaviour are those very 
stimuli generated by the ongoing behaviour of other actors in the population... 
Postulating the existence of a gene that obliquely codes for "altruism" is only a 
simplifying and heuristic procedure... such modelling procedures in no way commit 
one to strict genetic determinism or reactionary politics" (Kurland 1979,146-147 
emphasis in original) 
The latter guarded comments are best understood in light of the reaction to Wilson's 
controversial position on genes and behaviour (see below). However, Kurland's claim 
that biologists are concerned with `how behaviour maps onto the environment, not how 
genes map onto behaviour' too often results in a complete absence of any investigation 
of evolved proximate behavioural or psychological mechanisms of social behaviour. 
Irons (1979) follows the basic line of argument that individual behavioural choices are 
expected to maximise the individual's inclusive fitness, regardless of mechanisms; 
"It should further be noted that such choices are not consciously made in terms of 
inclusive fitness. Exactly what sort of thought processes do lead to actual decisions is 
a complex issue not dealt with in this paper. Here it is merely assumed that whatever 
these thought processes are they tend to produce the same result that a conscious 
weighing of choices would have in terms of their effects on inclusive fitness... [T]he 
objective is to demonstrate how one can derive specific testable hypotheses from the 
general proposition that interaction among primary social allies is governed by 
investment choices aimed at maximising inclusive fitness. " (Irons 1979,182-4) 
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Flinn concludes his treatment by outlining the Darwinian Anthropology methodology, 
highlighting the assumption of individuals' inclusive fitness maximising goals; 
"The biological model of family structure and mating-marriage systems presented 
here does not rely on genetic differences to account for behavioural differences. 
Rather, the variability of a few basic factors - confidence of paternity, genetic 
relatedness, and the distribution of reproductive resources in the physical and social 
environment - are postulated to explain behavioural differences within the context of 
individual adaptation... Modem evolutionary theory posits that individuals strive not 
only to survive, but also to reproduce and increase the survival and reproduction of 
genetic relatives. " (Flinn 1981,465) 
Gaulin and Schlegel include a brief statement on the relevance of proximate 
mechanisms in their final discussion: 
"The more proximate (e. g. psychological) aspects of how such changes [in 
investment norms] might be mediated fall outside of the realm of the present study 
but one might hypothesise a sort of cognitive consistency mechanism. " (Gaulin & 
Schlegel 1980,307) 
Hartung is even less interested in proximate mechanisms, but does make a statement on 
genetic influences; 
"The association between inheritance practise and probability of paternity illustrates 
an important relationship between culture and biology. Sociobiology need not argue 
that differences between societies result from differences in genes for inheritance 
strategy. The argument here is only that the association between traits can be 
predicted by evolutionary theory. " (Hartung 1985,669) 
By the time of his (1985) commentary in Hartung, Kurland had become more interested 
in discussing mechanisms; 
"What is the psychological reality of the paternity hypothesis? I think less stringent 
or improbable mechanisms are required than does Barkow (1984). Indeed, I do not 
believe it would be too difficult to find evidence of a human ability to track 
paternity; mice and monkeys seem capable of it (see papers in Hausfater & Hrdy 
1984). For example, the cross-cultural data on sexual jealousy provide prima-facie 
evidence for a male-specific psychology predicated on paternity uncertainty (Daly, 
Wilson & Weghorst 1982; Symons 1979). But perhaps Hartung and I have not 
thought through the exact causal, ecological, or psychological mechanism implied by 
the paternity hypothesis. " (Kurland 1985,676) 
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3.5 Criticism from Outside Darwinian Anthropology: Evolutionary Psychology 
From the above excerpts on mechanisms, it is notable that many of the treatments 
simultaneously emphasise that cultural differences need not be caused by genetic 
differences. Are the two points -a keenness to emphasise a lack of genetic 
"determinism" and the avoidance of focus on proximate mechanisms - related in any 
way? Although Alexander did not discuss these issues in his 1974 paper, he did in his 
1979 book; 
"If there is one thing that natural selection has given to every species, it is the ability 
to adjust in different fashions to different developmental environments. That is what 
phenotypes are all about, and all organisms have phenotypes. If there is an organism 
most elaborately endowed with flexibility in the face of environmental variation, it is 
the human organism. " (Alexander 1979,95) 
Like the others, Alexander suggests that attempts to draw conclusions about genetic 
limitations are "a profound misunderstanding of biology and evolution" (Alexander 
1979,95). For this reason, human behaviour is to be explained by revealing how, in 
different environments, people modify their attitudes and practices so as to maximise 
their individual inclusive fitness. 
This position of the Darwinian Anthropologists is undoubtedly motivated by a desire to 
avoid the controversy generated in the wake of publication of Wilson's 1975 book 
Sociobiology, and a distancing from some of Wilson's premises, especially his position 
on the relative place of phenotypic flexibility or genetic differences. Wilson, in turn, 
was of course reacting against what he saw to be the errors of the `environmentalist 
position'; 
"Dobzhansky (1963) stated this position as follows: "Culture is not inherited through 
genes, it is acquired by learning from other human beings... In a sense, human genes 
have surrendered their primacy in human evolution to an entirely new, nonbiological 
or superorganic agent, culture. However, it should not be forgotten that this agent is 
entirely dependent on the human genotype. " Although the genes have given away 
most of their sovereignty, they maintain a certain amount of influence in at least the 
behavioural qualities that underlie variations between cultures... Variations in the 
rules among human cultures, however slight, might provide clues to underlying 
genetic differences, particularly when it is correlated with variation in behavioural 
traits known to be heritable. " (Wilson 1975,550) 
Although many social scientists and biologists alike would broadly agree with 
Dobzhansky's position (see chapter one), Wilson's position is quite different. Wilson is 
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clearly quite wrong that variations between cultures necessarily must logically result 
from genetic differences. The unsupported claim that cultural differences reflect genetic 
differences runs contrary to the foundation that Boas and others had provided for the 
contemporary social sciences (see chapter 1), and was perhaps the main reason why 
Wilson's thesis attracted strong opposition. Alexander, seeking to avoid controversy, 
refers to behavioural plasticity and conversely avoids discussion of proximate 
mechanisms involving underlying genetic influence, and the possibility of uncovering 
Wilson's `differences'. 
Unfortunately, the Darwinian Anthropology caution and official agnosticism on 
proximate mechanisms, whilst being a `safe' position, itself is unsustainable, and 
eventually gave rise to a further counter position - that of the Evolutionary 
Psychologists (see Symons below). We saw above that Darwinian Anthropologists 
advance the hypothesis that individuals simply strive to maximise their individual 
inclusive fitness. Kitcher (1985) discusses this hypothesis; 
"Let us suppose that Alexander, Kurland, and others succeed in showing that in 
certain environments particular forms of social behaviour maximise the inclusive 
fitness of those who engage in them. What exactly have we learned about human 
nature? The careful qualifications issued by Kurland and Alexander seem to block 
the most direct connection between premises about inclusive fitness and conclusions 
about fundamental features of human social behaviour. So it seemed to three 
reviewers of Alexander's book. In the postscript he reports that these readers "were 
disappointed that I had not more explicitly attacked the problem of what constitutes 
human nature, identifying its limits and explaining the consequences" (Alexander 
1979,279)" (Kitcher 1985,282,283) 
Later in his book, Kitcher suggests that; 
"A commonsense picture of human motivation that I shall call folk psychology... 
supposes that people typically act so as to maximise the chances of obtaining the 
things that they perceive as valuable... [W]hen it is put to work in the social 
sciences, folk psychology offers an account of the proximate mechanisms that 
underlie human actions... we can envisage the possibility that evolutionary biology 
might enrich folk psychology by charting the evolutionary history that underlies the 
proximate mechanisms folk psychologists invoke. Here we discover one way in 
which Alexander's [behavioural plasticity] version of sociobiology might be 
articulated... Clear-headed folk psychologists ought to recognise that there are 
evolutionary explanations for whatever mechanisms underlie our familiar human 
aspirations... let us call this discipline evolutionary folk psychology... I conclude 
that if evolutionary folk psychology is a correct program for the understanding of 
human social arrangements, then the [Darwinian Anthropology] claims about 
maximisation of inclusive fitness under special social arrangements do not contribute 
the evolutionary explanations that are really needed. " (Kitcher 1985,285-288) 
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Kitcher's point about the wrong-headedness of Darwinian Anthropology's agnosticism 
about proximate mechanisms was well argued, and his concept of `proximate 
mechanisms' (particularly the psychological mechanisms) are what the current research 
will later investigate. A similar line of argument was taken up later by Symons (see 
below). The only alternative stance that Darwinian Anthropology could take was to; 
"[S]uppose there is some general mechanism for calculating the expected payoffs of 
the available courses of action and to maintain that this always comes into play in the 
causation of our social behaviour... the general fitness calculator, quietly grinding 
out what is in our best evolutionary interests. " (Kitcher 1985,289) 
Positing such a general purpose `inclusive fitness calculator' makes references to 
potentially complex proximate mechanisms unnecessary. In the Darwinian 
Anthropology assumption that individuals do act to maximise their inclusive fitness in 
some automatic way, such a general mechanism is implicitly invoked. But we saw in 
chapter two that this is an erroneous interpretation of Inclusive Fitness theory. Fox 
makes a similar point to that of Kitcher about a folk psychology view of motivation; 
"Are they really motivated to "maximise their inclusive fitness, " as the 
sociobiological formula has it?... Is it not enough to say that we have a number of 
simple and observable motives, and if we act on these... if we get all of these right, 
then "maximisation of inclusive fitness" will follow. We do not have to posit hidden 
and unconscious motives that go directly to maximisation choices (Fox 1986). " (Fox 
1993,225) 
Symons, in his influential paper "A Critique of Darwinian Anthropology" (1989) made 
a number of critiques of this neglect of the features of evolved behaviours (DA below = 
Darwinian Anthropology); 
"DA's central hypothesis is that "evolved behavioural tendencies" cause human 
"behaviour to assume the form that maximises inclusive fitness"(Irons 1979b, 33). 
Turke and Betzig (1985) state this hypothesis as a formal prediction: "Modem 
Darwinian theory predicts that human behaviour will be adaptive, that is, designed to 
promote maximum reproductive success through available descendant and 
nondescendant relatives. "(p 79)... [T]he key terms in [this] quotation are used in DA 
to bypass the question of phenotypic design in characterisations of adaptation. " 
(Symons 1989,131-132) 
"As Tooby and Cosmides [1989] note, "expectations of adaptation predict behaviour 
only approximately, and do not appear to lead further than the characterisation of 
modem behaviour as either adaptive or maladaptive, that is, as consistent with 
expectations derived from fitness maximisation models or inconsistent with them. 
On the other hand, knowledge of the innate psychological mechanisms that actually 
produce behaviour should predict behaviour far more closely. " (Symons 1989,141) 
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It was on the basis of the potential value of investigating proximate mechanisms that 
Evolutionary Psychology emerged. This school has largely stayed away from 
applications to human kinship patterns, with the exception of Daly and Wilson (see also 
chapter 1.6). In an explicit application to `kinship' Daly and Wilson, surprisingly, voice 
their support for the position advanced by the Darwinian Anthropologists; 
"Following a suggestion by Alexander (1974), evolution-minded anthropologists 
have discussed the incidence of extrapair paternity that would be necessary for 
putative fathers to actually be more closely related, on average, to their sister's sons 
than to their wives' sons (Kurland 1979). Avuncular inheritance is indeed cross- 
culturally associated with conditions conductive to low levels of paternity confidence 
(Flinn, 1981; Gaulin & Schlegel, 1980), and if those levels are seldom or never quite 
low enough to make the sisters' sons closer kinsmen than wives' sons, we should 
remember that these inheritance decisions are not the man's alone and that his 
parents can always be surer of their relationship to his sister's children than to his 
own children (Flinn, 1981; Hartung, 1985). " (Daly et al 1997,274) 
Daly and Wilson go on to question the accuracy of Sahlins' (1976) summary that 
human `kinship' patterns are potentially independent of consanguinity. In doing so they 
thus challenge Schneider's position, as well as most of the ethnographic evidence (see 
chapter 1), and ignore the findings of other sociobiologists (e. g. Silk 1987, see chapter 
1.2). In this respect, despite the stated adherence to a focus on proximate mechanisms, 
these Evolutionary Psychologists' privileging of genetic relatedness is actually stronger 
than that of earlier sociobiologists. They claim that amongst many other `universal' 
features of human kinship systems; 
"Kinship relations are universally understood to be arrayed along a dimension of 
closeness... [which] is always negatively correlated with the characteristic number 
of genealogical links defining them, and hence positively correlated with genetic 
relatedness (r). The first five universals are apparently conceded by even the most 
biophobic of commentators. Where cultural determinists have tried to draw the line 
is on this sixth point. In a famous attempt to refute the applicability of Hamiltonian 
theory to human affairs, Sahlins (1976) claimed to have demonstrated "that the 
categories of 'near' and `distant' vary independently of consanguinal distance and 
that these categories organize actual social practice" (p. 112). He had, of course, 
demonstrated nothing of the sort. His evidence consisted entirely of typological 
descriptions of alleged practices in certain societies which, if verified, would indicate 
only that the correlation between "closeness" and genetic relatedness is sometimes 
less than perfect... the categories of "near" and "distant" do not "vary independently 
of consanguinal distance, " not in any society on earth. " (Daly et al 1997,281-282) 
It is particularly ironic that Daly and Wilson's actual lack of understanding of 
anthropological thinking is such that they even go on to implicate Schneider himself as 
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being in support of their position that genealogy (by which they read genetic 
relatedness) is really what, for all societies, `kinship' is all about; 
"In our society and many others, the interests of the firstborn young may be 
especially well served by familial solidarity, and it is of interest that firstborns are 
disproportionally inclined to assume the role of family genealogist (Salmon, 1997). 
Ours is certainly not what anthropologists would call a kin-based society.... Both 
sexes are interested in genealogy as a hobby, but several studies suggest that women 
are particularly inclined to maintain active kin networks (Hogan & Eggebeen, 1995; 
Schneider & Cotterell, 1975). Troll (1987) provides evidence that men's kinship 
bonds operate through the influence of their wives or parents, and that older women 
typically adopt the role of "kinkeeper, " providing family news updates, organizing 
get-togethers, maintaining contacts among family members, and training daughters 
or granddaughters for the role. And North American women do indeed know their 
own genealogies better than men (Salmon & Daly, 1996; Schneider & Cottrell, 
1975). " (Daly et al. 1997,284) 
Of course, Schneider's point was precisely that this cultural valuation of `kinship' 
(genealogy) may be a unique feature of EuroAmerican culture (Schneider 1984,201). 
His point receives further support here from Daly et al. 
3.6 More Attention to Proximate Mechanisms? 
As is clear from the analysis so far, the assumption that individuals always act in 
accordance with the interests of their own `inclusive fitness maximisation' characterises 
Darwinian Anthropology as a whole. Kitcher gives an example of a case where the 
Darwinian Anthropologists' own data might better be interpreted with an appeal to 
proximate mechanisms that respond to circumstantial cues. He discusses Chagnon and 
Bugos' (1979) suggestion that genealogical relatedness mapping onto individual 
allegiance patterns should be clearly visible in a confrontational situation where such 
alliances are crucial. They illustrate this with the example of a Yanomamo `axe-fight' 
(they use the blunt ends) that occurs between two acquaintances during a period of 
`village fissioning'. Chagnon and Bugos claim that; 
"[T]he major variable appears to be closeness of genetic relatedness: individuals 
seemed primarily to "decide" to aid others on the basis of the degree of relatedness 
obtaining between themselves and other participants in the fight. (Chagnon & Bugos 
1979,222)" (Kitcher 1985,312) 
But Kitcher deliberately adopts a `proximate mechanism' perspective; 
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"Perhaps people fight on the side of those they like and against those they dislike, or 
those they like less. Given a propensity to like close kin, especially those with whom 
one has been reared, and also to be well disposed towards those with whom one has a 
history of reciprocal exchanges, it may be that the resultant behaviour will coincide 
with the action recommended by inclusive-fitness maximisation. However, there is 
no unconscious computation of coefficients of relatedness... This suggestion nearly 
makes sense of the data. Almost all Mohesiwa's supporters are close relatives - 
siblings, uncles, close cousins - or people who come from the new village. In three 
cases visitors from the new village who are more closely related to Uuwa than to 
Mohesiwa fight with Mohesiwa, presumably on the grounds of solidarity against the 
hosts [village]. " (Kitcher 1985,312-313) 
Notice that the proximate mechanisms that Kitcher suggests are of the same kind 
invoked by Hamilton and Dawkins (see chapter two). He suggests that simple `rule of 
thumb' mechanisms (e. g. liking those you have been reared with) might by-and-large 
have met the Inclusive Fitness criterion (in typical evolutionary environments). Kitcher 
further discusses some of the `coefficients of relatedness' which characterise the 
variously allied individuals in the Yanomamo confrontation, including this interesting 
fact that a small number of individuals actually go to the aid of the key combatant to 
whom they are less closely related (though the relationships are fairly distant relatives). 
Kitcher continues; 
"A preliminary explanation of the patterns of alliance is that people choose to defend 
close kin... and choose sides on the basis of village loyalty where factors of kinship 
do not proscribe a course of action... My tentative suggestions only show that folk 
psychology, with its strategy of appealing to proximate mechanisms promises to 
provide a far more illuminating account of the alliances in the fight... " (Kitcher 1985, 
315) 
Kitcher's suggestion is then that, in place of invocation of a `general purpose inclusive 
fitness maximising mechanism', an investigation of evolved proximate behavioural 
mechanisms should inform biological analyses of social behaviour. Can we add this 
suggestion about proximate mechanisms to the discussion about the comparative role of 
`situational cues' (e. g. Dawkins 1979, chapter 2.2.1)? The area of theory concerned 
with how social behaviours are mediated is investigated in the next chapter. 
112 
Chapter Four - `Kin Recognition' Theory: Context Driven or Positive Powers? 
4.1 Introduction 
In reviewing basic Inclusive Fitness theory in chapter 2, I argued that social behavioural 
tendencies will evolve to reflect the typical genetic relatedness of the (social) situations 
that individuals encounter, and that those behavioural tendencies are expressed within. 
An understanding of how this might occur is crucial. It was suggested that this could in 
principle happen by circumstantial rules of thumb (as in Dawkins' `in the nest' 
example), or by `positive discrimination' (Hamilton 1987) of actual genetic relatedness. 
These alternatives clearly have a bearing on how biological theory should be 
interpreted. Does it predict that individuals have evolved social behavioural dispositions 
to cooperate with actual genetic relatives? Or simply that the expression of social 
behaviours will be cued in those situations and contexts in which genetic relatives 
would typically (in past evolutionary environments) have been encountered? 
At the close of chapter three we found that Kitcher (1985) made a suggestion to 
illustrate that evolved `proximate' psychological mechanisms may be involved in the 
expression of social behaviours in humans. In its basic components, his suggestion was 
that; being reared with a person may lead to `liking' the person and; `liking' a person 
may lead to helping them. Clearly Kitcher supplied no great detail with this suggestion, 
and no evidence to support its validity as an accurate interpretation of how Inclusive 
Fitness theory applies to humans (his intention was simply to illustrate the conceptual 
point). Nevertheless, Kitcher's suggestion is not very different from Dawkins' 
suggestion, and even the discussion by Hamilton (1964) about the development of 
social behaviours in birds according to context and situational cues (see 2.2.4). In 
Kitcher's example the situation or context is `reared with' (although this lacks any clear 
definition) which leads to `liking' (a form of social bonding) and this in turn is the 
`proximate mechanism' that mediates the social behaviour. 
In the following three chapters, we investigate the question of `actual genetic 
relatedness' in the mediation of social behaviours more closely. Does the notion that 
human social actions may be mediated by situational cues and social bonds stand up 
against comparative evidence from other mammals and primates (chapters 5 and 6)? 
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Before we turn to this evidence, it would be useful to know how biologists usually 
conceptualise the possibilities. In this chapter (following on from the brief introduction 
on chapter 2), the theoretical alternatives are more thoroughly reviewed. The question 
of how social behaviours might `track relatedness' - whether this is `context driven' or 
by `positive powers' of discrimination (Hamilton 1987) - has become known as `kin 
recognition theory'. The term `kin recognition' is to `kin selection' as `tracking genetic 
relatedness' is to `Inclusive Fitness theory'. Kin recognition is the accepted language of 
the field which studies the extent to which organisms' behaviour effectively 
discriminates `relatedness'. Although, as noted in chapter two, the term `kin' is 
inappropriate in applications to human social behaviour, the terminological use in this 
chapter nevertheless follows the convention in this field. 
4.2 Tracking Genetic Relatedness - Basic Conceptual Points 
As I set out in chapter two, Inclusive Fitness theory should not be interpreted to mean 
that organisms are selected to evolve social behaviours regardless of the environmental 
and ecological selection pressures for doing so (see Sherman 1980, section 2.1.6). 
Similarly, mechanisms for accurately identifying genetic relatives are obviously not 
necessarily expected to evolve as ends in themselves. If the context of interaction 
between individuals who may be genetic relatives does not occur with any consistency 
there will be no selection pressure for behaviours which are sensitive to that relatedness 
(or lack of relatedness). 
Although experiments to demonstrate a lack of an evolved ability to distinguish genetic 
relatives are understandably rare, a few tests of kin recognition ability in some species 
illustrate this; for example, in work on the salamander Hemidactylium scutatum 
researchers summarized their findings thus; 
"Larvae of Hemidactylium did not show statistically significant kin recognition 
ability or the ability to recognize conspecifics based on familiarity. These results are 
consistent with the larval ecology of these organisms, which is characterized by a 
low population density and no schooling behavior. " (Carreno et al 1996,293) 
Similarly, in the northwestern salamander Ambystoma gracile, upon finding no ability 
to distinguish conspecifics on the basis of either familiarity or genetic relatedness, 
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researchers concluded "scrutiny of the life history and ecology of this species may 
provide important clues as to the selective forces operating on the evolution of kin 
discrimination in larval amphibians. "(Walls et al 1996,965) 
Other research has produced evidence that individuals of a variety of species (both 
vertebrate and invertebrate) may, in laboratory conditions, cannibalise siblings and/or 
offspring; Amazonian poison frog Dendrobates ventrimaculatus (Summers & Symula 
2001); Indian meal moth Plodia interpunctella (Boots 2000); ponerine ant 
Gnamptogenys striatula (Blatrix & Jaisson 2002); red-spotted newts Notophthalmus 
viridescens (Gabor 1996); Ladybird Beetle Harmonia axyridis (Osawa 1992); Marbled 
Salamanders Ambystoma opacum (Walls & Blaustein 1995). The occurrence of such 
behaviour reiterates the point that Inclusive Fitness theory should not be understood to 
simply predict that genetically related individuals will inevitably recognise and engage 
in positive social behaviours with genetic relatives. Consideration of the demographics 
of the typical evolutionary environment of any species is crucial to understanding the 
evolution of social behaviours. As Hamilton (1987) puts it, "Altruistic or selfish acts are 
only possible when a suitable social object is available. In this sense behaviours are 
conditional from the start. " (Hamilton 1987,420). 
To reinforce the importance of considering the conditionality of the evolution of social 
behaviours on demographic context, even where an ability to effectively recognise and 
behaviourally discriminate does exist, this may be very specific to typically encountered 
contexts. For example, Sherman et al (1997) suggest that certain classes of genetic 
relatives will inevitably fail to be recognised where no precedent for encountering such 
genetic relatives has existed in past evolutionary environments, and conversely, non- 
relatives may be treated as relatives, if they are encountered in circumstances typically 
constituted by relatives; 
"[C]ircumstances favouring recognition may be rare, or may have been rare until 
recently. Female Belding's ground squirrels behave nepotistically only to daughters 
and sisters. More distant relatives (granddaughters, second cousins) are treated like 
non-kin (Sherman, 1980). These distant kin are infrequently alive simultaneously 
(Sherman, 1981b). Either selection has not favoured abilities to learn templates to 
recognise distant relatives (perception component), or the rate of interaction with 
them is so low that the optimal acceptance threshold is restrictive, excluding distant 
kin (action component). As another example, bird species that have long been 
exposed to brood-parasitic cowbirds or cuckoos consistently reject parasite eggs, 
whereas species whose nesting habitats have been recently invaded (e. g. due to forest 
fragmentation) tend to accept all eggs in their nest, including those of parasites... ' 
(Sherman et al 1997,92-93) 
115 
The evolutionarily typical context of interaction is thus what constitutes the selection 
pressure for Inclusive Fitness effects, and `kin-directed' behavioural discriminations. 
Consistent with the discussion of interpretation of Inclusive Fitness theory in chapter 
two (see section 2.1.7), Sherman et al. also make the general point that selection 
pressure acts on long-term, reliable statistical associations, rather than the specific 
relatedness coefficients that constitute any given encounter; 
"Recognition-promoting alleles spread because of indirect statistical associations 
between the recognition cue (i. e. the location) and the presence of the recognition 
promoting allele in conspecifics. When frequencies of interactions with relatives at a 
particular location (e. g. a nest burrow) are sufficiently high, selection may favour 
universal acceptance at that location... In species exhibiting location-specific 
behaviour, parents do occasionally rear non-kin due to mix ups (in bank swallows: 
Hoogland and Sherman, 1976; Belding's ground Squirrels: Sherman 1980; paper 
wasps: Gamboa et al., 1986b), but these recognition errors are rare. Moreover, as we 
have seen, recognition systems based on phenotypic cues of genetic or 
environmental origin are not immune to errors either. " (Sherman et al. 1997,94) 
In short, just as demographic constraints should be understood to apply the potential 
evolution of social behaviours (chapter 2.1.6), so too, demographic patterns will 
influence what mechanisms of `kin discrimination' might evolve. These must thus be 
considered in any application of biological theory to the behaviours of a particular 
species. 
4.3 What is Kin `Recognition'? 
Although there are good reasons for `kin recognition' to evolve apart from for social 
discriminations (see section 4.5 below), the growth of interest in `kin recognition' was 
in large part directly stimulated by Hamilton's work on Inclusive Fitness theory, 
reviewed in chapter two. All those engaged in the debate about `kin recognition' (e. g. 
Alexander 1979, Dawkins 1982, Blaustein 1983, Waldman 1988, Grafen 1990, 
Sherman et al 1997, Tang Martinez 2001) and its relationship to Inclusive Fitness 
theory are essentially agreed about the significance of the latter as a selection pressure 
on social behaviours. 
But, as suggested, a complicating factor is that, apart from specifically social acts, there 
are other behaviours (such as inbreeding avoidance) that may benefit from a sensitivity 
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to genetic relatedness. Because of this, evidence of a kin recognition ability is not in 
itself evidence that social behaviours are also present, and even less that their 
expression is contingent on such recognition. 
The distinction between an ability to distinguish genetic relatedness and the behavioural 
acts that may or may not accompany this ability underlies the difference between `kin 
recognition' and `kin discrimination' in the established terminology (see e. g. Waldman 
1988, Holmes 1990, Hepper 1990), and will be employed in the following analysis. Kin 
discrimination can be said to occur when an individual exhibits differential behaviour 
towards genetic relatives, but may effectively come about in typical ecological and 
demographic conditions without the need for `sampling' of genetic relationship i. e. 
`recognition' per se (see the example of eusocial aphids, below). Conversely, even if 
individuals have an ability to differentiate between others on the basis of actual genetic 
relatedness, i. e. recognition is possible (as demonstrated under laboratory conditions), it 
is not necessarily always accompanied by any behavioural discrimination, let alone 
discrimination involving significant levels of social behaviour. 
Given the need for subtlety in this area, some theorists feel that `kin recognition theory' 
has been beset by conceptual confusions (e. g. Grafen 1990,1991, Tang-Martinez 2001); 
"Ever since Hamilton (1964) proposed his revolutionary concept of kin selection to 
explain social evolution and the evolution of "altruistic" behaviours, there has been a 
strong interest in kin recognition and the mechanisms by which animals are able to 
distinguish between their kin (genetically related individuals) and non-kin 
(genetically unrelated individuals). Kin recognition is considered such an important 
process for the operation of kin selection, that many behavioural ecologists seem to 
implicitly assume that specialised mechanisms allowing individuals to distinguish 
their kin from non-kin must have evolved. " (Tang-Martinez 2001,21) 
I suggest that this unsafe assumption also characterises simplistic applications of 
Inclusive Fitness theory to human social behaviour. Let us look at an example of this 
distinction between kin discrimination and kin recognition. An investigation of kin 
discrimination in the eusocial aphid Pseudoregma bambucicola found that unrelated 
alien workers placed into a novel colony were never attacked or removed by soldiers, 
and conversely soldiers placed into an alien colony provided altruistic defence even 
within that `non-kin' context (Shibao 1999). In this case, no kin recognition could be 
said to occur, even though the species is highly social and the typical behaviour of 
individuals in a typical context of the colony amounts very effectively to kin 
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discrimination. In fact only aliens of distantly related species were attacked by soldiers 
(congeneric species such as P. koshunensis were ignored). These results agree with 
those of other social aphids (Shibao 1999), and to the extent that any `recognition' 
mechanism at all is present, it would more accurately be described as a form of `species 
recognition'. In demonstrating the distinction between discrimination and recognition 
this example emphasises the need to consider the demographics that have shaped the 
social behaviour typical of the species. 
An important immediate conclusion from such investigations is that, in any particular 
instance, the expression of social behaviours - the existence of which may have been 
shaped by selection pressure for Inclusive Fitness - need not be limited to a situation 
which is actually comprised of genetic relatives. This is the case even if the evolution of 
those behaviours can be said to have come about via their meeting the Inclusive Fitness 
criterion in typical past environments. This contrast between the evolution of a 
behaviour and its actual expression is a crucial conceptual point. It is particularly 
relevant to understanding how Inclusive Fitness theory applied to humans can be 
consistent and compatible with findings in anthropology and comparative sociology 
(chapter one). 
Given that typical context can play an important role in channelling social behaviours 
towards genetic relatives (kin discrimination), as mentioned above, many have 
suggested making a distinction between two classes of `recognition'; on the one hand 
what might be called `inactive context driven' recognition and on the other, `positive 
powers' of recognition (Hamilton 1987). The former might also be called `locational' 
(Holmes and Sherman, 1982) or `indirect', and the latter `direct' cues (e. g. Waldman 
1988). (An overview of these mechanisms is provided below). 
These subtleties demonstrate that caution is necessary over how to interpret what is 
meant by `kin recognition', and its distinction from `kin discrimination'. Because 
behaviours that amount to `discrimination' can potentially be achieved without any 
need for `recognition' yet reliably allow the discrimination of behaviour towards 
genetic relatives, Grafen (like Tang-Martinez above) has questioned the very notion of 
`kin recognition' as a unitary phenomenon; 
"`Do animals really recognise kin in a way that is different from the way they 
recognise mates, neighbours, and other organisms and objects? '. Certainly animals 
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use recognition systems to recognise their offspring, their siblings and their parents. 
But to the extent that they do so in the same way that they recognise their mates and 
their neighbours, I feel it is unhelpful to say they have a kin recognition system. " 
(Grafen 1991,1095) 
Grafen goes on to suggest that `kin recognition' might be reserved for those cases where 
organisms are demonstrated to use `positive powers', particularly genetically labelled 
cues, to track genetic relatedness, of which he finds precious little experimental 
evidence (Grafen 1990). Tang-Martinez (2001) advises similar caution on invoking 
`recognition'; 
"[T]he fact that animals benefit from engaging in spatially mediated behaviors is not 
evidence that these animals can recognise their kin, nor does it support the 
conclusion that spatially-based differential behaviors represent a kin recognition 
mechanism (see also discussions by Blaustein, 1983; Waldman, 1987; Halpin 1991). 
In other words, from an evolutionary perspective it may well be advantageous for kin 
to aggregate and for individuals to behave preferentially towards nearby kin, whether 
or not this behaviour is the result of kin recognition per se. " (Tang-Martinez 2001, 
25) 
Having set out the conceptual pitfalls, it is necessary to look in more detail at the range 
of potential recognition or discrimination mechanisms, particularly with a view to 
understanding the distinction between what Hamilton (above) called `inactive context 
driven' recognition and `positive powers' of recognition. 
4.4 Overview of Possible Mechanisms 
There are generally understood to be a few possible `mechanisms' whereby `kin 
recognition' could be said to occur (whatever the type and level of any accompanying 
discrimination). It should be clear that some of these are `positive powers' and others 
`context driven'. Blaustein (1983) gives a useful summary; 
"There are four possible mechanisms proposed for kin recognition (reviewed by 
Alexander 1979; Bekoff 1983; Dawkins1982; Holmes and Sherman 1982). 
1. Recognition can be based on spatial distribution. - If relatives are distributed 
predictably in space, altruistic acts might be selected for if the acts are directed 
preferentially towards those individuals in a particular location. Such a location may 
be a home site or territory. 
2. Recognition can be based on familiarity'and prior association. - If relatives 
predictably occur in appropriate social circumstances, recognition could occur 
through social learning (Alexander 1979). Thus, individuals of the same litter within 
the same nest or those from one clutch may learn to recognise "familiar" individuals 
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(see Bekoff 1981,1983 for a detailed discussion of familiarity and recognition). 
Relatives might also recognise one another if they predictably meet in the presence 
of a third individual who is familiar to each of them. One example of this may be 
two maternally related half-siblings from different litters that interact with their 
common mother (Holmes and Sherman 1982). 
3. Recognition could occur through phenotypic matching. - In phenotypic matching, 
an individual learns and recalls the phenotypes of relatives or of itself (assuming 
phenotypic similarity is correlated with genetic similarity). The individual then 
assesses similarities and differences between its own phenotype and unfamiliar 
conspecifics. Thus, for example, if chemicals or odors are involved in kin 
recognition, they may have a genetic component, but must be learned for kin 
recognition to occur. 
4. Recognition could be achieved by the action of recognition alleles. Phenotypes 
could be used in recognition independent of learning if recognition alleles existed. In 
this system, the phenotypic marker (e. g., a particular chemical or odor) and the 
knowledge of that marker have genetic bases. " (Blaustein 1983,749) 
Blaustein observes the distinction between `context-driven' and `positive' recognition 
by going on to note that in mechanisms 1 and 2 `kin per se are not actually recognised' 
(Blaustein 1983,749). 
Mechanism 2, recognition based on familiarity and prior association, whilst not 
necessarily being recognition of kin per se nevertheless warrants the name `recognition' 
if some kind of learning (and subsequent remembering or equivalent process) does 
occur. Recognition via a mutually familiar `third individual' (see Blaustein above) or 
`go-between' has also been called `mediated recognition' (Holmes & Sherman 1983), 
and will be seen (esp. chapter 5) to be important for certain forms of recognition of 
genetic relatives outside the direct mother-offspring relationship, as Blaustein suggests. 
Mechanism 3, phenotype matching, has broadly two possibilities; learning a template 
phenotype from relatives, or learning one's own phenotype. The former must be 
"learned during interactions in unambiguous social circumstances"(Lacy & Sherman 
1983,490) i. e. requires that the initial context of learning is reliably constituted by 
actual genetic relatives, thus effectively joins mechanisms 1 and 2 as relying on 
`context-driven' recognition since `kin per se are not actually recognised' independently 
of the initial context of template formation. Indeed, external-referent phenotype 
matching can be thought of as similar to the above `recognition via a third individual' 
(or location), but based on a learned template of certain features of that common 
referent, rather that in its direct presence. For this reason some have named this type of 
recognition `indirect familiarity' (e. g. Porter 1988). A similar point is made by Halpin; 
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"[I]t could be argued that recognition by familiarisation and recognition by 
phenotype matching are nothing more than different forms of the same `association' 
or `familiarisation' mechanism (see also Halpin & Hoffman, 1987; Porter 1988). 
Furthermore, recognition by association and by phenotype matching do not differ in 
the origin of the cues upon which they rely. In both cases the cues may be of either 
genotypic or environmental origin. " (Halpin 1991,250-251) 
Self-referent phenotype matching (the second possibility for mechanism 3) as a 
potentially more direct `positive power' of discrimination, has more in common with 
mechanism 4, recognition alleles, albeit with some important distinctions between the 
two. In fact it is precisely these latter two possibilities that are referred to by Hamilton 
(1987) as `positive powers' of recognition and the similarities and differences between 
them will be considered below (section 4.6). 
4.5 Other Reasons for Recognition 
It is important to note that an ability to recognise genetic relatives from non-relatives 
may be selected for, due to mediating other types of `discrimination' than the mediation 
of social behaviours, as was mentioned above. This is particularly relevant for a 
consideration of selection pressure for the more `direct', `positive' forms of kin 
recognition, as will be explained in the following section. 
We have seen that, in principle, distinguishing genetic relatedness can mediate both 
positive social behaviours (such as defence), and an avoidance of `negative social 
behaviours' between relatives such as cannibalism (see the examples above, section 
4.3). Like positive social behaviours, selection pressure for avoiding detrimental 
behaviours will depend upon the potential (in this case for endangering close relatives) 
which exists given the ecological niche and accompanying demographics the species 
typically encounters. 
Independently, an ability to distinguish genetic relatedness may be selected via benefits 
from inbreeding avoidance. Recognition for purposes of inbreeding avoidance can be 
considered as one component of `mate recognition', along with species recognition, 
and recognition of sex (Sherman et al 1997). Selection pressure for recognition 
mediating these various forms of discrimination (in the sense of discrimination outlined 
above, section 4.3) means that evidence for the presence of a recognition ability in any 
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given species is not evidence for `kin discrimination' meaning engaging in significant 
social behaviours with genetic relatives. Hamilton makes a similar point; 
"It does not follow... that ability to discriminate degrees of relatedness automatically 
implies that kin selection is the model relevant to its origin. In fact, since even earlier 
than Darwin, it had been realised that most organisms tend to avoid closely inbred 
matings. The reasons must have to do with the function of sexuality and this is not 
quite yet resolved (see e. g. Bell, 1982; Shields, 1982; Hamilton, 1982); but whatever 
the function is, here must be another set of reasons for discriminating. Some animals 
clearly do use discrimination for purposes of mate selection. Japanese quail for 
example evidently use an early imprinting of their chick companions towards 
obtaining, much later, preferred degrees of consanguinity in their mates (Bateson 
1983). " (Hamilton 1987,419) 
4.6 'Positive Powers' of Recognition 
Whilst the same four possible types of mechanism as proposed above (section 4.4) 
could equally evolve to promote recognition for inbreeding avoidance, or for species 
recognition (e. g. Grafen 1990, Sherman et al 1997), an extension of this point needs 
consideration: There are certain behaviours which, if contingent upon `positive powers' 
of recognition of genetic identity, would in principle be subject to selection pressure for 
genetic suppression ('modification'), whilst other behaviours contingent on the exact 
same recognition mechanisms would not. The notion that the expression of certain of 
genes' effects might be subject to selection pressure for modification by other genes 
was discussed in chapter 2 (2.2.5); we consider this assessment of which effects might 
realistically evolve further here. 
Self-Referent phenotype matching has also been dubbed `the armpit effect' (Dawkins 
1982). There is an important distinction between this mechanism, which works via 
perceived phenotypic similarity, and the recognition gene (or `green-beard') effect, 
although the two might appear superficially similar (see also discussion in Dawkins 
1982,143-155) and both are both classified as `positive powers' of discrimination by 
Hamilton (1987). 
Unlike the `green beard' effect, the hypothesised self-referent phenotype matching 
mechanism is proposed not to rely on a label expressed by a single gene (or set of 
closely linked genes) to assess genetic similarity. Instead, the attribute/s used as the 
`template' for comparison to other individuals are potentially genetically unlinked from 
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the gene promoting the proposed effect, and the phenotypic attributes that serve as the 
reference template may be numerous and widely distributed across the genome (Lacy 
and Sherman 1983, Hamilton 1987). I cite here from Dawkins (1982) who gave the first 
clear illustration of the proposed mechanism and its distinction from the `green-beard 
effect' (see chapter 2.2.5 for more on the latter); 
"The only way for the green-beard effect to arise is by incidental pleiotropy. A 
mutation must arise which just happens to have two complimentary effects: the label 
or `green beard', and the tendency to behave altruistically towards labelled 
individuals. I have always thought such a fortuitous conjunction of pleiotropic 
effects too good to be true. Hamilton also noted the ideas' inherent implausibility, 
but he went on `... exactly the same a priori objections might be made to the 
evolution of assortative mating which manifestly has evolved, probably many times 
independently and despite its obscure advantages' (Hamilton 1964, p. 25)... Why is 
it that the green-beard effect seems so much more far-fetched than assortative 
mating? It is not just that assortative mating is positively known to occur. I suggest 
another reason. This is that when we think of assortative mating we implicitly 
assume self-inspection as a means of facilitating the effect. If [blue] individuals 
prefer to mate with [blue] individuals, and white with white, we do not find this hard 
to believe because we tacitly assume that individuals perceive their own colour. Each 
individual, whatever his colour, is assumed to be obeying the same rule: inspect 
yourself (or members of your own family) and choose a mate of the same colour. 
This principle does not stretch our credulity by demanding that two specific effects - 
colour and behavioural preference - are controlled pleiotropically by the same gene. 
If there is a general advantage to mating with similar partners, natural selection will 
favour the self-inspection rule regardless of the exact nature of the recognition 
character used... 
[The] `armpit effect' is here being used as a general name for any case of an animal 
inspecting himself, or a known close relative, and discriminating in favour of other 
individuals with a similar smell or with some other perceive similarity. The essential 
difference between the green-beard effect and the armpit effect is as follows. The 
armpit self-inspection behavioural rule will lead to the detection of other individuals 
that are similar in some respect, perhaps in many respects, but it will not specifically 
lead to the detection of individuals that possess copies of the gene mediating the 
behavioural rule itself... the green-beard effect is quite different. Here the important 
thing is that a gene (or close linkage group) programs the recognition specifically of 
copies of itself. The green beard effect is not a mechanism for the recognition of kin. 
Rather, kin recognition and `green-beard' recognition are alternative ways in which 
genes could behave as if discriminating in favour of copies of themselves... A `kin- 
selection gene' is, in a sense, working for itself alone, but it benefits the other genes 
in its genome as well. There will therefore not be selection for modifiers that 
suppress it. Armpit self-inspection genes would be a special case of kin-recognition 
genes, and are likewise not outlaws. " (Dawkins 1982,145). 
In principle a `self-referent phenotype matching' system which is based on learning of a 
template from the individual itself (what Dawkins calls the armpit effect) might be 
influenced by some (multi-locus) genetic endogenous labels. Such a multiply- 
influenced phenotype should in principle reliably correlate with ancestral relatedness 
(not just genetic identity at a single locus). The proposed multi-locus basis also requires 
a stable polymorphism of multiple rare alleles in order to ensure that identity at various 
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loci does indeed correlate with genetic relatedness across the whole genome (the genetic 
constitution that common ancestry reliably provides). 
Dawkins' useful summary remains an accurate description of the status of `positive 
powers' of discrimination within biological theory. Note that even here, the `armpit 
effect' requires learning, even if from `self', in the absence of other individuals 
(although how often `self would be the only reference available in non-laboratory 
conditions is subject to debate, see below). Of course, Dawkins' account in itself 
provides no information about the `real world' situation; whether such `positive 
powers', or alternatively, context-dependent discriminations are observed in species 
under study. The following chapters will look at the evidence. 
It is worth noting a further theoretical subtlety associated with the `green-beard' effect. 
Hamilton draws an important distinction between the kinds of discrimination which 
could be associated with the `learned' versus such `innate, ' green-beard types of 
recognition; 
"The [self referent phenotype-matching] system outlined above was based on a 
minimal kind of `social learning' (Alexander 1979). Prior to application in 
behaviour, the learning, which in this elemental case was self-habituation, can be 
done by the individual in total isolation. Could there be any mechanism of kin 
recognition that does not need learning of any kind? In fact, there do see to be effects 
describable as kin recognition which are like this, but at the same time there are also 
reasons to believe that they cannot evolve into nepotistic patterns of any complexity. " 
(Hamilton 1987,23 emphasis added) 
Hamilton goes on to give the example of `the case of the trees' cited in chapter two (see 
chapter 2.2.5). Recall that we saw in chapter two that social cooperation may be subject 
to modification if mediated by `recognition genes' and consisting of interactions which 
every other locus in the genome is not `in agreement' about regarding the Inclusive 
Fitness criterion, because, e. g. non-relatives are being actively prioritised. However, 
behavioural discriminations on such a `minority basis' would in principle not be 
subject to modification if they imposed no comparative cost (and perhaps some benefit) 
on the rest of the genome. Discriminatory behaviours involved with inbreeding 
avoidance would potentially meet this requirement. Thus Hamilton goes on to give an 
example where features of a learned template based on phenotype (but in fact 
influenced by a small number of genes) appears to mediate such a discrimination; 
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"The house mice which show mating preferences based on unlikeness of certain 
genes in the histocompatibility complex (Boyse, Beauchamp and Yamazaki, 1983). 
This effect is very surprising, perhaps the more so when it is known that it is 
mediated through odour coming from urine. We cannot do more than note here what 
appears to provide the basis for a minimally learned discrimination system of the 
kind already outlined, and that it seems to have potential to become `green-beardy' 
[involving recognition genes] in so far as the effect is concentrated in the small H-2 
region of the chromosome. But once again, we do not expect anything describable as 
an innate kin recognition adaptation, used for social behaviour other than mating, for 
the reasons already given in the hypothetical case of the trees. " (Hamilton 1987,425) 
In fact there is evidence that in the natural state of an individual's interaction, the 
`template' in the inbreeding avoidance system in this species is usually learned from 
others and not `self-referent' (see next chapter). Nevertheless Hamilton's point is that 
the `no-relative-cost' to the rest of the genome criterion could be fulfilled in the case 
where inbreeding avoidance results from a small number of genes involved in detection 
of genetic relatedness. Even in cases where genetic identity at one point of the genome 
does not in fact correlate with genetic relatedness across the whole genome (as it would 
in the case of ancestral relatedness), avoiding mating in such a hypothetical case may 
not constitute a significant enough cost (relative to the benefit other loci receive when 
ancestral relatedness is present) to select for modification of the effect. But for `social 
behaviour other than mating', discrimination on this basis is not expected. 
The implication of Hamilton's point it that, even in a case where `innate' forms of 
recognition appear to be present, theory predicts that social behaviours will not be 
mediated on this basis. Other theorists agree with Hamilton on this. Emphasising that 
the `template' to be used as a referent for measuring relatedness in self-referent 
phenotype matching must rely on a learned sampling, rather than innate, Sherman et al 
note that; 
"There are no clear examples of genetically encoded kin-recognition templates 
(Alexander 1990; Pfennig & Sherman 1995). This is probably because, as a result of 
meiotic shuffling of genetic cues and spatiotemporal variation in environmental cues, 
the characteristics of desirable recipients (kin) will differ for different actors, 
rendering genetically encoded templates unreliable. In addition, intragenomic 
conflict should thwart expression of selfish `recognition alleles' (template linked to 
both recognition cue and decision rule loci: see Alexander & Borgia 1978; 
Alexander 1979; Ridley & Grafen 1981). " (Sherman et al 1997,81) 
In short, for discriminations that constitute `social behaviour other than mating', innate 
recognition is not expected; and Sherman et al (above quote) confirm that (even for 
mating discrimination) there are no clear examples of innate templates. 
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Self-referent phenotype matching would be advantageous for inbreeding avoidance, and 
perhaps for certain other social discriminations where context driven cues are not 
available (see also Hamilton 1987). However, for species in which individuals are 
typically born into a minimal social environment in which other individuals are present, 
`other-referent' template formation may take precedence over `self-referent'. 
Thus some cautions are necessary when interpreting possible evidence of self-referent 
phenotype matching which may be produced under non-typical laboratory conditions. 
Some have suggested that evidence of self-referent phenotype matching may, in many 
cases be a product of experimental artificialities of individuals being reared in isolation 
from conspecifics, and forming a phenotype based `kin-recognition' template on the 
basis of the only phenotype they experience - their own. In short, experiments 
demonstrating the operation of self-referent phenotype matching in the lab do not 
necessarily reveal the comparative influence of such mechanisms on `kin recognition' 
in natural conditions (see for example Grafen 1990, Alexander 1991, Blaustein et al 
1991, Gamboa et a 1991). Sherman et al give the following caution; 
"Assessing the relative importance of different kinds of cues in kin recognition can 
be difficult because, as Breed (1983) and Carlin (1989) noted, whenever 
experimental subjects are reared in uniform environments, where the only detectable 
differences are in gene products, investigators may erroneously conclude that they 
use only genetic labels to recognise kin. The issue that must be addressed is whether 
such cues would be supplemented, or even supplanted, in nature by variable 
environmental cues. " (Sherman et al 1997,77) 
Holmes (1990) also urges caution in analysing experimental results, and emphasises the 
importance of consideration of the typical ecology of the species under study; 
"The point is that to interpret laboratory-derived discrimination abilities in an 
adaptive framework, one must be knowledgeable about the behaviour and ecology of 
the organism in its natural environment. Indeed this knowledge is critical in 
designing an ecologically relevant laboratory study in the first place. " (Holmes 1990, 
453) 
Holmes now brings us to a consideration of the fundamental place that ecology and 
patterns of interaction in natural environments play in the mediation of kin 
discriminatory behaviours. To conclude this section, the key point is that consideration 
of typical context is necessary even when appearances suggest that the most extreme 
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form of `positive powers' of discrimination (self-referent phenotype matching) may be 
present. 
4.7 Introduction to Context-Driven `Recognition' 
In this section we introduce consideration of what Hamilton called "context driven" 
recognition. As in the point made by Holmes (the above quote), I want to suggest that 
an understanding of a species' typical ecology can immediately give insights into the 
typical regularity and reliability of the contexts of interaction of genetic relatives. The 
following chapter (chapter 5) will look in greater detail at the importance of considering 
a species' typical context and evidence for context-driven recognition. 
That kin discrimination can effectively occur in eusocial aphids (section 4.3) without 
any positive powers of recognition is obvious when considering the normal ecology of 
the species. Similarly, results on Belding's ground squirrels make sense when 
considering the typical context of interaction of genetic relatives; 
"Cross-Fostering studies in the field (Holmes & Sherman, 1982) and laboratory 
(Holmes, 1984,1986a, 1994) indicate that nestmate females learn each other's 
odours just before weaning (when litters normally begin to mix), and later treat each 
other as siblings, regardless of their actual relatedness. Social learning of these kin- 
recognition templates does not increase acceptance errors in nature because unrelated 
pups rarely cohabit the same nest burrow (Sherman, 1980). " (Sherman et al 1997, 
82) 
In general, the variety of opportunities for context driven recognition is best illustrated 
by consideration of key, reliable ecological features of the focal species. Waldman 
agrees; 
"Knowledge of the mechanisms by which kin discrimination occurs, the extent to 
which different classes of relatives can be recognized, the cues upon which 
recognition is assessed, and the means by which social preferences develop is 
important for assessing how closely behavioral tactics of individuals conform to 
those predicted by kinship-based models. Studies of kin recognition are most 
valuable, however, when framed within ecologically appropriate settings, and 
analyses of the contexts in which kin discrimination occurs can clarify how 
recognition mechanisms function. " (Waldman 1988,543,544) 
The study of any potential mechanisms of context-driven social behaviour cannot be 
conducted in abstraction from consideration of basic features of the species' 
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evolutionarily typical living environment. This varies for each species, and is not 
directly observable. How context-driven social behaviours can be analysed is discussed 
in the next chapter (chapter 5), and evidence for presence of such mechanism in 
mammal species is also reviewed. 
4.8 Summary 
Chapter two reviewed the biological theory surrounding the evolution of social 
behaviours. This chapter has introduced some concepts surrounding the part played by 
the (evolutionary) criterion genetic relatedness in the actual expression of social 
behaviours, which is typically treated (somewhat inappropriately) as `kin recognition 
theory'. 
Environmental and ecological factors, amongst others, will determine a species' 
demographic possibilities. Statistical association of replica genes (most readily 
occurring in genetic relatives) is a necessary condition for the evolution of altruistic 
social behaviours, but due to such ecological conditionals, not a sufficient condition. 
However, as Sherman clearly demonstrates (see above and chapter 2.1.6), genetic 
relatedness is not a sufficient condition for the expression of social behaviours, and nor 
is it a necessary condition for the expression of social behaviours. 
As first suggested in chapter 2 (2.1.6), a consideration typical situations of interaction is 
crucial to understanding the evolution and modes of expression of social behaviours. 
Section 4.6 demonstrated that, even in cases where `positive powers of discrimination' 
(such as self-referent phenotype matching) seem to occur in laboratory conditions, the 
species' typical contexts of interaction cannot be ignored. 
Moreover, `context-driven' social behaviour is widely accepted as a strong theoretical 
possibility by Inclusive Fitness theorists and `kin recognition' theorists alike. We have 
seen, in passing, evidence that such context-driven social behaviour does appear to 
occur in some species (see e. g. Belding's ground squirrels and eusocial aphids, sections 
4.2 and 4.3). To understand how the evolution of context-driven social behaviour meets 
the Inclusive Fitness criterion for a given species requires an understanding of the 
typical ecology, demographics and contexts of interaction of that species. 
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The evidence for the occurrence of context-driven social behaviour in a variety of 
mammal species is reviewed more fully in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Five - The Mediation of Social Behaviours in Mammals 
5.1 Introduction and Overview 
Having reviewed the theoretical possibilities for `kin recognition' (chapter 4), we are 
now in a position to look more closely at the expression of social behaviours in 
mammals. The current chapter is divided into two main sections; ecology and 
demographic influences and; evidence on discrimination mechanisms. At the end of the 
chapter, two additional sections discuss related concepts and provide an overview of 
what has emerged from the chapters so far. 
Any investigation of the evolutionary significance of social behaviours has to take into 
account evolutionarily typical environments species have inhabited. As suggested in 
chapters 2 and 4, ecological and demographic conditions strongly dictate evolutionarily 
typical contexts of interaction between individuals, including genetic relatives. The first 
sections of this chapter (5.2 to 5.6) discuss how basic ecological conditions have this 
influence on demographic patterns in mammal species. We will note that throughout 
varying demographic arrangements, certain contexts of interaction between genetic 
relatives are nevertheless reliable. A summary of this analysis of demographic and 
ecological factors is given in section 5.6. 
Understanding ecological and demographic influences allows a clearer appreciation of 
the evidence regarding mechanisms mediating social behaviours in mammals. The 
evidence, reviewed in sections 5.7 to 5.8, demonstrates that context-based social 
discriminations are overwhelmingly important in the expression of social behaviours in 
mammal species. These findings are summarised in section 5.9. 
The familiarity mechanism which is widely suggested to mediate social behaviours 
requires species to engage in social learning and social recognition. Many kin 
recognition theorists use the concept of social bonding when investigating social 
recognition typical to close relatives in many mammal species (discussed in section 
5.10). We close the chapter by noting that a distinction between evolutionary processes 
and the expression of social behaviours can be helpful in resolving some debates around 
kin recognition theory. As Kitcher (1985) suggested (chapter 3), in the human case, once 
we have understood the evolutionary process involved, investigation of the expression 
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of social behaviours may be of more interest. The following chapters will turn to this 
question. 
5.2 The Basic `Niche' of Mammals 
Present day mammals, and their mammalian ancestors have certain basic characteristics 
which can be considered "facts of biology" as well founded as any (see chapter one). 
Mammals are endothermic, almost all have live-birth (or viviparity) and new-borns are 
often immobile and always totally dependent (socially dependent if you will) on their 
carer for nursing with nutrient rich milk and protection. This fundamental social 
dependence is a fact of life for all mammals, including humans. 
Amongst other consequences these features may have served mammals early in their 
evolution by allowing relatively underdeveloped infants to rapidly attain adult 
physiology especially in regard to ecological feeding opportunities, an advantage which 
could have given them the edge over their reptilian dinosaur cousins in the late 
Cretaceous (Macdonald 1995). Over the past 70 million years, mammals have 
undergone rapid evolution to multiple forms and have come to dominate land-based 
ecological niches. 
Due to the basic characteristics of mammalian reproduction, combined with 
demographic factors (see below) which typically isolate a reproductive female and her 
infant offspring, a reliable situation in which there is a statistical association of replica 
genes between a reproductive female and her genetic offspring exists (and has been 
evolutionary typical) for most mammal species. As will be illustrated in more detail 
below, in group-living mammals this typical fundamental association between a female 
and her offspring may also extend out beyond infancy. 
5.3 Ecological and Demographic Variables in Mammals: Overview 
In his original papers on Inclusive Fitness theory, Hamilton discussed the potential 
influence of demographic factors on the patterns of statistical association of replica 
genes (see chapter two). In particular, he mentioned the influence of exogamy and 
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migration patterns on the genetic constitution of a demographic group (Hamilton 1975), 
and the variation in distribution of relatives (maternally related and paternally related) 
resulting from mating systems (Hamilton 1987). 
Other relevant demographic variables include litter size (e. g. multiple or single births), 
birth spacing, age of weaning or independence and any sex-biased exogamy. These 
variables will particularly shape the grouping context of maternal relatives beyond the 
fairly constant mother-offspring `group'. Outside of the early developmental context, 
perhaps after weaning, there may be other situations in which paternal relatives are 
encountered. In addition to the demographic variables listed above as influencing 
distribution of maternal relatives, variations in mating system, and sex bias of exogamy 
will further influence the statistical association of paternal relatives (and replica genes). 
The next sections will discuss asymmetries in the distribution of maternal and paternal 
relatives further. 
Ultimately many of these variables, as well as fundamentals such as population density, 
are influenced by ecological factors. Thus for a given species, an analysis of these 
demographic variables is typically inseparable from an analysis of the ecological niche 
of the species under study. The fundamental situation can be summarised thus; 
"The breeding systems of mammalian species are strongly influenced by the 
density and dispersion of their populations. These in turn are affected by 
variations in the distribution of resources. Through quantitative comparisons, it is 
possible to trace evolutionary relationships between feeding behaviour, 
population dispersion, breeding systems and morphology. " (Clutton Brock & 
Harvey 1978,191). 
An important influence on the initial close clustering and thus potential interaction of 
genetic relatives is litter-size and time between subsequent litters, variables relevant to 
what is traditionally known as `r or K selection' (MacArthur and Wilson 1967), or 
equally treatable with `life history theory' (Stearns 1992, Charnov 1993). What are 
often referred to as `r' (resource-limited) type species tend to produce large litters at 
frequent intervals, whereas `K' ('carrying capacity') type tend to have smaller litters 
and greater intervals between litters. These variations are considered a response to 
ecology, particularly the stability over time of key food resources. When prime 
resources are periodic and potentially highly abundant, species tend to be `r' selected; 
small in body size, short lived, quick to reproductive maturity, and have large litter 
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sizes (and potentially high mortality). Species relying on more stable food resources 
tend to be `K' selected; larger, longer-lived and slower to reproductive maturity, with 
small litters (or single births) with a longer period of infant dependency. Time to 
maturity and subsequent dispersal will obviously have an influence on the 
opportunities for and duration of interactions between genetic relatives. 
The nature and size of the minimum demographic group (from solitary female with 
pre-weaned offspring, to multi-female, multi-male durable groups), the patterns of 
dispersal from the natal-group (perhaps upon weaning or sexual maturity), the duration 
of interactions between individuals both within the group and after dispersal; all such 
variables have been studied intensively by ecologists, and here too there is agreement 
about the crucial impact of ecological influences such as major food source/s. Early 
studies uncovering the strong correlations between ecology and demographic patterns 
included work by Crook (1964,1970) and Orians (1969). The latter study linked 
ecology and resource availability to mating system using data from bird species, but 
has since been found relevant in mammals also (Rubenstein & Wrangham 1986). 
Further work (Emlen & Oring 1977) suggested that opportunity for polygynous mating 
systems may be influenced by the spatial and temporal distribution of individuals of 
the sex dictating the basic reproduction rate; in the mammal case usually females 
(Trivers 1972). This complimented other studies (Jarman 1974, Bradbury & 
Vehrencamp 1977) suggesting that the distribution of females was greatly influenced 
by requirements of seeking food resources and avoiding predation and other threats. In 
their conclusions to their 1986 edited volume, Rubenstein and Wrangham 
characterised the picture thus; 
"Unravelling the evolution of any social system must begin with an 
understanding of the roots of female behaviour, since the behaviour of males is 
largely adapted to that of females. Finding these roots can be assisted by 
answering three queries. First, does the distribution of the critical resource (food, 
water, safe sites) force females to forage, travel, or live alone? If the resources 
are sparsely distributed, or intense predation can only be avoided by crypsis, then 
females will be forced to spend most of their time apart. Second, does the nature 
of the critical resource facilitate its exclusive defense? If territoriality by lone 
females is economically feasible then females will rarely meet, otherwise they 
may aggregate when not contesting this critical resource, and a variety of fission- 
fusion type social systems may develop. If females are not forced to forage, 
travel, or rest alone, then a third query must be answered - does the distribution 
of resources or the overall structure of the habitat permit females to aggregate, or 
force them to do so? Permissive habitats are bountiful ones where resources are 
distributed fairly evenly, and competition among females is low. In such 
situations the risks of either predation or male harassment may be so high that 
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females aggregate around males that can provide benefits sufficient to reduce 
these risks and offset the cost of competition. Since competition for primary 
resources may be keen, permanent associations may develop. Conversely, in 
other habitats where resources are distributed in rich but scattered patches 
competition is intensified and may force females to aggregate, ensuring that 
others and not oneself, are excluded. " (Wrangham & Rubenstein 1986,469-470) 
In short, typical demographic patterns are closely associated with ecological niche. 
Since this niche is different for each species, it must be investigated in any analysis of 
the potential for interaction between individuals (including genetic relatives). As we 
saw in chapters 2 and 4 (sections 2.1.6 and 4.7), an understanding of typical interaction 
and grouping contexts is crucial to understanding mechanisms of `kin discrimination' 
and ultimately, how Inclusive Fitness theory might apply to a given species. 
The following sections look in more detail at how demographic factors affect the 
potential context of grouping of genetic relatives in mammal species. 
5.4 Basic Grouping Contexts and Asymmetries of Interaction 
As noted by Clutton Brock and Harvey amongst others (1978, quoted above) mating 
systems are a key demographic factor largely influenced by the ecological niche 
occupied and basic aspects of the life history of the species under study. The simplest 
rule that seems to hold for mating systems, with a few exceptions (such as `leks'), is 
that females are distributed according to resources (and predator avoidance) whereas 
males are distributed according to where they can find the females. As described by 
Rubenstein and Wrangham; 
"[A] framework is now in place for examining how ecology shapes certain intra- 
and inter-sexual relationships... [I]n its simplest form, the model expects first, 
that female behaviour - and this includes their social relationships - will be 
adapted primarily to meeting demands imposed by the physical environment. 
This is because the reproductive rate of females will normally be raised, or 
lowered, more predictably by their success in meeting these demands than their 
success in other endeavors such as finding, or choosing among, mates. Second, it 
expects that males strategies are adapted primarily to competing for mating 
opportunities, because male fitness is more closely tied to mating success than to 
the acquisition of other resources. " (Rubenstein & Wrangham 1986,6) 
From the brief introduction in section 5.2 (above) it should be clear that variations in 
mating system don't usually significantly alter the fundamental grouping context of a 
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female and her dependent offspring. Thus, whether the mating system is polygynous 
with isolated solitary reproductive females, or monogamous with the male and female 
cohabiting, female and dependent offspring are typically in close physical contact from 
birth. Conversely, the grouping context of paternally related individuals, both male- 
and-offspring and paternal siblings is highly influenced by the pattern of sexual 
activity and the residential pattern of males. Immediately an important distinction 
emerges: Evolutionary typical grouping contexts are rarely symmetrical between 
maternally related individuals and paternally related individuals. Whereas a minimal 
reliable grouping context is typically available for the former, for the latter, any 
context of interaction is more rare (since monogamy and male residence are the 
exception). 
The assumption of many sociobiologists (as noted in chapters 2 and 3) has been that 
where genetic relatedness (degree of `r') is equivalent, social behaviour accompanying 
that relatedness is equally expected to be equivalent. In particular, we found that the 
Darwinian Anthropologists (chapter 3) assumed males have evolved to parentally 
invest' in their offspring according to Y. In this section we briefly look at a few 
examples of mammalian mating systems and the typical grouping contexts of relatives 
they give rise to. This will clearly demonstrate that selection pressures on the evolution 
of social behaviour typical to different types of genetic relative can be quite different, 
even if the `r' between them is the same. 
Although mammalian mating systems can be roughly classified into polygyny, 
monogamy and polyandry, these classifications tend to cross equally important 
demographic variables such as whether individuals cluster or are in isolation. It is also 
important to note that even the same species may exhibit different demographic 
arrangements in different environments, so flexibility is a key characteristic (especially 
in primate species, see chapter 6). 
Polygyny (one male mating with more than one female) is much the most common 
mating system in mammals, but its form will vary greatly depending on other 
demographic factors. The most common demographic arrangement amongst 
mammalian species is one of dispersed and solitary reproductive females occupying 
their own feeding ranges (see e. g. Clutton Brock 1989, Davies 1992). A number of 
such isolated females will tend to mate with one male who maintains a (larger) local 
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territory for comparatively short periods (usually substantially shorter than the 
female's residence in her territory and her reproductive span). Beyond the female- 
offspring group, interaction in such species usually involves a very limited bond 
between males and females, typically lasting only for the duration of mating itself. A 
further complication is that there may be other males in the area who succeed in 
fertilizing some females, and multiple paternity litters may even be possible (e. g. 
Belding's ground squirrels, see below). 
Another form of polygyny occurs in species which don't have fixed territories and may 
congregate in groups. Some mammals may move frequently to access seasonal food 
sources perhaps ranging over a large, thinly distributed resource base as seen in many 
ungulates (Clutton Brock 1989) and thus not have discrete home ranges (e. g. African 
Buffalo). Where a number of reproductive females are associated in such groups (see 
Wrangham & Rubenstein above), depending on breeding seasonality and female 
reproductive synchrony, one or a small number of males may be able to monopolise 
the matings with a significant proportion of females. Depending on the length of tenure 
of the male occupying this role in such species, and the patterns of dispersal from the 
group (see next section 5.5), there may be opportunities for interaction of male and his 
potential offspring, or there may be no such opportunities. 
A variation on the above pattern is multi-male, multi-female mating systems. Here, two 
or more males may regularly associate and mate with (usually a greater number of) 
group-living females. This pattern is fairly common in some primate species (see 
chapter 6). 
Another possible mating arrangement is monogamy, where a single male and female 
will pair for an extended period, in some cases perhaps for most of their reproductive 
careers, and thus produce full sibling offspring. More often monogamy is limited to 
shorter periods, perhaps a single breeding season. Even in apparently monogamous 
species, depending on the degree of isolation, both partners may mate outside the pair. 
Mating systems where a single male is cohabitant with a female and her offspring are 
very rare in mammals (a few rodents, primates and some others). 
An even rarer mating system is one where a single female will associate with a number 
of males for extended periods, and may mate with two or more of the males (sometimes 
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called 'polyandry'). The males may assist in dcfcnding scarce territory and resources, 
and cvcn assist in raising offspring. When this does occur, the species involved may 
follow a different breeding system in other ecological conditions. 
Looking at mammals as a wholc, the most common arrangcmcnt is that of a mature 
fcmalc living in isolation and mating with more than one malc ovcr her rcproductivc 
lifc. Othcr spccics have females living in groups, with the samc brccding pattcm. In 
both thesc systems matcrnal rclativcs will be rcgularly associatcd. 
Contexts of interaction of paternal relatives are typically fcwcr. Depending on factors 
such as; the size of the group of associated females; the number of polygynous males; 
the degree of reproductive monopolization by a small number of dominant males 
(reproductive skew); the length of association/tcnurc of any such malc/s with females; 
and the birth interval of the females' offspring - their may be significant interaction 
between paternally related individuals. A further crucial variable, particularly for 
'ongoing' interactions, is the pattern of philopatry and dispersal typical of a species (sec 
next section); this also rarely has a symmetrical influence on paternal as on maternal 
relatives. 
Notice that the same 'r' (cocfficicnt of relatedness) charactcriscs diiprcnt classcs of 
genetically related individuals, (e. g. mother-and-offspring and father"and-ofspring or 
maternal half siblings and paternal half siblings). The idea that Inclusive Fitness theory 
predicts that any individuals of a given 'r' are expected to engage in social behaviours 
(such as 'male parental investment') to the same degree is incorrect (sec chapter two). 
This interpretation characterised the Darwinian Anthropological interpretation of 
Inclusivc Fitncss thcory. 
Even amongst those interpreting Inclusive Fitness theory as a description of selection 
pressure on genes, there has been a tendency to overlook the point that selection acts on 
the expressed effects of genes, and behaviours statistically associated with the presence 
of those genes (Price 1970). For example, it has sometimes been assumed that. because 
genes pass through males and females in subsequent generations, and thus arc 
statistically equally likely to have derived from a 'mother' or a 'father'. a gene should 
be equally strongly selected for its inclusive fitness effects (and behaviours promoted) 
towards maternal siblings (perhaps clustered) as in paternal siblings (perhaps likely to 
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be more widely dispersed). In other words, an assumption has been that `Inclusive 
Fitness' will mould genes to have effects which are `symmetrical' on relatives, whilst 
ignoring the demographic potentials provided for contexts of interaction. This too is a 
teleological understanding of Inclusive Fitness theory. A gene's expression tends to 
have certain effects, and whether some of these might amount to being `social' (in the 
sense described in chapter two) depends on the demographic context. If an interaction 
context is present, it is such effects as these which (initially randomly arising), are then 
acted on by selection pressure to meet the Inclusive Fitness criterion. There are few 
kinds of effects that could possibly have the same consequences on all individuals of a 
given degree of relatedness (both maternal and paternal) under circumstances where the 
typical distribution pattern of such individuals is entirely different. 
Where effects are asymmetrical, it might be that a gene's having positive impact on 
replicas in maternal relatives (when maternally derived) entails having a potentially 
negative impact on replicas in paternal relatives (when paternally derived). So long as 
the positive consequences in the former occasions outweigh the negative consequence 
in the latter, these effects will nevertheless meet the Inclusive Fitness criterion. Haig 
(1997) gives a more formal presentation of this point, and quantifies the selection 
pressures involved. 
5.5 Additional Influences; Philopatry and Dispersal 
In most species of mammals, females give birth to more offspring than replacement 
rate. Apart from occasions with high short-term abundance of resources (see `r 
selected' species, above) the finite local environment cannot support all offspring 
produced by all females, and thus some degree of dispersal from the natal 
territory/homerange is inevitable. Unless resources within the wider environment can 
support a growing population, initial dispersal ('natal dispersal') will not necessarily 
result in survival nor successful settling and breeding, and thus further moves, or what 
is known as `breeding dispersal' into subsequent territories may be necessary (e. g. 
Belichon et al 1996, Clarke et al 1997, Paradis et al 1998). Inevitably, dispersal 
typically involves significant risks (e. g. Motro 1991, Alberts & Altmann 1995). 
However, remaining with in the natal environment may also involve risks, particularly 
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in environments with variation in resource availability (e. g. McPeek & Holt 1992, 
Johst & Brandle 1997, Mathias et al 2001). 
There are further selection pressures on the evolution of dispersal. Apart from resource 
pressures, due to inbreeding depression (Lacy 1997, Crnokrak 1999, Keller 2002), 
inbreeding avoidance between closely genetically related individuals may promote 
dispersal (Clutton Brock 1989, Pusey & Wolf 1996, Perrin & Mazalov 2000). 
Particularly for `K selected' species (see 5.3 above) in which stable local environments 
may allow a proportion of individuals to remain in their natal range, inbreeding 
avoidance and mating competition and resource competition in general tend to produce 
sex-biased dispersal. Which sex of offspring typically remain and which disperse 
depends on the relative costs/benefits to the sexes, and the wider ecological pressures 
on the resource/ territorial options of the sexes in general (Clutton Brock 1989, 
Johnson & Gaines 1990, also see Rubenstein & Wrangham 1986, above). We have 
already seen that, in mammals, female access to resources tends to dominate the 
fundamental demographic patterns. Whereas in birds, dispersal is often female biased, 
since males engage in resource competition for successful breeding (reviewed in 
Johnson & Gaines 1990), in mammals, due to resource competition, females usually 
(but not always) remain in the natal territory (are `philopatric'), and males tend to 
disperse for mating opportunities (Wolff 1992, Altmann & Alberts 1996, Isbell & 
VanVuren 1996). 
Patterns of philopatry and dispersal greatly influence the genetic relatedness of 
individuals who remain in their natal range, and this will be particularly significant in 
group-living species, as we will see in the review of primate species, in chapter 6. 
5.6 Ecology and Demographics Summary 
As suggested in chapter two (section 2.1.6 and see Sherman 1980), the ecological 
niche a species occupies, and the associated demographic patterns typical of it are 
fundamental to an analysis of the potential for social interaction and social behaviour, 
and an understanding of how social behaviour might be mediated. 
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In particular, typical grouping contexts of genetic relatives will vary with demographic 
factors such as group-living or isolation, polygynous mating system or monogamy, and 
male or female dispersal. Further factors will influence typical grouping contexts and 
patterns of interaction between genetic relatives. Litter size and time to maturity will 
influence the statistical association of genetic relatives such as a female and her 
offspring, or the offspring themselves. The interaction between the female and her 
offspring is highly statistically reliable in isolated living mammal species, as noted 
above. In species with large litters, a number of maternal siblings will typically interact 
in close proximity with the reproductive female during infancy. In species with long 
infant dependency and single births, maternal siblings from subsequent gestations may 
also interact, in the presence of the nursing female. In species where females aggregate 
and group membership is highly durable (Wrangham & Rubenstein above), where 
male offspring disperse from the natal group at reproductive maturity, extended 
association of related reproductive females is a consequence. 
In chapter 2 (section 2.1.6) it was suggested that different grouping situations an 
individual faces (e. g. in the nest/burrow versus on the edge of the territory) might be 
comprised of quite different patterns of genetic relatives. The following sections will 
illustrate how, for many mammals, context-dependent cues mediate the expression of 
social behaviours, and how these match the typical demographic environments 
individuals of a given species might encounter. 
5.7 Evidence on Mechanisms Mediating Kin Discrimination in Mammals 
The typical patterns of interaction analysed in the last section demonstrate that certain 
reliable contexts are available to mediate context driven recognition in many mammal 
species. For grouping contexts (and social behaviours) relevant to many types of 
genetic relatives, simple continuities from birth can potentially mediate `recognition'. 
The case of paternal half-siblings is an exception here since a common context at birth 
does not necessarily exist, yet individuals may encounter one another later in 
development. Where such encounters have potentially significant outcomes, self- 
referent phenotype matching (see chapter 4.6) may be the only means to mediate 
`recognition'. This will particularly be the case where no other context-cues (such as 
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membership of a cohesive social group) are reliably statistically associated with 
common paternity; particularly in species where a male's matings are more widely 
scattered such that even geographic proximity cannot serve as a reliable cue to common 
paternity. Of course, in such cases, opportunities for significant interaction (and 
selection pressure for social behaviours that meet the Inclusive Fitness criterion) would 
also be correspondingly slight. However, `recognition' for purposes of inbreeding 
avoidance might still be selected for (see Hamilton 1987, chapter 4.5). 
The following sections briefly review the relevant evidence for the respective 
occurrence of context-based recognition and `positive powers' of recognition in 
mammals. Holmes (below) gives a succinct account reminding us of the relationship 
between ecological niche, demography and selection pressures. He goes on to 
summarise the kinds of recognition which appear to operate (or be absent) between 
different types of genetic relatives in the much studied Belding's ground squirrels 
(Spermophilus beldingi); 
"If parental ability to discriminate own offspring has evolved in both sexes, 
females and males will often rely on different proximate mechanisms to make 
discriminations... males in most mammalian species are unlikely to rely on the 
association mechanism in nature because, at the proximate level, they rarely 
interact directly with their young during early development... In polygynous, 
polyandrous or promiscuous mating relations, or when mate guarding by males is 
often unsuccessful, three recognition mechanisms other than prior association 
might facilitate father-offspring recognition. First "mediated recognition" [via 
association with the mother]... Second, if male's offspring were predictably and 
reliably distributed in space, differential treatment of male's own and alien 
young would occur if males varied their behaviour relative to location cues... if 
females reared their litters of the territories of males they mated with and males 
protects young within males' territorial boundaries, then sires would be treating 
their own offspring preferentially as a result of location specific behaviour... a 
third mechanism that males could employ to recognise offspring is phenotype 
matching. " (Holmes 1990,447-449) 
"Three points suggest that male S. beldingi do not recognise their offspring. First, 
males do not behave parentally toward young, regardless of male-young 
relatedness. Second, males leave the meadow areas where they inseminated 
females shortly after mating (Sherman & Morton, 1984) and thus do not interact 
with the juveniles they sired. Finally, because most litters are of mixed paternity 
due to multiple mating by females (Hanken & Sherman, 1981), the identities of a 
male's former mates, even if he could recall them, would not correlate with 
male-young relatedness. " (Holmes 1990,450) 
Holmes also sums up the evidence regarding Female-Offspring `recognition' 
mechanisms in this species; 
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"Mother-offspring recognition in S. beldingi is based on the association 
mechanism, as revealed by field (Holmes & Sherman, 1982) and laboratory 
(Holmes 1984) tests (see also Mitchner & Sheppard, 1972, and Mitchner, 1974, 
on Richardson's Ground squirrels). In the field, Sherman found that he could 
foster alien young by placing them near natal burrows and waiting for resident 
dams to retrieve them. When litters later emerged, resident dams treated their 
biological and foster offspring alike and behaved aggressively towards young 
reared by other (unrelated) females. In the laboratory, Holmes fostered young 
reciprocally between females shortly after birth and later found that dams 
retrieved 22-day-old young they had reared (familiar young) faster than young 
they had not reared (unfamiliar young). Retrieval times did not vary with true 
relatedness (Holmes 1988, fig 3). Thus in field and laboratory tests, dams 
responded not to their biological offspring as such, but to familiar and unfamiliar 
young. Because dams in nature rear their young isolated in underground burrows 
until the young are weaned, a "familiarity rule" (learn kin signatures of the 
young in your burrow) would result in discriminate treatment of a dam's own 
offspring. " (Holmes 1990,451) 
In fact, in all species that have been successfully cross fostered, this in itself is strong 
prima facie evidence that a context-based rule is operational in the mother-offspring 
case (further examples given below). In the case of the `recognition mechanism' 
operating in infants themselves; 
"S. beldingi young (1) can distinguish between the dam that reared them and the 
one that did not, (2) behave as though they cannot recognise their biological dam 
if reared apart from her (3) distinguish between a familiar and an unfamiliar dam 
at about the age young could first come above ground in the field. " (Holmes 
1990,452) 
As for sibling-sibling recognition, Sherman et al (1997) summarise the findings; 
"Female Belding's ground squirrels learn kin recognition cues from nestmates. In 
this species, mothers and daughters and sisters behave nepotistically: they warn 
each other of predators and protect their own and each others' pups against 
infanticide by establishing and jointly defending territories (Sherman, 1977, 
1981a, b). Cross-fostering studies in the field (Holmes & Sherman, 1982) and 
laboratory (Holmes, 1984,1986a, 1994) indicate that nestmate females learn 
each others' odours just before weaning (when litters normally begin to mix), 
and later treat each other as siblings, regardless of actual relatedness. Socially 
learning these kin-recognition templates does not increase acceptance errors in 
nature because unrelated pups rarely cohabit the same nest burrows. " (Sherman 
et al 1997,82) 
But Sherman et al note that there is some evidence that this context driven recognition, 
though primary, may be slightly supplemented by self-referencing in the case of 
paternal half-siblings, and point to the mating system as a factor; 
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"Female Belding's ground squirrels mate with one to eight males and most litters 
are multiple sired (Hanken & Sherman 1981). In the field, females are slightly 
less likely to attack full-sisters than maternal half-sisters, and more likely to 
share territories with full-sisters (Holmes & Sherman, 1982). Discrimination of 
nestmates from non-nestmates and full from half-sisters among nestmates 
suggest that a female's own smell, as well as the odours of nestmates, both 
contribute to her kin-recognition template (Sherman & Holmes 1985). In 
apparent support of self-referent phenotype matching, in laboratory studies 
paternal half-sisters also recognised each other (Holmes 1986b; but see 
Alexander, 1991). " (Sherman et al 1997,83) 
Alexander (1991), mentioned here by Sherman, simply notes that the `template' (see 
4.4) used for recognising relatedness in the case of unfamiliar paternal siblings in this 
species could in fact have been learned from littermates who shared the same father 
(Alexander 1991,387) and thus context-based recognition may play a part in mediating 
the effect. 
Similar results emerged with a related species; Holmes (1995) found that in Golden- 
Mantled ground squirrels Spermophilus lateralis, cross-fostering experiments suggested 
that a shared environment of co-rearing (in the lab) with a nursing female had more 
influence on subsequent social preferences (in a semi-natural environment) than being 
genetic littermates per se. However, the latter did exert some effect, such that the 
overall preference for social interaction, as measured by play-bout frequencies was 
ordered: littermates reared together>non-littermates reared together>littermates reared 
apart>non-littermates reared apart (Holmes 1995,309). 
Hare (1992) conducted dyadic interaction tests on wild Columbian ground squirrels 
Spermophilus columbianus and found that similar levels of cohesion and hostility were 
exhibited by all intra-colony dyads. Conversely, interactions between members of 
different colonies demonstrated lower cohesion and increased hostility. These results 
suggest that there may be a group-member familiarity mechanism at work (Hare 1992). 
Later cross-fostering work (Hare & Murie 1996) found that; 
"Rearing association significantly influenced recognitive and agonistic behavior 
among juveniles while relatedness proved insignificant in affecting behavioral 
interactions. Thus, direct familiarization in the natal burrow is both sufficient and 
necessary to account for the transitive appearance of kin-differential behavior 
among newly emerged juveniles documented in previous studies" (Hare & Murie 
1996,76). 
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Hare (1998) has also conducted work on Richardson's ground squirrels, Spermophilus 
richardsonii which also suggests that the ability that juveniles develop to discriminate 
between neighbours and strangers is based on familiarity. 
Heth et al (1998) found evidence that Golden hamsters can distinguish between siblings 
and non-siblings based on scent cues despite successful cross-fostering, which they 
suggest may reflect a self-referent phenotype matching ability. However, no positive 
social behaviours (discriminations) other than the individuals' own scent-marking 
behaviour (linked to inbreeding avoidance in females) were demonstrated to accompany 
this recognition ability. 
Sun and MullerShwarze (1997) found that the beaver, Castor canadensis, displayed a 
similar ability to distinguish between the scents of related and unrelated individuals in 
the field, and show stronger territorial response to the scent of non-relatives, which 
suggests self-referent phenotype matching. They also note that an individual's mate also 
responds differently to the scent of its partner's relative, demonstrating phenotype 
matching via learned familiarity. 
Tai et al (2000), whilst analysing the inbreeding avoidance cues of the mandarin vole, 
Microtus mandarinus found that co-habitation during development plays the key role on 
subsequent mate choice, although there was an slight, non-significant, role for genetic 
relatedness. They thus suggest that in this species "genetic relatedness may have some 
effect on kin recognition, although familiarity is the main mechanism. "(Tai et al 2000, 
2119). 
Stookey and Gonyou (1998) conducted cross-fostering experiments on pigs to measure 
the comparative effect of familiarity or genetic relatedness and measured no detectable 
decline in aggression between sibling dyads reared apart over non-familiar non-siblings. 
Conversely, familiar non-siblings (reared together) spent significantly less time fighting 
than those reared apart. Based on these results, they suggest that "recognition among 
young piglets appears to be based on familiarity gained through rearing associations, 
and does not involve genetic relatedness" (Stookey and Gonyou 1998,291). 
In a recent review, Hauber & Sherman (2001) describe only two cases in which they 
believe self-referent phenotype matching has thus far been clearly demonstrated in 
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mammals, one being Golden hamsters (see Heth et al 1998 above), the other being 
Alberts' work on Baboons (see next chapter). 
The overall impression from these studies is that context-dependent discrimination, and 
learned recognition, is the main mediator of social behaviours for most species. 
Waldman's (1988) review gives a useful montage of the recognition mechanisms 
documented in mammals; 
"Social systems of many mammals tend to be matrilineal in character, as the 
female parent is the primary care provider. In rodents (e. g. gerbils, Meriones 
unguiculatus), discrimination of young is facilitated by salivary cues the mother 
applies to her offspring (28). Similarly, goat mothers label their offspring by 
licking them (89). Sheep dams recognize their lambs by visual and auditory cues 
from a distance and by smell at close range, and lambs recognize the individual 
calls of their mothers (175). Many ground-dwelling sciurids rear their litters in 
their own burrows, so social groups consist of siblings only and kin identities can 
be learned (155). Females of colonially nesting sciurids (black-tailed prairie 
dogs, Cynomys Zudovicianus) appear to recognize their offspring only indirectly 
and fail to discriminate their own young from unrelated littermates (107,11 1). 
Mexican free-tailed bats (Tadarida brasiliensis mexicana) also nest colonially 
but do selectively nurse their own young and may mark their pups with odors to 
facilitate recognition; pups, however, do not discriminate between their mothers 
and other lactating females (90). Primate infants (e. g. squirrel monkeys, Saimiri 
sciureus) recognize and orient toward their mothers by olfactory cues (120). 
Male vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops) exercise parental care as well, for 
example, responding to infant distress calls (98). Paternal recognition appears to 
be circumstantial, however, as males provide parental care to offspring of 
females with which they had consorted during the approximate time of 
conception (39,79,98). " (Waldman 1988,545,546, see references in original) 
5.8 Selection Against Clear Signals of Relatedness 
Waldman (above) notes that, in primates, "paternal recognition" and protection of 
infants appears mediated via familiarity with the female (see next chapter for more 
detail). Note that, particularly relevant to male-infant interactions, there may be species 
for which selection pressure exists to obscure positive cues of actual genetic identity, 
for example, where non-relatedness would result in costly rejection (or worse). Sherman 
et al illustrate this point; 
"[W]hen recipients benefit from the absence of discrimination they will be 
favoured to hide their true kinship by `muting' or `scrambling' recognition labels 
(Reeve, 1997a). For example, extrapair copulations set in motion a 
coevolutionary arms race between males attempting to discriminate their progeny 
145 
and unrelated juveniles attempting to dupe the male by not revealing their 
genotype via their phenotype (Beecher, 1981). If young are initially uncertain 
about whether the resident male is in fact their father, they should hide, change 
or mix their recognition cues (e. g. via rapid growth and feather development) 
because the fatal cost of being rejected, even if improbable, may exceed the 
small benefit, even if likely, of receiving extra food from a male that has 
identified them as his progeny. Juveniles have an upper hand in this 
coevolutionary struggle because, on average, they have more to lose by being 
recognised and rejected than males lose through misdirected nepotism. " 
(Sherman et al 1997,93) 
Pagel (1997) has made a similar point, and has formalised the argument in a model 
demonstrating that comparatively small amounts of actual non-relatedness could exert 
selection pressure for concealment of relatedness; 
"[A] simple population genetics model shows that some aspects of neonatal 
appearance may arise as adaptive strategies on the part of infants actively to 
conceal the identity of their parents, especially of their father. Concealing 
paternal identity is advantageous as a strategy to avoid paternal neglect, abuse, or 
infanticide when the `domestic father' is not likely to be the `biological father'. 
The model reveals that `anonymity' as a neonatal strategy can be adaptive in a 
wide a variety of mating systems, because infants are expected to resemble their 
fathers only if the `domestic father' is also the `biological father' a high 
proportion of the time. Even small amounts of paternity uncertainty are sufficient 
to select against parent-infant resemblance. " (Pagel 1997,973) 
Pagel goes on to discuss whether the model may be applicable to the human case, but 
provides little by way of discussion of possible selection pressure in past environments. 
Nevertheless, the point remains that signalling genetic identity may be selected against 
in species where unrelated individuals may be in a position to withhold care, or exert 
harm on infants on the basis of cues of their actual genetic relatedness. There are many 
species where this power imbalance exists, as illustrated by Waldman; 
"Male lions (Panthera leo) kill new cubs in prides that they have just taken over, 
and as in rodents, females generally become reproductively receptive more 
quickly, thus allowing the intruder males to breed (170). Recent immigrant male 
Colobus and Procolobus monkeys similarly kill unrelated infants, and this 
pattern is typical of the nonhuman primates (211). Mammalian studies reveal in 
general that males refrain from killing infants in social circumstances in which 
they potentially might have fathered those individuals. Only rarely does kin 
discrimination appear to be more precise, and then males assess their paternity by 
using cues of the mother rather than the infants themselves (99). For example, 
male mice (Mus musculus) kill their own offspring when they are placed in the 
nest of a strange female, but they tolerate offspring they have not fathered that 
are placed in a familiar female's nest and those that may be marked with urine 
odors of familiar females (114). " (Waldman 1988,554) 
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These considerations will figure more in the following chapter where male-infant 
interactions in primates are reviewed and discussed. Notice also that signalling actual 
genetic relatedness as a cue mediating the expression of social cooperation and 
acceptance within a social group may also be selected against in species in which such 
social solidarity is vital for an individual's survival (e. g. Kokko et al 2001). 
5.9 Summary: The Importance of Familiarity in Mediating Social Behaviours 
In characterising the expression of social behaviours in mammals as a whole, a distinct 
trend is visible. Although it is clear that a few cases exist where a positive power of 
discrimination (apparently self-referent phenotype matching) occurs between paternal 
half-siblings, the significance of this in mediating actual social behaviours (as opposed 
to inbreeding avoidance) appears slight for mammals as a whole. On the other hand, 
even in those cases where `positive powers' are observed, the importance of context- 
based discrimination, particularly the role of familiarity in mediating actual social 
behaviours appears unequivocal. Put differently, even in those species which do display 
some positive powers under experimental conditions, familiarity appears to mediate 
social behaviour independently of actual genetic relatedness. Waldman (1988) discusses 
the comparative influence of context-driven cues, particularly familiarity, and `positive 
powers' of discrimination, and reaches a similar conclusion about the primacy of 
familiarity mediating the role of social behaviour in the species' natural environments; 
"Evidence that individuals discriminate kin that they have not previously 
encountered, or discriminate between different classes of kin and nonkin that 
they have always encountered together, holds particular fascination for 
behavioral ecologists. In the majority of cases in which kin biases are apparent, 
kinship is confounded with other variables, particularly familiarity and spatial 
distribution. Yet the "cleaner" experimental design afforded by these studies 
allows kinship effects to be examined separately from those associated with other 
types of social interactions. Many organisms can discriminate unfamiliar kin, or 
among familiar kin and nonkin (e. g. 27,75,83,105,106,121,166,222) [but see 
Hauber & Sherman 2001, above]. Yet in natural conditions kin discrimination is 
often based on familiarity and spatial distribution, and these cues can serve as 
reliable indicators of kinship identity. Experimental studies generally show that 
even if organisms can discriminate kin from nonkin when familiarity and 
proximity provide no basis for discrimination, these cues when available strongly 
influence behavioral tendencies. For example, individuals experimentally reared 
in social isolation may discriminate kin from nonkin (e. g. larvae of the 
amphibians Bufo americanus and Rana cascadae), but if reared in a socially 
mixed environment they fail to discriminate between familiar kin and nonkin 
(27,166,222). Similarly, results of several studies on rodents suggest that 
individuals can discriminate between unfamiliar siblings and unfamiliar non- 
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siblings (or half-siblings), but in usual conditions these effects are masked by 
much stronger preferences to interact with familiar individuals even if they are 
nonkin (83,121). "(Waldman 1988,560) 
Erhart et al. (1997) also give an overview of mechanisms mediating social behaviour in 
mammals and similarly characterise the overall picture as one where familiarity is of 
overriding importance; 
"The most widespread and important mechanism for kin recognition in mammals 
appears to be familiarity through prior association (Bekoff, 1981; Sherman, 
1980). During development, individuals learn and respond to cues from the most 
familiar or most commonly encountered conspecifics in their environment. 
Individuals respond to familiar individuals as kin and unfamiliar individuals as 
nonkin" (Erhart et al. 1997,153-154) 
Bekoff also emphasises, like Waldman, that it is familiarity which can override the 
presence or absence of actual relatedness in the expression of social behaviours, and not 
the other way round; 
"Mammalian young are born into a wide variety of social situations, ranging 
from being isolated from all other individuals except their mother (and possibly 
other siblings) to being born into large social groups. Although siblings do 
interact in a wide variety of species having different life histories, there are 
certain conditions, almost all of which have to do with the developmental 
environment, that will favor a biased occurrence of interactions between 
littermates and/or different-aged siblings. It will be argued later that it is these, 
and perhaps other, conditions that predispose (in a probabilistic way) siblings to 
interact with one another. However, if two (or more) very young unrelated 
individuals (assume conspecifics for simplicity) are exposed to these conditions, 
they too will behave like siblings. That is, although [relatedness] and 
[familiarity] are tightly linked in many mammals, it is [familiarity] that can 
override [relatedness], rather than the reverse. " (Bekoff, 1981,309) 
We saw in chapters 2 and 4 that `kin recognition' is central to understanding how 
Inclusive Fitness theory applies to the expression of social behaviours. Here in 
reviewing the role of `kin recognition' the evidence clearly points to context-based cues 
such as prior familiarity mediating the expression of social behaviours in the great 
majority of mammals studied. Thus it is not correct, either in theory, or in reference to 
the evidence, to suggest that `the facts of biology' support the idea that organisms have 
evolved to cooperate with genetic relatives per se. The further question then is; can we 
uncover in any greater detail how familiarity and other context-dependent cues operate? 
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5.10 Social Learning and Social Bonds 
For familiarity to mediate social behaviour requires social learning during various 
stages of an individual's development. An emphasis on social learning can be traced 
back to Hamilton's original papers (Hamilton 1964) and beyond. 
"Generally, numerous workers have stressed the importance of including 
development in analyses of behaviour (Lehrman 1953; Tinbergen 1963; Lorenz 
1965; Bekoff & Byers 1985; Alessandro et al 1989; Byers & Bekoff 1990; 
Kitcher 1990)... ontogenetic variables are important in the acquisition of kin 
recognition in animals ranging from insects to primates, including humans 
(Fletcher & Mitchner 1987; Hepper 1990). " (Byers & Bekoff 1991,1088) 
Recall Hamilton's references (section 2.2.4 for full quote) to studies of the context- 
mediated social learning of offspring identities in birds; 
"[l]t seems a reasonable hypothesis that the ability to discriminate `own young' 
advances in step with the chance that without such discrimination strange chicks 
would be fostered and the benefits of parental care wasted on unrelated genes. 
Supporting this hypothesis are the findings quoted by Tinbergen of Watson and 
Lashley on two tropical species of tern: `the Noddies nesting in trees do not 
recognise their young at any age, whereas the ground-nesting Sooties are very 
similar to herring gulls in that they learn to recognise their own young in the 
course of four days. ' House sparrows will accept strange young of the right age 
placed in the nest but after the nestlings have flown `they will not, in normal 
circumstances, feed any but their own young'. " (Hamilton 1996 (1964) 53-54) 
Tang-Martinez, in a recent review of kin recognition theory also notes the importance of 
developmental context in both learning of offspring identities by adults and in learning 
of adult identities (via `imprinting') by neonates, both in birds and in mammals; 
"Developmental studies can also provide insights into the evolution of kin 
recognition mechanisms. In several species, the neonatal central nervous system 
has evolved to be particularly sensitive to learning cues that are later used to 
discriminate kin from non-kin. For example there are imprinting or imprinting- 
like processes that result in the learning of relevant cues during certain stages of 
ontogeny. Filial imprinting, using visual cues, is well known among precocial 
birds... Among rodents, neonatal learning of cues associated with the mother are 
also important for kin discrimination... Not all sensitive periods for learning kin- 
related odors occur in neo-natal animals. Female goats, Capra hircus (e. g. 
Klopfer and Gamble, 1966), and sheep, Ovis aries (Poindron and levy, 1990; 
Kendrick et al., 1992) appear to be predisposed to learn the odors of their 
newborn offspring immediately after giving birth.., it is well known that mothers 
can be deceived into accepting alien young (non-kin) as long as they are 
introduced immediately after parturition (Levy et al., 1991). " (Tang-Martinez 
2001,33) 
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Where social learning of an individual's identity leads to close familiarity which 
endures over time and is accompanied by particular social responses and social 
behaviours, the concept of a `social bond' may be useful. Gubernick's influential Parent 
and Infant Attachment in Mammals gave an early review (1981) of the development of 
social bonds between relatives, and links social bonding and attachment to 
discriminatory parent-offspring social behaviour; 
"Parental care is one strategy which helps ensure the survival of offspring and 
thereby enhances the parents' reproductive success (see Klopfer, this volume; 
Pianka, 1970). In mammals, parental care usually involves behavioural 
interactions between parents and offspring. One form these interactions can take 
is that of parent and infant attachment, the subject of this chapter. 
The interactions between parents and offspring that have received the widest 
attention have been those between the mother and her young, while male parental 
care has been less studied... My emphasis here will be placed on mammals other 
than humans. Three general questions will be addressed: what is attachment, 
where is attachment found, and why are attachments formed?... Typically 
attachment is defined as a special affectional relationship between two 
individuals that is specific in its focus and endures over time... The important 
features of such definitions are (1) the formation of a special emotional 
relationship (i. e., affective bond), (2) with a specific individual (i. e. the 
specificity of the bond), (3) towards whom certain responses are directed rather 
than towards other individuals (i. e., differential responding). These features 
assume the recognition and discrimination of the attachment figure from other 
figures. " (Gubernick 1981,243-244) 
Just as Hamilton noted the variations in the form of social learning in different bird 
species, so Gubernick also emphasises that the development of social attachments will 
depend on the typical demographic features of the species, especially the typical 
circumstances in which parent and infants are in contact; 
"The ultimate function of attachment (measured in term of fitness) is probably 
not protection from predation as some have argued but rather insurance that care 
is provided for one's own young and not those of another. Since the same 
ultimate and proximate consequences are, in some species, achieved without 
forming attachment, it is necessary to assess the conditions favouring the 
evolution of parent and infant attachment. 
Based on the assumed function of attachment, predictions can be made regarding 
the likelihood of finding attachment under varying conditions of mobility of the 
young and social structure. A survey of the available evidence suggests that 
attachment does in fact occur where the chances of misdirecting parental care 
seems high. 
Although parent and infant attachment is found in many species, the mechanisms 
and developmental timing of such attachments may differ, as illustrated in 
several species of rodents, primates, and ungulates. " (Gubernick 1981,288) 
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Primate demography, social interactions and social bonding will be covered in greater 
detail in the following chapter (Chapter 6). As well as the many mammals reviewed by 
Gubernick, other studies of the context-based formation of social bonds and 
accompanying social discriminations have been conducted. These include work on 
rodents (e. g. Gerbils; Valsecchi et al 1996; Guinea Pigs; Janzen et al 1999, Jackel & 
Trillmich 2003; Rats; Sigling et al 1998), Ungulates (e. g. Sheep; Porter & Levy 1991, 
Romeyer 1993, Gonzales & Goddard 1998; Goats; Romeyer & Poindron 1992, 
Hemandez et al 2002; Bison; Green 1993; Horses; Houpt 2002), canids (e. g. Dogs; 
Mekoshrosenbaum et al 1994, Topal et al 1998), felids (e. g. Cheetah; Ruiz-Miranda et 
al 1998), and pinnipeds (e. g. Harbour Seals; Lawson & Renouf 1987; Sea-lions; Hanggi 
et al 1990) amongst others. 
In short, in those mammals where social bonds typically form between parent and 
infant, it is possible to investigate "discriminatory" social behaviour via an investigation 
of the process of formation of those social bonds which are well established as 
mediating social behaviours in many species. Although clear social bonding is not 
inevitably present in all mammals, when we review primates (chapter 6), it is common 
to find that "kin recognition", "social learning", social bonding, and the formation of 
social relationships are usually interdependent and are thus studied together. Since the 
development of social bonds is well established in many mammals - particularly in 
primates and humans - an analysis of this area becomes an efficient way of 
investigating the proximate mechanisms of `kin discrimination'. 
5.11 Summary: Correlations and the Distinction between Evolution and 
Expression 
Reviewing his own results suggesting familiarity may mediate female-offspring 
`recognition' in Belding's ground squirrels (Spermophilus beldingi), Holmes 1990 
suggests that; 
"Two points emerge from this study (Holmes, 1984). First, a kin recognition 
mechanism based on social learning does not allow assessment of kinship or 
genetic relatedness per se, but allows an individual to behave as though it can 
assess relatedness in species-typical circumstances. Thus "kin recognition" could 
more precisely be called "kin-correlate recognition, " where the factor(s) 
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correlated with kinship (rearing association in the previous example) vary with 
the ecology and social organisation of the species being considered (Holmes & 
Sherman, 1983)... Second, recognition mechanisms are best considered "rules of 
thumb" or "behavioural heuristics" that typically, but not always, result in kin- 
differential behaviour. " (Holmes 1990,442) 
In this chapter, we have reviewed evidence that makes it clear that genes whose effects 
are `social' can - in many circumstances, in many mammalian species - meet the 
Inclusive Fitness criterion simply by the expression of social behaviours being context 
sensitive. As Kitcher (1985) pointed out (see chapter 3.5) those making reference to 
Inclusive Fitness theory in applications to humans have largely ignored the possibility 
of a contextual rule of thumb by which the expression of social behaviours tends to 
benefit genetic relatives. Instead it has been assumed that "Inclusive Fitness" must 
involve the notion that the expression of individuals' social behaviour will actively 
target genetic relatives essentially by `recognising kin' and differentially interacting 
with them. This would require the expression of social behaviour in humans to be 
totally different from that seen in all other mammals. Where social behaviours are 
mediated by familiarity and context-based cues which evolutionarily typically have 
"correlated with kin" (Holmes, above), the concept that actual 'kin recognition' 
mediates social behaviours is incorrect, notwithstanding the evolutionary selection 
pressures involved; 
"[T]he fact that animals benefit from engaging in spatially mediated behaviors is 
not evidence that these animals can recognise their kin, nor does it support the 
conclusion that spatially-based differential behaviors represent a kin recognition 
mechanism (see also discussions by Blaustein, 1983; Waldman, 1987; Halpin 
1991). In other words, from an evolutionary perspective it may well be 
advantageous for kin to aggregate and for individuals to behave preferentially 
towards nearby kin, whether or not this behaviour is the result of kin recognition 
per se" (Tang-Martinez 2001,25) 
As we saw in Chapter 4 (4.3), theorists such as Tang-Martinez and Grafen (1991) have 
questioned the concept of `kin recognition' on this basis. Such considerations led 
Grafen to suggest that we might want to limit `kin recognition' strictly to cases where 
`positive powers' of discrimination are used. It may be helpful to recall that theories 
about evolutionary selection pressures are necessarily about typical outcomes of the 
effects of genes. Genes and behaviours spread (increase in frequency) simply because 
of their statistical covariance (Price 1970) with reproductive success in the species' 
typical environments. Thus a selection criterion relevant to evolutionary trends does not 
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entail that the expression of social behaviour must be contingent on actual genetic 
relatedness. Failing to note this distinction between the evolutionary process and the 
expression of behaviours can lead to confused debates. For example, others theorists 
respond to Grafen's (1991, see section 4.3) point (which is really a call for caution over 
what mediates the expression of social behaviour) with the opposite emphasis, 
suggesting that `kin recognition is what kin recognition does'; in other words a focus on 
evolutionarily-typical statistical outcomes; 
"I suggest that group or individual recognition systems might well qualify as kin 
recognition regardless of the cues used, provided that the groups or individuals 
so recognised are routinely kin and that the fitness benefits associated with 
recognition typically flow among kin... Grafen's insistence that kin recognition 
be a function of genetically based cues and that no individual or group 
recognition system should qualify excludes many recognition systems that may 
well function to associate kin in a fitness enhancing context. Kin recognition is 
an inherently functional concept and any definition or restriction that relies too 
much on a particular mechanisms or source of cues is problematic" (Stuart 1991, 
1093) 
Of course both sides of the debate are right, but are really talking about two different 
things; evolution and expression. It could be argued that this tension between 
emphasising evolution or expression has dogged kin recognition research and theory for 
a long time. On the one hand it makes sense from the perspective of analysing 
`function', i. e. evolutionarily significant statistical outcomes, to be plural in classifying 
the mechanisms/ processes/ circumstances that potentially mediate kin discrimination. 
On the other hand, if we want to strictly understand the ontogeny and flexibility of 
potential for an individual's expression of behaviours which lead to social bonding and 
social behaviours, it is vital to approach `kin recognition' with a view to proximate 
mechanisms of expression, and bear in mind the typical correlation of such `rules of 
thumb' with bonding and behaviour between genetic relatives in typical evolutionary 
environments. As Tang-Martinez puts it; 
"Some may argue that this criticism [should kin bias be considered `kin 
recognition'] is irrelevant if one is interested primarily in the evolutionary 
consequences of behavior. This may be true, but it begs the question of the 
underlying cause of the behavior. A lack of knowledge, or a misunderstanding, 
of the proximate mechanisms of behavior can lead to erroneous conclusions 
about evolution and function... In summary, it is not enough to argue that the 
consequences of a behavior (e. g. kin bias) may be adaptive and that it all that 
matters in the long run. To adequately understand the behavior and the 
evolutionary forces that have influenced it, it is imperative also to understand the 
underlying processes and mechanisms that have given rise to the behavior. " 
(Tang-Martinez 2001,25) 
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This is particularly the case with analyses of human social bonds and behaviour. 
Without a consideration of the evolutionarily typical environments in which behaviours 
evolve, references to "Inclusive Fitness" are not only potentially misinterpretations, but 
also might contribute little to our understanding of the workings of social behaviour. As 
we noted in chapter 3 (3.5 for full quote), Kitcher made a very similar point to Tang- 
Martinez, about Darwinian Anthropologists' hypotheses; 
"Let us suppose that Alexander, Kurland, and others succeed in showing that in 
certain environments particular forms of social behaviour maximise the inclusive 
fitness of those who engage in them. What exactly have we learned about human 
nature? " (Kitcher 1985,282) 
If the expression of social bonding and behaviour in humans in context-based, due to 
the reliability of the evolutionary context of interactions with actual genetic relatives, 
the same social bonding mechanisms could readily lead to the social bonding between 
non-genetic-relatives where a similar context exists. If this is the case, then 
consideration of the proximate mechanisms of social bonding becomes key to 
understanding how Inclusive Fitness selective pressure has moulded the evolution of 
social bonding and social behaviours in humans. 
An understanding of the `Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness' and how it shapes 
proximate mechanisms of behaviour is therefore important in understanding the form of 
current species-typical social behaviours. The following chapter will attempt to 
indirectly consider some fundamental aspects of evolutionarily typical environments 
relevant to humans. This relies heavily on defining likely evolutionarily long-term, 
fundamental, demographic features ofprimate groups, and African apes in particular. 
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Chapter Six - The Mediation of Social Behaviours in Primates 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter demonstrated that, in mammals, context-driven cues such as 
familiarity and social bonding are of key influence in mediating of the expression of 
social behaviours. In a small number of species there is some evidence for an ability to 
distinguish relatives by self-referent phenotype-matching, particularly between relatives 
(e. g. paternal siblings) for whom the typical context of interaction does not necessarily 
correlate with their actual relatedness. However even in such species, familiarity 
regardless of actual relatedness is of over-riding influence. In this chapter, similar 
findings are made of primate species. 
The relevance of the present enquiry into the mediation of social behaviours in primates 
needs clarification. Recall that `Inclusive Fitness' is proposed to be best interpreted as a 
description of the selection pressure genes face in evolutionary environments for their 
social effects. In order to understand past selection pressures that have shaped current 
species-typical human behaviours, we must examine aspects of evolutionarily typical 
environments relevant to humans. 
Evolutionary Psychology posits an `Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness' (EEA) 
of a particular time period to be of primary relevance to understanding current human 
behavioural characteristics. The key influential period of human evolution is typically 
proposed to be the past two million years or so depending on what version one follows 
(e. g. Symons 1992, see chapter 7 for more); in all cases the focus is on the period after 
human ancestral species branched off from other African apes. 
Whilst Evolutionary Psychologists' use of this conceptual tool (the `EEA') is an 
improvement on the Darwinian Anthropologists' assumption (that behaviour always 
leads to Inclusive Fitness maximisation in the present - independently of evolved 
mechanisms), the common reference to a discreet and finite EEA is itself somewhat 
artificial. If one wanted to understand the differences in behaviour of humans and, for 
example, other African apes, then investigating the different unique selection pressures 
operating on these species and their ancestors for the past 5 million years would be a 
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worthwhile approach. However, as one might expect, there are similarities in many 
aspects of behaviour between all African apes, (as well as deeper commonalities 
stemming from around 200 million years of mammalian ancestry). To assume that the 
past couple of million years is the crucial period for an understanding of fundamental 
aspects of current species-typical human social behaviour (and that previous 
evolutionary history is largely irrelevant) may be too narrow a focus. It really depends 
on what behaviours you are interested in analysing, and what assumptions you are 
already making about human uniqueness. The concept of the EEA was borrowed from 
the ethological attachment theorist John Bowlby. Bowby's own interest was in an 
investigation of the mechanisms and evolution of social bonding behaviour in humans 
which he explicitly linked to similar mechanisms in other primates. Rather than 
focussing exclusively on the past two million years of uniquely human evolutionary 
history, Bowlby consistently related human behaviours to general selection pressures 
operating in primate environments (Bowlby 1982, see chapter 7). 
Reviewing basic features of current primate groups which share a common evolutionary 
history with humans (including an investigation of other African apes) may reasonably 
be taken to indicate some fundamentals which have also been present in the past 
adaptive environments of the human species. Furthermore, this approach has the 
advantage of potentially outlining basic social behavioural propensities that humans 
have in common with other primates, independently from the theoretical basis (in this 
case Inclusive Fitness theory) investigated in the current analysis. 
This chapter will first outline basic demographic influences common to many primates, 
and note the varieties of mating system and dispersal patterns observed in primate 
species. As we saw for mammals, ecological factors heavily influence demographic 
patterns for all primates including the African apes (section 6.3). 
The chapter then. gives an initial overview of the typical grouping contexts of genetic 
relatives (section 6.3.1) and notes the considerable incidence of groups of maternally 
related females in many species (section 6.3.2). 
The main part of the chapter reviews evidence of the typical patterns of interaction 
between particular pairs of relatives. In each case, this is accompanied by a review of 
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the evidence (sections 6.4.1 - 6.4.6) demonstrating that context-driven cues strongly 
mediate social bonds observed in primate species closely related to humans. 
6.2 Basic Niche and Life History Variables of Old World Primates 
Relative to most other mammals, primates have been studied extensively in the field, 
mainly due to the long standing assumption that insights gained into primate behaviour 
might help illuminate aspects of human behaviour (Washburn 1950). For present 
purposes it is necessary to draw on evidence from those primate species most closely 
related to humans. Although phylogenetic reconstructions are not straightforward 
(Hartwig 1999), there is general agreement over ancestral relatedness between primate 
species. The two branches of primates, prosimians and anthropoids, perhaps had a 
common ancestor some 50-60 million years ago, and probably divided early in the 
Eocene period if not before. Within anthropoid primates (the branch to which African 
apes belong) evidence is suggestive of a split 25-35 million years ago between the `Old 
World' and `New World' branches (see Hartwig 1999 for a recent review). Our focus 
in this review will be on `Old World' primates (Infraorder Catarrhini) of which the 
two sub-branches are apes (Superfamily Hominoidea) and cercopithecids (Superfamily 
Cercopithecoidea), the latter comprising the cercopithecine (e. g. vervets, baboons, 
macaques) and colobine (e. g. colobus, langur) subfamilies. 
Relevant demographic features of all Old World primates include the following; single 
births with significant birth spacing (1-2 years for most Cercopithecoidea, 3-6 years 
for Hominoidea); extended developmental period and time to reproductive maturity 
(typically 3-6 years for most Cercopithecoidea, 7+ for Hominoidea); relative longevity 
(typically 20+ for most Cercopithecoidea; 40+ for Hominoidea). These figures are 
consistent with highly `K selected' species (see chapter 5.3), or what Kappeler et al 
refer to as species with `slow life histories'; 
"Primate life histories are among the slowest among mammals (Harvey and Clutton- 
Brock 1985; Harvey, Martin and Clutton-Brock 1987; Ross 1988; Charnov and 
Berrigan 1993; Lee 1993; Ross 1998). Primates' birth, growth, and death rates, in 
particular, are substantially lower than those of other mammals after controlling for 
difference in body size. Specifically, primates have relatively long gestation lengths, 
large neonates, low reproductive rates, slow postnatal growth rates, late ages at 
maturity, and long life spans in comparison to other mammals (Martin and 
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MacLarnon 1988; Charnov 1991; Harvey and Nee 1991; Lee, Majluf, and Gordon 
1991; Ross 1992a; Charnov and Berrigan 1993). " (Kappeler et al 2003) 
In common with other mammals, ecological influences play a large part in determining 
both these life history variables, and the concomitant contexts of interaction between 
individuals. 
6.3 Ecological Influences and Dispersal Patterns 
As with other mammals (reviewed in chapter 5.3), outside the considerably important 
mother-offspring relationship, interactions with other genetic relatives will depend 
upon demographic influences such as patterns of philopatry and mating system. 
Old World primate social systems are characterised by great variability both between 
and within species (Fuentes 1999; Yamagiwa 1999). This variability initially upset the 
earliest models of primate demographic structure (based on first observations) when it 
was discovered upon further fieldwork that the same species in different locations 
could exhibit different social systems (Fedigan & Strum 1999). For example, studies 
by Dolhinow (Jay 1965, Dolhinow 1972) on Hanuman langurs in north India gave the 
impression of a multi-male multi-female species. Independent studies in south India by 
Sugiyama (1965) suggested single male multi-female groups were also characteristic 
of the Hanuman langur. A similar flexibility of system was found to characterise 
different baboon populations (Fedigan & Strum 1999). As research has mounted, the 
only safe conclusion is that flexibility is characteristic for the majority of species, and 
this flexibility is reflected in the individual behavioural plasticity characteristic of 
primate species; 
"Even a brief examination of primate species indicates that grouping patterns, group 
composition, and the subsequent set of interactions within and between groups can 
be highly variable (Rylands 1993; Treves and Chapman 1996; Vasey 1997; Fuentes 
1998; Chism, Essay 9; Freed, Essay 13; Kirkpatrick, Essay 10; Strier, Essay 11). 
Because these elements can be highly variable, it is likely that selection has favoured 
individuals who are highly adaptable in their behaviour potentials. " (Fuentes 1999, 
187) 
Despite these variabilities, there is traditional classification of demographic patterns in 
primates, and the key patterns relevant to Old World primates are as follows; 
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"Multimale, multifemale groups range greatly in size and include two or more adult 
males, two or more adult females and their offspring... Within this type are a number 
of subtypes (for example, communities, fission-fusion groups, and multilevel 
bands)... 
One-male, multifemale groups have one adult male and two or more adult females 
and offspring. Although common in cercopithecoids, this grouping pattern is less 
widespread than previously thought in other primate taxa... 
One-female, multimale groups... [are] very rare and only consistently reported for 
some callitrichid [new world] species. 
One-male, one-female groups have only one adult of each sex plus offspring. This 
grouping was thought to be common in primates as compared with other mammals, 
but recently it has been shown to be rather rare (Fuentes [2000]). 
Solitary or semi-solitary primates are those in which a female and her dependent 
offspring utilise a home range that overlaps with those of other females-offspring 
units and with multiple males. Although not truly a traditional group, these primates 
may be fairly social and may form sleeping associations, temporary multifemale 
associations, or male-female associations. This pattern is common in many 
prosimians and in one hominid [pongo]. 
Although these groupings are identified by the sex of members, they do not 
necessarily reflect mating patterns. " (Fuentes 1999,185) 
In Old World primates, only gibbon (Hylobates) species have traditionally been 
classified as one-male, one-female (and viewed as having monogamous mating), but 
recent evidence has shown this to be over simple (Reichard & Sommer 1997, Fuentes 
2000). Additionally, as suggested by Fuentes, females of the only `solitary' Old World 
primate, the orangutan, also sometimes associate with other females. Other than these 
notable exceptions within the Superfamily Hominoidea, Old World primates are 
essentially one-male, multifemale or multimale, multifemale. Within the other 
superfamily Cercopithecidae (comprising cercopithecines and colobines), Andelman 
(1986) gives a useful summary of the structure of the cercopithecine subfamily; 
"The subfamily Cercopithecinae consist of four main groups: Macaca, Papio 
(including Theropithecus), Cercocebus, and Cercopithecus (including Erythrocebus, 
Miopithecus, and Allenopithecus). The basic female group structure is very similar 
for all Cercopithecines that have been examined, with the exception of Papio 
hamadryas. Following Wrangham (1980), Cercopithecines may be described as 
"female-bonded" in that females typically remain in their natal groups for life and 
female social interactions are characterized by pronounced dominance hierarchies 
and well-developed networks of grooming relationships. Males usually transfer out 
of their natal groups upon reaching sexual maturity. Consequently, most 
Cercopithecine social groups consist of a stable core of related females and their 
immature offspring, while the membership of adult males in such groups is more 
transient (P. hamadryas is exceptional in that females do not breed in their natal 
groups)... 
In summary, among Cercopithecines, female group size is closely related to the 
distribution of feeding sites. Male membership in groups, and the resulting social 
system, are strongly dependent on the size of female groups. In general, small female 
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groups lead to uni-male social systems. There is a significant linear relationship 
between the size of the female group and the number of male members in multimale 
groups. At intermediate female group sizes, both social systems occur, and a variety 
of factors, including dispersion of females and cooperative male behaviour, appear to 
be important in determining which system prevails. The ratio of adult males to adult 
females in multimale groups (for which data are available) is virtually constant 
across species ["approximately 1: 2.4"], suggesting that multimale social structures 
are not primarily an adaptation to high predation pressure. " (Andelman 1986,202, 
216) 
In primates, as with other mammals, because associations of adult females tend to be 
influenced by distribution of key food resources available to them, it is females which 
tend to be philopatric, remaining in their natal home range with its familiar resources 
upon maturity, whilst males tend to disperse. There are some exceptions, where males 
are philopatric, which will be discussed below. In the cercopithecines, as Andelman's 
summary suggests, most male polygyny is partial and relatively short term (the 
`harem' arrangement of the hamadryas baboon is an exception). In the Colobinae 
subfamily, there are also a couple of exceptions to this general pattern. This can most 
easily be seen from dispersal patterns. Pusey and Packer (1987) provide a clear 
summary of primate dispersal, and demonstrate that patterns appear to follow a similar 
pattern to those in other mammals (see chapter 5.5); 
"It is now clear that although members of one sex often remain in their natal group 
throughout their lives, members of the other sex usually emigrate at sexual 
maturity... 
Male-biased dispersal occurs in all the Old World monkey [Cercopithecoidea] 
species that have been well studied, except hamadryas baboons, red colobus, and 
possibly black colobus (Colobus Satanas)... 
In most polygynous species, males provide little direct paternal care. Female 
reproductive success appears limited primarily by nutritional constraints, while male 
reproductive success seems limited more by the numbers of females they can 
inseminate (Trivers 1972; Bradbury and Vehrencamp 1977; Wrangham 1980). 
Studies of various mammals show that foraging efficiency is increased by familiarity 
with the area and the phenology of food sources and that such familiarity is best 
gained by remaining in the natal area (Waser and Jones 1983). As a result, females 
may benefit more than males from philopatry. " (Pusey and Packer 1987,250,265) 
In the Hominoidea branch of Old World primates, however, significantly different 
patterns predominate. The social system of gibbons (Hylobates) was briefly described 
above, and both sexes usually disperse, but sons may remain if the adult male dies. The 
other Hominoidea (Orangutan, Gorilla, Chimpanzee and Bonobo (or `pygmy chimp') 
and Humans) are sometimes know as the "great apes", and have quite different social 
systems. Although we will go into more detail on the African apes (Gorilla, 
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Chimpanzee, Bonobo and Human) below, Wrangham gives an account of the potential 
significance of ecological influences (particularly the distribution of primary food 
sources) on the social organisation of the great ape species; 
"For a family containing only four species, the social systems of the great apes are 
strikingly diverse. Orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) are essentially solitary. Gorillas 
(Gorilla gorilla) form stable bisexual groups with rarely more than two males or six 
females. Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (or pygmy chimpanzees) (P. 
Paniscus) live in closed social networks (communities) with as many as one hundred 
or more individuals. Within communities the mating systems and association 
patterns of the two chimpanzee species differ substantially. 
These social variations present an attractive problem because the ecology of the four 
species is similar in many ways. All are confined to habitats that contain at least a 
small amount of tropical rain forest. They breed all year and the young travel with 
their mothers from birth. They sleep in nests throughout their habitats, and have no 
permanent sleeping sites. There are no obvious differences in their vulnerability to 
predation, disease, or bad weather. Their main ecological differences appear to lie in 
foraging patterns, and even these have striking similarities, because all species feed 
from rather discrete patches on easily digested food (even the gorilla: Waterman et 
al, 1983). 
Previously I have suggested that foraging patterns are primarily responsible for 
difference in great ape social organization. Fig. 16.1 shows that group size varies 
among the four species. Differences in group size are not explained by difference in 
population density: at any density bonobos from the largest parties and orangutans 
the smallest. Therefore food density, which presumably controls population density, 
is unlikely to be a strong influence on group size. Food distribution varies, however, 
and the nature of each species' food type and foraging style suggests that differences 
in average group size may be differences in the intensity of feeding competition. " 
(Wrangham 1986,352) 
In respect of the importance of influence from food-sources on basic demographic 
patterns, great apes are no different from other mammal species (see chapter 5.4). 
Orangutans are mainly solitary, with long-term non-coresident single-male polygyny. 
Females and their dependent offspring may occasionally congregate with other mother- 
offspring units at prime feeding sites. Humans, chimps, bonobos and gorillas are 
classified as African apes, and probably had a common ancestor on the order of 5-7 
million years ago. For this reason, as set out in the introduction, it may be worth 
considering the commonalities of all these species in any attempt to understand basic 
behavioural features of any one of them. Goldsmith (1999) gives a characterization of 
Gorillas (whose geographic distribution overlaps that of chimps), again emphasising the 
influence of food-sources; 
"Gorilla populations differ from one another in aspects of their ecology and 
behaviour. At the lowest altitudes forests are fruit-rich, and chimpanzee densities are 
high. In these regions gorillas are highly frugivorous, more arboreal, travel far daily 
distances, and, in some cases, may live in less cohesive social groups. This is similar 
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to what we see in other African apes, especially bonobos. At the other end of the 
scale - at high altitudes where there are few fruit sources and no chimpanzees - 
gorillas are folivorous, terrestrial, travel short daily distances, and live in cohesive, 
stable groups. [... ] 
Mountain gorillas live in relatively stable groups of 2 to 34 members, with an 
average of 9.2 individuals. Although they are generally described as living in single- 
male, polygynous social groups, 28% of the groups have two breeding silverback 
males. There is much variation, but females generally transfer from their natal group 
and engage in secondary transfer, whereas males either remain solitary or form all- 
male groups. As seen in other mammals that live in single-male groups, takeovers 
may result in infanticide, wherein the new resident male kills offspring he has not 
sired. 
The extent to which mountain gorillas experience within group feeding competition 
is low due to abundant and evenly distributed food sources. Daily path length 
increases with group size, but only weakly, and competition for food between group 
members is low... 
The latest evidence from Lope, Gabon (Tautin et al 1992), the Ndoki Forest, Congo 
(Olejniczak 1996), and Bai Hokou, Central African Republic (Goldsmith 1996), 
suggests a mean group size of about 9.5 individuals for western lowland gorillas, 
similar to that of the Virunga mountain gorillas, but western lowland gorilla groups 
rarely exceed 16 to 18 individuals. Although most of the information on the ecology 
and behaviour of western lowland gorillas comes from limited observations and 
indirect data (due to lack of habituation), there have been no documented or 
suspected cases of infanticide... 
Although western lowland gorilla groups are frugivorous and experience within- 
group feeding competition, they do not live in smaller groups as predicted. How then 
do they reduce competition that results from feeding on sparsely distributed fruits? 
Western lowland gorillas increase their group spread and form smaller temporary 
foraging subgroups. More than five years of study at Bai Hokou has documented that 
gorillas form temporary subgroups that feed separately and, on occasion, sleep 
separately from each other (Goldsmith 1996; Remis 1997b). Although temporary 
subgroups form throughout the year, they occur significantly more often during the 
rainy season months when feeding on fruits. This behaviour is newly described for 
gorillas and is similar to what we see in other frugivorous African apes. " (Goldsmith 
1999,60-63) 
Goldsmith's summary clearly demonstrates the influence on ecological factors on 
demographics. Apart from Humans, the other African ape species are both of the Pan 
genus. Fruth et al (1999) give a useful overview of their commonalities and differences; 
"Both Pan species show many common characteristics. Their anatomy is 
fundamentally similar; that is, there is sexual dimorphism, males being heavier and 
having larger canine teeth than females (Jungers and Susman 1984; Parish, under 
review). 
Both species live in groups or communities of 20 to 120 members (Nishida 1968; 
Kuroda 1979; Goodall 1986). Both are diurnal, wide-ranging, and regularly form 
subgroups of differing number and composition, so-called parties, that range 
independently in a common home range. This fluid pattern is called fission-fusion 
social organization. Home range size varies and depends strongly on both habitat 
quality and community size, ranging from 6 to more than 300 km2 (Kano 1971; 
Baldwin, McGrew, and Tutin 1982; Sugiyama 1984). Communities consist of both 
sexes, but females usually outnumber males (Male-to-female ratio may be as much 
as 1: 4. ) Males remain in their natal community, but females generally migrate to 
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neighbouring communities, usually at sexual maturity. As a result, males know one 
another from childhood until death and many are closely related, whereas females 
are less familiar and more distantly related (Morin et al. 1994b). 
Depending on habitat, food patch size, and food distribution, both species travel 
daily distances ranging from several 100 m up to 10 km, with an average of about 3 
km/day, to meet their nutritional needs (Wrangham 1997; Fruth 1995). They are 
omnivorous, eating ripe fruit, leaves, piths, flowers, and a small but important 
proportion of animal prey, such as insects or mammals... 
The most striking differences between the two Pan species occur in social 
organization and structure. An eye-catching difference concerns party composition 
(Figure 3). Chimpanzee females spend most of their time only with dependent 
offspring. They join males seasonally or when in estrus, whereas males range in 
parties year-round. Community boundaries are frequented by males, and encounters 
with neighbouring communities are either avoided or hostile (Goodall 1986). 
Bonobo females, in contrast, are typically found in mixed-sex parties, regardless of 
season and reproductive status. All-female parties are frequent, whereas all male 
parties are almost absent (Kuroda 1979). Community boundaries exist, but attractive 
resources in zones of overlap lead to occasional encounters between neighbouring 
communities. These encounters begin with agonistic displays but end up with 
members of both communities eating together and interacting peacefully (Kano 
1992). " (Fruth et al 1999,64-66) 
6.3.1 Typical Grouping Contexts of Relatives: Overview 
As our key focus is on the typical grouping contexts of genetic relatives in Old World 
primates, a summary of the effects of the demographic factors reviewed above is 
worthwhile. Note that whilst this section will focus on the clustering of genetic relatives 
brought about by these demographic influences, it is crucial to remember that ecological 
potential must provide the opportunity for interactions between individuals prior to 
considerations of the evolution of complex sociality that may be attributable to reliable 
patterns of relatedness. In short, group living per se must be both possible and 
advantageous for individuals to begin with. Walters (1987) makes this point well; 
"I am distinguishing behaviour concentrated on relatives within groups, discussed 
below [... ] from overall levels of cooperation characterizing social groups. The issue 
in the latter case is to what extent particular levels of cooperation can be attributed to 
average relatedness of group members resulting from population structure. 
Some of the cooperative benefits that primates derive from group living are 
widespread among animals, and occur even in groups of unrelated individuals. These 
include benefits gained from alarm calling, improved foraging efficiency, and some 
forms of cooperative defense against predators. Similar. behavior occurs for example 
in mixed species flocks of birds (Morse, 1980, Chapter 12) and in temporary flocks 
of wintering sanderlings (Calidris alba) comprised of unrelated individuals (Myers, 
1983). The benefits derived from these forms of cooperation are presumably 
sufficiently large that high relatedness (i. e. kin selection) is not necessary for their 
evolution. Behavior such as cooperative defense of resources, allogrooming, and 
other forms of cooperative defense against predators (e. g. physical attacks on 
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predators) are not as widespread, and their evolution may well be attributable to the 
levels of relatedness characteristic of primate groups. " (Walters 1987,361-362) 
Whether social discriminations typically occur between these various genetic relatives 
and, if so, how they are mediated ('recognition') will be further looked at below. 
Walters (1987) gives us an overview of the commonest pattern of interaction between 
relatives; that between maternally related females in female-philopatric polygynous 
groups; 
"The best studied population structure in non-human primates is one in which groups 
consist of related females and their offspring, plus associated males (Wrangham, 
1980; Moore, 1984; Periera and Altmann, 1985; Pusey and Packer 1986). Males 
usually emigrate from their natal groups, and avoid mating with close kin within 
their natal groups even when they do not emigrate (see below). The interaction 
structure in this system, known as the female-bonded group system (Wrangham, 
1980; Moore, 1984), thus results in the association of maternal kin. The polygynous 
nature of the mating structure (see below) also leads to high relatedness within 
groups, especially within age cohorts, but through paternal lines (J. Altmann, 1979). " 
(Walters 1987,361) 
We saw that mating pattern particularly affects paternal relatedness in the discussion in 
chapter 5 (see more below). The clearest context of interaction of relatives however is 
that between mother and offspring, pre-dispersal maternal siblings of both sexes, and 
maternal siblings of the philopatric sex. Gouzoules and Gouzoules (1987) discuss the 
predominance of this interaction between close maternally related individuals; 
"Related individuals in species of Old World monkeys that typically form multimale 
groups (primarily the cercopithecines, see chapters, 9,11) are often found near and 
in contact with one another and may travel, feed and sleep together (e. g. pigtailed 
macaques; Rosenblum 1971; Rosenblum, Kaufman, and Stynes 1966; Japanese 
macaques; Yamada 1963; Kurland 1977; chimpanzees; Goodall 1968; Pusey 1983; 
yellow baboons; Altmann 1980). Mothers and their immediate offspring are 
particularly spatially cohesive, collateral kin (i. e., nonlineal kin such as aunts/uncles 
- nieces/nephews, cousins) to a 
lesser extent... In many species of nonhuman 
primates, infants and juveniles regularly interact with relatives other than their 
mothers (rhesus macaques; Berman 1982a, 1983a, Japanese macaques; H. Gouzoules 
1980b, in prep.; yellow baboons; Altman 1980, chapter 27; chimpanzees; Goodall 
1968; gorillas; Fossey 1979; vervets; Lee 1983a). Older siblings are usually the first 
and most persistent individuals other than the mother to interact with infants. " 
(Gouzoules and Gouzoules 1987,299-303) 
The extent and duration of both mother-offspring and maternal-sibling relationships will 
vary according to age of weaning, age of dispersal and birth spacing. Where females are 
philopatric, maternal sisters will tend to continue to associate as adults, perhaps still in 
the presence of their own mother, and in turn, their infants may encounter 
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`grandmothers', maternal `aunts' and other maternal relatives in addition to the more 
fundamental and basic interactions with mother and maternal siblings. 
As Walters (above) reminds us, a polygynous mating system can lead to a substantial 
number of paternal half-siblings. The duration of interaction of such paternal-siblings 
depends on dispersal (long for paternal sisters in a polygynous female philopatric 
species, such as most cercopithecines, long for paternally related brothers/males in a 
male philopatric species, such as chimps (but here matings are multi-male). Where 
typically a single male dominates matings for a few years at a time (as often occurs in 
gorillas) all individuals born into a group over the period of his tenure will be paternal 
siblings. From the individual infant's point of view, similar-aged juveniles in the group 
are likely to be paternal half-siblings. In other species such as chimps a number of 
females sexually associate with a number of males, and no one male necessarily 
dominates reproduction; a mother's subsequent offspring will tend to be fathered by 
different males, and paternal relatedness across the group will be more diffuse, although 
still present. 
In general then, across all groups, paternal relatedness (where the mating system 
provides it) is reflected in age cohorts across the group and is less reliable than maternal 
relatedness. The latter is more localised, perhaps just constituting mother and maternal 
siblings (as in chimps), or perhaps other maternal relatives (in female philopatric 
species). 
Again, as we saw for mammals in general, note that the context and degree of 
interaction between paternally related individuals is distinct from the context and degree 
of interaction between maternally related individuals. The selection pressures on social 
behaviours are thus asymmetrical. Whereas paternal relatedness, even where potentially 
significant, is variable and unreliable; interactions between maternally related 
individuals - particularly maternally related females - is consistently present in at least 
a minimal form and may be greatly extended. 
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6.3.2 Female Philopatry and Maternally Related Females 
Before looking at how `kin recognition' is mediated in these species, a notable feature 
of female philopatric Old World primates is worth bearing in mind for its typical impact 
on the distribution of genetic relatives that the developing infant encounters. As noted 
above, female philopatry combined with cohesive groups produces a situation for such 
species in which maternally relatives beyond the mother-offspring unit can interact for 
many years, particularly female maternal relatives. These maternal relatives are 
sometimes referred to as `matrilines' in the primate literature, but since this term has 
anthropological resonance that appears to prejudge a homology to ('descent models' of) 
human kinship (see e. g. above chapters 1 and 3), the current approach maintains the 
phrase maternal genetic relatives. Not only is there a reliable context of interaction 
between such maternal relatives, but these relationships have become highly socially 
elaborated in many species. Although this cannot always have been the case, it is worth 
bearing this in mind when considering why context-dependent `kin recognition' is so 
ubiquitous, and thus apparently a stable mechanism in such species (reviewed below). A 
recent review of the frequency of interactions between such maternal relatives is given 
by Silk (2001) who summarises this social elaboration; 
"The importance of strong kin ties among females is most clearly documented 
among contemporary Old World monkeys (Gouzoules & Gouzoules 1987). In these 
species, maternal kinship underlies a suite of features, including female philopatry, 
well-differentiated relationships among females, matrilineal social networks, and 
stable and linear dominance hierarchies. " (Silk 2001,78) 
Chapais gives a similar account; 
"[M]aternal relatedness is an important factor promoting preferential relationships in 
primates (Gouzoules, 1984; Walters 1987; Gouzoules and Gouzoules, 1987; Walters 
and Seyfarth 1987; Bernstein 1991). In female philopatric species, female kin spend 
their lifetimes together, producing extensive matrilineal structures that span up to 
four generations. " (Chapais 2001,205-206) 
As well as measures such as basic proximity between maternally related individuals 
being high, active interactions such as grooming also accompany maternal relatedness 
(e. g. Kapsalis & Berman 1996, Silk & Seyfarth 1999). Walters summarises the kinds of 
interaction that typically accompany maternal relatedness in Old World Primates; 
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"That individuals behave differently towards maternal kin than toward non-kin 
within social groups is well documented among non-human primates. The pertinent 
data have been reviewed in detail in several recent papers (Gouzoules, 1984; Pereira 
and Altmann, 1985; Gouzoules and Gouzoules, 1986; Walters and Seyfarth, 1986). 
Among the presumably altruistic behaviours for which kin selection has been shown 
are allogrooming, alliance formation and food sharing (Silk, 1986). Other behaviors 
for which evidence of kin-bias exists include tolerance during feeding (co-feeding), 
spatial proximity, play, carrying and otherwise caring for infants, and aggression. " 
(Walters 1987,365) 
How such social discriminations should come to reliably occur between relatives is of 
course dependent on the ontogeny of social bonds and behaviours implicated in the `kin 
recognition' mechanisms discussed below. 
6.4 The Mediation of Social Behaviours 
Now that we have seen how the ecological variables and associated demographic 
factors influence the typical grouping contexts of genetic relatives, we can investigate 
the details of mechanisms mediating the expression of social `discriminations' i. e. 
significant social behaviours in these primates. 
6.4.1 Male-Offspring 
Perhaps the most illuminating evidence is that concerning the interaction between a 
male and what are typically his potential offspring. In many Old World primates (van 
Schaik 1996), infanticide by newly dominant males appears to be a common 
phenomenon, as it does in other mammals (see e. g. Goldsmith on mountain gorillas 
above, and Waldman's brief review, in chapter 5). Hrdy (1977) was the first to suggest 
that this behaviour could be understood via its consequences for mating success and, 
due to the proximate mechanisms mediating the expression of the behaviour, that it 
usually accurately reflects genetic relatedness (in this case, the absence of close 
relatedness). Male infanticide occurs in a number of mammals in which females' 
fertility is suppressed by lengthy post-partum anestrus (van Schaik 1996). The benefit 
of the behaviour to the male is proposed to be that, in killing the dependent infant, he 
effectively removes the impediment to the female's fertility, and thus increases his own 
reproductive prospects. The context of expression of infanticidal behaviour appears to 
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effectively limit the killing to only those individuals sired by previous males, and is 
circumstantially cued and `time sensitive'. Hrdy (2000) gives a summary of primate 
male infanticide; 
"In many primates (34 different species, so far) infanticide is one of the more toxic 
effects of sexually selected competition between males. Among langur monkeys, for 
example, males who enter the breeding system from outside may kill unweaned 
infants. Over an 18-year-long study of langurs at Jodhpur, in the largest such study 
ever undertaken, Sommer reports that 33% of all infants die by being killed when 
their mothers are intercepted by males they have never mated with. [... ] Recent 
DNA evidence collected by Carolla Borries and colleagues in the first langur field 
study to ascertain paternity reveals that none of the victims were attacked by genetic 
fathers. Males who either were or might be the father (this based on both DNA 
evidence and behavioural observations to ascertain which males mated with the 
mother when she was fertile) refrain from attacking offspring of that female. At 
Borries's site, where males are sometimes able to remain near the mother, possible 
fathers actually help her to protect her infant. Since all mothers mate with multiple 
males, none of the protectors could be certain of paternity, yet a possibility of 
paternity was sufficient to alter the male's subsequent behaviour towards her 
offspring, presumably because past sexual history with the mother provides some 
sort of cue that elicits tolerant versus destructive behaviour towards her infant [note 
(a)]... 
[Note (a) reads] The best evidence for this is that even if a strange infant, temporarily 
kidnapped from another troop, is not attacked so long as it remains in the possession 
of a female who is familiar to the male. " (Hrdy 2000,78-79) 
This behavioural rule operating in males which by-and-large `tracks' genetic relatedness 
is thus not a `positive power' of discrimination (see chapter 4.6). Given the potential 
cost to infants signalling `the wrong' paternity, under conditions of frequent infanticide, 
this would be a clear case in which there would be strong selection pressure to conceal 
genetic identity (e. g. Pagel 1997, Sherman et al 1997, see discussion in chapter 5). 
Walters also gives a summary of the mediation of male-infant relationships; 
"Differential behaviour towards infants by adult males is well documented for a 
variety of species. Species practicing infanticide and living in one-male groups are 
an extreme example; adult males kill some infants and behave protectively towards 
others (Hrdy, 1977,1979; Gouzoules, 1984; Struhsaker and Leland, 1986). In this 
case differential behaviour is highly correlated with paternity, being related to the 
male's period of residency in the group. Kin recognition may be based simply on 
period of residency or on prior sexual interaction with the mother (Gouzoules 1984). 
Differential behaviour is less pronounced in species living in multi-male groups. In 
baboons male association with infants is highly differentiated. Association involves 
spatial proximity, co-feeding, alliance formation, and in some cases reciprocation by 
the infant in the form of agonistic buffering (Fig. 3) (Packer, 1980; Altmann, 1980; 
Stein, 1981,1984; Strum, 1983; Smuts, 1985; Whitten, 1986). Association is more 
closely correlated with long-term bonds between males and the mothers of the 
infants than with mating relationships during the period in which the infant was 
conceived, however (Stein, 1984; Smuts, 1985). Special relationships between 
infants and adult males are more subtle in macaques, but they occur in some species 
(Grewal, 1980b; Berenstain, Rodman and Smith, 1981). Again, however, the weak 
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differential bonding that exists appears more closely correlated with bonds between 
males and females than with paternity (Berenstain, Rodman and Smith, 1981). Thus, 
paternal kin bias occurs in the interaction of adult male and infant baboons and 
macaques, but correlations for kinship behavior are not as high as for maternal kin 
bias. The kin recognition mechanism apparently involved, recognition through 
bonding with a referent individual, the mother, is imprecise. " (Walters 1987,376- 
377) 
As well as earlier reviews such as Walters' (see also Busse 1985; Gouzoules and 
Gouzoules 1987) the consensus view amongst primatologists remains that interactions 
between a male and his possible infants are mediated via his relationship with the 
female caring for the infant. Paul et al (2000) give a summary for savannah baboons 
that could serve for Old World primates as a whole; 
"[A]lmost all researchers agree that the male's relationship with the infant's mother 
is the single most important variable for the establishment of an affiliative 
relationship between a male and an infant (Strum 1984; Smuts 1985)" (Paul et al 
2000,274) 
Similar evidence is available in other primate species; cues for male-infant association 
rely on familiarity with the mother (Davis 1984; Smuts 1985; Palombit 1999; Borries 
1999; Bernstein 1999; Hrdy 2000; van Schaik 2000). With the points noted by Walters 
above, whether this relationship can be considered as `parental investment' has been 
questioned. Even the unusually strong bonding between some savannah baboon males 
and particular infants is interpreted as `mating effort' (Smuts 1985, Paul 1993) rather 
than `parental investment', since the males subsequently stand a good chance of 
securing matings with the mother and often could not have fathered the infant in 
question; 
"Stein (1984a) looked for evidence in wild yellow baboons for a relationship 
between probable paternity (based on copulations around the time the mother 
conceived) and male relationships with infants. Probable fathers were indeed more 
likely than other males to develop an affiliative bond with an infant, but Smuts 
(1985) showed that, in olive baboons, such relationships were nearly always the 
result of a long-term bond between the male and the infant's mother. Probable 
fathers that did not share a bond with the mother were unlikely to develop a close 
bond with her infant, and males that were not observed mating with the mother, but 
that did have a long term relationship with her, did form a close bond with the infant. 
These findings from the wild are consistent with results from a study of captive 
rhesus macaques, where true paternity was determined by analysis of genetic 
markers (Berenstain, Rodman, and Smith 1981). The rhesus fathers showed a slight 
but significant tendency to associate with their own offspring, but "the effect of 
paternity disappeared when maternal association with males was controlled" 
(p. 1061). These studies of baboons and macaques cast considerable doubt on the 
ability of males to recognizes their own infants independent of close behavioural 
association. " (Gouzoules and Gouzoules 1987,304-305) 
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Davis (1984) reports that association with the mother also mediates the (less 
significant) relationship between males and infants in Chimpanzees. Recall that we 
saw in chapter 3 (section 3.2.2) that recent applications of biological theory to studies 
of human societies also suggests that the traditional view of the `father role' of human 
males in connection with a female and offspring also should include the influence of 
`mating effort', not simply `parental investment' (Hawkes et al 1998,2001; Hrdy 
1999,2000; Marlowe 1999,2001). More generally, the evidence from primates that 
the male's relationship with the infant is mediated through his relationship with the 
female is resonant with the long-standing position in anthropology over the social role 
of the father (see chapter 3.2.2). 
6.4.2 Paternal Siblings 
The established position in primate studies is that paternal siblings do not identify each 
other as such nor interact preferentially; 
"The available evidence also indicate that other patrilineal relatives do not recognize 
themselves as kin. In pig-tailed macaques (Macaca nemestrina) and baboons (Papio 
cynocephalus), paternal half-siblings that were raised apart, hence were unfamiliar, 
did not later treat each other preferentially (Fredrickson and Sackett, 1984; Erhart et 
al., 1997). In Barbary macaques, patrilineal kin did not avoid incestuous matings 
whereas matrilineal kin did (Kuester et al 1994). Thus, although female philopatric 
(and for that matter male philopatric) primate groups may include several classes of 
paternal relatives, patrilineal kinship does not appear, on the basis of the available 
evidence, to translate into nepotism. " (Chapais 2001,205) 
We have seen that the reliable distribution of paternal siblings (where occurring) will be 
heavily influenced by the typical mating systems occurring in Old World primates. 
Altmann (1979) noted that paternal siblings would typically be distributed in cross- 
group `age cohorts' as a result of skew in male reproductive success. In this case the 
local group itself provides the fundamental context of paternal sibling interaction. 
However, as we saw in chapter 4, because a reliable context of interaction is lacking for 
paternal siblings (as compared to maternal siblings), the former are a more likely 
candidate for self-referent phenotype matching `recognition'. Walters' review 
summarises this situation; 
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"Just as researchers have difficulty determining paternity within multi-male primate 
groups, the monkeys themselves may not be able to recognise paternal-siblings from 
social interaction. Intrinsic recognition mechanisms are therefore a more compelling 
possibility for paternal kin than for maternal kin where precise mechanisms based on 
social interaction are feasible. Sackett and his colleagues have examined intrinsic 
recognition of paternal siblings in pig-tailed macaques (Macaca nemestrina) in two 
experiments. In the first, juveniles were simultaneously exposed to two peers 
unknown to them, one of which was a paternal-sibling, the other an unrelated 
juvenile (Wu et a1.1980). Thirteen of 16 subjects orientated more toward the related 
juvenile. This was originally construed as evidence of phenotype matching. 
However, the test situation was not a natural one in that juveniles in the wild do not 
have to discriminate among strangers, but among familiar group members. In the 
second experiment (Frederickson and Sackett, 1984), the youngsters were tested with 
familiar peers as well as strangers. The subjects orientated more towards familiar 
animals than unfamiliar ones, regardless of paternal kinship, and did not orient more 
toward unfamiliar relatives that toward unfamiliar non-relatives... 
There is thus no evidence of precise recognition of, or kin bias towards, paternal 
siblings. Imprecise recognition mechanisms, and corresponding kin biases, are 
nevertheless possible. In both multi-male and one-male groups peers are often 
paternal siblings (see above). Even if paternal siblings are treated no differently from 
non-siblings among peers, treating peers in general differently than non-peers should 
result in some kin bias (J. Almann, 1979)... If peers are treated specially as a class, 
then simple recognition by social context, specifically membership in an age-cohort 
within a group, is most likely. " (Walters 1987,378-379) 
More recently, with the availability of non-invasive genetic testing, the patterns of 
interaction of actual paternal siblings has been analysed. Alberts (1999) investigated 
possible inbreeding avoidance mechanisms between paternal siblings in savannah 
baboons (Papio cynocephalus). Despite the conventional wisdom (see e. g. Chapais 
above), she found that; 
"The current study indicates that Baboons use social cues to avoid paternal relatives 
and may use phenotypic cues as well. The social cues, involving age proximity, are 
likely to stem from close association during the juvenile period... " (Alberts 1999, 
1506 emphasis added) 
Similarly, Widdig et al (2001,2002) found that the context of age-cohorts was key for 
mediating affiliative interactions between paternal sisters in Macaca mulatta (their 
dataset was limited to females), but that some self-referent phenotype matching 
mechanism (they suggest similarity of `personality') also appeared to supplement the 
discrimination. Widdig et al (2001,2002) also note that reciprocal play and familiarity 
from an early stage of development characterises age-cohort members in many primate 
groups. Recall that Pagel (1997) and Sherman et al (1997) noted that selection against 
signalling genetic relatedness would occur in those species where outcomes from 
signalling non-relatedness would be detrimental (see discussion in chapter 5.8). The 
same is the case for signalling 
identity in interactions between peers. Given typical 
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mating patterns, the incidence of paternal siblings will never be wholly reliable; 
sometimes they are present, sometimes not. Where engaging in social interactions with 
peers is individually beneficial to those involved, making any such interaction strictly 
contingent on identifying actual paternal relatedness would be selected against (in both 
the `initiator' and the `target' individuals), since such relatedness may not be present 
much of the time. This is consistent with the findings that, although some bias towards 
interacting with actual paternal siblings within the age-cohort is evident, even without 
relatedness, familiarity with peers mediates social interactions. 
In order to keep these findings suggesting self-referent phenotype matching in 
perspective, note that social affiliations between paternal siblings were secondary in 
significance to those between maternal siblings and mother-offspring dyads (Widdig et 
al 2002). 
6.4.3 Maternal Relatives 
As with other mammals, the interaction between female and offspring is subject to a 
reliable context in all primate groups. As we saw in chapter 4, where this is the case, 
context-driven `recognition' is likely to mediate social bonds and behaviour. Erhart et al 
(1997) give a succinct summary of the mechanisms mediating recognition between 
maternal relatives in primates; 
"In most nonhuman primate species, an infant is continually associated with its 
mother for the first part of its life and as a consequence has prolonged exposure to 
other maternal kin, including older and younger siblings and possibly aunts and the 
mother's mother. An infant's early social relationships, then, are almost all with 
maternal kin. Thus, selection for these maternal relationships may be the most 
parsimonious mechanism for explaining kin selection for savanna baboons and other 
nonhuman primates which share the same social organisation (Bernstein, 1991; 
Fedigan, 1982; Walters 1987). This conclusion is supported by errors in kin 
recognition of unrelated infants and close associates of the mother who receive the 
same social treatment as maternal relatives. We propose that, if and when nonhuman 
primates behave differently with members of their social group, the basis of the 
observed recognition may be the result of social learning and social history. " (Erhart 
et al 1997,155) 
The availability of maternal relatives beyond the mother-offsprings unit will depend 
upon typical philopatry patterns (see discussion, section 6.3 above). Whilst the `typical' 
patterns are clear, cases in which primate infants are adopted by individuals other than 
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their biological mother are regularly reported (e. g. Bernstein 1991). The existence of 
such adoptions is interesting and will be discussed further below. 
6.4.4 Female-Offspring 
The female-offspring relationship takes place in a similar, reliable context in all Old 
World primates. This section will look at what mediates social bonds and social 
behaviours from the point of view of the adult female. Silk states the fundamental 
position; 
"Apparently, even mothers must learn who their own infants are. Mother's inability 
to recognise their own infants at birth enables managers of captive colonies to cross- 
foster newborn infants (Bernstein 1991). Foster mothers routinely accept these 
strange infants, even if they are not the same sex or precise ages as their own infants. 
Female macaques are even willing to rear infants of other macaque species. (Owren 
et al. 1993). We generally assume that primates learn who their relatives are through 
their early experiences and associations. " (Silk 2001,74) 
More recent work has further demonstrated successful inter-specific adoption (Guerra et 
al 1998). The initial postnatal connection between a reproductive female and her 
offspring is made immediately at birth, which, as with other mammals, usually takes 
place in seclusion from other individuals (Swartz and Rosenblum 1981), thus typically 
avoiding potential ambiguity. Soon after birth, the female will learn phenotypic features 
of the infant (Gubemick 1981) which usually results in reliable subsequent 
identification. However, even at this stage, evidence from Macaca nemestrina suggests 
that a female may employ a `rule of thumb' to identify her offspring, since if mother 
and infant are separated after birth, upon reunion 3-7 days later, mothers preferred the 
younger of two infants available, regardless of whether or not it was their own birth 
infant (Gubernick 1981). It is notable that the infant itself may play an active role in 
`who becomes the mother', as McGrew illustrates; 
"It is also important to consider the role the infant plays in actively encouraging its 
own care, as Lewis and Rosenblum (1974) demonstrated a few years ago. While the 
precise age of the infant and its neurological maturity will affect the degree of infant 
manipulation, it now seems evident that the infant will control more of its own care 
than was previously believed. During a project in which 6-month-old Indian langurs 
were separated for 2 weeks from their mothers, Dolhinow (1980) was surprised to 
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learn that despite the fact that Indian langur females are eager and frequent 
allomothers, the infants and not the adult females initiated and were responsible for 
their adoption by particular females. More surprising was the fact that most of the 
infants did not go back'to their own mothers when they were reunited with them a 
mere 2 weeks later (see Dolhinow, 1980, and Dolhinow and De May 1983, for a 
discussion of adoption). " (McKenna 1987,160) 
As with other mammals (see chapter 5.7) successful fostering in many species of Old 
World primates, confirms that genetic relatedness per se (e. g. Bernstein 1991) is not 
required for the expression of maternal social behaviours (see also next section, and 
Harlow, reviewed in chapter 7). 
Whether birth-mother or foster-mother, the typical content of social discriminations 
towards infants remains the same. As is discussed in the next section, the expression of 
social behaviours by the `mother' towards the infant plays a major role in mediating the 
social bond towards her that develops in the infant. The key social behaviours expressed 
by the mother figure are discussed here. 
The female (the carer is typically, but not always female) will normally have largely 
uninterrupted, continuous bodily contact with the infant for a prolonged period after 
birth. For example, during the first month, the proportion of time spent in direct contact 
may be from around 80% (Vervet, Rhesus macaque) to almost 100% (yellow baboon) 
of the time (data from Nicolson 1987). In the African apes, the first break in contact is 
typically at 4-6 months of age (Nicolson 1987 and references therein). Although contact 
gradually declines after the first months, the female and infant will remain in close 
proximity, particularly prior to weaning. This proximity may be primarily maintained 
by the infant after months 3-4 (savannah baboons, rhesus macaques), particularly in 
cold whether or rain (Nicolson 1982,1987) or other threatening conditions. 
There are significant benefits to the infant from physical `contact' itself, such as 
warmth, and shelter both during waking hours and whilst asleep (together), and even 
provision of movement and physical stimulation (Gubernick 1981). During these 
periods of close contact, the female will express a range of more active social 
behaviours including; nursing with milk, carrying, cleaning and grooming, responding 
to signs of the infant's distress (e. g. in the form of vocalisations from the infant). 
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Another reliable form of interaction between maternal relatives, particularly mother- 
offspring, is co-feeding. In frugivours (the majority of Old World species with the 
exception of colobines), due to the patchy distribution of feeding sites (and difficulty of 
access for infants), individuals will usually eat in the company of close maternal 
relatives particularly as infants and juveniles. In a few other species, co-feeding is more 
elaborated, and as well as providing access to feeding sites, mothers will sometimes 
share food with infants. Waldman gives an overview; 
"Food-sharing among primates is relatively uncommon, although a few species 
collect vegetable matter to feed to their young (201). Captive vervet monkeys 
(Cercopithecus aethiops sabaeus) feed on prey together, usually with their close 
relatives (62). Primates sometimes communicate information about locations of 
plentiful food supplies to members of their groups (e. g. chimpanzees, Pan 
troglodytes; macaques, Macaca sinica)(208). " (Waldman 1988,559) 
In chimpanzees and Bonobos, active food provision by mothers to offspring is common 
(McGrew 1996, Hohmann and Fruth 1996). Feistner and McGrew give an account of 
this; 
"More has been published about food-sharing in common chimpanzees than in any 
other species of non-human primates. In the wild, it was first reported by Goodall 
(1963) at the Gombe Stream reserve in Western Tanzania. Since then every long- 
term field study of chimpanzees that has included behavioural data has found food- 
sharing to occur, and, thus, it can be considered to be a `universal' pattern within the 
species' repertoire (see Ghiglieri, 1984). Chimpanzees share both plant and animal 
foods and transfer occurs not only between mother and offspring, but also between 
unrelated individuals of various age and sex classes (figs. 1 and 2). 
In the first quantitative study in the wild, McGrew (1975) found that pairs of 
relations, e. g. mother-offspring, sib-sib, uncle-nephew, and grandmother-grandchild, 
accounted for 86% of banana distribution seen. Almost all of these kin-related cases 
involved a mother and her immature offspring, and 92% were transfers from the 
former to the latter. " (Feistner and McGrew 1989,25) 
In summary, the levels of social behaviour and care typically directed towards infants 
by females are extremely high in Old World primates. Swartz and Rosenblum (1981) 
give the following account of the level of commitment; 
"As the infant becomes active during the I` or 2°d week of life, the mother attempts 
to restrain it when it tries to leave her. If the infant is successful in leaving, the 
mother follows the infant very closely, often with her hands hovering over the infant 
in a guarding fashion. She is very quick to retrieve the infant at the slightest sign of 
distress from the baby, or any sign of danger in the group (Bertrand, 1969; Hinde et 
al, 1964; Jay, 1963; Struthsaker 1971). 
" (Swartz and Rosenblum 1981,423) 
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6.4.5 Offspring-Female 
As with other mammals, the infant is unlikely to be particular about whom it gets care 
from. The distinction from most other mammals is that, being group-living, Old World 
primate infants do potentially face a situation where individuals other than the mother 
are typically present from the earliest stages of development. Added to this, infants 
attract a great deal of attention; 
"That the infant is an effective stimulus for eliciting caretaking behaviour should be 
evident from the fact that in most primate species, the newborn is very attractive to 
members of the social group... "Aunts, " nulliparous or nonpregnant females in the 
mother's social group, approach a newly parturient female and her infant, in attempts 
to touch, hold or groom the infant (Jay, 1963; Poirier, 1968; Rowell et al 1964; 
Struthsaker 1971; van Lawick-Goodall, 1968). " (Swartz and Rosenblum 1981,423) 
Temporary `allocare' ('babysitting' if you will) by individuals other than the mother is 
also a common feature of many Old World primates (see e. g. McKenna 1987 for 
review). Given what we have already noted about the patterns of association and thus 
familiarity between maternally related individuals, in most cases, the allocarer is 
typically related to the mother and infant (Nicolson 1987), and may often be an older 
sibling of the infant. Temporary instances of allocare are different from instances of 
permanent adoption, but such adoptions do occasionally occur in natural conditions 
(arranged adoptions are not uncommon, as noted by Silk 2001, above section 6.4.4). 
Again, adoption is typically by individuals of close maternal relatedness (but what 
mediates this is again probably not genetic relatedness per se, but rather social bonds 
whose formation typically correlates with relatedness). Nicolson makes this point about 
adoptions and maternal relatedness; 
"When infants are orphaned, siblings often attempt to care for them; in some cases, 
such care may make a crucial difference to infant survival (chacma baboons: 
Hamilton, Busse, and Smith 1982; chimpanzees: Goodall 1983; Pusey 1983). 
Berman (1983b) has described a case of sibling adoption in rhesus monkeys on Cayo 
Santiago. By examining measures of typical patterns of mother-infant interaction, 
she found that the interactions between the orphaned infant and a 3-year-old 
nulliparous sister developed over a period of 2 months, through adjustments by each, 
into a relationship very similar to that of a mother and a similar-aged infant. " 
(Nicolson 1987,338) 
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Swartz and Rosenblum make the point that, for many Old World primates, a readiness 
to care for `an' infant (regardless of whether they have given birth to it) is a particularly 
salient feature; 
"Hence, animals who lack the biochemical composition of the newly parturient 
female's blood can display adequate caretaking behaviour, indicating that, although 
the hormonal factors may enhance interest in the new born infant, they are not 
necessary to the initiation of those behaviours which may normally lead to the 
formation of the attachment bond. Thus, DeVore (1963) has cited the case of 
adoption of a young female baboon by a dominant male at the death of the mother, 
and van Lawick-Goodall (1968) cited several cases in which orphaned chimpanzees 
were adopted by an older male or female sibling. " (Swartz & Rosenblum 1981,421) 
Thus an infant can form a primary social bond to an individual other than the mother 
(even males), and such figures (often close maternal relatives) will often be available. 
Given that this is the case, it follows that what mediate the formation of the social bond 
(from the point of view of the infant) between the infant and what would typically be its 
mother, are in large part the `behaviours' that it receives from the individual, having 
solicited care (see also Harlow, chapter 7). In other words, what cues social bonding for 
the infant is not genetic relatedness per se, but the very process of receiving care and 
being looked after, responded to and nurtured. If this is the case then actual genetic 
relatedness is obviously irrelevant to the formation of the bond, and the expression of 
social discriminations that accompany that bond. 
Specifically, the `context' driven formation of the bond in the infant appears to be cued 
by precisely those kinds of social discriminations that an infant would typically receive 
from its carer (as described above in the mother-offspring section). These include; being 
in physical contact (warmth, shelter and protection); receiving nursing; ' being carried 
(and other stimulation); being groomed and cleaned; being responded to in distress; 
being assisted with access to food (by transportation to food sites, and co-feeding, if not 
actual food provision). 
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6.4.6 Maternal Sibling - Sibling and Other Maternal Relatives 
Consistent with what we have seen for female-offspring interaction, `recognition' 
between maternal relatives is agreed to be context-driven in primates; 
"There is a widespread consensus that maternal kin recognition in primates is based 
on a predictable social context, specifically familiarity during development (Breed 
and Bekoff, 1981; Bateson, 1983; Moore and Ali, 1984; Gouzoules, 1984; 
Gouzoules and Gouzoules, 1986)... Mechanisms based on predictable social context 
appear to be the rule in mammals (Bekoff, 1977,1978; Sherman, 1980; Bekoff and 
Byers, 1981; Gouzoules 1984; see also chapter 10), so primates apparently are not 
exceptional in this regard. Such mechanisms are based on a strong correlation 
between interaction in a particular context and relatedness (Sherman, 1980; Holmes 
and Sherman, 1983). In species such as ground squirrels or canids the mechanism is 
straightforward; association during early development is confined to particular kin 
classes by the rearing situation so that particular kinds of interaction (e. g., play), 
bond-formation or familiarization during that time are strongly correlated with 
kinship. Subsequently treating others differently based on familiarity or social 
bonding then leads to kin bias in behavior (Bekoff, 1977,1978; Sherman, 1980; 
Bekoff and Byers, 1981). The kin recognition mechanism must be more complex in 
non-human primates, because contact early in development is not restricted to a few 
close kin of a predictable class. Instead, in many species individuals are in at least 
occasional contact from birth with a variety of others, including the mother, maternal 
siblings, other maternal kin and anon-relatives. 
One way in which kin may be recognized is through a reference individual, 
specifically the mother (Berman, 1978,1982; Sherman, 1980; Holmes and Sherman, 
1983; Gouzoules, 1984). Young primates learn to recognize their mothers soon after 
birth (McKenna, 1979b); they might then identify other kin from the way in which 
others interact with their mother. This mechanism requires, first of all, that primates 
recognize one another individually (Brown, Sanderson and Michod, 1983). There is 
abundant evidence that they do (Breed and Bekoff, 1981; Cheney and Seyfarth, 
1982; Cheney, 1983; Moore and Ali, 1984), and can even retain recognition after 
long separation (Erwin et al., 1974). The mechanism also requires certain 
interactions or social bonds of the mother are correlated with kinship. There is no 
single behavior that is directed only at close kin most species, so the mechanism 
must involve the relative frequency with which the mother exchanges one or more 
behaviors with other group members. " (Walters 1987,374-375) 
More recent evidence agrees that social bonding/'recognition' between maternal 
siblings is mediated via the mother in Old World primates ('mediated recognition', see 
chapter 4). Chapais (2001) gives the following account; 
"The mother-offspring relationship appears to be at the heart of matrilineal kin 
recognition... This basic bond may, in turn, allow individuals to recognise other 
categories of uterine kin. For example, maternal siblings use familiarity based cues 
to recognise each other in pig-tailed macaques, as evidenced by the observation that 
maternal half-siblings raised apart, hence unfamiliar, did not later treat each other 
preferentially (Sackett and Fredrikson, 1987). The role of familiarity in maternal kin 
recognition is further supported by the observation that maternal kin familiar to each 
other avoid incestuous matings in Barbary macaques (Macaca sylvanus), whereas 
unfamiliar maternal relatives did not (Kuester et al, 1994). " (Chapais 2001,206) 
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Bernstein (1991) gives a similar account; 
"The fact that matrilineal kin reared together, as well as unrelated `adopted' animals, 
all treat each other preferentially, whereas patrilineal kin do not, suggests an 
association mechanism. Walters (1987) and MacKenzie et al., (1985) have pointed to 
the period of early infant association as sufficient to account for most social 
preferences among primates. The infant is continually associated with the mother in 
many primate species for the first part of its life. (It would be interesting to study 
kinship and behaviour correlates in taxa where this is less true, e. g. some colobines). 
The bond between mother and infant persists after the birth of her next infant. As a 
consequence, the youngest infant's first prolonged contacts are likely to be with 
mother and mother's other still dependent offspring. The bond between mother and 
child (especially female offspring) may be prolonged and enduring so that infants are 
likely to find older siblings also in proximity. Moreover, mother's mother may also 
still be in association, and mother's female siblings may be in proximity as well. " 
(Bernstein 1991,19) 
Both accounts illustrate that contextually driven, mediated `recognition' does not 
guarantee social bonding on the basis of genetic relatedness per se. 
Maternal siblings exhibit the typical social discriminations of mutual grooming and 
solidarity to counter aggression from (as well as hand out aggression to) other 
individuals within the group (see Silk above). Additionally, as suggested in the 
discussion of allocare and fostering above, a maternal sibling may also express 
nurturing behaviours towards a younger sibling. Gubernick notes that; 
"[L]ong-term genealogical information necessary to determine kinship networks is 
available for only a few species, and those are primates. Such information is 
available for the chimpanzee, Pan troglodytes (van Lawick-Goodall, 1967,1968, 
1971), rhesus monkey, Macaca mulatta (Kornford, 1963a, b; Sade, 1965), and 
Japanese macaque, M. fuscata (e. g. Itani, 1959; Kawamura, 1958; Yamada, 1963). In 
such matrifocal groups an infant usually remains associated with its mother after the 
birth of the next infant. In each of the above species it is usually the mother's kin, 
especially previous daughters, that help care for and protect the infant (see also 
Poirier, 1968, for Nilgiri langurs, Presbytisjohnii). " (Gubernick 1981,269-270) 
Given the close interaction between maternal relatives, it is unsurprising that when 
infants are orphaned, adoptions that may follow (see examples above) are often by 
maternal relatives; 
"Maternal kin have been observed to care for orphaned infants in several species 
(e. g. Marsden and Vessey, 1968; Hasegawa and Hiraiwa, 1980; Hamilton, Busse and 
Smith, 1982). Care in such cases consists of carrying, grooming, sleeping with, and 
defending the infant... With respect to altruistic interaction, the relationship between 
an orphaned juvenile female yellow baboon and her sister was identical to that 
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between her peers and their mothers (Walters, 1981, in preparation). " (Walters 1987, 
372-373) 
Gouzoules and Gouzoules (1987) also discuss sibling interactions and `adoptions' in the 
African apes; 
"Older siblings are usually the first and most persistent individuals other than the 
mother to interact with infants. For instance, Fossey (1979) reported that siblings 
were more consistently near infant gorillas than any other class of individuals except 
mothers, and that this proximity was maintained throughout the first 3 years of an 
infant's life. In chimpanzees, older siblings interact a great deal with infants, 
touching, grooming, protecting playing, and even briefly "kidnapping" them 
(Goodall 1968). Most interestingly, several cases of adoption of infants by older 
siblings were also recorded at Gombe. Orphaned infants without siblings were not 
adopted by other chimpanzees in the community. " (Gouzoules & Gouzoules 1987, 
303) 
Given the tendency of chimpanzee communities to be male philopatric, without the 
availability of maternal siblings, an infant would have few if any maternal kin nearby. 
Marsden (2000) gives further examples of adoptions by older siblings in chimps, 
including by brothers. 
In sum, it is notable that relationship between maternal siblings, who are inevitably 
separated in age by at least 2 years in most species of Old World primates, are 
characterised by aspects of the care and nurture which typically accompany the mother- 
offspring relationship. 
6.5 Summary 
In the first part of the chapter we found that ecological factors heavily influence 
demographic patterns in primate species, just as they do for other mammals. This in turn 
influences the typical contexts of interaction of genetic relatives. 
The evidence has demonstrated that social bonds and social behaviours in primates are 
mediated by social context. Whilst we have seen tentative suggestions that some 
positive powers of discrimination may occur between paternal siblings, even here, 
context-based cues also operate to mediate social interactions. For all other social bonds 
that would typically characterise genetic relatives, context-based cues are in operation. 
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Central to these social bonds is the relationship between what are typically mother and 
offspring. The basic features of this relationship have been studied by attachment 
theorists, as the next chapter will review. 
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Chapter Seven - Attachment 
7.1 Introduction 
Earlier chapters have reviewed the basic biological theory of the evolution of social 
behaviours (particularly chapters 2 and 4). It has been suggested that the sociobiological 
applications to anthropological data have misrepresented biological theory, and that a 
focus on the typical evolutionary context of an organism's behaviour is a necessary part 
of any application of Inclusive Fitness theory. In other words, Inclusive Fitness theory 
should not be understood to make predictions about the outcomes of organisms' 
behaviours in any given instance, only as a description of the general statistical 
outcomes necessary (the criterion) for the evolution of social behaviours within a 
species over evolutionary time scales. For an analysis of behavioural characteristics in a 
given species, theory simply emphasises that this potential selection pressure will result 
in proximate behavioural mechanisms governing social behaviour and social bonding, 
which by-and-large (in typical environments) have met the Inclusive Fitness `criterion'. 
The evidence in mammals confirms that social discriminations are largely mediated by 
familiarity and social bonding between individuals. In turn, the development of these 
social bonds overwhelmingly relies on circumstantial cues, rather than genetic 
relatedness per se. This has also been confirmed for primates (this chapter will add a 
little more detail on the primate mechanisms). 
This finding on the importance of circumstantial cues clarifies the first issue posed by 
integration of biological theory with ethnographic data on human social behaviour: 
Basic biological theory (Inclusive Fitness theory) does not predict that an individual's 
key social bonds (and social behaviour) will necessarily be with genetic relatives. 
A further issue is whether we can give an account of mechanisms of social bonding 
which is both compatible with Inclusive Fitness theory and for which we can find 
evidence in humans. Towards this end, the previous chapter built upon the general 
evidence derived from the review of social bonding in mammals, and provided us with 
some insights into specific mechanisms that operate in Old World primates. The current 
chapter continues by looking at the general findings of the ethological attachment 
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theorists who have explicitly conceived of human social bonding instincts within a 
primate-wide framework, and thus provide a useful bridge for the current approach. 
The further relevance of reviewing attachment studies is for their description of the 
empirical findings on mechanisms of social bonding in humans. In the second part of 
the chapter we will be attempting to define key characteristics of these processes of 
social bonding which can then be carried forward in order to check against the 
ethnographic data and summaries (in chapter 8). 
Some of the assumptions accompanying early attachment theory's descriptions of the 
norms of social bonding (e. g. gender roles and number of attachment figures) were 
limited by a culturally narrow empirical base. Some of the debates and developments in 
this area are discussed both in this chapter (sections 7.5.4,7.5.5) and in chapter nine. 
7.2 Confirming that Social Bonding Mediates Social Behaviour in Humans 
As noted in chapter two, social behaviour can take many forms, and is hard to 
quantify. In general `social behaviour' as we defined it in chapter two is an 
accompanying characteristic of social bonds, particularly primary social bonds that 
typically form between close genetic relatives (such as mother and offspring) as was 
discussed in chapter 5 (5.10). In the primate and human case, I also make this 
simplifying assumption, supported by many different perspectives, that social bonds 
are accompanied by social behaviours (as defined in chapter two), in order not to have 
to include a formal analysis of the presence of `social behaviour'. 
Anthropology also typically makes this assumption in its analysis of human social 
behaviour. Although the `content' of social relationships is sometimes described, it is 
usually treated generally as `amity', `altruism' or `generosity' (Fortes 1969) or `code 
for conduct' (Schneider 1968,1984) and suggested to accompany the patterns of social 
bonding which are often the subject under focus. Fortes' work on the `axiom of amity' 
that accompanies social bonds (which he refers to as `kinship') demonstrates this most 
clearly. He speaks of; 
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"[A] general principle of kinship morality that is rooted in the familial domain 
and is assumed everywhere to be axiomatically binding. This is the rule of 
prescriptive altruism which I have referred to as the principle of kinship amity 
and which Hiatt calls the ethic of generosity... 
Though the structural connotation which the notion of kinship carries varies 
widely, the central value premise associated with it is uniform. Kinship 
predicates the axiom of amity, the prescriptive altruism exhibited in the ethic of 
generosity... kinsfolk are expected to be loving, just and generous to one another 
and not to demand strictly equivalent returns from one another. " (Fortes 1969, 
232,237) 
Although making the behaviours typically accompanying `kinship' fairly explicit, 
Fortes doesn't claim to be the first to make this suggestion. He notes that others have 
referred to "kinship solidarity" (Phillpotts 1913) and expectations of "immediate 
support and protection" (Schapera 1950). Particularly interesting for its relevance to 
the current chapter, Fortes quotes a lengthy passage from Young and Willmott's 
(1957) study of social relationships which nowhere mentions `kinship' and instead 
talks of `attachment'; 
"Though they [mother and daughter] both derive benefit from the relationship, it 
is far more than a mere arrangement for mutual convenience. The attachment 
between them is supported by a powerful moral code... in most of these 
families... duty and affection seem to co-exist, and indeed, reinforce each other. " 
(Young and Wilmott 1957,161, quoted in Fortes 1969) 
Fortes also states that "It is conceivable - and I for one would accept - that the axiom 
of amity reflects biological and psychological parameters of human social existence. " 
However, as noted in chapter one, too often biological referents for social bonding by 
`kinship' theorists were made whilst not explicitly examined, and genealogy and social 
bonding conflated (Schneider 1984). Schneider suggests that, were we to remove the 
genealogical assumption, `prescriptive altruism' might be a starting point for analysis 
of what is usually referred to as `kinship'; 
"If kinship were defined in some other terms - for example, as the axiom of 
prescriptive altruism - then genealogy would become structurally and logically 
secondary. It might still be quite important, but it could not have the logical 
priority it has now. We would be bound first to establish that the axiom of 
prescriptive altruism obtained and second to correlate different factors, such as 
genealogy, with the defining criterion... [in some societies, it is argued] kinship 
is defined in terms of both landholding and blood relationship. For other societies 
it is argued that kinship is defined in terms of some special code for conduct such 
as the axiom of prescriptive altruism. " (Schneider 1984,130) 
184 
Schneider's (1968) analysis of American Kinship suggested that "code for conduct" is 
an integral part of the kinship concept within this culture, albeit also defined 
genealogically. Although Schneider (1980) was not keen to see the concepts he derived 
from American culture uncritically universalised through alignment with Fortes' 
`axiom of amity, ' other ethnographers have suggested `diffuse enduring solidarity' 
might characterise social bonds in other cultures (including Witherspoon (1975), one 
of Schneider's students). Many anthropologists have referred to the social behaviours 
and/or expectation of behaviour which accompany social bonds and relationships. 
These may be expressed as "rights and privileges, duties and obligations" (e. g. Barnes 
1955, Scheffler and Lounsbury 1971, Pitt-Rivers 1973) or even "attachment and 
obligation" (e. g. McKinley 2001). Sahlins' (1976), whilst critical of sociobiology, 
suggests that kinship systems "are true models of and for social action... manifested in 
behaviours of altruism... " (Sahlins 1976,25). As well as this undercurrent amongst 
traditional kinship theory, many contemporary anthropologists explicitly discuss 
`kinship' as social bonds (and `attachment') and link this to social behaviour (see 
chapters 8 and 9). 
Social psychologists also make the connection between social bonding and social 
behaviour. For example, in the long-standing debate over how best to characterise the 
relationship between feelings of empathy and acts of altruism (see e. g. Batson & Shaw 
1991 and commentary), Zahn-Waxier suggests that altruistic behaviour and 
`cooperative awareness' begins with primary social bonds and attachments; 
"Research by Batson and his colleagues has focussed on conditions that 
determine young adults' potential willingness to help unfamiliar others in highly 
controlled, constrained, structured environments. This may limit analyses of 
empathy to those aspects that are more planful, reasoned, and goal orientated. 
This nondevelopmental approach bypasses the affective origins of empathy and 
the question of how humans come to be caring, committed, and responsible 
individuals, as well as self-serving. Moreover, it ignores the family unit which 
provides, in the view of many, the main context for emergent empathy and 
altruism.... The origins of altruism are likely to evolve, as Batson and Shaw 
suggest, in the context of an attachment relationship in which parent and child 
forge bonds that create, in their terms, a "we-feeling. " Many observational 
studies of mother-infant interaction during the first year of life document the 
complex interplay of sharing and exchange of emotions, as well as cooperation 
and turn-taking in social interactions (e. g. Trevarthen, 1977). These early forms 
of "cooperative awareness" between caregiver and child begin to create a world 
of shared meaning, empathic understanding and appropriate linking of one's own 
emotions with those of others that then generalize beyond the parent-child dyad. " 
(Zahn-Waxler 1991,155-156) 
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Relevant to the current research, Korchmaros and Kenny (2001) have argued that 
`emotional closeness' may mediate "the effect of genetic relatedness on altruism". 
They not only link these emotional bonds to the performance of social behaviours, 
(supporting the current simplifying assumption) but advance them as `proximate 
mechanisms' in an Inclusive Fitness theory framework. This is very welcome (note 
that they employ the non-anthropological meaning of `kin' in the below); 
"[R]esearch has shown that people are systematically more willing to act 
altruistically toward nonkin whom they are close to and care about than towards 
kin, even kin of high degrees of genetic relatedness. For example, Essock-Vitale 
and McGuire (1985) showed that although women's willingness to assist other 
people increased as genetic relatedness increased among kin, women tended to 
be more willing to aid friends than kin... 
The present study is an attempt to integrate the findings of evolutionary and 
social psychology. Inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton, 1964), an evolutionary 
theory, explains social behaviours in terms of ultimate causes and is useful at 
predicting the overall patterns of these behaviours (e. g. willingness to act 
altruistically as genetic relatedness increases). However, inclusive fitness theory 
does not address the underlying psychological mechanisms that cause the overall 
patterns of behaviour to occur (Cunningham, Druen, & Barbee, 1997). Social 
psychological theorists, in contrast, focus on psychological mechanisms, the 
proximate causes of behaviour. Merging evolutionary and social psychology 
enables simultaneous examination of ultimate and proximate causes of social 
behaviours and enables a more complete understanding of those behaviours... 
The present study, conducted from the perspective of inclusive fitness theory 
(Hamilton, 1964), provides a new and more comprehensive interpretation of 
altruistic behaviour than previously premised by inclusive fitness theorists. 
People are not simply calculators of costs and benefits acting in response to 
information specifying amount of shared genes and reproductive value. There is 
another component: emotional closeness. Individuals form relationships and 
spend time together. Consequently, they become interdependent, feel concern for 
each other, and are willing to act altruistically toward one another. " (Korchmaros 
and Kenny 2001,262-264) 
A similar perspective on the place of emotional ties and empathy in mediating social 
behaviours, taking into account Inclusive Fitness theory, has also been suggested for 
other primates (Preston & de Waal 2002). In brief, the simplifying assumption that the 
current analysis makes - that `social bonding' mediates social behaviours - is agreed 
upon by both animal behaviourists and human social psychologists. In turn, 
anthropological discussions of the social bonds traditionally referred to as `kinship' 
also link these to social behaviour. 
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7.3 Relevance of Infant Social Bonding Instincts 
Are findings about the social bonding instincts of infants relevant to a general 
understanding of how Inclusive Fitness theory applies to humans? If we accept the 
above argument that mechanisms of social bonding are a key area shaped by selection 
pressure for inclusive fitness, then the question can be reduced to issues about the 
relationship of infantile social bonding to those bonds occurring at later stages of 
development. On the one hand is the potential enduring importance of those actual 
bonds formed in infancy, and on the other is whether the mediation of social bonds in 
later life bears resemblance to mechanisms operating in infancy. 
In chapter two, it was argued that what we discover about the kinds of factors that 
mediate the expression of social behaviour between (typically) the closest genetic 
relatives (in particular whether actual genetic relatedness a necessary condition) should 
also be generalisable to other social bonds. 
If the mechanisms of social bonding which typically operate between an infant and its 
mother are of an indirect nature, and are cued and mediated by certain conditions, and 
if such social bonds formed in infancy and childhood tend to be (and particularly 
would have been in evolutionary environments) significant throughout the lifespan, 
then they are of relevance to the investigation. Supporting arguments for this 
perspective come from both from the findings of attachment studies, reviewed below 
(section 7.5), and from ethnographic evidence (chapter 8). 
7.4 Attachment Theory's Compatibility with Evolutionary Biology 
7.4.1 Introduction 
At this stage of the thesis, we are mainly interested in the empirical findings of 
attachment research, since we are 
looking for details of social bonding mechanisms 
that operate in humans. However, to support the wider claim that an understanding of 
infants' social bonding instincts is directly related to biological theory of social 
behaviour, it is notable that Bowlby saw his work on human bonding as fitting into the 
context of primate sociability 
in general (see below). 
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In the following sections we will see that Bowlby not only formulates attachment 
theory in reference to the evolutionary biology of social behaviour, but in particular, 
Inclusive Fitness theory. He also interpreted the biological theory to require focus on 
evolutionarily typical contexts, and particularly emphasises that the relationship 
between female and offspring as the most fundamental regular social interaction for all 
mammals. 
7.4.2 Animal Behaviour and Ethology 
From the start, Bowlby, the key architect of attachment theory, was interested in other 
species (Ainsworth and Bowlby 1991) and acknowledges help from a number of 
animal ethologists in preparation of his work (including Huxley, Lorenz, Tinbergen 
and Hinde). He states that "The theoretical schema elaborated stems partly from 
psychoanalysis and partly from ethology"(Bowlby 1982, xvii). 
"Recognising, as Darwin the founding father of ethology himself did, that the 
behavioural repertoire of each species is as unique as are its morphological and 
physiological characteristics, ethologists have sought to understand behavioural 
equipment by reference to the contribution it makes to the survival of members 
of the species and their kin in the natural habitat of that species. To their 
following of this principle so consistently are largely due the distinctive and 
distinguished contributions that they have made to an understanding of 
behaviour. A main thesis of this book is that the same principle must be followed 
equally consistently if we are to understand the instinctive behaviour of man. " 
(Bowlby 1982,55) 
Recall Hamilton's own early interpretations of how selection pressure on social 
behaviour (to meet the Inclusive Fitness criterion) would be visible in the ontogeny of 
animal behaviours. Hamilton (1964) drew heavily on the work of ethologists when 
illustrating behaviours that he felt demonstrated this selection pressure (see Hamilton's 
references to Tinbergen's ethological work on typical mechanisms of parent-offspring 
bonding in birds, in chapter 2.2.4). These mechanisms of bonding, and the behaviours 
accompanying them are clearly central to what Hamilton himself believed Inclusive 
Fitness theory to involve. Conversely, Bowlby recognised the basic validity of 
Inclusive Fitness theory within evolutionary biology. 
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7.4.3 Bowlby's Support of Inclusive Fitness Theory 
Bowlby's first theoretical treatment of attachment behaviour (Bowlby 1958), although 
drawing heavily upon the data and theoretical perspective of ethology, did not discuss 
the theoretical aspects of the evolution of social behaviours per se, and pre-dated 
Hamilton's work. His fist volume of the larger work Attachment (Bowlby 1969) also 
essentially pre-dated the growing currency of Inclusive Fitness theory. However, such 
was the link between Inclusive Fitness theory and the social bonding behaviours that 
Bowlby's work focussed on, that he felt compelled to produce a revision (Bowlby 
1982) of the earlier volume incorporating this shift; 
"The principle reason for preparing a revised edition of this work is that during 
the past fifteen years there have been major developments in the thinking of 
biologists studying the social behaviour of species other than man. These 
developments have necessitated significant changes in a few places... " (Bowlby 
1982, preface xvi) 
"During the 1960s a revolution took place in the biological study of social 
behaviour. Until then there had been much confusion about the identity of the 
biological unit that is adapted... the belief has arisen that that unit of adaptation 
is the social group itself... The basic concept of the genetical theory of natural 
selection is that the unit central to the whole process is the individual gene... The 
genetical theory of natural selection is clearly described by Williams in his 
Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966). In it he demonstrates how the many 
forms of social behaviour observed in animals can be understood in terms of 
gene selection, making it unnecessary for a theory of group selection to account 
for them. A recent more popular account is given by Dawkins in his Selfish Gene 
(1976)... " (Bowlby 1982,57) 
Williams (1966) had debated the relative parsimony of `group selection' and `gene 
selection' accounts of the evolution of certain behaviours, and was one of the first to 
discuss Hamilton's work (which itself had drawn on some of Williams' earlier work). 
The following passage leaves no doubt that Bowlby also felt that behaviours typically 
accompanying the parent-offspring relationship are a key example of the sort of social 
behaviours that Inclusive Fitness theory is relevant to; 
"Some instinctive behaviour is so structured that it commonly achieves food- 
intake and good nutrition, and as such may appear to fulfil a function of value 
only to an individual... there is other instinctive behaviour that is so structured 
that it commonly fulfils a function of obvious benefit to some other individual 
though of no benefit to the performer. An example is the caregiving behaviour of 
parents towards their young. Other examples include the helpful behaviour of 
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individuals towards kin other than offspring, notably siblings, nephews, nieces, 
and sometimes cousins. In every case the behaviour is readily intelligible in 
terms of gene survival. Offspring carry half the genes of each parent; and, on 
average, siblings have half their genes in common. " (Bowlby 1982,132) 
7.4.4 Bowlby's Focus on the Evolutionarily Typical Context of Behaviours 
Being predominantly interested in species-typical instinctive behaviours, it is perhaps 
little wonder that Bowlby avoided the problem of overlooking proximate behaviours 
that had characterised Darwinian Anthropologists' interpretations of evolutionary 
biology (see particularly Kitcher's critique, reviewed in chapter three). Indeed, 
Bowlby's emphasis on the importance of considering behaviours in their evolutionarily 
typical context (his `environment of evolutionary adaptedness' or EEA) was later to be 
a key component in Evolutionary Psychology's conceptual critique of Darwinian 
Anthropology (see chapter 3.5 and chapter 6.1). This section briefly reviews this 
aspect of Bowlby's approach; 
"Although the survival of the genes an individual is carrying must always be the 
ultimate criterion when biological adaptedness is being evaluated, it is often 
convenient to consider the adaptedness of any part of an organism's equipment 
in terms of some proximate outcome. " (Bowlby 1982,56) 
"For most species of animal the natural habitat not only is of limited variation 
but also changes only slowly. As a result each species is living today in an 
environment little different from the one in which its behavioural equipment was 
evolved... For man this is not so... This leads to the conclusion that the 
environment in terms of which the adaptedness of man's instinctive equipment 
must be considered is the one man has inhabited for two million years until 
changes of the past few thousand years led to the extraordinary variety of 
habitats that he occupies today... This means that man's primeval environment 
is, almost certainly, also his environment of evolutionary adaptedness. " (Bowlby 
1982,59) 
Although Bowlby is the source of Evolutionary Psychology's concept of the EEA, the 
interpretation of `which is the critical period' of past evolution for current species- 
typical behaviours is quite different. Symons (1992), a prominent proponent of the 
Evolutionary Psychology approach, gives the definition; "[T]he human environment of 
evolutionary adaptedness (EEA) - i. e., the Pleistocene environment in which the 
overwhelming majority of human evolution occurred... " (Symons 1992,143). The 
Pleistocene is generally understood to refer to the period lasting from around 1.5-2m 
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years ago to the end of the last ice age (about 10,000 years ago). Evolutionary 
Psychology thus typically uses the EEA concept to refer to a posited environment 
unique to recent human ancestors, long after those ancestors began to inhabit separate 
environments from those currently occupied by the other African Apes. 
Unsurprisingly, this focus is usually accompanied by a modelling of the evolution of 
`unique to human' behaviours (see fuller discussion in chapter 6.1). Ironically, Bowlby 
himself was keenly interested in what he felt to be primate-wide behaviours, and thus 
draws heavily on cross-species analysis and comparisons in his description of the 
infant's social bonding instincts; 
"Just as Darwin found it impossible to understand the structure of an orchid 
flower until he knew what insects flourished and visited it in its environment of 
adaptedness, so, it is held, it is impossible to understand man's instinctive 
behaviour until we know something of the environment in which it evolved. For 
a picture of this we need to turn to anthropological studies of human 
communities living in the least modified of human environments, to 
archaeological studies of early man, and to field studies of the higher primates... 
Whereas some social groups are reasonably stable, others change in size and 
composition. But whether the larger group is stable or not, the tie between a 
mother and her children is always present and virtually unchanging... [I]t seems 
clear that man's primeval way of living can fruitfully be compared with the ways 
of living of the other large ground-dwelling species of higher primate. 
Differences between man and sub-human species there certainly are; but for the 
purposes of this book, it is argued, their similarities are equally important, and 
perhaps more so than their differences. " (Bowlby 1982,61-62) 
7.4.5 Bowlby on Primate Fundamentals 
The last chapter dealt quite fully with the basic demographic conditions faced by 
current Old World primate species, and posited that many of those fundamentals are 
likely to have been essentially the same for the ancestors of modem humans even 
though current demographic conditions for many human populations are clearly very 
different. The aim in this section is not to spend more time on considering primate 
fundamentals per se, rather to illustrate the compatibility of this approach with that of 
Bowlby, and to support the claim that what mediates social bonding in humans 
resembles that in other primates. The data reviewed by Bowlby below focus on Old 
World Primates, and look at the same fundamentals analysed by the current approach 
(see chapter 6); 
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"Reviewing the reports of Sade (1965) for rhesus monkeys and of Goodall 
(1965) for chimpanzees, Washburn, Jay, and Lancaster (1965) remark that these 
kinship sub-groups are `determined by the necessarily close association of 
mother with newborn infant, which is extended through time and generations and 
allowed to ramify into close associations between siblings'; and they express 
their belief `that this pattern of enduring social relations between a mother and 
her offspring will be found in other species of primates'... [T]hat the child's tie 
to his mother is the human version of behaviour seen commonly in many other 
species of animal seems now indisputable; and it is in this perspective that the 
nature of the tie is examined... [W]hatever behaviour is found in non-human 
primates we can be confident is likely to be truly homologous with what obtains 
in man. " (Bowlby 1982,183) 
Bowlby also notes that this fundamental relationship between a female and her 
offspring, can (particularly when combined with female philopatry in species such as 
Macaca mulata) result in several generations of maternal relatives typically being in 
close proximity; 
"[flt has become evident not only that in each band there are stable sub-groups, 
composed of several adult animals of both sexes and a number of juveniles and 
infants all of which remain in proximity to one another, but that all the members 
of such a sub-group may be the children and grandchildren of a single elderly 
female. " (Bowlby 1982,187) 
Notice that this is in close agreement with the current understanding of demographics 
of this (and other) female philopatric species in primatology (see chapter 6). Bowlby 
goes on to note that a key feature of African Apes (here chimpanzees) is the lifelong 
influence of the social ties and loyalties formed in infancy. This has relevance for the 
current investigation, since it supports the idea that the bonds formed in infancy (for 
both humans and other primates) typically have an enduring influence in the social 
partners and social behaviours an individual engages with well into adulthood. This 
adds support to the current claim that studying mechanisms of infant social bonding is 
of key relevance to understanding life-long patterns of social bonding; 
"Goodall (1975) reports that in most of the cases for which evidence is available 
close relationships between a mother and her offspring, and also between 
siblings, persist throughout the life-cycle... [I]n a study at the Gombe Stream 
Reserve, Pusey (1978) observed that each of four juvenile females whose 
mothers were still alive spent at least four-fifths of their time in the company of 
her mother; and only after their first oestrus did they begin to spend less time 
with mother and more with adult males. Similarly, up to the time of reaching 
puberty, males were still spending at least half of their time with mother; and 
each of them continued to meet his mother occasionally up to the time of her 
death. Throughout these years of increasing independence the initiative for 
departure and return seems to lie with the young animal; no signs of a mother 
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discouraging or rejecting one of her offspring have been observed. " (Bowlby 
1982,190-191) 
7.5 Part Two - Attachment Mechanisms 
7.5.1 Introduction 
The following sections will introduce the broad workings of the attachment process 
and its basic features. A full appreciation of these is inextricably linked to evolutionary 
pressures and typical demographic fundamentals of primates as discussed in previous 
sections and chapters. We will see that the infant's attachment to a carer tracks mainly 
that individual's responsiveness to the infant's elicitations for various forms of care 
and nurture, rather than tracking relatedness. This will confirm that, at least for this 
most primary of social bonds, genetic relatedness per se is irrelevant to their 
development. On the contrary, the evidence is that it is the actual process of provision 
of care and responsiveness to the infant's needs which cues the formation of an 
attachment bond within the infant. 
This aspect of the process has a strong resonance with anthropological descriptions of 
`kinship bonds' being mediated through `the doing of nurturant behaviours, rather 
than `being' a relative per se (see Schneider 1984, in chapter 1, and chapters 8 and 9). 
7.5.2 Overview of the Attachment Process 
Geiger (1996) gives a useful summary of the mutual behaviours that must occur in 
order for the child to form a bond with a carer; 
"Attachment theorists now suggest that infants are biologically predisposed to 
emit signals such as tracking visually, crying, smiling, vocalising, clinging, etc., 
to elicit nurturance and proximity not only to their mother, but also to their father 
or any other caregiver (Ainsworth, Bell & Stayton, 1974; Lamb, 1978b). 
Consistent and prompt responding to infants' signals leads to infants' perception 
of adults as concerned, predictable, and reliable, and to the formation of secure 
attachment. Mothers, fathers and other caregivers, by their different styles of 
responding, create a different set of expectations and an array of attachment 
relationships of various qualities and flavours (Bretherton, 1985; Bridges, 
Connell & Belsky, 1988; Stroufe, 1988). " (Geiger 1996,6) 
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Lamb also provides -a similar overview of the process of the infant's elicitations, a 
social partner's responsiveness, and the infant's perception of this; 
"Perhaps the most useful formulation is that of the ethological attachment 
theorists (Ainsworth, 1973; Bowlby, 1969; Lamb & Easterbrooks, 1981; Lamb & 
Gilbride, 198; Lamb, Thompson, Gardner & Chamov, 1985) who propose that 
infants are biologically predisposed to emit signals (e. g. cries and smiles) to 
which adults are biologically predisposed to respond. When adults consistently 
respond promptly and appropriately to infant signals, infants come to perceive 
them as predictable and reliable. " (Lamb 1997,105) 
Notice that Bowlby (1982), quotes Ainsworth (1963) to emphasise that the process of 
the infant's seeking social interactions and then forming social bonds is initiated by the 
infant itself rather than being imposed from outside, and that this eliciting behaviour is 
very much `instinctive'; 
"One feature of attachment behaviour that struck me especially was the extent to 
which the infant himself takes the initiative in seeking interaction. At least from 
two months of age onwards, and increasingly through the first year of life, these 
infants were not so much passive and recipient as active in seeking 
interaction. "(Ainsworth 1963, cited in Bowlby 1982,203) 
Notice that this is resonant with McKenna's (1987) discussion of Old World primates 
(chapter 6.4.4). In addition to an infant's tendency to seek interaction, Bowlby gives 
some further details (followed up in section 7.5.6 below) of specific conditions under 
which an infant is particularly likely to elicit a response and attention from a carer; 
"Many conditions activate attachment behaviour. The simplest perhaps is sheer 
distance from the mother... Other conditions well known to activate attachment 
behaviour and to influence the form it takes and the intensity with which it is 
exhibited fall under three main heads: 
1- Condition of the child: fatigue; hunger; pain; cold; ill health 
2- Whereabouts and behaviour of mother: mother absent; mother departing; 
mother discouraging of proximity 
3- Other environmental conditions: occurrence of alarming events; rebuffs by 
other adults or children" (Bowlby 1982,258-259) 
Note that Bowlby's use of the term "mother" is a shorthand, and that (as he confirms 
below) relatedness per se is not a factor in the formation of attachments. 
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7.5.3 Confirming that `Relatedness' is Unnecessary 
The last chapter (chapter 6) confirmed that, for primates, primary social bonds can 
form on the basis of nurturant treatment of the infant regardless of actual relatedness. 
Bowlby was highly influenced by Harlow's work with Rhesus Macaques (Macaca 
mulata), and it is thus worth noting Harlow's position on adoptions and the formation 
of attachments in primates. As Ainsworth later noted for humans, and McKenna for 
other primates (see previous section), Harlow emphasises the impetus given to the 
formation of primary social relationships by the infant itself via its own active 
elicitations; 
"We have observed the behavior of two multiparous rhesus monkeys (299 and 
385) whose own infants were removed on the day of birth. After a separation 
interval of 9 and 4 months, respectively, these females were given the 
opportunity to adopt infant monkeys. 
The procedure in the case of female 385 was to separate a 78-day-old infant from 
its real mother by inserting a Plexiglass screen between them and to give the 
infant access to the cage of the prospective adopting mother. After the infant's 
real mother was removed from the room, the infant immediately ran to and 
contacted female 385. Overtly normal patterns of motherhood appeared and were 
maintained until the infant was forcibly removed 3 months later. 
A different procedure was used with female 299. A 38-day-old infant was 
placed in an open-field test situation and the female subsequently introduced. 
During the first few minutes after the female entered, the infant orientated and 
moved toward her several times but could make no contact because she [the 
adult] was seated on a shelf 3 feet above the floor. The infant, noticeably 
disturbed, alternately cried and screeched, while the female frequently looked at 
the infant. After this brief delay, the female suddenly dropped to the floor, picked 
up the infant, and held it for the remainder of the session and during transport 
back to her cage. She was not observed to release it for 3 days. Again, entirely 
normal mother-infant relationships were established and maintained until the pair 
were separated by the experimenter some months later. 
In both cases, the behaviour of the infants was similar in that they actively sought 
out the female. " (Harlow [1963], 1986,168-169) 
Harlow goes on to note that an infant deprived of any mother for several weeks from 
birth subsequently failed to initiate interaction in the presence of adults, and, although 
contacted and groomed intermittently by an adult female, never responded, and social 
bonds failed to develop. Harlow interpreted this as further demonstrating the 
importance of the infant's active participation in the interaction. Overall it is clear that 
Harlow believed that relatedness is unnecessary in the basic process of formation of 
attachments. 
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Although Bowlby's conceptual framework makes frequent reference to the `mother' 
(or the `parents'), Bowlby repeatedly confirmed that in strict terms of the workings of 
the bonding mechanisms, the caregiver to whom the infant forms an attachment bond 
need not be its `real' mother; 
"Although throughout this book the text refers usually to `mother' and not to 
`mother-figure', it is to be understood that in every case reference is to the person 
who mothers a child and to whom he becomes attached. For most children, of 
course, that person is also his natural mother. "(Bowlby 1982,29) 
"Observations such as these and many others make it abundantly clear that, 
although it is usual for a child's natural mother to be his principle attachment- 
figure, the role can be effectively taken by others. Such evidence as we have is 
that, provided a mother-substitute behaves in a mothering way towards a child, 
he will treat her as any other child would treat his natural mother. Just what 
comprises a `mothering way' of treating a child will be discussed in the next 
section. Briefly, it appears to be engaging in lively social interaction with him, 
and responding readily to his signals and approaches. " (Bowlby 1982,306) 
This passage clearly demonstrates that Bowlby understands social bonds forming as 
the result of a process, and `social interaction' itself is central to that process, and thus 
relatedness is incidental. This emphasis on the importance of `interaction' is further 
confirmed by Bowlby's discussion of the results of Ainsworth's Baltimore research; 
"The results of that study (Ainsworth and others, 1978) show clearly that two 
variables are significantly related to development of attachment behaviour: (i) 
sensitivity of mother in responding to her baby's signals, and (ii) the amount and 
nature of interaction between mother and baby. The mothers whose infants are 
most securely attached to them are mothers who respond to their babies' signals 
promptly and appropriately, and who engage in much social interchange with 
them - to the delight of each party. " (Bowlby 1982,315-316) 
7.5.4 Multiple Targets and the Context of Bonding 
A further consideration, rarely dwelt upon by early attachment theorists, is that the 
wider social context within which an infant encounters the `social interaction' or 
`interchange' so central to bonding will depend a great deal on the typical living 
arrangements of the culture in which an infant develops. It may be that a limited 
sample contributed to Bowlby's interpretation of the potential for patterns of social 
interactions and diversity of possible attachment figures (See Mead below). 
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Anthropologists are (especially post-Schneider), of course, more interested in varieties 
of living arrangements, and the subtleties of patterns of social bonding. 
As well as emphasising that the attachment figure need not be the `natural mother', 
Bowlby discusses the potential flexibility surrounding the nature of targets of 
attachment bonds in some further detail; 
"In the discussion so far it has been implied that a child directs his behaviour 
towards one particular figure, referred to either as his mother-figure or even 
simply as his mother. This usage, which for the sake of brevity is unavoidable, 
has nonetheless given rise on occasion to misunderstanding [Bowlby inserts a 
note which reads: ] For example, it has sometimes been alleged that I have 
expressed the view that mothering should always be provided by a child's natural 
mother and also that mothering `cannot be safely distributed among several 
figures' (Mead, 1962). No such views have been expressed by me. " (Bowlby 
1982,303) 
Bowlby certainly accepted that the infant can potentially form multiple social bonds; 
"Of fifty-eight Scottish infants studied by Schaffer and Emerson (1964a), 17 (29 
per cent) are reported to have been directing attachment behaviour towards more 
than one figure almost from the time they started showing it to anyone. After 
another four months not only had half the children more than one attachment- 
figure but a number of them had as many as five or more different attachment- 
figures. By the time these children had reached eighteen months of age, those 
who still restricted their attachment behaviour to only one figure had fallen to 3 
per cent of the sample; which means that for a child of 18 months to have only 
one attachment figure is quite exceptional. Ainsworth's findings for the Ganda 
study show a comparable state of affairs: all but a tiny minority were showing 
multiple attachments by nine or ten months of age. "(Bowlby 1982,304) 
The question of whether an infant is likely to have access to single or multiple carers is 
inseparable from the question of typical living arrangements of the culture in which the 
child develops. As mentioned, Bowlby scarcely discusses the issue of the wider social 
context within which any such `social interactions' might typically take place. 
However, he does briefly mention that, (at least in the cultures within his samples), the 
context of `the household' appears to be a constant `containing set' for the formation 
of an infant's attachments (see section 7.5.6 below). 
In this section, we briefly look at living arrangements for the effect they have on the 
infant's forming multiple attachments. Tronick et al (1985) studied the communal 
organisation of many aspects of infant care amongst the Efe of the Ituri forest of Zaire. 
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The Efe have different living arrangements from those in many Euro-American 
Cultures; 
"The Efe live in virilocal bands, with 6-50 residents, and although some bands 
have relatively stable membership with a consistent set of families, there is a 
great deal of flexibility of membership. The Efe in this study area are 
traditionally classified as hunters and gatherers... The Efe are semi-nomadic. 
The pattern of movement over a year partly reflect seasonal variation in the 
availability of forest and cultivated foods and affects Efe work patterns and 
social organization. For approximately 7 months of the year they live in 
encampments near a Walese village, often on the perimeter of the village 
fields... For the remaining 5 months of the year, the Efe move deeper into the 
forest to camps 1-3 days walk from the villages... The life of the Efe is that of 
continuous social contact. There are few solitary tasks or settings... " (Tronick et 
al 1985,302-307) 
Tronick et al go on to describe how childcare is typically organised in this culture; 
"This pattern of assistance, caring for the infant while the mother engages in 
other tasks, continues as the infant gets older. These observations indicate that, 
over the first half year of life and particularly over the first few weeks, whether 
in camp or out, the infant is almost always held in close bodily contact and 
seldom if ever put down or left alone. Access to a breast is virtually constant and 
upon demand. However, the mother although present may not be - indeed (with 
respect to holding and carrying) tends not to be - the sole caregiver of the infant. 
Rather, infants have multiple caretakers whose interactions with them are 
typically playful and sensitive. For example, in one 1-hour session, a 4-month- 
old was transferred nine times among six different people. To summarise, Efe 
infants during the first six months of life and to a lesser extent throughout the 
following year and a half experience multiple caretaking, including nursing by 
women other than the mother. " (Tronick et al 1985,305) 
Endicott also provides an account of shared responsibility for child-rearing in a 
Malaysian society whose living arrangements are quite different from the isolated 
discrete households of western societies. She describes the flexibility of living 
arrangements thus; 
"The Batek De' dialect group in the Lebir River area consists of about 84 people. 
Usually from 5 to 8 nuclear families camp together, each family in a separate 
lean-to shelter. The average camp population was 34 persons... camps, as 
physical entities and groups, generally last a week to 10 days before people move 
to find new food or trade resources... Families erect lean-tos at random 
locations, rarely more than a few yards from each other. These shelters are open 
on three sides, thus exposing the activities of camp members to the full view of 
everyone else in camp... 
A fact of life for Batek children is that the groups around them constantly 
change. With each move, the composition of a camp group may shift 
dramatically... Correlated with this freedom to leave social groupings in Batek 
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society is the ease with which individuals can attach themselves to others. 
Individuals can choose who they want to work and camp with, and they select 
their own marriage partners... In cases of divorce, very young children, 
especially nursing infants, usually remain with the mother, but older children 
may decide for themselves with which parent they will live. Children may 
alternate between the parents, live with older siblings, or even live with 
stepparents who are no longer married to their biological parent. " (Endicott 1991, 
282-283) 
As for other aspects of child-rearing, Endicott points out that for such fundamentals as 
the provision of food, the families do not operate as isolated care-giving units; 
"The flexibility of social groupings is facilitated by the campwide sharing 
network that entitles all people in a camp to food. All food - whether vegetable 
or meat and whether procured by women or men - is shared, unless the quantities 
are so small as to be considered enough for only one or two people. Parents often 
give their children plates of food to deliver to other families in camp. This 
sharing occurs even when each family has procured similar food through their 
own labors. In addition to ensuring that all people have direct access to foods that 
they may not be able to procure themselves... the sharing network facilitates 
childcare: raising children does not create overbearing burdens on individual 
caregivers; through the sharing network, the entire camp absorbs responsibility 
for feeding children. " (Endicott 1991,283-284) 
These descriptions demonstrate that the typical organisation of childcare in the Euro- 
American societies usually sampled by attachment theorists is not necessarily 
generalisable cross-culturally. Strictly speaking, Bowlby's position is not that multiple 
attachments cannot form. His interpretation is rather that there will typically be one 
figure of particular importance, rather than all social ties being equivalent; 
"[I]t is a mistake to suppose that a young child diffuses his attachment over many 
figures in such a way that he gets along with no strong attachment to anyone, and 
consequently without missing any particular person when that person is away. 
On the contrary, both the older evidence and that more recently available (Rutter, 
1981, Ainsworth, 1982) supports a hypothesis advanced in an earlier paper 
(Bowlby, 1958), namely that there is a strong bias for attachment behaviour to 
become directed mainly towards one particular person. In support of that view 
attention was drawn to the way in which young children in a residential nursery 
tend, when given any opportunity, to latch themselves on to a particular nurse. " 
(Bowlby 1982,308-309) 
Overall, the widely accepted position regarding the openness of the identity and 
multiplicity of caregivers is summarised by Archer and Lloyd 2002, who also discuss 
the impact of the work of Schaffer & Emerson (1964), Geiger (1996) and others; 
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"Geiger's research provides a clear answer to the question as to whether an 
infant's mother is a privileged object of attachment, and establishes that an 
infant's response is not determined by the sex of its primary caregiver. In the 
work of Schaffer and Emerson, we noted that, in addition to forming multiple 
attachments, a small proportion of infants became primarily attached to their 
fathers. The clear conclusion is that the object of initial attachment need not be 
the natural mother or even female. " (Archer & Lloyd 2002,173-174) 
Archer and Lloyd's summary, noting Geiger's demonstration that a male can serve as 
the primary attachment figure, reminds us of adoptions by older siblings (even males) 
in chimps (chapter 6.4.6). Before we move on, it is worth noting the evidence for 
sibling caretaking in humans. Whilst this may be less common in Euro-American 
societies, it is common in other societies, and often features in anthropological 
accounts (for an early example, see Mead 1928, on Samoan society). A sample 
(HRAF) survey by Barry and Paxson (1971) suggested that female children are the 
principle companions or caretakers of infants in 16.7% of societies, and this figure 
extends to 53.9% for caretaking of charges who are in early childhood. McKenna 
(1987) also discusses the lack of acknowledgement in traditional attachment accounts 
of the realities of child-care in many non-western societies; 
"[T]he cross-cultural data on multiple care-giving within what have been called 
"polymatric" societies, as compared with societies in which there is a single care 
giving figure, so-called "monomatric" societies, indicate that there is a need to 
better evaluate what constitutes infant care among humans. More attention needs 
to be focused upon what differentiates the kind of care that is given and at what 
age and under what amounts of supervision young care givers (or any care 
givers) are assuming responsibility for their infant charges (see Weisner and 
Gallimore, 1977); Whiting and Whiting, 1975; Super, 1981). 
Weisner and Gallimore (1977) have called attention to the fact that in most 
societies around the world siblings spend, if not more time caring for children 
than mothers do, at least significant amounts of time with them. Unfortunately, 
much research on child development tends to ignore these important 
contributions. Super (1981) argues persuasively that a "firm" enough empirical 
basis of quantitative, well-focused data as devoid of narrow presuppositions as 
possible is desperately needed. His excellent review demonstrates that the nature 
of supplemental care, its form and function, is but one of the many sets of 
problems in need of serious rethinking among infant researchers. " (McKenna 
1987,174-175) 
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In a later chapter (chapter 9) I argue that one key area of research which is currently 
extending our understanding of the formation of social bonds and attachments is the 
area of ethnographic studies, which, unlike many accounts of attachment, benefit from 
being informed by non-western societies. 
7.5.5 Basic Features of Attachment Behaviour Extend Into Adulthood 
At the beginning of the chapter (section 7.3) we noted that the relevance of analysing 
basic features of attachment behaviour commonly occurring in infants and children can 
be applicable to understanding social bonding behaviour in general, to the extent that 
adult social bonding has similar features, and to the extent that early bonds are 
maintained into adulthood. As noted above, one of the limitations of much attachment 
theory is that, despite its grounding in ethology and its subject matter being universals 
of human behaviour, many of the studies are limited to western society. This orientation 
is noticeable in discussions of attachments in adulthood, the social context of which 
perhaps differs more between different societies than does infancy, which indeed 
Bowlby viewed as having essential features across primates. Because attachment 
theorists' discussions of adult attachments are typically informed by western concepts 
and culture (though see Weiss 1991, below), this is an area where ethnographic reports 
can provide valuable additional insights (see chapter 8). 
It is clear that attachment theorists conceive of attachment mechanisms in childhood to 
also be relevant to attachment and social bonds in adulthood. Bowlby suggested that 
attachment behaviours "characterize human beings from the cradle to the grave" 
(Bowlby, 1979,129, cf. Rotherbard and Shaver 1991). The following passage illustrates 
that Bowlby (albeit talking about western culture) felt that later social bonds are based 
on the same dispositions that operate in childhood; 
"During adolescence a measure of attachment behaviour is commonly directed 
not only towards persons outside the family but also towards groups and 
institutions other that the family. A school or college, a work group, a religious 
group or a political group can come to constitute for many people a subordinate 
attachment-'figure', and for some people a principle attachment-`figure'. In such 
cases, it seems probable, the development of attachment to a group is mediated, 
at least initially, by attachment to a person holding a prominent position within 
that group... That attachment behaviour in adult life is a straightforward 
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continuation of attachment behaviour in childhood is shown by the 
circumstances that lead an adult's attachment behaviour to become more readily 
excited. In sickness and calamity, adults often become demanding of others; in 
conditions of sudden danger or disaster a person will almost certainly seek 
proximity to another known and trusted person. In such circumstances an 
increase of attachment behaviour is recognised by all as natural. " (Bowlby 1982, 
207-208) 
Berman and Sperling (1994) suggest that care-giving and care-seeking are inextricably 
linked in adult attachments (see also Camelley and Pietromonaco 1996; Carpenter 
2001); 
"Within the domain of adult attachment, we suggest that the theory should 
combine the attachment system (originally characterized by care-seeking or 
proximity-seeking behaviors) with a nurturance system characterized by 
caregiving behaviours... In contrast to the perspective that attachment and 
caregiving are independent but related behavioural systems, we believe that the 
caregiving system is an integral component and direct outgrowth of the 
attachment system. This is particularly true in the realm of adult attachment, 
although it may be applicable to attachment across the life span. {[here they 
note] It may be that even in parent-infant attachment, attachment and caregiving 
are part of the same nurturance system. The caregiving behaviors of the parent 
may also serve to foster the parent's attachment to his or her child (Weiss, 1988). 
For example, proximity to one's child gives a parent the experience of "felt 
security, " even though safety of the parent is not relevant. Conversely, in the 
experience of parenting, one is confronted with intense anxiety when one's child 
is inaccessible, whereas proximity is reassuring even in the face of real 
danger... } 
Clearly, functioning adult marital or sexual relationships require reciprocity and 
easy interchange between caregiving and attachment roles (Ainsworth, 1985). 
The same can be said of parent-child relationships when the children are grown. 
It is rare that parents do not accept help, support, or nurturance from an adult 
child, even while they remain an attachment figure to their child. 
[O]ur personal and clinical experiences suggest that the emotional experiences 
that are bound up in attachment are exactly those that are bound up in caregiving. 
The fear of danger or threat triggers caregiving responses, just as it triggers 
attachment responses. " (Berman and Sperling 1994,9) 
This interplay of reciprocated caregiving and bonding in adult attachments reappears in 
chapter 8 (e. g. Witherspoon 1975; Marshall 1977). Ainsworth (1989) discusses social 
bonds beyond the parent-child and marital ones, albeit here apparently in reference to 
western (urban) culture, and agrees that proximity-seeking and caregiving may both be 
components of some such 
bonds; 
"Friendship can connote a wide range of dyadic relationships, including 
relationships with acquaintances with whom one has occasional pleasant 
interaction, relationships with congenial companions with whom one spends 
quite a great deal of time in activities of mutual concern or interest, and close 
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intimate relationships with one or a few particularly valued persons whose 
company one seeks intermittently. It seems likely that some of these 
relationships are sufficiently close and enduring to be characterized as affectional 
bonds, in which the partner is felt to be a uniquely valued person, not 
interchangeable with anyone else who might play a similar role. 
Weiss (1982) suggested that such bonds often exist between army buddies and 
that these bonds may be identified as attachments. Indeed, there seem to be both 
attachment and caregiving components in such bonds. The partners seek 
proximity to each other, they give care and protection to each other; separation or 
threat of separation occasions anxiety, and loss would certainly cause grief. " 
(Ainsworth 1989,714) 
Weiss (1991) notes that many of these analyses (including his own) should be 
considered to be potentially culturally-specific. He also confirms that, despite these 
problems, there is enough evidence to conclude that adult attachment bonds are 
developments of the behaviours that operate in childhood; 
"That particular relationships should be attachments - that, for example, the pair 
[romantic/marital] bond should quite regularly be an attachment relationship - 
may be true only in societies whose social arrangements are like ours. In 
societies of different social arrangements the adult arrangements that regularly 
display properties of childhood attachment might be different... 
It appears that aside from choice of attachment figure, relationship to attachment 
figure, and nature of triggering threat, the properties of childhood attachment and 
adult attachment are the same. They are, in general, alike in the feelings 
associated with their arousal. They are also alike motivationally, in their ability 
to command attention and energy under conditions of threat. Only in their 
perceptual aspects are they different. So, they differ in the image of the 
attachment figure and the target of the triggering threat. This is consistent with 
the idea that we are dealing with the same emotional system, but one whose 
perceptual elements have been modified. 
Loss of the attachment figure, in attachment relationships of adult life as in 
childhood attachment, produces grief. Separation protest as a component of grief 
in adults is similar to the separation protest of childhood attachment in 
behavioural expression. In each case a syndrome can be observed that includes 
calling and crying, determined and sometimes frantic search, persisting 
perceptual recall of the lost figure, restlessness, and eventual despair. The 
indefinite persistence of grief in adult attachments is also similar to the 
persistence of childhood distress on loss of the attachment figure. " (Weiss 1991, 
86-69) 
In sum, although this chapter focuses on social bonding processes relevant to infants 
and children, these commentators agree that the same basic mechanisms are at work in 
forming and maintaining social bonds throughout the lifespan. 
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7.5.6 Social Organisation, Exposure and Familiarity 
Although not analysing it in any detail, Bowlby did realise that the typical living 
arrangements of a culture influence infants' social exposure and thus potential 
attachment bonds; 
"It is evident that whom a child selects as his principle attachment-figure, and to 
how many other figures he becomes attached, turn in large part on who cares for 
him and on the composition of the household in which he is living. As a matter 
of empirical fact there can be no doubt that in virtually every culture the people 
in question are most likely to be his natural mother, father, older siblings, and 
perhaps grandparents, and that it is from amongst these figures that a child is 
most likely to select both his principle attachment-figure and his subsidiary 
figures. " (Bowlby 1982,305) 
Confirming the potential importance of the household, he later adds; 
"For both the Ganda and the Scottish infants the commonest subsidiary figures to 
be reported were father and older siblings. Others included a grandparent or other 
persons staying in the house, and occasionally a neighbour... Inevitably, for each 
child both the number and the identity of these additional figures change over 
time. Schaffer and Emerson record how, for a particular child, there might be a 
sudden increase in the number of figures and later perhaps a decrease. As a rule, 
though not always, such changes clearly reflected who happened to be available 
in the household at the time. " (Bowlby 1982,307) 
In those cultures where `households' are discrete and are the predominant or exclusive 
context of an infant's social interactions, then both primary and secondary attachments 
would (following the theory) be expected to be limited to this context. Most of 
Bowlby's data is derived from such cultures, but is he right to suggest that in virtually 
every culture individuals develop in a `household' comprised purely of a nuclear 
family (mother, father, siblings and perhaps grandparents)? The examples from 
Tronick et al and Endicott (see section 7.5.4) suggest this is not always the case. These 
variables are of relevance to ethnographic and cross-cultural investigations of social 
bonding norms, and will be looked at further in the following chapter. 
The importance of `household composition' demonstrates the influence that familiarity 
plays in the formation of attachment. In summarising the conditions under which an 
infant comes to form attachments to certain particular individuals, Bowlby notes that; 
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"In determining this course of development, at least four processes are likely to 
be at work: 
A- an in-built bias towards looking a certain patterns in preference to others and 
at things that move; 
B- exposure learning, by which the familiar comes to be distinguished from the 
strange; 
C- an in-built bias to approach the familiar (and later to withdraw from the 
strange); 
D- feedback of results, by which a behavioural sequence is augmented when it is 
followed by certain results and diminished when it is followed by others. " 
(Bowlby 1982,273) 
The condition of familiarity via an association with the primary attachment figure also 
influences the formation of secondary attachments (this resembles `mediated 
recognition' as described for interactions typically accompanying maternal relatedness 
in female philopatric primates, e. g. Walters 1987, chapter 6.4.6); 
"[A]fler their third birthday most children become increasingly able in a strange 
place to feel secure with subordinate attachment figures, for example, a relative 
or a school teacher. Even so, such feeling of security is conditional. First, the 
subordinate figures must be familiar people, preferably those whom the child has 
got to know whilst in the company of his mother. " (Bowlby 1982,205) 
7.5.7 Social Interaction and Nurture 
I have tried to demonstrate that a consideration of the social/living arrangements the 
infant develops within will define the breadth of exposure to, and variety of, everyday 
social interactions. Within the primary living context, in which potential care-givers 
are familiar figures, the more specific behaviours mediating attachments, as we saw 
above (section 7.5.2), are broadly described as `social interaction' (Bowlby 1982,306) 
or `social interchange' (Bowlby 1982,316) and more specifically responsiveness to the 
elicitation of the infant. 
These conditions give us a good basic foundation with which to approach the 
ethnographic accounts of human social bonding (chapter 8). More detailed 
specification of what mediates social bonds is not always readily discussed in the 
attachment literature. However, the accounts reviewed above make it clear that an 
important component of `care' involves responsiveness to infant elicitations. Recall 
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that Bowlby suggested certain conditions of the infant are particularly likely to activate 
elicitation, including "fatigue, hunger, pain, cold and ill-health" (see full quote above, 
7.5.2). Whilst pain and ill-heath would occur on an occasional basis, cold, fatigue and 
hunger are likely to be more regular states. Responsiveness to the infant's elicitations 
when it is hungry can only be met by the provision of food. Potential cold and fatigue 
are relieved by what attachment theorists often refer to as `contact comfort', and a safe 
place in which to sleep. I briefly discuss both `contact comfort' and feeding here. 
Prior to Harlow's work with primates, the dominant model of what mediates an 
infant's bond to its carer was that the infant forms a `secondary drive' for the carer due 
to its experience and association of the carer fulfilling its `primary drive' of feeding. 
This model was known as Secondary Drive theory (Hull 1943); 
"The position commonly held by psychologists and sociologists is quite clear: 
the basic motives are, for the most part, the primary drives - particularly hunger, 
thirst, elimination, pain, and sex - and all other motives, including love or 
affection, are derived or secondary drives. The mother is associated with the 
reduction of the primary drives - particularly hunger, thirst and pain - and 
through learning, affection or love is derived. " (Harlow [1958] 1986,102) 
In a later review, Harlow describes the essential elements of his findings. Note the 
importance of warmth as a component of `contact comfort'; 
"The cloth surrogate was originally designed to test the relative importance of 
body contact in contrast to activities of the breast, and the results were clear 
beyond all expectation. Body contact was of overpowering importance by any 
measure taken, even contact time... In one experiment, we heated the surface of 
a wire surrogate and let four infant macaques choose between this heated mother 
and a room-temperature cloth mother. The neonatal monkeys clearly preferred 
the former. With increasing age this difference decreased, and at approximately 
15 days the preference reversed. In a second experiment, we used two differently 
coloured cloth surrogates and heated one and not the other. The infants preferred 
the hot surrogate, but frequently contacted the room-temperature surrogate for 
considerable periods of time... It is clear that warmth is a variable of major 
importance, particularly in the neonate, and we hazard the guess that elevated 
temperature is a variable of importance in the operation of all the affectional 
systems... " (Harlow [1970] 1986,121-132) 
Geiger's (1996) research on humans, in particular the ability for males to become 
infants' primary attachment figures, supports this position; 
"Hull's drive reduction hypothesis (1943), that mothers acquire the value of a 
secondary reinforcer by satisfying their infant's hunger drive, has been 
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disconfirmed. By contrast, Harlow's contrary hypothesis (1961) has been 
confirmed. This hypothesis assumed that it was not the actual feeding but the 
circumstances surrounding the feeding, namely, the warmth and comfort 
provided by the caregiver that were at the origin of the infant-mother bond. " 
(Geiger 1996,96) 
These findings about `contact comfort' and particularly warmth, as well as the 
`security from danger' aspect of attachment are compatible with the findings of 
primatologists (reviewed by Nicolson, see chapter 6.4.4) that infant and carer are in 
almost continuous physical contact for the first weeks (cercopithecines) or months 
(African apes). Bowlby's review of primate social interaction included discussion of 
the universality of maintaining close physical contact between infant and carer. A 
related universal arrangement relevant to relieving the condition of `fatigue' is sleeping 
in physical contact with the carer observed in all primates. Bowlby notes that this 
pattern of behaviour endures at night throughout juvenility, even when daytime contact 
reduces; 
"At birth or soon after, all primate infants, bar the human, cling to their mothers. 
Throughout early childhood they are either in direct physical contact with mother 
or only a few feet or yards from her. Mother reciprocates and keeps the infant 
close to her. As the young grow older the proportion of the day when they are in 
direct contact with mother diminishes and the distance of their excursions 
increases; but they continue to sleep with her at night and to rush to her side at 
the least alarm. " (Bowlby 1982,184) 
Bowlby summarises relevant observations for specific Old World Primates and apes. 
For macaques; 
"Although during their second year infants spend most of their daytime hours in 
sight of but out of physical contact with mother, most of them nonetheless are in 
actual contact with her for a substantial fraction of their day - usually from 10 to 
20 percent of it - and for the whole night. " (Bowlby 1982,186) 
And Baboons; 
"From six months onwards play with peers increases and absorbs a large part of 
the young baboon's time and energy. Nevertheless, until about twelve months it 
remains fairly close to the mother and always sleeps with her... By the end of its 
second year an infant's mother is likely to have a new baby but the youngster 
continues to spend time near her and frequently sleeps with her at night. " 
(Bowlby 1982,188-189) 
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For chimps; 
"The next eighteen months, until the age of three years, see increasing activity 
away from the mother and play with companions, and the young chimpanzee is 
out of physical contact with the mother for as much as 75 to 90 per cent of the 
day. Nevertheless it continues to be transported by her, jockey-fashion unless she 
is moving fast, and it still sleeps with her. " (Bowlby 1982,190) 
Bowlby also notes that similar sleeping patterns occur in gorillas also (Bowlby 1982, 
192). It thus seems likely that co-sleeping arrangements - either in direct physical 
contact or sharing a sleeping-nest - are a regular `interaction' context that serve as a 
`response' to infant needs and elicitations. Beyond straightforward familiarity, social 
interaction and care, sleeping arrangements and physical comfort are thus a potential 
candidate of significance in our consideration of what specific kinds of interaction 
contexts mediate human social bonding. 
Harlow's research demonstrated that, at least in infant macaques, the importance of 
feeding per se had been overstated by secondary drive theorists. Nevertheless, that 
infants' elicitations to potential care-givers are heavily motivated by hunger is firmly 
established within attachment theory. Ainsworth & Bowlby (1991) illustrate this in 
discussing the results of Ainsworth's `strange situation' and longitudinal home visit 
(Baltimore) research; 
"Highlights of the findings are as follows. Mothers who fairly consistently 
responded promptly to infant crying early-on had infants who by the end of the 
first year cried relatively little and were securely attached. Indeed, mothers who 
were sensitively and appropriately responsive to infant signals in general, 
including feeding signals, fostered secure infant-mother attachment. " (Ainsworth 
& Bowlby 1991,338, see refs in original) 
Bowlby (1982) also mentions the part that hunger plays in motivating elicitations in 
other primates; 
"Some other conditions that lead attachment behaviour to be shown, or shown 
more intensely, are reported in the accounts of infants raised by human foster- 
parents. Rowell reports that when her young baboon was hungry `he was 
insistent in maintaining contact and screamed continually if left. " (Bowlby 1982, 
196) 
208 
It was noted in chapter 6 (6.4.4) that for all frugivorous primates, in addition to the 
access to feeding sites provided by a carer, feeding for infants and juveniles usually 
occurs in the company of others (who are typically relatives). Further, we saw that for 
chimps, the carer may share food with the infant or juvenile, and thus the period of 
dependency on the carer for food is extended (weaning is at around 5-6 years in 
chimps). As Harlow's work was with macaques (weaning around 1-2 years) where 
active sharing of food by the carer is rare, it may be that his findings are 
unrepresentative of the significance of food provision (of both milk and later food 
stuffs) in humans (and chimps). In fact, although initially downplaying the place of 
hunger and feeding in the formation of attachments (Harlow 1958, see above quotes) 
in later reviews, Harlow too was clear that food and feeding are of importance in 
macaques; 
"Although the original surrogate papers (Harlow, 1958; Harlow & Zimmermann, 
1959) were written as if activities associated with the breast, particularly nursing, 
were of no importance, this is doubtless incorrect. There were no statistically 
significant differences in time spent by the babies on the lactating versus 
nonlactating cloth surrogate and on the lactating versus nonlactating wire 
surrogates, but the fact is that there were consistent preferences for both the cloth 
and the wire lactating surrogates and that these tendencies held for both the 
situations of time on surrogate and frequency of surrogate preference when the 
infant was exposed to a fear stimulus... [T]he infants showed a consistent 
preference for the lactating surrogate when contact comfort was held constant. " 
(Harlow [1970] 1986,122-124) 
This demonstrates that, whilst the research was able to show the primacy of warmth 
and contact comfort in mediating attachment (particularly for newborns), the artificial 
dichotomisation of the surrogate into < warmth or food provision > or < `being cold' 
versus `being hungry' > may have under-emphasised the importance of feeding under 
normal circumstances. Lamb (1985) gives an apt summary of the outcomes of 
Harlow's research; 
"Taken together, Harlow's experimental research and the nonexperimental 
studies of children in institutions led developmentalists to conclude that: (1) 
"contact comfort"(in addition to feeding) was important; (2) the secondary drive 
theory interpretation of early relationship formation was inadequate... "(Lamb et 
al 1985,12) 
In short, for humans, both contact comfort and warmth as well as the provision of food 
and co-feeding are likely to be significant factors mediating the infant's bonding to 
its 
care-giver. As mentioned above, these are just some of the forms of `responsiveness' 
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likely to mediate an infant's bond to its carer, and other less visible or tangible forms 
of nurture are surely also important, including play, communication and `talking', as 
well as other kinds of physical and mental stimulation. Given that deconstructing 
`social interaction' and `responsiveness' is not necessarily straightforward, it is 
understandable that Bowlby often used these broad terms in defining what kinds of 
behaviour mediate the infant's attachments. Similarly, as we will see in the next 
chapter, ethnographic accounts, although sometimes focussing on food provision or 
sleeping arrangements, usually employ the broad concepts of `nurture' and `caring' to 
describe the behaviours that mediate social bonds. 
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Chapter Eight - Ethnographic Compatibility 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have reviewed the theoretical position in Biology and noted its 
compatibility with findings of Attachment studies (chapter 7). Having found much 
evidence that interaction and responsiveness mediate the social bonding of the infant to 
caregivers, we are now in a position to look for support (or disagreements) for this 
perspective in the ethnographic literature. 
This chapter will start with a brief review of the development of attention paid to 
cultural ideas concerning the basis of social bonding. It will be seen that prior to the 
questions raised about the study of `kinship' by Schneider and others from the 1960s 
onwards (see chapters 1 and 9), sociology and anthropology paid very little attention to 
the notion that social bonds were anything other than connected to consanguinal 
relatedness (or its local extensions). The social bonding associated with provision of 
and sharing of food was one important exception, particularly in the work of Richards, 
who tried to bring together sociological and biological perspectives (see 8.3), but this 
was largely ignored by descriptions of `kinship' till more recently. Although 
questioning the means by which `kinship bonds' form, few of these early accounts 
questioned the fundamental role of `procreative ties' in social bonding (Schneider, 
1984, see chapter 1). From the 1950s onwards, reports on kinship patterns in the New 
Guinea Highlands added some momentum to the older suggestion that living together 
(co-residence) underlies social bonding, and eventually contributed to the general shift 
away from a genealogical approach (see 8.5). 
By the 1970s ethnographic reports started to emerge which paid greater attention to 
these non-genealogical, processual aspects of `kinship' and social bonding. At the same 
time these reports included a significant focus on the formation of social bonds in 
infants and children, in contrast to anthropology's historical attention to ties of 
`kinship' between adults - and usually adult males (see also chapter 1.3.2 and chapter 
9.2). The main emphasis of the current chapter will be in reviewing a sample of such 
ethnographic reports, and assessing their compatibility with the ideas discussed in the 
last chapters. To review all relevant ethnographies would be a major task beyond the 
means of the current research, and therefore there are doubtless important ethnographies 
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which have been overlooked. This review nevertheless demonstrates that very often in 
contemporary ethnographies, there is a strong focus on processes mediating social 
bonding, and sometimes explicit use of notions of `attachment'. 
The final section of the chapter will summarise these findings. Chapter 9 will be a 
discussion of the main ideas and findings of the thesis as a whole. 
8.2 Early Discussions of Processes Mediating Kinship Bonding 
Perhaps a good place to start is with Robertson Smith's (1889) compiled Lectures on 
the Religion of the Semites. Though his main focus was on clanship and `kinsmen' 
rather than social bonding per se, he noted the significance of commensality (eating 
together) in forming social bonds, and noted that this is a means by which bonds of 
kinship can be acquired, rather than simply being `an affair of birth'; 
"The ethical significance which thus appertains to the sacrificial meal, viewed as 
a social act, received particular emphasis from certain ancient customs and ideas 
connected with eating and drinking. According to antique ideas, those who eat 
and drink together are by this very act tied to one another by a bond of friendship 
and mutual obligation. " (Robertson Smith 1889,265) 
"The idea that kinship is not purely an affair of birth, but may be acquired, has 
quite fallen out of our circle of ideas... In Hebrew the phrase by which one 
claims kinship is "I am your bone and your flesh". Both in Hebrew and in 
Arabic, "flesh" is synonymous with "clan" or kindred group. To us this all seems 
mere metaphor from which no practical consequences can follow. But in early 
thought there is no sharp line between the metaphorical and the literal, between 
the way of expressing a thing and the way of conceiving it; phrases and symbols 
are treated as realities. Now, if kinship means participation in a common mass of 
flesh blood and bones, it is natural that it should be regarded as dependent, not 
merely on the fact that a man was born of his mother's body, and so was from his 
birth a part of her flesh, but also on the not less significant fact that he was 
nourished by her milk. And so we find that among the Arabs there is a tie of 
milk, as well as of blood, which unites the foster child to his foster-mother and to 
her kin. Again, after the child is weaned, his flesh and blood continue to be 
nourished and renewed by the food which he shares with his commensal, so that 
commensality can be thought of (1) as confirming or even (2) as constituting 
kinship in a very real sense. " (Robertson Smith 1889,273,274) 
These discussions of the significance of nursing would be taken up again later (see 
Richards, below and 8.6.3). It is also interesting to note the emphasis on local 
conceptions and the importance of symbols, which has since been re-emphasised as 
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vital for the study of kinship (Schneider 1968,1972,1984) as well as by other cultural 
anthropologists (e. g. Geertz 1973). As Richards would later point out, Robertson Smith 
had an unusual definition of `family' life (meaning presence of an adult male) which 
seems to undermine the significance of those statements just made about bonds between 
care-givers and children; 
"That the sacrificial meal was originally a kind of feast of kinsmen is apt to 
suggest to modem minds that its primitive type is to be sought in the family 
circle... But the notion that the clan is only a larger household is not consistent 
with the results of modem research. Kinship is an older thing than family life, 
and in the most primitive societies known to us the family or household group 
was not a subdivision of the clan, but contained members of more than one 
kindred. As a rule the savage man may not marry a clanswoman, and the children 
are of the mother's kin, and therefore have no communion of blood religion with 
their father. In such a family there is hardly any family life, and there can be no 
sacred household meal. " (Robertson Smith 1889 277,278) 
This definition of family clearly ignores the question of social bonds between children 
and carers. The division between the kinship formed amongst male `kinsmen' and that 
between children and carers is unhelpful if similar processes of bonding operate in the 
carer-child case as in the "between adults" case, as Malinowski, Richards and others 
suggest (see below). After Robertson Smith, further accounts of the significance of 
commensality are few until Richards (1932). 
Crawley (1902) discussed commensality, but mainly to argue that in `savage man' it 
does not exist since, as he would have it, man prefers to eat alone just like other animals 
(Crawley 1902, vol 1). As well as being absolutely refuted by primatological evidence, 
this claim sits uncomfortably with his simultaneous suggestion, like Robertson Smith, 
that; 
"Food produces flesh and flesh is connected with blood... eating food together 
produces identity of substance, of flesh, and thereby introduces mutual 
responsibility resulting from eating what is part of the other, and giving the other 
what is part of oneself to eat. " (Crawley 1902 Vol. 2,121 quoted in Richards 
1932) 
Notice that sharing substance here emphasises the mutability of social identity, as 
opposed to the permanent `shared genetic substance' concept prevalent in Euro- 
American kinship (Schneider 1968,1984). This shared-substance (or consubstantiation) 
interpretation of eating together would also return in later discussions (see 8.7). Van 
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Gennep (1960 [1908], 29) briefly mentions Robertson Smith's work when describing 
"rites of incorporation", but does not add anything of significance for kinship theory. 
Simmel's (1910) `Sociology of the meal' also very briefly refers to Robertson Smith's 
finding on Semitic commensality (1997 [1910] 131), but mainly argues that sharing 
meals is a civilized `triumph over the naturalism of eating' because it requires 
participants to observe `temporal regularity' as well as individual restraint in taking a 
share of the food (Simmel 1997 [1910], 131). 
Mauss's The Gift (1967[1925]) also discusses the role of food sharing in maintaining 
social bonds, albeit mainly in the community wide and inter-community contexts. 
Richards (1932) would later classify this approach as `Durkheimian' and argue for 
greater focus on the role of food sharing in creating social ties at the primary level (e. g. 
parent to child). Some of Mauss closely resembles Crawley's discussion of sharing 
substance; 
"To give something is to give a part of oneself... In this system of ideas one 
gives away what is in reality a part of one's nature and substance, while to 
receive something is to receive a part of someone's spiritual essence. " (Mauss 
1967 [1925], 10) 
8.3 Richards' Hunger and Work 
Richards' (1932) Hunger and work in a Savage Tribe reintroduced a focus on food 
sharing and in particular, a focus on infants, children and their carers; 
,, Now the nutritional system of a primitive people is as complex and important as 
the reproductive, but the institutions centred round the biological need of food 
have never yet been described. It is this analysis that I want now to undertake. I 
want to examine the human relationships of a primitive society as determined by 
nutritional needs, showing how hunger shapes the sentiments which bind 
together the members of each social group. By what means is this fundamental 
biological want fulfilled in a given environment; and what forms of human 
activities and social groupings are so derived? " (Richards 1932,23 emphasis in 
original) 
"We cannot analyse the formation of kinship sentiment in a primitive society 
unless we realize that the common sharing and preparation of food is one of the 
essential ties which hold together the groups, and one of the most important legal 
obligations of the family system. " (Richards 1932,28) 
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In contrast with Robertson Smith's subordination of `family life' in favour of `the clan', 
Richards, following Malinowski (1930b, see below), specifically focused on the family 
in her discussion of social bonding. Richards suggested that the same process of social 
bonding which contributes to the child's tie to its caregivers also underlies sentiments 
upon which later social bonds are built (see also Bowlby chapter 7, and 8.6.4); 
"... Family meals are intimately connected with the building up of ties of 
affection, confidence and trust towards the parents, and the sense of security and 
routine of home life. " (Richards 1932,28) 
"Primitive ritual shows clearly the extent to which the common meal becomes 
symbolic of the ties of union between two members of a group, and it is in the 
circle of the family household that these sentiments first begin to find 
shape. "(1932,60) 
Richards (1932,36-38) argues for the validity of a life-history approach in studying the 
formation of sentiments, and suggests a similar approach is visible in Malinowski 
(1930b), Radcliffe Brown (1922) as well as in Mead (1928). In reality, although the 
`life history' approach may have characterised some of these accounts, Richards' 
interest in how social bonds are formed was all too unusual amongst anthropologists, 
with the exception of Malinowski (1930a; 1930b), whose interest turned increasingly 
towards `biological needs' around this time (and who was Richards' tutor), but who 
didn't discuss potential mechanisms in any detail. Malinowski's view was that kinship 
ties are based on sentiments formed in childhood towards the parents, stemming from 
procreation, on the basis of the physiological care provided by them, and (like Richards) 
that clanship `ties' are subsidiary; 
"As I have tried to show elsewhere, there is something almost absurd in the 
tendency of anthropologists to treat the family and the clan as equivalent units 
which can replace one another in the evolution of mankind. The relations 
between parents and child - that is, family relations - are based on procreation, 
on the early physiological cares given by the parents to the child and on innate 
emotional attitudes which unite offspring and parents. These elements are never 
found in clanship... It may be safely laid down that the family, based on 
marriage, is the only domestic institution of mankind, that is, the only institution 
the function of which is the procreation, the early cares and the elementary 
training of offspring. Kinship thus always rests on the family and begins within 
the family. The clan is essentially a non-reproductive, non-sexual and non- 
parental group, and it is never the primary source and basis of kinship. " 
(Malinowski 1930a, 27-28) 
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As Schneider (1984, see chapter 9) later pointed out, Malinowski followed the 
conventional definition in his emphasis on the procreative basis for kinship sentiments, 
albeit also emphasising caregiving. In Richards' view, the best way to define a `family' 
is precisely in terms of the regularity of eating meals together. Richards describes a 
Zulu culture; 
"At mealtimes each different household is clearly distinguished, although the 
men and women usually eat apart. The members of family are those who receive 
their food from one woman, and who prepare it and eat it together according to 
the various rules of precedence which are observed in each particular tribe. Mr 
Bryant tells me that he has often heard Zulu mothers rebuke their children for 
straying into other huts at mealtimes, although by the laws of hospitality they 
would be bound to be offered food. " (Richards 1932,61-62) 
"[A child] becomes early acquainted with the grouping of the family at 
mealtimes, and the rules governing the ownership and distribution of cooked 
food. It is by lessons such as these that the whole kinship structure is felt rather 
than explained. Family sentiment is imprinted by a series of daily habits rather 
than taught by any definite lesson or rule. " (Richards 1932,66) 
Here, Richards expresses the view that it is the basic social environment, the one in 
which food is provisioned which serves as the context of social and emotional bonding. 
However, like Malinowski (Schneider 1984), she doesn't go so far as to question 
whether or not the procreative tie is necessarily `the basis' for these acts of care and 
emotional bonds (see chapter 1). Richards also comments directly on Robertson Smith's 
claim about the primacy of clanship over familial sentiments (see above); 
"The clan grows out of the family and not the family out of the clan, and no 
society has yet been discovered of which it could be said that "there is hardly any 
family life at all". Field-observation has again forced a modification of earlier 
anthropological theories, and to my mind it is the sentiments formed in the 
intimate circle of the family hearth which are reflected in the sacrificial meal of 
primitive ritual. These sentiments can obviously only be understood through a 
first-hand observation of the daily life of the tribe. " (Richards, 1932,180) 
Nevertheless, following Robertson Smith, Richards also discusses the part played by 
nursing in mediating social ties - not just between the nurse and the infant, but also 
between those who have been nursed by the same person. Thus she notes Gutmann's 
finding that, for the Wachagga, "the bond of milk pledges you to stand by your brother" 
(Gutmann 1926,254-7, quoted in Richards 1932). This connection is another 
emphasised by more recent ethnographies (see section 8.6.3). In sum, although not 
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questioning the procreative assumption, Richards' approach is a unique synthesis of 
biological and sociological perspectives; 
"It was my thesis that nutrition in human society cannot be considered as a 
biological instinct alone, of the type that actuates the behaviour of the lower 
animals. Nor, on the contrary, can man's nutritive needs and food-getting 
activities be divided from the physiological basis on which they rest, as too often 
has happened in the history of sociological theory.... [T]he earliest tie of 
childhood - that of the infant to its mother - is almost entirely a physiological 
relationship. The structure and bonds of the family in a primitive society are 
determined to a very large extent by the fundamental biological need of food: 
since it is within these groups that the child learns from whom he may expect his 
sustenance, and with whom it must be shared. 
But nutrition must also be considered from the sociological point of view. From 
the day of birth, tradition regulates the way in which the child is fed, and this 
process continues till adult life, the individual's choice of diet and manner of 
eating depending on the social customs and values of his tribe. " (Richards 1932, 
211-212) 
8.4 Waning Interest in Food Sharing 
Richards' thesis, which greatly expanded on Malinowski's position in proposing food 
provision as mediating bonds, was subsequently referred to in positive language by both 
Firth (1934) and by Fortes (1936) in studies of the place of food in society. However, 
both (along with other anthropologists) nonetheless effectively ignored her focus on the 
significance of sharing food and the focus on the formation of social bonds and 
sentiments (see chapter 9 for further discussion of this neglect). 
Despite Richards' persuasive account, the notion that social ties could usefully be 
studied in reference to social processes such as sharing food was thus largely ignored 
within comparative sociology and anthropology. An interesting exception is Cohen's 
(1955) "Cross-Cultural study of sharing and non-sharing". This appears to be a rarely- 
cited work, probably due to its interdisciplinary nature, but it won an award at the time 
from the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Cohen's basic position 
is similar to Richards'; 
"The reason for this apparently universal symbolic usage of food is that food is 
the mainspring and the context of the very first warmth and sensed belonging - 
the very first sense of relation to another person - which the individual, as a 
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neonate, experiences. Generally speaking, the earliest experiences with the 
mother (as a representative of the world) through the instrumentality of food 
establish one important and basic pattern of relating to other people later on. " 
(Cohen 1961 [1955], 330 emphasis in original) 
Cohen also includes some interesting related points about how food sharing practices 
within a culture may affect what he calls the solidarity and communality of its social 
groups (see chapter 9). 
For the most part, further study of processes of social bonding waited until the 1970s 
when, under the strain of mounting theoretical discussion questioning the utility of the 
genealogical `kinship' approach to social bonding (see also chapter 1), some of these 
themes became more widely appreciated, and their practice investigated within 
societies. 
8.5 Social Bonds through Living Together 
Despite Richard's emphasis on social bonding at the individual level, most `kinship' 
analyses continued to focus on the `social structure' of groups. This group analysis 
combined with the emphasis on genealogical links is perhaps most clearly exemplified 
by the British `Descent Theorists' (e. g. Radcliffe-Brown, Evans-Pritchard, Fortes) who 
placed a heavy emphasis on the `descent reckoning' features of human societies and the 
primacy of genealogical linearity structures as criteria for group membership in the 
(typically African) societies they studied (see e. g. Kuper's 1982 review). Levi-Strauss 
approached kinship on a similar scale (see also Carsten and Hugh Jones 1995, chapter 
9.6). His The Elementary Structures of Kinship (1969 [1949]) argued that an exogamy 
rule (an `incest taboo') promoting exchange and alliance between potentially warring 
descent groups was the first act of culture. Levi-Strauss's argument was explicitly 
predicated on the notion that all other animals, including primates, have random mating 
and no discernable social patterns (Levi-Strauss 1969 [1949], 6). Today we know that 
almost all mammals practice exogamy, and have reliable social patterns (see chapter 5). 
On the genealogical question, Levi-Strauss did not explicitly discuss kinship as `blood 
ties' (apart from his reference to the culture of `old ties of blood' in European `houses', 
cf. Carsten and Hugh Jones 1995, see chapter 9). He does however refer to `the natural 
links of kinship' (1969,480 cf. Schneider 1984). Thus neither Levi-Strauss nor the 
decent theorists questioned the primacy of genealogy. 
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The importance of residence patterns which passively shape the composition of social 
groups, notwithstanding supposed formal criteria such as `descent' (and genealogy), has 
long been a submerged strand noted by students of kinship. In a recent review of this 
debate, Parkin notes that; 
`By the early twentieth century... it began to be realised that clans and other 
descent groups were frequently linked to a particular territory, however they 
were organised in other ways. Radcliffe-Brown, writing about Australian 
societies explicitly made the link between descent and territory, using the term 
`horde' almost interchangeably with `clan'. This led some American 
anthropologists to challenge the idea of descent itself as a primary constituent of 
social groups. Alfred Kroeber, for instance, stressed residence and common 
economic activities (fanning and so on). Robert Lowie (1920) and George 
Murdock (1949) turned the whole theory of descent around by claiming common 
residence as the basic factor, which gave rise to descent - that is, people did not 
live together because they were related by descent, but rather were related by 
descent because they lived together. " (Parkin 1997,146) 
These ideas about coresidence will be discussed further in chapter 9. One important 
critique of the `African Models' of kinship and descent was Barnes' 1962 paper based 
on an analysis of social patterns and kinship in the New Guinea Highlands. This paper 
pointed out a number of exceptions to the descent models developed in Africa including 
an emphasis on residence as opposed to `descent' and also more focus on individual 
actions rather than society-wide structures. 
Barnes pointed out that "the New Guinea hamlet is full of matrilateral kin, affines, 
refugees and casual visitors, quite unlike the hypothecated entirely virilocal and agnatic 
Nuer village (though similar to real Nuer villages). "(Barnes 1962,5). (This critique of 
Evans-Pritchard's models was later repeated by Kuper; "Even the Nuer are not like The 
Nuer" (Kuper 1982,84). Barnes goes on to list a number of exceptions to a genealogical 
descent rule governing New Guinea social groups, including the point that "Many 
individuals who assert a mutual agnatic relationship are unable to trace out their 
connexions step by step and are uninterested in trying to do so. "(Barnes 1962,6). These 
observations led Barnes to suggest that; 
"[C]learly, genealogical connexion of some sort is one criterion for membership 
of many social groups. But it may not be the only criterion; birth, or residence, or 
a parent's former residence, or utilization of garden land, or participation in 
exchange and feasting activities or in house-building or raiding, may be other 
relevant criteria for group membership. "(Bames 1962,6) 
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The predominant conception of `kinship' as genealogical ties continued however, 
despite Barnes' findings. Fortes (1969) referred to "the irreducible genealogical 
connections, the given relations of actual connectedness, which are universally utilised 
in building up kinship relations and categories. " (Fortes 1969,52, see also A. Strathern 
1973 and below). Nevertheless, the shift away from focus on genealogy towards the 
notion of `kinship as co-residence' became stronger as other New Guinea ethnographies 
also emphasised that ties may arise from living together; 
"The sheer fact of residence in a Bena Bena group can and does determine 
kinship. People do not necessarily reside where they do because they are 
kinsmen: rather they become kinsmen because they reside there. " (Langness 
1964,172 emphasis in original, quoted in Meigs 1989,37) 
8.6 Current Ethnographies 
8.6.1 The Emergence of Processual Accounts 
As these non-genealogical conceptions of social bonding became more apparent, it was 
perhaps only a matter of time before more ethnographers began to recognise a 
combination of these ideas in their accounts. For example, Strathern (1973) noted the 
importance of both living together and sharing food as `creating kinship' in New 
Guinea; 
"[F]ood, in fact, we may suggest, is a mediator between locality and kinship. A 
clear case is found in the Maring, among whom: `First generation non-agnates in 
residence are usually considered members of other clans. Their children, 
however, appear to be considered members of the clan with which their father 
resides. The rationalisation for this is that these children have been nourished by 
and grown on the products of local land and therefore may be claimed as 
members of the clan' (Lowman-Vayda 1971: 322). I interpret this rationalisation 
as follows. Clansmen are felt to share identity. One way of symbolizing this is 
in 
terms of descent constructs (see Lowman-Vayda 1971). Such constructs posit 
that clansmen share substance in some way through their descent from an 
ancestor. Another way in which they share substance is through consumption of 
food grown on clan land. Food builds their bodies and gives them substance just 
as their father's semen and mother's blood and milk give them substance in the 
womb and as small children. Hence it is through food that the identification of 
the sons of immigrants with their host group is strengthened. Food creates 
substance, just as procreation 
does, and forms an excellent symbol both for the 
creation of identity out of residence and 
for the values of nurturance, growth, 
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comfort and solidarity which are associated with parenthood. " (Strathern 1973, 
28,29) 
The use of the concept of `substance' here is somewhat similar to that of Holy (1996, 
see chapter 1.4). The utility of this usage has since been questioned (see 8.7). However, 
Strathern's emphasis on the symbols of shared food, shared residence and nurturance 
are very different from traditional kinship accounts. From the 1970s onwards, an 
increasing number of reports emerged which no longer assumed the primacy of 
genealogical ties in the construction of kinship bonds. Instead, these ethnographies 
attempted to give a cultural account of patterns of social bonding. Schneider's 1968 
American Kinship: A cultural account provided an important impetus to this shift (see 
chapter 1). A key goal of this approach is to describe how the people themselves 
conceive of social bonds and their meaning. In the sections that follow, I review a 
number of such ethnographies. 
8.6.2 Connections Between Childhood and Adult Bonds 
A typical feature of such accounts is the (previously neglected) emphasis on the process 
of formation of bonds from infancy and childhood, rather than the traditional holistic 
emphasis on the `kinship group'. As reviewed in chapter 7, Bowlby maintained the 
position that the mechanisms which mediate social bonding in adulthood are in many 
ways continuous with those that operate during infancy and childhood. Thus, treating 
adult social bonds as analytically distinct from childhood bonding may not be useful. 
Indeed, echoing this perspective, several ethnographers have reported that the processes 
mediating social bonding in infancy form the basis of those operating between adults 
('kinsmen') in the wider social group. This is the case in Witherspoon's influential 
account of Navajo Kinship and Marriage (1975); 
"The Navajo never mention common substance in finding or invoking kinship 
ties or norms. Kinship is defined in terms of the acts of giving birth and sharing 
sustenance. The primary bond in the Navajo kinship system is the mother-child 
bond, and it is in this bond that the nature and meaning of kinship become clear. 
In Navajo culture, kinship means intense, diffuse, and enduring solidarity, and 
this solidarity is realized in actions and behaviour befitting the cultural 
definitions of kinship solidarity. Just as a mother is one who gives life to her 
children through birth and sustains their life by providing them with loving care, 
assistance, protection, and sustenance, kinsmen are those who sustain each 
other's life by helping one another, protecting one another, and by the giving or 
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sharing of food and other items of subsistence. Where this kind of solidarity 
exists, kinship exists; where it does not, there is no kinship. " (Witherspoon 175, 
21-22) 
"The ideal of communalism comes most directly out of the cultural definition of 
the mother-child relationship, which is realized in acts of giving and sharing. The 
mother-child bond is the primary bond of kinship in the Navajo cultural system 
and all kinsmen are essentially mothers and children to each other. If the Navajo 
have a golden rule, it would be, "One should treat everyone as a kinsman. " This 
ideal is expressed in the fact that everyone, even a stranger, is addressed with a 
kinship term. The negative side of this is that one of the worst things one can say 
about another person is, "He acts as if he had no kinsmen. "" (Witherspoon 1975, 
95-96) 
Witherspoon further re-emphasises this symbolism the final paragraph of his book; 
"The solidarity of mother and child, symbolized in patterns of giving life and 
sharing items which sustain life, is projected in Navajo culture as the ideal 
relationship between and among all people. All one's kinsmen are simply 
differentiated kinds of mothers; and, since everyone is treated and addressed as a 
kinsman, all people are bound together by the bond of k'e ["love", "kindness", 
"peacefulness", "friendliness", "cooperation"]... the k'e that exists between 
mother and child provides the foundational concepts and forms for all 
relationships in Navajo social life. " (Witherspoon 1975,125-126) 
Further ethnographies give a similar account of the continuity of processes of bonding 
across childhood and adulthood (see below 8.6.4). Another reason why a focus on 
childhood bonding is probably not usefully separated from conceptions of adult social 
bonds (e. g. between `kinsmen') is that, in many circumstances, an adult's most 
significant social bonds may be those first formed during childhood and infancy (see 
chapter 7.4.5). Gow's (1991) account of `kinship' in the Peruvian Amazonian Piro 
demonstrates that the strongest social bonds for adults are frequently said to be those 
which were formed during childhood. This includes bonds to the individual's 
caregivers, and bonds between those that were `raised' together; 
"[A] person may be real kin to Ego's real kin, but not necessarily real kin to Ego. 
This is not because native people think in terms of group boundaries or of 
genealogical relations, but rather because they think in chains of relationship of 
raising and being raised together... When people talk about their real kin, they 
make continuous reference to the past, and particularly to their childhood. This is 
clear from the idiom of caring discussed in the previous section, but it is 
pervasive in discussions of real kin. One man described his attachment to his 
uncle as follows, `When I was a child we lived together down on the Ucayali. He 
was always good to me, and brought us food. He loved me a lot. ' The most 
intense of such relations of memory are those between parents and children. 
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Adults constantly evoke their own childhood, and the care they received from 
their parents, as a reason for wanting to be near them. " (Gow 1991,164,167) 
As Witherspoon points out for the Navajo (see above) so for the Piro too, peers can be 
care-givers to one another; thus a distinction between those who give care and those 
who one is raised with may not always be appropriate. Early care-givers may 
simultaneously be older siblings; 
"As a child begins to eat real food, and to walk and eventually to talk, its 
relationship to its parents changes from one in which the parents take care that 
their physical connection to the body of the child does not harm it, into one in 
which gifts of food, given out of love for the child, evoke the child's love for its 
parents and other kin. Older siblings are very important here. From birth, the 
baby is frequently picked up and held (marcar, `to hold in the arms') by its older 
brothers and sisters. As it learns to walk and talk, its closest physical ties are with 
such siblings, for they are its constant companions and they eat and sleep 
together. Such intimate ties with siblings replace the earlier one with parents as 
the child grows. " (Gow, 1991,157) 
Here, Gow's account also suggests that spending time together ('constant companions'), 
sleeping together, as well as sharing food and eating together are the experiences that 
constitute being `raised together'. These kinds of interaction (which were discussed in 
chapter 7) figure for other societies, as we will see below. 
8.6.3 A Focus on Children and Caregiving 
Recent ethnographies often report social bonds between individuals in terms of 
sentiments, love and attachment. At the same time, it is the processes that create such 
bonds which are emphasised, including aspects that were perhaps underemphasized by 
Bowlby (see chapter 7). Perhaps the greatest difference between these ethnographic 
accounts and earlier discussions of kinship is the focus on the lives of children, and a 
`micro' account describing daily living arrangements and various processes of 
interaction. De Matos Viegas (2003) notes that for a Caboclo-Indian community of 
south Bahia, Brazil; 
"[T]he attachment between parents and children becomes meaningful not only 
because events of significant content are taking place, but also because the same 
actions are continually repeated every day... I argue that by focussing on the 
intersubjective relations whereby kinship is constituted, time as a dimension of 
sociality becomes apparent. Time is explored in this article from two 
ethnographic perspectives. I show, first that, in order to become kin, people need 
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to keep on repeating small acts such as dressing or feeding, both daily and on a 
continuous basis over days, weeks, and months, and, secondly, that people can 
turn others into kin by performing such acts. But the latter makes even clearer the 
importance of this daily re-enactment with relation to the forming of kin links. It 
shows that people are deeply aware of the fact that, if they stop performing these 
acts, the link between parents and children is weakened, and may even be 
severed altogether. "(de Matos Viegas 2003,22) 
As Gow suggested for the Piro (see above), de Matos Viegas finds that adults remember 
those who spent time in raising them; 
"Adults who early in their lives had been taken to become raised children 
[fostered] state clearly that the situation had never displeased them. They 
maintain that they belong to the woman who cared for or raised them, and it is to 
her that they want their children to become attached. Although they recognise 
who their pail legitimos are, it is those who have cared for a person for a longer 
period of their childhood that are considered mother and father. It is in this sense 
that kinship is constituted as memory of being related through caring and 
feeding, along the lines developed in large part by Peter Gow and within other 
South Amerindian contexts. " (de Matos Viegas 2003,32) 
Other reports from South America give a similar view. Weismantel's influential (1988) 
study of Zumbagua society demonstrates a `house and hearth' theme which would be 
taken up by Carsten and others later (see below). She finds that; 
"In Zumbagua, the hearth defines the home. It supplants the marriage bed as the 
symbol of conjugal living and the bond of blood as the emblem of parenthood: 
the Zumbagua family consists of those who eat together. The hearth's 
importance can be seen in the great significance attached to the founding of a 
new kitchen. A man and woman are ready to marry after a year's courtship, but it 
may be ten years before they begin to cook apart from their parents and siblings. " 
(Weismantel 1988,169) 
"On a day-to-day basis, then, the use of parent-child terminologies refers to the 
people who share a hearth: the older generation that feeds and the younger one 
that is fed. All of the children that a couple raise in their household (vinachishka) 
are referred to by them as their sons and daughters. Food, not blood, is the tie 
that binds. " (Weismantel 1988,171) 
Like de Matos Viegas, Weismantel also emphasises that the process of creating social 
bonds involves time and daily contact, and also reflects living arrangements; 
"The emphasis on work and time that undergirds the Zumbagua kinship system 
exposes the material bases of social reproduction. Parenting is a long and often 
collective process by which a helpless and prelinguistic infant - not even human 
in the Andean definition of the concept - is shepherded past the illnesses that kill 
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thousands of indigenous children each year to become, first, a Quicha-speaking 
subject and, later, a parent. In this context the physical bond between parent and 
child is not characterized in the essentialist (and oddly non-physical) terms of an 
involuntary genetic connection that exists even if undiscovered, but, rather, this 
bond is forged through far more sensuous connections created through taste, 
smell, and touch. The purchase of foods with scarce funds, the gift of warm 
clothing in a cold climate, the intimate familiarity with each another's body that 
comes from sleeping, bathing, and eating together in the close quarters of a one- 
room house: these are the material bases of kinship in Zumbagua. " (Weismantel 
1995,707-708) 
Where Weismantel echoes Richards in emphasising shared eating within the household, 
the theme is continued by Carsten's work in Malaysia. Carsten's work also gives us an 
interesting insight into the use of the concepts of substance and consubstantiation in 
descriptions of social bonding and `kinship'. As will become clear in the quotes and the 
commentary, despite superficial similarities, this `substance' has a very different 
meaning from the `biogenetic substance' of Euro-American kinship (Schneider 1968, 
1984), in short because it is `mutable' (see chapter 1.4, and 8.7 below). Whilst Carsten 
continues the notion of the shared hearth as the focal point of the house and its 
members, she particularly emphasises the importance of sharing rice meals prepared on 
the hearth, and the `shared substance' and even `shared blood' that this creates; 
"In this article I analyse the cultural construction of kinship among Malays on 
the island of Langkawi. Amongst these Malays ideas surrounding co-eating and 
sharing are as fundamental for kinship as are ideas about procreation.... Eating 
together implies having blood in common. One becomes related to the people 
with whom one shares consumption. And these may or may not be one's genetic 
1än. In other words, although one is born with blood, one's blood also becomes. 
The substance of kinship is acquired in the course of childhood through 
developing social relations in the house. " (Carsten 1991,425,426) 
"In particular, houses never have more than one hearth, dapur. However many 
couples reside together in one house, they always cook and eat full meals, of 
which rice is a main constituent, together. This commensality is a prime focus of 
what it means to be of one household. "(Carsten 1991,426-427) 
"Through the day-to-day sharing of meals cooked in the same hearth, those who 
live together in one house come to have substance in common. From this point of 
view, eating such meals in other houses has negative implications, and children 
are strongly discouraged from doing so. Eating meals in other houses implies a 
dispersal of intimate substances to other houses... In a culture in which people 
often move to other houses, these ideas gain further salience. The frequency of 
divorce, and temporary or more permanent fostering, lend an enormous force to 
the idea that living and eating together is one way of coming to share substance. 
This has further significance, however, in the historical context of demographic 
mobility characteristic of Langkawi. Feeding is one way in which strangers and 
outsiders can begin their incorporation into a village community, a process that 
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continues with fostering and marriage. The converse process means that if close 
kin move to the mainland or to other villages in Langkawi and cease to interact 
(either because of geographic distance or quarrels) their kinship and that of their 
descendants effectively lapses. " (Carsten 1995,234) 
Like Gow and Weismantel, Carsten also later notes the emphasis placed on the child's 
sleeping in their house (Carsten 1991,429). The concept of consubstantiation here, even 
as `shared blood', is one that is mutable; open to continuous transformation and 
`environmental influences' (thus the importance of eating in one's own house rather 
than in others). It is not just rice-meals which contribute to substance, nursing-milk also 
does; 
"Feeding is said to begin in the womb. In its first house the child is nourished by 
its mother's blood. After birth, the milk fed to a baby from its mother's breast is 
believed to derive from the mother's blood. People say that "blood becomes 
milk, " darah jadi susu. The mother's milk is immensely important to a child's 
physical and emotional development and to the child's connection with its 
mother. Children who are not breast-fed supposedly become ill; they may also 
fail to "recognize" their mothers. " (Carsten 1995,227) 
"The substance that kin are said to share derives in large part from the shared 
consumption of milk as babies... In the context of widespread fostering 
arrangements of different kinds, co-feeding can create shared blood, shared 
substance, and kinship. People in Langkawi say, "If you drink the same milk you 
become kin, " kalau makan sama susu, jadi adik-beradik. "You become one 
blood, one flesh" jadi satu darah, satu daging... There exists a continuum 
between rice (food), milk, and blood. The sharing of any or all of these connotes 
having substance in common, hence being related. " (Carsten 1995,228) 
The importance attached to the consumption of these various `consubstantiating' foods, 
and where one sleeps, clearly demonstrates that a child's social identity is mutable and 
open to influence rather than given (see also Carsten 2001). Montague (2001) also 
describes how sharing mother's milk constitutes `relatedness' in the Trobriand Islands; 
"Early on in my doctoral fieldwork I caused a group of women to roll on the 
ground laughing when I suggested that Westerners think that people are related 
because they share blood. (I did not know any way to couch the words 
"biogenetic substance" in the Trobriand language, so I had to fall back on 
tradition. ) Finally, one of the women recovered herself enough to gasp out, "No! 
People are related through mother's milk! "... [T]he newborn may not be nursed 
by its genetrix, but by some other woman instead. " (Montague 2001,174,175) 
Montague, like Carsten, uses the concept of sharing mutable substances that parallels 
conceptions of changeable social identity. As we have seen repeatedly, the emphasis 
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here is on performance and process as is made clear by the similar importance of later 
food provisioning by the inal'mother'; 
"Thus we confront the fact that, for example, even if ego's ina (Malinowski's 
"mother") is ego's genetrix, she is not ego's ina by virtue of being ego's 
genetrix. She is ego's ina by virtue of deciding to provide the child with 
processed staple and nonstaple foods. If ego's genetrix never provides ego with 
processed foods, she never becomes ego's ina. Moreover, if, having provided 
ego with processed foods, she decides to stop doing that at any time during ego's 
minority, she ceases to be ego's ina. As Bosiwosi put the matter, "Gala ina. Besa 
bogwu aokuva" (Not ina. This is already over). " (Montague 2001,176) 
Other ethnographies, whilst emphasising the same processes as mediating social bonds, 
suggest that we should focus on the `performance' of the nurturing behaviour, rather 
than the more material `state of connectedness' that substance implies. Thomas' (1999) 
work on the Temanambondro of south east Madagascar discusses potential drawbacks 
of the emphasis on substance (see below 8.7) and instead points to the ongoing giving 
and receiving of nurture; 
"[W]hilst procreation and birth do create some type of relation, this is not 
thought of in terms of substance. Moreover, the relation is hardly elaborated 
upon and in fact does not constitute kinship in any significant sense; it `counts 
for' very little (cf. Schneider 1980: 120-4). The reason for this, I suggest, is that 
procreation and birth are not the template for Temanambondro kinship. Indeed 
Temanambondro place emphasis on relationship constituted through practice 
rather than through procreation and bodily substances, as we will see presently. " 
(Thomas 1999,29) 
"Among Temanambondro it is not unusual for a man to marry a woman who 
already has a child. Upon completing the marriage rites, the man may negotiate 
with his `in-laws' (rafoza) to have the child `recognized' as his own regardless of 
whether or not he is known to be the father who `gave birth to' the child. Indeed 
it is sometimes well known that he is not, but if the child is subsequently 
`recognized' as his own then he becomes the child's father and the child takes on 
his ancestry identity. " (Thomas 1999,35) 
"Yet just as fathers are not simply made by birth, neither are mothers, and 
although mothers are not made by `custom' they, like fathers, can make 
themselves through another type of performatively constituted relation, the 
giving of `nurture'. Relations of ancestry are particularly important in contexts of 
ritual, inheritance and the defining of marriageability and incest; they are in 
effect the `structuring structures' (Bourdieu 1977) of social reproduction and 
intergenerational continuity. Father, mother and children are, however, also 
performatively related through the giving and receiving of `nurture' (fitezana). 
Like ancestry, relations of `nurture' do not always coincide with relations by 
birth; but unlike ancestry, `nurture' is a largely ungendered relation, constituted 
in contexts of everyday practical existence, in the intimate, familial and familiar 
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world of the household, and in ongoing relations of work and consumption, of 
feeding and farming. "(Thomas 1999,37) 
Thomas suggests that performance is what actually creates the relationship for the 
Temanambondro, and parentage by birth is not the issue, even in the mother-child case. 
Schrauwers' (1999) study of the Pamona of Central Sulawesi, Indonesia provides a 
similar view. Schrauwers emphasises process and suggests that, even in the case of the 
affective ties between parent and child, it is `time and effort' that make the relationship, 
not any genetic connection; 
"The ease with which children move from house to house reflects a notion of 
parentage rooted in nurturance and shared consumption, rather than narrowly 
defined biological filiation. The personal acknowledgement of parentage is more 
closely linked to affective ties established through actual coresidence and shared 
consumption (cf. Carsten 1991, Weismantel 1995)... Whereas to Pamona, 
parents and children see the recognition of parentage as emergent through time 
and effort, Westerners' kinship theory of parenthood is inherently structural and 
timeless, determined by the single moment of conception (Weismantel 
1995: 697). Kinship theory requires a processual approach to parentage that 
recognizes it as a "transaction in kinship" (Brady 1976). Parenthood, no less than 
adoption and fosterage, is negotiated situationally, not established by nature. " 
(Schrauwers 1999,311) 
These reports strongly suggest that various regularly occurring contexts, and 
particularly the performance of nurturing behaviour are crucial to social ties in the 
parent-child (and child-child) cases. But what about the creation and maintenance of 
social bonds between adults? 
8.6.4 Performing Nurture: Caring and Sharing between Adults 
Witherspoon reported that, for the Navajo (see above 8.6.2), the performance of care 
and nurture not only underlies social bonds between adults and children, but also 
between adults and adults. Stafford, working in Dragon-head village, North Eastern 
China, and Angang, Taiwan, demonstrates that the care given by adults to children 
creates social bonds and an enduring respect which is then typically returned to the 
carers as elderly dependents when the children becomes adults themselves; 
"Yang is a very common Chinese expression meaning `to raise' or `to care for', 
e. g. in `raise flowers' (yang hua), `raise pigs' (yang zhu), or `raise children' 
(yang haizi). In the case of children, the provision of yang -a kind of all- 
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encompassing nurturance - is, of course, very complex. It is also productive of 
an almost inescapable obligation: once they have grown up, children are heavily 
obliged to yang, `care for', or fengyang, `respectfully care for', their parents in 
old age. More specifically, the receipt of yang from one's parents during 
childhood obliges sons to return yang to their parents later in life... [however] it 
is women who normally shoulder (often `on behalf of their husbands) the actual 
process of providing yang; in many cases for their parents-in-law, their parents, 
their children, and their grandchildren. "(Stafford 2000,41-42 emphasis as 
original) 
Stafford suggests that defining the content of yang is not straightforward, but includes 
the provision of housing, clothing, education, and money, as well as food. Stafford goes 
on to note that yang can create relatedness not confined to genealogical relatives; 
"It is possible to produce, through yang, relatedness with children who are not 
one's own `natural' descendents. Children raised by foster parents (called yang 
mothers and yang fathers) are obliged, because they have received yang from 
them, to care for their foster parents in old age... [correspondingly] there are 
many cases in which a failure of the `cycle of yang' is what provokes the 
termination of relations of descent. Sons who fail to provide their parents with 
yang may be dropped from family estates, ties of blood notwithstanding. In sum, 
yang may produce kinship where there is no `natural' tie of descent, and the 
absence of yang may end kinship where a `natural' tie exists. "(Stafford 2000,42- 
43) 
Stafford's description of the cycle of yang is reminiscent of Schneider's description of 
changing care and dependency in the citamangen / fak relationship on Yap (Schneider 
1984, see chapter 1.2). Stafford suggests that this perspective may be important for 
Chinese ethnography since the heavy emphasis on descent has, he suggests, perhaps 
obscured fundamental similarities in the basic workings of `kinship' between Chinese 
society and others; 
"[T]his cycle - through emphasis on feeding, nurturance, and care - is 
comparable (as I have mentioned) to the processual, fluid, and transformative 
forms of kinship which anthropologists do not generally associate with China... 
Not surprisingly, the reality is that in China, as elsewhere, people make kinship - 
it is, of course, never simply `given' to them by birth - and patrilineal ideologies, 
however powerful, are forced to compete in a crowded field of ideas about the 
ways in which relatedness is produced. " (Stafford 2000,43,52). 
There is common sentiment amongst southern Chinese, `Yuen tsan bat yue gan lun' - 
`far away relatives are no better than close neighbours' reflecting the point that 
patrilineal ideologies are not always necessarily as prominent as many accounts would 
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suggest, and that coresidence may be more important (see also Vilaca 2002, Storrie 
2003, below). 
Marshall's influential studies of the Truk District, Caroline Islands, Micronesia (now 
known as Chuuk) also suggest that ties which are created and maintained through caring 
and nurture are not limited to those between adults and children, but also amongst 
adults; 
"Trukese kinsmen are those who share such things as land, labor, residence, 
support, and (not necessarily) genetic substance who choose to mutually to 
acknowledge each other as kin. In the Trukese view, those who nurture one 
another through acts of sharing validate their natural kinship or become created 
kinsmen as a consequence of these nurturant acts. It follows from this that 
persons who do not continue to nurture each other may cease to recognise each 
other as kin (compare Carroll 1968;, 1970b: 147; Smith 1977: 477-478). For 
Trukese, then, kinship is active" - it must be sustained by continuing nurturant 
behaviours. " (Marshall 1977,650-651) 
"Like any other social system, Trukese society contains a limited set of 
relationships to which individuals feel a very strong sense of commitment, which 
are characterised by a high degree of affect and sharing and which endure over 
time. In GTS [Greater Trukese Society], these intensive * interpersonal 
relationships generally include some or all of the following features: intense 
commitment, complete trust, diffuse reciprocal obligations coupled with explicit 
rights and duties, intimacy, confidentiality, privateness, and regular 
unquestioning mutual aid, support, and cooperation. Features such as these 
receive expression in different cultures in a variety of distinct ways, but they all 
reduce to one central idea: sharing. This includes the sharing of time, things, 
thoughts, and these, in turn, are represented symbolically by a broad range of 
possibilities. Shared substance, shared residence, shared food, shared land, 
shared locale, common names, and a variety of other alternatives have been 
selected by different cultures to symbolize the essence of "intensive interpersonal 
relationships". No matter what symbols are chosen, however, one thing remains 
constant: close personal relationships involve the concept of sharing. " (Marshall 
1977,654-655) 
,, All sibling relationships - natural or created - involve the height of sharing and 
ttong "feelings of strong sentimental attachment. "... In Trukese kinship, actions 
speak louder than words; ttong must be demonstrated by nurturant acts. Trukese 
kinship pivots on the fulcrum of nurturance, a fact partially understood by Ruth 
Goodenough (1970: 331) who noted the "intense concentration on problems of 
nurture - taking care of and being cared for by others" in GTS. Nurture is the 
nature of Trukese kinship. " (Marshall 1977,656) 
More recent ethnography confirms this view of the process of social bonding in Truk 
(now Chuuk). In a paper explicitly focussing on the continuity between attachment 
theory and the social bonds of `kinship', Lowe (2002) reiterates that; 
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"The point here is not that "real" kin relationships are genealogical whereas 
"created" kin relationships are based on interpersonal histories of reciprocal acts 
of assistance and nurturance. All social relationships in Chuuk are defined, in 
part, by the quality of mutual acts of nurturance and support. " (Lowe 2002,128 
emphasis in original) 
Vilaca (2002) suggests that, for the Wari people of Western Amazonia, Brazil, these 
same processes of the performance of mutual care, sharing food, and the daily context 
of living together are what underlie social and emotional bonds for adults as well as 
children, just as they do in other Amazonian groups; 
"The performative aspects of kinship are present in numerous Amazonian 
ethnographies. Notions such as the cognatization of the local group, found in 
studies of Guianese groups (Overing 1975; Riviere 1984), and others (Gow 
1991: 192), point us to a similar inference; people who live together tend to be 
identified as consanguinal kin, whether through the use of consanguinal terms of 
reference or through the use of teknonyms. " (Vilaca 2002,351) 
"Kinsfolk, Called ka nari wa, may be classified as true kin, iri nari, and distant 
kin, naripira or naripaxi (where iri means true, pira means `far' and paxi means 
`more or less'). Though on some occasions the Wari' say they are all kin, they 
tend to classify cohabitants as true kin and those who live at a spatial or social 
distance as distant kin. The closest win ma are same sex siblings, but the term is 
usually extended to include all inhabitants of the local group and members of the 
sub-group, such that the term win ma, which means `one who accompanies' or 
`one who does the same', functions as an antonym of foreigner, tatirim. Today, 
the Wari' usually refer to inhabitants of the same post (a village settlement, 
equivalent in actuality to a sub-group) as their true kin and on these occasions 
may exclude genealogical kin who live in another village. "(Vilaca 2002,352) 
Vilaca points out that this emphasis on coresidence occurs in other Amazonian contexts, 
and cites Gow's work with the Piro (see above). She also points out the contrast 
between this conception of `kinship' and what she calls `our own ideas'; 
"The same type of phenomena was described by Gow in terms of the Piro: 
proximity and living together are so decisive in determining kinship that 
genealogical kin who live far away may be excluded from the kin circle. 
Inhabitants of the village of Santa Clara would very often say: `we are all kin 
here'. And a woman once told the author: `These are my kin, the people in this 
village. You know them all, there are no others. ' According to Gow, her 
statement excluded two siblings, two daughters and many other real kin in other 
communities, while simultaneously including several people with whom she 
otherwise counts no close kin connections at all' (1991,193-194). It should be 
stressed that this is not a purely formal or terminological assimilation, but a true 
process of consubstantialization, generated by proximity, intimate living, 
commensality, mutual care, and the desire to become kin. For many Amerindian 
groups, the body is a product of particular social acts that continually transform 
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it. This implies a radical difference in focus: in contrast to our own ideas, 
informed (at least from the end of the nineteenth century) by a genetic 
conception of kinship in which substance determines social relations, in 
Amazonia, social relations determine substance (Viveiros de Castro 200: 29 n. 40, 
30). " (Vilaca 2002,352) 
Here again we see the substance theme, but as Vilaca suggests, and is made clear by 
Storrie (below) the difference is that this concept of substance is of something 
transformable, not immutable down the generations. Storrie's work (2003) on the Hoti 
of Serrania de Maigualida, Venezuelan Guiana again finds that living together, being 
raised and nurtured together, and sharing foods creates strong bonds of affection and 
sentiment (see also quotes in next section 8.7); 
"The existential framework and sense of well-being that Hoti derive from 
everyday relationships stand in place of what we call `kinship', and this is a 
matter of the interaction of distance and sentiment... As I have already indicated, 
there is no interest or concern among the Hoti about any possible genealogical 
basis for their relationship terminology. The important thing is whom one lives 
with. How one came to live with these people is largely unimportant" (Storrie 
2003,416) 
"It was my Hoti friends who, through their rejection of my expectations that I 
would be able to `collect' genealogical information, brought me to the idea that 
dwelling together and particularly the notions of consumption and ingestion are, 
for them, fundamental to social identity. Whenever I attempted to discover if 
there were ideas of genealogical relatedness between kin, I was told that there is 
nothing that links a parent to their children, or siblings to each other, apart from 
the bonds of affection and sentiment that they feel for each other. In other words, 
there is nothing more to `relatedness' than those things that link `all people' 
together. " (Storrie 2003,420) 
8.7 Clarifying `Substance': Transformable not Fixed 
Storrie's account of the sharing of substance in Hoti culture clearly demonstrates the 
distinction between this form of substance and the `biogenetic substance' conceived of 
as central to Euro-American notions of kinship (see also chapter 1.4, and 8.6.3 above); 
"Kin are bound together by ties of shared physical and metaphysical substance, 
but this is not transmitted by descent. The transferable property of substance is 
further reflected in the morality of sharing. The most obvious thing that kin do 
amongst themselves is to share, and the most obvious thing they share is food. 
Sharing food, over time, transforms the unrelated into the related. This sense of 
shared substance is very strong among those who have been raised and nurtured 
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together, but the transformative effect of sharing food and living together is made 
clear also in the case of pets, who can become kin. 
The idea that food, and particularly meat, is imbued with a certain agency is 
quite explicit for the Hoti. I was told that `when you eat tapir meat, you become a 
little bit tapir'. The weakest, most vulnerable and most transformable `eater' of 
meat is the unborn child. For this reason, the majority of dietary restrictions 
apply to pregnant women. However, restrictions also apply, to varying degrees 
and depending entirely upon personal sentiment, to members of the pregnant 
woman's kin, as all members of this group are linked together through their 
shared substance, and thus are capable of affecting and transforming each other. 
For the Hoti, people are grown through the participation of others and the mixing 
of substances - not just in the womb but for all of their lives. Here, crucially, the 
substances that are shared and mixed by kin are not pre-specified (as they would 
be in a genealogical model of relatedness) but are continually incorporated 
(literally embodied) through all of a child's kin. 
When food is offered to a guest or stranger, it is believed that the giver seeks to 
make the recipient like the giver. In accepting, the guest minimizes the difference 
between them. It is through this process that affines, and even strangers, may 
become kin. It is also why co-residence is so important, and why even close 
consanguines who are no longer co-resident are eventually forgotten, as their 
substance changes from shared to different. " (Storrie 2003,421-422) 
Montague confirms this mutability of connecting substance also occurs in cases where 
individuals are conceived as sharing blood, as for the Trobriand Islanders; 
"The first food that any newborn child routinely ingests is mother's milk. 
Because mother's milk contains traces of everything that mother has ever 
consumed, and because, through digestion, mother's milk enters into the 
newborn's blood, the newborn child's blood becomes compositionally identical 
to that of the woman whose breast milk it consumes [not necessarily the 
genetrix]. The result is that this woman becomes its veyotatu, a person who has 
avoided consuming the same seasonal wind-related bird and plant foods of the 
air as has ego... [T]he substantial identity between any two veyotatu, is mutable. 
Either one of them can at any time consume some foodstuff which alters his 
bodily substance such that it is no longer sufficiently the same as that of the other 
for them to still be one another's veyotatu. " (Montague 2001,174,175) 
In sum, all the current ethnographies which describe a concept of substance emphasise 
its transformable, non-fixed, `open-to-environmental-influence' character. This 
`substance' is thus the opposite of `biogenetic substance', which is definitively fixed, 
given ('being'), and impenetrable to environmental influence. This distinction is also a 
major component of Ingold's (2000) discussion of `substance' and the problems of 
prioritising genealogy over relationships of nurture. Partly because of its `biogenetic' 
connotations, the utility of substance as an analytical concept has recently been 
questioned by some theorists (Thomas 1999, Carsten 2001). For example, Thomas 
(1999), notes the frequency of use of the concept, and comments that; 
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"Whilst I would accept that the term is not without its merits, and that some very 
sophisticated analyses of kinship in terms of substance have been made, I think 
that there are also some problems with the use of the term. Aside from the fact 
that it risks perpetuating some of our own cultural preoccupations about the 
nature of kinship, as something rooted in bodies and conceptualised in terms of 
(ethno)biological processes, the term is sometimes used in such a way that it 
obscures rather than clarifies `culturally posited forms of relatedness' (Schneider 
1984: 117). Occasionally references to substance do not contain sufficient 
ethnographic detail for the reader to clearly ascertain what the term signifies in a 
particular instance, and all too often the explanatory power of the term is 
assumed rather than demonstrated. " (Thomas 1999,22) 
As we saw above (section 8.6.3), Thomas prefers an explicit statement on what kinds of 
circumstances, behaviours and performance are involved in creating `relatedness'. 
8.8 Summary of the Findings 
There are many other ethnographies which have not been quoted from that are resonant 
with the above reports, and can be consulted by anyone interested. Such ethnographies 
also document the importance of processes such as `nurturing, ' `caring for' or 
`compassion' (e. g. Meigs 1989,1997; Toren 1999; Lambert 2000; Bodenhorn 2000; 
Zimmer-Tamakoshi 2001); sharing food (e. g. Watson 1983; Janowski 1995; Meigs 
1997; Rival 1998; Toren 1999; Lambert 2000); sharing living environment (e. g. Watson 
1983; Rival 1998; Lambert 2000); sleeping together (e. g. Pader 1993; Sault 1995; Rival 
1998) and working together (e. g. Bodenhorn 2000; Nuttall 2000). 
The recurrence of these themes in so many ethnographies, from such a wide range of 
cultures has led to suggestions that, despite exorcism of genealogical assumptions, some 
cross-cultural commonalities could nevertheless be said to underlie the formation of 
`kinship' bonds. Galvin (2001) makes such a suggestion; 
"Recent research differs from much earlier work in that it refuses to take for 
granted the underlying assumption of the biological basis of kinship, but at the 
same time, this new research does not follow the call to abandon or dismantle 
kinship in anthropology... based on this recent research, this chapter suggests 
that not only is kinship a valid field of study, but also that some bases for the 
cultural construction of kinship may be universal. " (Galvin 2001,109) 
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Galvin draws upon the ethnographies of Carsten and Weismantel (see above) as well as 
Parish (1994), and points to food sharing and living together (sharing of shelter) as 
potentially universal components; 
"[T]hese contemporary kinship researchers have also found ways to explore and 
describe kinship systems. They accomplish this by illustrating other ways that 
people create "kinship" amongst themselves. Yet they all appear to have in 
common the idea that substance of sharing, of life-giving or life-sustaining 
properties, is necessary in one form or another to forge bonds of kinship. All 
three use food as a medium through which relatedness is constructed... [T]he 
other type of sharing is the sharing of shelter. Like food, shelter is sometimes no 
more complex than its physical characteristics, and at other times, is represented 
by more intangible properties of space. Although in the Langkawi group, rice, as 
food, is both conduit and sustenance, it also takes on kin constructing qualities 
from the hearth. Rice eaten where food is shared is as vested with the ability to 
create relatedness as other substance. " (Galvin 2001,118,120) 
Here then is an account that also notes some of the potential common threads in reports 
of the cultural conceptions of kinship. Even cognitive approaches to kinship 
terminology (which are perhaps closest to evolutionary psychology approaches) have 
drawn similar conclusions; 
"In constructing kin term meaning, children also rely on observed patterns of 
behaviour - specifically, the enduring and habitual associations having to do 
with the sharing of sleeping, eating, and other sustenance relations typically 
grouped under the rubric of coresidence. This appears to be true of adults as well 
as children, though most cognitive accounts of kinship have ignored this aspect 
of the kinship concept. " (Hirschfeld 1994,221) 
In sum, the above ethnographic reports seem to reliably demonstrate that social and 
emotional bonds are very often mediated by processes and circumstances rather than by 
genealogical relatedness per se, over a wide range of human cultures. Many of these 
peoples place little or no cultural value on genealogical links, and others, whilst placing 
variable cultural value on genealogical links (not necessarily underscored by a Euro- 
American concept of procreation), may nevertheless consider such links revocable 
rather than inalienable, where acts of nurture and care are absent (see, e. g. Stafford 
2000, above). 
Further, there is a definite compatibility between the processes conceived as mediating 
social bonds described in these ethnographic reports and social bonding mechanisms 
described by attachment theorists (see chapter 7). In some cases this compatibility 
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between ethnographic treatments and attachment theory is made explicit by 
ethnographers. This theme will be looked at further in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Nine - Summary and Discussion 
9.1 Introduction 
The last chapter reviewed ethnographic reports and found substantial support for the 
notion that various nurturing processes and circumstances create social bonds 
notwithstanding genealogical links. This demonstrates that cultural approaches to 
understanding the formation and operation of social bonds (or `kinship') in a variety of 
societies are compatible with attachment theory's findings on the formation of social 
and emotional bonds which, in turn, were demonstrated to be compatible with the basic 
biological theory of social behaviour. 
A focus on personal attachments and emotions has been a submerged strand in kinship 
theorising at least since Malinowski and Richards (see previous chapter). Other than the 
current research, other recent analyses have discussed the compatibility between 
attachment theory and ethnographic findings on kinship; to compliment the review in 
chapter eight, we start by discussing this trend in section 9.2. I argue further, that 
ethnographic accounts are extending our understanding of attachment and social 
bonding processes beyond the perspectives of traditional attachment theory. 
I then conduct a brief review and summary of the steps of the argument made in 
chapters 1-8, emphasising the differences between the current interpretation of basic 
theories, and more traditional interpretations (see section 9.4). 
There is an interesting parallel between this interpretation of biological theory and 
ethnographers moves between `genealogy is primary' and `residence is primary' 
positions. This fs discussed in section 9.6. This leads into a discussion of correlation in 
conceptions about `the basis of social bonds', particularly views prevalent in Euro- 
American culture, incorporating the insights afforded by the current analysis. I suggest 
how other aspects of the cultural background (neolocality and economic individualism) 
may also contribute to the prominence of the concept. 
In section 9.8 I suggest that ethnographic accounts of kinship can benefit from 
focussing of the local factors that shape actual patterns of social bonding. In a time of 
transformation of economies and community structure, what impacts can external 
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influences have on the strength, flexibility and constancy of social ties? I briefly review 
examples of recent work which, I believe, strongly demonstrate the power of 
ethnographic analysis to document how historical, ecological, and political-economy 
influences shape patterns of social bonding, and how changes in these factors are 
implicated in social change. Examples of forces of globalisation and one-way cultural 
diffusion from western societies will be discussed here. 
9.2 Ethnographers' Study of Individual Bonds 
In reviewing recent ethnographic material (chapter 8) we found that some analyses 
make explicit reference to individual social and emotional bonding processes, and 
occasionally even to psychological concepts such as attachment. In this section we 
review some recent perspectives on this trend. 
As was noted in chapter 8, Malinowski and Richards paid considerable attention to the 
development of social bonds in infants and children, and argued that such primary 
bonds are the basis of links across the wider group. These accounts were nevertheless 
accompanied by an emphasis on blood ties (see below). As pointed out by Carsten 
(2000), whilst others (e. g. Fortes) recognised that strong bonds are formed between 
children and caregivers, the connection with wider social ties (proper `kinship') was 
played down by an analytical separation, and the latter social sphere was generally 
deemed to be of more interest; 
"The formalisation of kinship as a field of study involved the separation of what 
Fortes termed the `domestic domain' from the 'political-jural domain' (1958,1969). 
Both Malinowski and Fortes saw the nuclear family as a universal social institution 
which was necessary to fulfil the functions of producing and rearing children (see 
Malinowski 1930; Fortes 1949). They both had a keen interest in domestic family 
arrangements, which may in part be attributed to the influence of Freudian 
psychology (see Fortes 1974,1977). Fortes also saw kinship as `an irreducible 
principle', the source of basic moral values (1949: 346; 1969). His study The Web of 
Kinship among the Tallensi (1949) devoted considerable space to relations between 
parents and children, sibling relations, and domestic family arrangements. The 
separation which he himself had introduced between two domains of kinship could, 
however, be taken to imply that the social context in which the nuclear family was 
set - in other words, wider kinship arrangements - carried greater analytic 
significance. The politico-jural domain of kinship - public roles or offices ordered by 
wider kinship relations, and the political and religious aspects of kinship - were 
described analytically as a source of cohesion in the societies anthropologists 
studied, and hence what rendered kinship of interest for anthropology (see e. g. 
Radcliffe-Brown 1950). 
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It is thus perhaps not surprising that the comparative study of kinship could devote 
relatively little attention to intimate domestic arrangements and the behaviour and 
emotions associated with them [note]. These were assumed to be to a large degree 
universally constant or a matter for psychological rather than anthropological study. 
If one considers Fortes' meticulous ethnography, it is quite paradoxical that the very 
data which documented in detail the small everyday acts of constructing relatedness 
between women, or between women and children, might be more or less excluded 
from the frame if his more general injunctions were taken seriously. " (Carsten 2000, 
17)[Carsten notes the exception of Goody's 1958 The Developmental Cycle in 
Domestic Groups] 
Carsten's perspective is not unique. Overing and Passes (2000) introduce the studies in 
their recent volume as; 
"[D]irected at overcoming a prejudice inherent in Western political, legal, social and 
moral theory which separates the dominant `domain of the public' (the cool and 
rational space of societal relationships which are ruled through contract and law) 
from the contingent `domain of the domestic' (the hot and affective space of personal 
family relationships centred around the everyday care and responsibility of 
children). " (Overing and Passes 2000,3) 
They believe that this separation between `public sphere' and `domestic sphere' is 
inappropriately applied to Amazonian cultures; 
"To understand the difference between Western theory and the Amazonian vision 
and practice, the distinction must be made between collectivity as might be 
expressed through social-structural imperatives (through roles, statuses and juridical 
rules) and the collective as an attachment to (or among) the people who follow 
specific cultural and social ways of being. Many indigenous peoples of Amazonia 
are strongly, adamantly, fond of their own cultural and social ways of doing things, 
and of the people with whom they share them, but not of heavy imperatives of social 
structure or collectivity (cf. Overing 1999). Again, we need to find the paths into 
their sociality, and the one that we suggest to be followed pays closer attention to the 
ways and wherefores of Amazonian peoples' attachment to people: what for them 
are the conditions for human sociability? " (Overing and Passes 2000,14 emphasis in 
original) 
Stafford (2000) notes the significance of the `two separate domains' model in traditional 
accounts of Chinese kinship, illustrating this by way of quoting from the `seminal' work 
of Freedman; 
"We can show without much difficulty that kinship bound together large numbers of 
people in Chinese society and exerted an important effect of their political, 
economic, and religious conduct at large. Family is another matter. Essentially, its 
realm is that of domestic life, a realm of co-residence and the constant involvement 
in affairs of the hearth, children and marriage. Kinship is something different. " 
(Freedman 1979,240-241 quoted in Stafford 2000) 
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Stafford succinctly summarises the problem with such an approach, that; "this formalist 
approach is liable, I think, to obscure in anthropological accounts the lived experience 
of Chinese kinship... " (Stafford 2000,37). Gow agrees; in Amazonia "Personal 
experience, as I discuss here, is also central to native people's understanding of kinship. 
Kinship is about relations between living people. " (Gow 1991,151). Similar points 
relating to Amazonia are also made by Vilaca (2002). 
In contrast to the traditional accounts of `kinship', we have seen how a renewed interest 
in everyday personal experience and interactions has influenced contemporary 
ethnographies (chapter 8). As suggested in the discussion by Overing and Passes 
(above) the concept of `attachment' has sometimes proved useful. This point was made 
strongly by Stafford (2000a, see also chapter 1) who suggested that attachment theory's 
perspectives on social bonding could provide a useful base for anthropological 
accounts; 
"Might Bowlby's realist approach -... be a useful starting point for anthropologists? 
... 
One could make the case that all anthropological discussions of relatedness - e. g. 
the accounts by Malinowski, Mauss, and a great many others of the ways in which 
gift exchange and reciprocity, or commensality and the sharing of `substance', help to 
constitute human relatedness - are also by definition, dealing with intractable 
problems of attachment and separation in social life. " (Stafford 2000,12,24 emphasis 
in original) 
Many of the accounts reviewed in chapter 8 used concepts from attachment theory to 
describe social bonds. Marshall (1977) for example referred to ttong - `feelings of 
strong sentimental attachment' which are demonstrated by nurturant acts. Other 
discussions are, like Stafford, more explicit in their reference to the potential utility of 
an attachment approach (e. g. Sault 1995, Lowe 2002). Lowe explains why he explicitly 
pursues an analysis guided by attachment perspectives; 
"This article examines the ways emergent human psychological needs and social 
identities dynamically intermingle through experience to organize meaningful social 
relationships. Specifically, I examine the idealized cultural models that associate kin- 
based identities and acts of need fulfilment and how these models mediate the 
formation of personally meaningful and socially legitimate relationships in Chuuk 
Lagoon (formally Truk) of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). My purposes 
in doing so are twofold. First I intend to contribute to a long-held - but often 
neglected - concern in anthropology with the contribution of human psychology to 
culture and social process in everyday experience (e. g. Hollan 2000; Malinowski 
1930). Second, I hope to contribute to the recent efforts to overcome some of the 
stubborn theoretical divides in anthropology that separate the study of the 
psychological and social aspects of organized human relationships and systems of 
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cultural meaning (e. g. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Shore 1996). " (Lowe 2002, 
123) 
In reviewing Bowlby's discussions in chapter 7, I suggested that a weakness of 
traditional attachment theory, particularly applied to adult social bonding, is that most 
analyses are limited to social patterns prevalent in western culture (see chapter 7). Lowe 
agrees with this; 
"It is now widely recognized that the qualities of emotional attachments to a variety 
of relational partners remain important for the adaptive negotiation of social 
relationships throughout one's life (Antonucci 1985; Herzberg et al. 1999; Levitt 
1991; Levitt et al 1994; Mikulincer and Florian 1999). While this point may be 
conceded by most, attachment-orientated research remains largely concerned with 
those attachment processes and resulting personal understandings that emerge from 
the earliest interactive experiences and relational partners, typically mothers and, 
occasionally, fathers. Few studies have examined the attachment processes and 
outcomes surrounding other relational dyads that develop later in the life course 
(Levitt 1991). Fewer still have examined cultural variations in the attachment 
processes across the life span. " (Lowe 2002,124) 
Where traditional attachment studies have not been able to illuminate cultural 
variabilities in patterns of attachment and social bonding, increasingly, ethnographers 
are providing insights. Ainsworth's early study of infant attachment behaviour amongst 
the Ganda was an important exception here, as has been work such as that of Tronick et 
al as discussed in chapter 7. Most attachment theory is however clearly based on data 
and studies from western culture. Since it is by now clear that patterns of social 
bonding, and how these are conceptualised in western culture is not representative of 
human societies in general, there is great opportunity for ethnographers to supply more 
detail to our understanding of the variables involved in attachment and social bonding. 
9.3 Malinowski and the Procreative View 
Before we move on to the summary of the current thesis let us remind ourselves of the 
opportunity for clarification that Schneider outlined on the basis of his review of 
anthropology's traditional perspective on social bonds. We have seen (chapter 8) that 
Malinowski argued forcefully that kinship is essentially about individual, sentiment- 
based social ties formed in childhood rather than being primarily some clan-based 
phenomenon. Richards also took this position. This position predates all current similar 
ethnographic emphases on the place of sentiments and attachments reviewed in chapter 
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8, as well as the focus discussed in previous section. But there is a key difference. From 
the post-Schneider perspective, the problem with these early accounts is that, in 
orientating around biological need fulfilment (and in Malinowski's case explicitly 
linking this to procreative function) they did not question the `blood-ties' conception of 
`kinship' and, arguably, reinforced it. Schneider gives an account of Malinowski's 
adherence to the traditional blood-ties concept; 
"Most important for the problem here is Malinowski's view that kinship consists of 
bonds which are essentially psychobiological in nature. Culture can bend them, but 
only so far, and not very far at that. Malinowski's view of adoption makes this clear; 
Social and cultural influences always indorse and emphasize the original 
individuality of the biological fact. These influences are so strong that in the case of 
adoption they may override the biological tie and substitute a cultural one for it. But 
statistically speaking, the biological ties are almost invariably merely reinforced, 
redetermined, and remoulded by the cultural ones. (1930b: 137) 
A note on adoption is in order. Malinowski says that adoption is a case in which 
culture is so strong that it overrides the biological ties and substitutes a cultural tie 
for it. If this were true it would present a problem, and seeing this, Malinowski 
suggests that it is really no problem as all because ties like adoption are rare; that is, 
"statistically speaking, the biological ties are almost invariably merely reinforced, 
redetermined, and remoulded by the cultural ones. " 
The problem that Malinowski points to is this. If the blood relationship is presumed 
to have inherent qualities of its own which "are" and which "exist" and are so strong 
and take such precedence, then adoption ought not to be possible, or at most it should 
be unusual and rarely practiced. " (Schneider 1984,171-172) 
Weismantel (1995,688) makes a similar point; "But adoption, in which a consanguineal 
relationship is wholly fabricated, seemed so problematic that he [Malinowski] was 
driven to assert that is must be statistically uncommon (1930: 137)". Schneider pursues 
this line of argument further; 
"For Malinowski the problem was to show in general the ways in which social 
kinship were determined by its vital psychobiological functions. 
In setting the biological aspects of kinship aside, there was felt no need to redefine 
kinship. It could still be defined as dealing with human reproduction as a social and 
cultural phenomenon. One could still assume that Blood is Thicker Than Water but 
not dwell on that part of it. Indeed for Malinowski and those who followed his sort of 
functionalism it was more convenient not to dwell on it, for to do so raised the whole 
question of precisely how specific social forms were constrained or determined by 
what particular biological conditions by what specific mechanisms, questions which 
they glossed over with glittering generalities. " (Schneider 1984,193) 
Schneider's probing is right on target - not just for Malinowski and `followers' within 
anthropology, but, perhaps even more so, for those sociobiologists and evolutionary 
psychologists (like Daly and Wilson) who overlook any investigation of mechanisms of 
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social bonding. But in investigating the biological perspective on social bonding, and in 
focussing attention on the mechanisms by which social bonding occurs, some 
clarification is possible. Malinowski's reference to the statistical relationship between 
`social kinship' and `physical kinship' is particularly pertinent here. 
In Malinowski's thinking, statistically, social kinship is somehow expected to follow 
physical kinship, because the biological fundamentals (procreation and the meeting of 
biological needs) are `the basis' for the social relationship. In this case, as Schneider 
puts it, "adoption ought not to be possible, or at most it should be unusual and rarely 
practiced". 
The dilemma Malinowski faced has been a common one for both anthropologists and 
sociobiologists since. This can be resolved with a distinction, always necessary in 
biological analyses of behaviour (Tinbergen 1951), between the evolutionarily typical 
statistical outcomes and selective forces involved in the evolution of characteristics, and 
the circumstances that mediate the expression of those characteristics. It is this 
distinction that the current thesis has attempted to highlight. 
Malinowski's logic that social relationship `should statistically' follow physical 
relationship in fact parallels biological theory's description of a necessary condition for 
the evolution of social behaviour. But, crucially, not the expression of social behaviour. 
9.4 Review and Summary of the Steps of the Thesis 
The review of the transitions in kinship theory conducted in chapter one demonstrated 
the potential value of any clarification of the relationship between `the scientific facts of 
biology' and the social bonding behaviours of humans. I suggested that, following the 
growth of contrary ethnographic evidence and the theoretical work of Schneider (1984), 
the concept of a necessary fundamental association between genealogical ties and social 
bonds has been rejected by the majority of contemporary kinship theorists. 
Nevertheless, for many social scientists, questions still remain about the relationship 
between biology and social bonding. For some (e. g. Goodenough 2001), the belief is 
that genealogical and procreative ties really are an underlying factor, but a clear 
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demonstration of `just how' is absent (Schneider 1984 see above section). For others 
(e. g. Carsten 2000, see 1.7) the connection between social bonding and `biology' is of a 
different kind, and notions of various processes of nurture creating social bonds and 
attachments have increasingly been part of ethnographic analyses and theoretical 
discussions. 
Yet another current perspective, essentially continuous with sociobiological hypotheses 
stemming from the 1970s, is that there is indeed a natural association between genetic 
links and social bonds; it is claimed to be `part of evolved human nature' to direct social 
behaviour towards genetic relatives (e. g. Daly et al 1997). The evidence, as before (e. g. 
Sahlins 1976), shows this view to be wrong. 
The `scientific facts of biology' are reviewed in chapter 2. The basic theoretical 
position, Inclusive Fitness theory, is a widely accepted description of a key aspect of the 
selection pressure that exists on the evolution of social behaviours. Hamilton's view 
was that the correct interpretation of Inclusive Fitness theory requires an understanding 
of Price's clarification about the statistical associations which natural selection acts 
upon (Price 1970). Price's work emphasised that the change in frequency of an 
hereditary characteristic depends on the statistical covariance between that character 
and reproductive fitness. Similarly, Hamilton (1970) showed that the Inclusive Fitness 
criterion describes the condition of statistical association between genotypes of actor 
and recipient necessary for the evolution of social behaviour (Frank 1995). 
It was noted that `the criterion' does not specify mechanisms for the expression of 
social behaviours beyond this requirement of statistically (in typical evolutionary 
environments) benefiting genetic relatives. It was also noted that the criterion 
describes 
one of the necessary conditions for the evolution of social behaviours, 
but not a 
sufficient condition. 
I further argue that to understand whether social behaviours might evolve in a given 
species, and what forms these social 
behaviours might take, requires an analysis of the 
potential for and context of social 
interaction in the past evolutionarily typical 
environments of that species 
(Sherman 1980). We note, following Dawkins (1979) and 
Hamilton (1964) that the expression of social behaviour that meets the criterion might 
be mediated by straightforward context-based rules of thumb. 
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With this solid and unelaborated interpretation of Inclusive Fitness theory set out, we 
are in position to take a brief detour away from biological theory into a review some 
past popular interpretations of the theory in Chapter 3. In particular, we review early 
sociobiological hypotheses advanced by Darwinian Anthropology to attempt to explain 
certain features of human kinship organisation. These sociobiological approaches had 
problems accounting for the ethnographic data and relied on a particular interpretation 
of Inclusive Fitness theory, which I (along with many biologists) suggested to be 
wrong. From the anthropological perspective, Darwinian Anthropological treatments' 
focus on unilineal descent constructs was unfortunate, since most anthropological 
research had moved away from these perspectives by the late 1970s and 1980s. More 
importantly, they could not account for the data. From the biological perspective (but 
see also Schneider's critique of Malinowski above 9.3) these sociobiological 
approaches also ignored the whole issue of the proximate factors involved in the 
expression of social behaviours. 
The critiques of Darwinian Anthropology from within biology gave rise to the current 
Evolutionary Psychology School. In light of this, it is particularly surprising that, where 
evolutionary psychologists have returned to treatments of anthropological kinship data, 
they follow precisely in the footsteps of the Darwinian Anthropologists (e. g. Daly et al 
1997). We also noted that, in an ironic twist, Daly et al., in support for their claim that 
humans everywhere culturally value actual blood relatedness, cited Schneider's work 
which was in fact specifically about the (perhaps unique) prioritising of blood 
relationship in American culture. 
At the close of chapter three we found that Kitcher, in his critique of the sociobiological 
position, suggested that the expression of social behaviours in humans might quite 
simply be based on cues of context and familiarity, rather than genetic relatedness per 
se. 
In chapter four, spurred by the questions over of the proximate mechanisms of the 
expression of social behaviours, we returned to issues of the interpretation of Inclusive 
Fitness theory, in particular, what has come, perhaps unhelpfully, to be called `kin 
recognition theory'. We noted a few important distinctions which need to be observed 
in this area. Social behaviour statistically benefiting genetic relatives strictly requires 
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only that a form of what some have called `kin discrimination' is typically the outcome 
of the behaviour, in the species' normal (evolutionarily typical) environments. Kin 
recognition per se is thus not actually necessary, and not strictly predicted by Inclusive 
Fitness theory. Thus, for any given behaviour, what effectively amounts to `kin 
discrimination' might come about variously as a response to `context-based' cues that 
have typically correlated with genetic relatedness in evolutionarily-typical 
environments, or it might alternatively come about by `positive powers' of recognition 
of genetic relatedness based on a mechanism such as self-referent phenotype matching. 
However, even if an organism demonstrates an ability to distinguish genetic relatives 
from non-relatives, this must be interpreted cautiously. Other than social behaviours, 
inbreeding avoidance can be a selective force for an ability to make this distinction, and 
thus the discrimination may have nothing to do with the mediation of social behaviours. 
Further, what is apparently self-referent phenotype matching observable under 
laboratory conditions might in fact be a side-product of what would usually be a 
mechanism for learning phenotypes in a social context of likely genetic relatives for 
`other-referent phenotype matching' under natural conditions (e. g. Sherman et al 1997). 
Having outlined the theoretical position in chapter four, we review the evidence 
relevant to mammal species in the following chapter. Given the importance of 
knowledge of the typical social context a behaviour is expressed within, we first look at 
how a species' ecology and niche fundamentally influence its demographics, and the 
potential for interactions between individuals. We note that a basic characteristic of 
most mammals is the typical reliability of the context of interaction between a female 
and her offspring, who are very often isolated from other individuals. A related point to 
note is that contexts of interaction will differ significantly for different kinds of genetic 
relatives, even relatives of the same degree of genetic relatedness. One example is the 
context of interaction between maternal half-siblings who are likely to interact with 
each other and the mother in the nursing context, and on the other hand, paternal half- 
siblings, who are neither likely to encounter each other, nor necessarily interact with the 
genetic father in most mammals. 
The evidence on the expression of social behaviours in mammals demonstrates that 
context-based behavioural discriminations occur in the great majority of species 
studied. Although there is some evidence that a type of self-referent phenotype 
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matching appears to operate in a small number of species (2 mammal species according 
to Hauber and Sherman 2001), the role of context, and particularly the place of social 
familiarity appears crucial even where some positive powers appear to be present. We 
note that in species with behaviours such as male infanticide, selection would not favour 
signalling of actual genetic `identity' (e. g. Pagel 1997, Sherman et al 1997). We also 
find that the expression of social behaviours being mediated by familiarity requires 
social learning of individual identities as well as behavioural biases towards these 
individuals. The concept of social bonding encapsulates these two effects, and is widely 
used in the study of mammal social behaviours (e. g. Gubernick 1981, Walters 1987). 
We close chapter five by consolidating the crucial distinction between the expression of 
social behaviours and the evolution of social behaviour. This distinction allows us a 
clear perspective on the scope of Hamilton's Inclusive Fitness theory. The latter 
specifies a criterion (a statistical association involving genetic relatedness) which is a 
necessary condition for the evolution of social behaviours. The criterion is not a 
sufficient condition, since, for example, ecological potential is also necessary. 
On the other hand, for the expression of social behaviours, genetic relatedness is neither 
a sufficient nor even a necessary condition. Mediating circumstances that would, in 
evolutionarily-typical conditions, reliably statistically correlate with genetic relatedness, 
are a sufficient condition for the expression of social behaviours. This distinction 
between evolutionary process and the expression of behaviour clarifies how the concept 
of genetic relatedness plays a role in biological theory of social behaviour. 
I argue that applying biological theory to an understanding of social bonding and the 
expression of behaviours in humans requires an understanding of evolutionarily typical 
environments, just as for other mammals. An analysis of the basic ecological and 
demographic features common to closely related primates, and particularly African 
apes, (in addition to the insights gained into common features of mammalian 
demographics) is thus required. Chapter six reviews the evidence. We find that, like 
other mammals, Old World primate demographics are strongly influenced by ecological 
conditions, particularly density and distribution of food sources. These species have low 
birth rates and long periods of infant dependency, particularly so in African apes. 
Cohesive social groups and delayed natal dispersal mean that maternally related 
individuals, including maternal siblings, will invariably interact in all Old World 
247 
primates. This reliable context of interaction with maternally related individuals is 
extended amongst those species with female philopatry (especially the cercopithecines). 
In reviewing evidence on what mediates social behaviours in primates, we find 
similarity with other mammals; that social context based cues are overwhelmingly 
important. Social behaviours between potentially paternally related individuals are 
generally less marked than between maternal relatives in primates. Nevertheless, where 
such interaction does occur, there is abundant evidence from numerous sources that 
male interaction with potential infants is mediated via familiarity with the female caring 
for the infant. Social interactions between potential paternal siblings are also mediated 
by social context, because in most species, paternal siblings, in those cases where they 
are present, are likely to be members of an individual's peer group. There is evidence 
that some positive powers may accompany these circumstantial cues mediating paternal 
sibling interaction, but the latter are found to be more crucial, which makes sense 
considering that paternal siblings may often not in fact be present, but social interaction 
with peers is nonetheless likely to be individually beneficial. 
For maternal relatives the evidence strongly points to circumstantial cues mediating 
social bonding and social behaviour. Adoptions of infants by females (as well as 
sometimes by males) demonstrates that maternal bonding to infants is not mediated by 
positive powers of discrimination. From the infant's perspective, it will bond with any 
responsive carer. If not necessarily the actual mother, in natural conditions this will 
often be a maternal relative (particularly an older sibling), but the context is primary, 
not the actual relatedness. Similarly, social bonding and social behaviours between 
maternal siblings (and occasionally between other maternal relatives) is context-driven 
in primates, and mediated via the care-giver. 
Confirming the value of considering primate demographics and social bonding 
mechanisms, in chapter 7 we find that the area of study most closely concerned with 
mechanisms of social bonding in humans considers there to be continuity between 
humans and other primates in the operation of these behaviours. Ethological Attachment 
theory, largely devised by Bowlby in the second half of the twentieth century has 
investigated mechanisms of social and emotional bonding in humans, particularly the 
attachment bonds of infants to their caregivers. In support of the interpretation of 
Inclusive Fitness theory set out in this thesis, Bowlby (1982) himself stated that the 
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evolution of social bonding that typically occurs between an infant and its carer should 
be understood in terms of this biological theory. Thus, investigating mechanisms of 
social bonding in humans also demonstrates how Inclusive Fitness theory relates to 
human behaviour. 
Bowlby demonstrated the primate-typical nature of basic human social bonding 
mechanisms. His work demonstrated that social attachments form on the basis of 
provision of care, and responsiveness to elicitations for care. The social context of 
living together and the familiarity this brings, provides the circumstance within which 
social bonds can form. However, we noted that some of Bowlby's descriptions of the 
`normal' patterns of ties that develop depended on a perspective on `normal' living 
arrangements perhaps biased towards western cultures, and that the identities of 
bonding figures might be different under alternative arrangements. We particularly 
noted a lack of recognition of the frequency of care-taking by older-sibling figures in 
many societies. In attempting to define more specific forms of the giving of care and 
nurture which may mediate social bonding we found that provision of food is likely to 
play a part, as well as the more intangible provision of warmth and comfort, and a safe 
base for sleeping. 
Having derived these basic mechanisms of social bonding from attachment studies, as 
well as insights gained from the reviews of social bonding mechanisms observed in 
primates and mammals, chapter eight found us in a position to compare what are 
usually understood to be very different perspectives on social bonding. On the one 
hand are the perspectives from theoretical biology and attachment studies, and on the 
other, anthropological treatments of social bonding and ethnographic reports describing 
processes and conceptions of social bonding in various cultures. Is there compatibility 
between these perspectives? 
In chapter eight we found that Robertson Smith had noted the importance of sharing 
food in creating social ties, although his analysis excluded the context of child-care and 
focussed on bonds between `kinsmen'. Richards, under Malinowski's influence, 
refocused on the importance of food meeting `the needs of the infant', and food 
provision mediating social bonds, (although she maintained the association with the 
procreative relationship). Alternative ways of considering the basis for social bonding 
emerged later, particularly after clear evidence that living together mediates `becoming 
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kin' had emerged from the New Guinea highlands, and various theoretical critiques 
questioned the genealogical perspective (culminating in Schneider's 1984 critique as 
discussed in chapter one). 
Ethnographic accounts focussing on the processes mediating social bonds emerged in 
the 1970s. For example, Witherspoon (1975) reported that all social bonding in Navajo 
society, not just that between the infant and its carer, is based on giving and sharing of 
loving care and sustenance. Other ethnographies demonstrate that bonds first formed 
during childhood often remain important throughout the lifespan (e. g. Gow 1991). 
Throughout the review we found that many contemporary accounts focus on social 
bonds formed in childhood and the importance of the performance of acts of care, 
including food provision, in mediating these bonds. In all cases it is this performance of 
care which is considered the overriding factor in mediating social bonds, 
notwithstanding `blood ties'. In short, there is strong compatibility between the 
perspectives on social bonding that emerge from a proper account of biological theory 
and those documented by ethnographers. 
9.5 Interpreting Biological Theory - Summary 
In terms of theoretical orientation, the current thesis interprets basic biological theory 
somewhat differently from the interpretations common to sociobiological and 
evolutionary psychological accounts. I argue that Inclusive Fitness theory describes a 
necessary condition or `criterion' for the increase in frequency (evolution) of certain 
kinds of social behaviour (as defined in chapter two). This condition concerns the 
statistical covariance of genetic relatedness between actor and recipients of such social 
behaviour. Being a theory about an evolutionary process, the condition is relevant to 
typical outcomes in evolutionarily typical environments - statistical outcomes are key. 
Inclusive Fitness is commonly incorrectly referred to as something like a formal proof 
that organisms will always engage in social behaviours with genetic relatives. In other 
words, it is interpreted as specifying a rule governing the expression of social 
behaviour; as justification for the claim that organisms have evolved to direct such 
behaviour towards genetic relatives. This is absolutely wrong, and the basis of a great 
deal of error. 
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Another important feature of the interpretation of Inclusive Fitness theory I am arguing 
for is that statistical covariance of genetic relatedness is a necessary condition, but not a 
sufficient condition for the evolution of social behaviours. This point is also strongly 
underemphasized in typical discussions. Sherman (1980) gives a clear account of the 
fact that demographic potential must exist for a context of interaction before any 
behaviour describable as `social' can occur. As Hamilton (1987) puts it; "in this sense 
social behaviours are conditional from the start". 
In overlooking this point, and in combination with misunderstanding the previous point, 
many accounts of Inclusive Fitness theory suggests that individuals will express social 
behaviour towards genetic relatives, and point to `Hamilton's rule' (about the trade-off 
between cost/benefit and degree of relatedness, see chapter two) as the only relevant 
condition. This interpretation completely ignores the place of evolutionarily typical 
demographic patterns and contexts of interaction, and can make no sense of, for 
example, sibling cannibalism (as described in chapter 4) where it occurs. 
There is a related problem associated with ignoring the necessary / sufficient 
distinction. Overlooking the point that a reliable context of interaction is a necessary 
condition for the evolution of social behaviours also obscures the point that context- 
based cues will therefore usually be available for mediating the expression of social 
behaviours. In chapter four, we found that even the name "kin recognition theory" gives 
an (incorrect) impression that some kind of `active recognition' of genetic relatedness is 
expected to mediate the expression of social behaviours. This point is also made by 
Grafen (1991) and Tang Martinez (2001). All the evidence suggests that `the criterion' 
has been met by context-based social bonding and behaviours in the vast majority of 
mammal species studied. 
A crucial implication of this is that the expression of the kinds of social behaviours 
treated by Inclusive Fitness theory does not require genetic relatedness. Sociobiological 
claims that biological theory predicts that organisms will direct social behaviour to 
relatives are thus both wrong and highly misleading. Properly interpreted, biological 
theory is consistent with current anthropological perspectives and ethnographic data on 
processes of social bonding in humans. Most of all, this requires a focus on the 
circumstances and processes which lead to social bonding. 
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9.6 Grouping Contexts, Living Together and Coresidence 
In interpreting Inclusive Fitness theory we paid close attention to the part played by the 
typical context of interactions and the processes involved in mediating social bonding. 
In this section I want to look at how this distinction between the `based on genetic 
relatedness' view of social bonding and the `context and process' view within biology 
has been paralleled within history of anthropological debates by the distinction between 
`blood' and `soil' views of kinship. 
As Schneider's analyses of kinship theory (1972,1984) made clear the anthropological 
conception of social bonding as `kinship' was founded on the additional concept of 
`blood is thicker than water'. But, as we saw in chapter eight, in many cultures, the 
circumstances of living together play a crucial role in mediating social bonds. Although 
this was strongly emphasised after evidence from the New Guinea highlands emerged 
(see chapter 8, and Kuper 1982) various anthropologists had long noted that coresidence 
is an important determining factor in kinship patterns. Later, this led to debate as to 
whether `blood is primary' or `coresidence is primary' in creating bonds of kinship. 
As early as 1889, Tylor was emphasising the role of coresidence in determining other 
aspects of social systems. Note that he was not claiming that coresidence mediates 
social bonding (this bold move had to wait for Barnes and others), but rather that it 
fundamentally shapes which lineal relatives will tend to be grouped together. In turn, 
which relatives are grouped as a result of coresidence fundamentally influences social 
solidarity and comparative authority. Here is Tylor, discussing these matters in terms of 
the `mutual relations of these social rules' (of coresidence and `maternal/paternal 
systems' of decent and inheritance). He notes that not enough data is available for firm 
conclusions, but the hypothesis he discusses is that; 
"[I]n the one simple fact of residence we may seek the main determining cause of the 
several usages which combine to form a maternal or paternal system... This 
direction is indeed consistent with what our own knowledge of human nature would 
lead us to expect. We can well understand how when the man lives in his wife's 
family, his power will count for little against the combined authority of her maternal 
uncles and brothers, whereas when he takes her to his own home, he is apt to become 
master of the household; and we should expect the rules of descent, succession and 
inheritance to follow the same order. " (Tylor 1889,258) 
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In Tylor's view, postmarital residence is a primary influence, and rules of descent and 
inheritance follow from this. If we were very generous we could say that Tylor 
recognised that social bonds and solidarity/ power/ authority would tend to be strong 
amongst those who live together. But he did not spell this out. A more comprehensive 
view, which incorporates the effects of residence, acting via `sentiments' on kinship 
both in terms of `the life of the family' and for systems of descent grouping, is given by 
Lowie. His initial thoughts seem to have contemporary resonance, but note that his 
main focus is on descent groups; 
"Rules of residence exert an incalculable influence on the life of the family, for 
physical propinquity affects not merely sexual love but all human sentiments. " 
(Lowie 1947 [1920] 70) 
"Why are certain relatives put together to form a social unit [sib] to the exclusion of 
other kin? In attempting a solution we must scrutinize the social conditions found 
among the sibless tribes in the hope of detecting factors favourable to the 
development of the unilateral principle; and we must also examine the correlates of 
sib organizations in search of agencies that may have produced them and tend to 
maintain them in operation. In my opinion the transmission of property rights and the 
mode of residence after marriage have been the most effective means of establishing 
the principle of unilateral descent, and I will endeavour to show how they might 
originate both a patrilineal and a matrilineal community. 
... 
[for the Hupa], in the majority of cases the paternal grandfather, father, son and 
son's son of a man are natives and occupants of the same village, taking their wives 
from without. In other words, the Hupa system actually unites by residence those 
male relatives who are united in a father-sib. We have here the germ out of which a 
father-sib might readily develop. 
... 
Hahn has familiarized us with the notion that tillage at primitive levels is 
frequently a feminine occupation... The girls growing up to maturity will learn form 
their mother how to cultivate the soil as they learn any other technique characteristic 
of their sex. But in some cases their exclusive preoccupation with horticulture may 
establish a proprietary title to descend from mother to daughters, and in this way a 
matrilineal set of female kin is defined... there was no patrilineal principle to 
counterbalance the active matrilineal one. Since, then, the garden-owners formed the 
most definitive group, it was natural for any child to have its affiliations indicated 
from birth by reference to the garden group. In short, there thus developed 
matrilineal descent and the mother-sib. " (Lowie 1947 [1920], 157-160] 
Kroeber conducted an analysis which suggested societies with lineal systems (and other 
types of system based on formal principles) tended to occur in geographic clusters; that 
is, the incidence of societies with such features; 
"tend to be associated, not only among particular peoples, but massed in certain large 
areas, as contrasted with other large areas in which they all end to be absent. In other 
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words, viewed historically these social features appear to be at least partially 
functions of one another. " (Kroeber 1938,307) 
Because of this, Kroeber suggested that the operation of such formal principles should 
not be considered fundamental to human societies; 
"Traits having to do with what we may call formal social organization - clan, 
moiety, exogamy, unilateral descent reckoning, totemism - which theoretical 
ethnologists have been so exited about for two or three generations, form part of the 
secondary patterns of culture; secondary on a broad historical view of culture, and 
secondary or superstructural even as regards their functional value in many particular 
societies. They are in a sense epiphenomena to other, underlying phenomena, such as 
place of residence. This is in one way inevitable, because while one must live 
somewhere, one can live without artificial exogamic groupings, descent reckoning, 
or totems; co-residence necessarily brings associations which have social influence; 
just as one must have kin, but need not have clans. " (Kroeber 1938,307-308) 
As Kuper (1982) notes, this position preceded the later critiques of descent theory (see 
chapter 8) and indeed, critiques of anthropology's study of kinship in general. Murdock, 
on the other hand, emphasised the underlying influence of residence patterns, but also 
maintained the place of rules of descent in organizing social structure. The latter played 
a significant role (not just as secondary elaborations) because they are highly `durable'; 
"Rules of descent and the kin groups resulting therefrom are also relatively immune 
to forces from outside the social organization. There is abundant evidence that they 
tend to long outlast the influences which produce them, as is demonstrated by the 
frequent survival of matrilineal descent under patrilocal residence and by the 
continuation of consanguineal kin groups after the disappearance of the forms of 
family or clan organization which have presumably produced them. Extended 
families and clans are obviously dependent upon rules of residence; they appear only 
under an appropriate rule of residence and disappear almost immediately when 
residence changes. " (Murdock 1949,201) 
After suggesting that Lowie's contribution (see above) regarding the primary influence 
of rules of residence was `by far the most important contribution of any modem 
anthropologist to our knowledge of the evolution of social organization', Murdock 
outlines this primary influence; 
"Patrilocal residence involves a man in lifelong residential propinquity and social 
participation with his father's patrilineal kinsmen; matrilocal residence associates 
him with the matrilineal relatives of his mother before marriage and with those of his 
wife after marriage... his relations with his parents, his children, and other relatives 
differ profoundly under these various arrangements... " (Murdock 1949,202) 
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Murdock also has a discussion of the impact of neolocal residence on patterns of 
association, which we will revisit later (9.7 below). All of the above accounts record the 
influence of residence on `kinship' structures, but at the level of descent groupings, sibs 
and the like rather than as simply social bonding between individuals. Lowie, for 
example, referred to the sentiments involved in `physical propinquity' but restricted his 
discussion mainly to descent groupings. 
We saw in chapter 8 that, whilst descent models were largely rejected in the face of 
evidence from the New Guinea highlands, the importance of coresidence in social 
bonding was further emphasised by this new data. Murdock and others had not 
emphasised the importance of living together per se, they had simply emphasised that 
residence rule will dictate which genealogical relatives will tend to be associated. As 
this newer evidence became available, it suggested that coresidence itself can create 
kinship, notwithstanding genealogical relationship. Recall Langness' point that; 
"The sheer fact of residence in a Bena Bena group can and does determine kinship. 
People do not necessarily reside where they do because they are kinsmen: rather they 
become kinsmen because they reside there. " (Langness 1964,172 emphasis in 
original, quoted in Meigs 1989,37) 
On the basis of such evidence, Barnes (1962) had concluded that genealogical 
connection is only one criterion for group membership. In other words, these 
discussions took the extra step of questioning the necessity of genealogical conceptions 
for social bonding. In discussing Levi-Strauss' model of house societies, Carsten and 
Hugh Jones highlight this distinction; 
"The evolutionary tone of some of Levi-Strauss's arguments, the idea that the 
development of class, capital and kingdoms all represent a progressive invasion and 
erosion of `the old ties of blood' (Levi-Strauss, 1983a: 186), points to a problem at 
the heart of his notion of house societies. This is the assumption, shared by descent 
theorists, that kinship is logically prior to forms of association based on residence, 
territory or `soil' (see Kuper 1988) or other factors. There is, of course, abundant 
ethnographic evidence for the salience of relations founded on ties of blood and 
plenty too that kinship is frequently used as a language to talk about relations 
founded on common residence, property or political interests. But this is not 
evidence for the ontological priority of `blood' itself. " (Carsten and Hugh Jones 
1995,19) 
Humans everywhere have long lived in groups, but then again we now know that the 
same is true of most primates and many other mammals. We must thus be careful about 
what aspect of group-living requires a unique-to-human explanation. Early 
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anthropology theorists apparently assumed that in the human case, social groups form 
by virtue of genealogical ties, i. e. that such blood relatedness is ontologically primary. 
In many species, individuals regularly form temporary groups in the absence of 
relatedness (see e. g. Walters 1987, chapter 6). In other species, permanent group-living 
can occur, and significant social and emotional bonds develop, in the absence of any 
genealogical relatedness, as it can in humans. So long as social disposition, and 
ecological constraints allow it, group-living per se does not require explanation in terms 
of relatedness, or genealogy in the human case. To put it differently - neither in other 
species nor in humans is blood relatedness ontologically primary in bringing about 
groupings of individuals. 
In the absence of external disruptions leading to high levels of movement between 
groups, individuals who live together are likely to have some genealogical links in 
common purely because they reside in the same place they were born, and where a 
parent was born, and so on. To claim that individuals live together because of 
genealogical ties is thus unwarranted. Rather, genealogically related individuals tend to 
live together in groups where the ecological, social, and cultural factors create 
conditions in which groups can form and remain in existence. In the human case, this 
point is emphasised by the recent ethnographies discussed in chapters 8. Storrie (2003) 
has recently made the point very clearly; 
"As I have already indicated, there is no interest or concern among the Hoti about 
any possible genealogical basis for their relationship terminology. The important 
thing is whom one lives with. How one came to live with these people is largely 
unimportant. We make the assumption that people are bound together specifically 
because they belong to the same family, but the accident of belonging to a family is 
what gives the members of the house or community the opportunity to develop trust 
and become bound together. " (Storrie 2003,416) 
9.7 Correlation Between Coresidence and Genealogy in Euro-American Society 
Schneider documented the prevalence of the `blood is thicker than water' view at the 
heart of traditional anthropological perspectives on social bonding for over a century, 
and suggested that this was derived from values prevalent in anthropologists' own 
cultures (Schneider 1968,1984). 1 want to briefly look at how this feature of Euro- 
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American culture may be influenced by genealogy and coresidence correlations and 
that apparent correlation may be confused for root cause. Murdock's summary of 
residence patterns is suggestive; 
"Neolocal residence isolates [the individual] before marriage with his family of 
orientation and thereafter with his family of procreation... The development of 
neolocal residence, in societies following other rules appears to be favoured by any 
influence which tends to isolate or to emphasise the individual or the nuclear 
family... Individualism in its various manifestations, e. g., private property, 
individual enterprise in the economic sphere, or personal freedom in the choice of 
marital partners, facilitates the establishment of independent households by married 
couples. A similar effect may be produced by overpopulation and other factors which 
stimulate individual migration, or by pioneer life in the occupation of new territory, 
or by the expansion of trade and industry, or by developing urbanization. A 
modification of inheritance rules, such as the replacement of primogeniture by the 
division of an estate among a number of heirs, can likewise favor neolocal 
residence. " (Murdock 1949,202-204) 
Murdock is not alone in making these suggestions. Some similar points are visible in 
Macgregor (1946; see Cohen's 1961 summary below 9.8). Firth (1956) also makes 
some similar observations, in this case specifically about western society, particularly 
noting that this relative isolation may not be limited to urban environments; 
"The general patterns of industrial living have penetrated modern Western rural 
society far further than is often thought. For instance, in a remote Dorset village, a 
young man who had grown up there, but been away for a while, said rather ruefully 
that he did not know the people who were living two doors from him. Even in a 
country village the neighbour relations have far more of the impersonal quality often 
attributed solely to urban living than is commonly realised. I have referred to such a 
hypothesis, even though it may be unacceptable, in order to emphasise the relation 
between nearness or separation of residence and maintenance or obliteration of kin 
relations. Any investigation of kinship in an urban environment soon brings out the 
great degree of variation in relations with kin. The reasons for this are complex, and 
their force in various types of kin situation is not entirely clear. But among the 
correlates of the varying recognition and maintenance of kin ties would appear to be 
the following: residential accessibility; common economic interests, as in 
occupation, or in property-holding; composition of household; composition of 
elementary family, especially as regards that of the sibling group... " (Firth 1971 
[1956] 389) 
Many sections of Euro-American societies have been marked by demographic factors 
leading to individual isolation, and in these conditions, particularly where combined 
with shifting, temporary residence (e. g. due to the necessity of labour mobility), 
contexts of social interaction are often limited to the household itself. With neolocal 
residence, as Murdock notes (see also Bowlby chapter 7), household is typically 
comprised of other members of a `nuclear family', either parents and siblings, or spouse 
and children. This concept of `nuclear family' appears to beg the question of the 
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relationship between social and physical kinship, but if monogamous spouses live 
together in isolation after marriage separated from interaction contexts that would 
normally mediate social bonds and `create kinship', such social bonds would rarely 
develop. Under the system Murdock describes, the one reliable class of individuals who 
could typically enter into this minimal community of the spousal household would be 
the couple's own (biological) offspring. The repetition of this pattern over a few 
generations would soon lead to a situation where social kinship is non-existent and 
genealogical links and social bonds are de facto highly correlated. The pervasiveness of 
this correlation may exert an influence on cultural conceptions of the `naturalness' of 
the association between genealogical ties and social bonds, without the basis of the 
correlation which leads to this generalisation being clearly recognised. 
In a society where social bonds are culturally conceived to be `naturally' associated 
with procreation and biological relationship, anthropologists may also conceive of 
social bonds in these terms and overlook the processes involved. This is what Schneider 
argued to be the case, and why he emphasised that the basis of this conception needs to 
be examined and justified, rather than referred to in vague terms and as he put it 
"glossed over with glittering generalities" (see above 9.3). 
9.8 But One of the Conditions to which Kinship Systems Must Adapt 
We have noted above and in chapter one that Schneider didn't reject the idea that social 
bonding might have some connection to the `scientific facts of biology'. The current 
thesis has suggested a way in which this connection might be understood. However, 
Schneider's broader point was that constraining analyses of `kinship' with reference to 
genealogical ties potentially obscures alternative insights. His main concern was the 
submergence of local culturally specific conceptualisations of social bonds and the 
processes that constitute them. But Schneider was also concerned about what other 
factors that might be influencing social bonding patterns. These other, submerged 
conditions which contribute to patterns of social bonding might be seen more clearly 
once assumptions about genealogy are put to one side; 
"If certain aspects of kinship could indeed be accounted for by the "ineluctable 
biological facts, " while certain others could not, the question would arise as to the 
relation between them. Are those parts of the kinship system which are determined 
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by the biological facts in some sense primary, while others are secondary and 
derivative? If, as Spiro says, "kinship systems must adapt to and are conditioned by 
variations in ecology, economy, demography, politics, and so on, " do the biological 
facts have some priority or are they but one of the conditions, like ecology, economy, 
demography, etc., to which kinship systems must adapt? Take note: if the latter is the 
case, then kinship must be as much rooted in these other conditions as in the 
biological facts. " (Schneider 1984,139) 
Our above discussion of some of the conditions that may have led to the isolation of 
nuclear families in western society is consistent with the idea that social bonding 
patterns are influenced by economy and demography. More generally, broad agreement 
about the ways in which social bonds tend to form might provide a good platform for 
studies of social change. In the remainder of this section, I want to draw on 
ethnographies from a range of societies, from East Asia to North and South America, to 
illustrate how multiple conditions influence social patterns. 
We start with Stafford's discussion of the various influences on social bonds in Chinese 
culture, which demonstrates that even official patrilineal kinship is in reality fluid and 
moulded by various forces; 
"Without question, in many Chinese contexts ties based on mutual assistance, 
coresidence, - friendship, and discipleship may be more significant than ties of 
kinship. 
Historians and anthropologists have also shown that Chinese patriliny only ever 
operates in a wider politico-economic context (see e. g. Gates 1996). That is, they 
have problematised the notion of pan-Chinese timeless principles of kinship, and 
shown that descent, as such, never `stands alone'. The volume edited by Faure and 
Siu (1995) addresses, among other things, the mutual impact of ethnicity, state- 
building, and lineage development in a single Chinese region, suggesting that the 
political economy of land control, and considerations of ethnic differentiation, may 
be as significant in lineage development as considerations of kinship in the narrow 
sense. Rubie Watson (1985) examines the interrelation of patrilineal ideology and 
class, and shows how patriliny may underpin class exploitation within lineages. The 
volume edited by Davis and Harrel (1993) analyses the (often paradoxical) impact of 
state intervention and official ideology on kinship practice in post-Mao China. In 
short, in terms of Chinese history, and even within the history of Chinese kinship, 
ethnicity, class, and state intervention must be viewed as equal players with 
`patriliny'. " (Stafford 2000,50) 
Another case where history and state intervention has affected social arrangements and 
the strength of bonds is amongst the Teton Dakota of North America. Originally these 
people had an open social structure, which Macgregor referred to as bands (note that 
this account employs traditional anthropological usages of `kinship'). This changed 
considerably after land reforms were introduced by the government. These produced 
economic and residential conditions that resembled those established in mainstream 
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North American society. Macgregor shows how these had crucial consequences for 
basic social patterns; 
" "Occasionally the band included other families who joined either to escape some 
unpleasant social pressure or to become the followers of some renowned warrior. 
There were also larger bands of related and unrelated extended families, which 
maintained social unity the year round"... Generosity, one of the most highly 
esteemed values in Teton Dakota life, was the principle basis of the system of food 
distribution. Open-handedness was not only a cardinal criterion of behaviour among 
kinsmen, but was extended to unrelated members of the band... 
Since their "pacification" and settlement on the reservation, changes have occurred 
in the structuralizations of relationships among many of the Teton Dakotas with 
concomitant shifts in the system of distribution. Aside from the loss of the buffalo as 
the source of subsistence, and of warfare as the primary source of prestige, perhaps 
the most significant change which transpired among the Teton Dakotas was the loss 
of the ancient band organization and the dispersal of individual households. As a 
result of the American system of land allotments to individual families, individual 
extended families are "stretched in a line of separated homes. " "Family homes are 
geographically widely separated today in comparison with the band camp"; as a 
result, "the family now lives with greater independence of related families in its own 
farm home. " 
Concomitantly, significant changes from these shifts can be observed on many 
levels, Not only are the "associations within an extended group... less frequent and 
intensive, " but energies which were formerly directed outside the family are now 
turned into it. 
"The mother's role has also gained by the present isolation of the individual 
household. Formerly the family lived in a camp with several other related families, 
with whom the child associated freely. Now the child living in a farmhouse on an 
allotment is forced to spend much more time with his own family and especially with 
his mother. " 
In line with the status of the family as a productive unit, "the individual and the 
individual family can, if they so desire, support themselves on a farm or by wage 
work without the assistance of others and can fmd companionship and social life 
outside the community. " (Macgregor 1946, cited and discussed in Cohen 1961 
[1955] 344-345) 
These changes in social bonding patterns mark a submergence of the Teton's long- 
standing social organisation and the shift to a way of life typical to wider U. S. culture. 
Schrauwers (1999) also discusses the affect on social relationships of the imposition of 
resettlement policy and a change in subsistence economy on the people of central 
Sulawesi, Indonesia. This has a profound effect on patterns of social relations between 
siblings; 
"While the general outlines of official kinship have remained the same over the last 
century, the practical implications of these relationships have changed as economic 
and social conditions altered radically under Dutch colonialism. Subsequent to 
Kruyt's pioneering field work at the turn of the century, the swiddeners now 
designated as the To Pamona have been reconstituted as a peasantry. They were 
resettled by the Dutch from hilltop hamlets in 1908 and forced to adopt wet-rice 
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agriculture in the valley floor on the shores of lake Poso. This change in agricultural 
technologies involved fundamental changes in relations of production through the 
introduction of individually owned landed property, the market, and wage relations. 
Following Kahn (1993), I refer to these changes as "peasantization, " a process with 
two major thrusts. On the one hand, this introduction of individually owned landed 
property resulted in a differentiation over time into viable and nonviable peasant 
households. Geertz (1963: 97), in a different ethnographic context, described a 
similarly poor area as divided into "just enoughs" and "not quite enoughs. " On the 
other hand, peasantization means low capitalization, such that even viable 
households with sufficient property depend on so-called free (i. e. non-commodified) 
domestic labor to meet the bulk of their labor needs... 
Most smallholders acquire their land through inheritance, usually at marriage. Ideally 
parental holdings are divided equally among their children; however, as parental 
holdings have shrunk over the generations, many newly married couples have 
inherited too little to become viable households. Frequently older children will 
magagu (take more than their share) so as to reach that threshold of viability... 
practical kinship ties the viable households of older siblings (tukaka) to the 
nonviable households of their younger siblings (tua'i). Elsewhere I have noted the 
blurred household boundaries typical of sibling sets in contexts where non-viable 
households transfer some of their domestic functions to the more viable households 
of kin (Schrauwers 1995). One of these domestic functions is child rearing: unable to 
care for their children, they may ask their kinsmen with viable households to foster 
them. These kinsmen, still largely dependent on domestic labor for the cultivation of 
their fields, may actively seek to foster older children (both boys and girls) for the 
contribution they can make in reducing the household's dependence on wage labor... 
The domestic exploitation which occurs within the kinship sphere is thus crucial to 
maintaining the viability of peasant enterprises. This exploitation, however, is not a 
simple perpetuation of historical relations of servitude but a form of labor 
mobilization that have emerged in the niches of the capitalist transformation of the 
highlands. The so-called free labor of kin is a substitute for wage labor, peasant 
producers cannot afford wage labor because so much of their own surpluses have 
been drained away by the mengijon [agricultural loans] system. Green revolution 
inputs such as improved irrigation, fertilizers, and the mechanization of agricultural 
production have subordinated even viable subsistence households to the market since 
their access to these inputs is through the village merchants. The benefits of the 
green revolution thus accrue to the merchants, leaving peasant enterprises (including 
those of the bagagu) undercapitalised and dependent on noncommodified inputs. " 
(Schrauwers 1999,316-320) 
Schrauwers thus demonstrates that changed subsistence options in an imposed 
environment of commoditisation of agriculture and a market economy can result in 
disruption to traditional relationships, even between siblings, as well as changed social 
and power relations between them. 
Nuttall's work on the Kangersuatsiarmiit also describes the impact economic change. 
He describes how global economic forces change patterns of social bonding within Inuit 
communities in Greenland. In particular, Nuttall describes the shift away from 
communal organisation towards economic individualism; 
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"Like many other hunting societies, the Kangersuatsiarmiit do not only regard the 
environment as `giving': sharing the products of the hunt is a social event that 
demonstrates relatedness, affection and concern. Cultural identity is founded upon 
and derives meaning from a culturally embedded system of sharing relations. As 
with many other Inuit communities that depend on hunting (see for example, Wenzel 
1991), when meat is shared and exchanged in Kangersuatsiaq it is done so on the 
understanding that hunters have an obligation to distribute much of what they catch. 
This obligation to share underlies the customary ideology of subsistence in 
Kangersuatsiaq and contributes to the reproduction of kinship ties and other close 
social relationships. While this obligation to share remains strong, as I discuss below, 
there is an increasing commoditisation of hunting and some hunters prefer to try to 
sell meat... 
The sale of whale meat and other Greenlandic food, such as seal and fish, is being 
encouraged by the Greenlandic Home Rule government, although on a larger scale 
than the local-level economy... As well as other goods, Greenland relies to a great 
extent on imported foodstuffs, mainly from Denmark. To ease this reliance, hunters 
in small settlements such as Kangersuatsiaq are being encouraged to sell part or most 
of what they catch to Royal Greenland, the country's meat and fish processing and 
marketing company, rather than to share or sell the meat within the village... In 
many parts of Greenland, however, there is local opposition, or reluctance, to sell 
seal and whale meat to the Royal Greenland processing plants that are to be found in 
many villages... Royal Greenland has failed to recognise the essence of sharing as a 
fundamental part of the hunting culture, as well as understanding the immediate 
gains for a hunter who sells meat privately rather than to the Royal Greenland 
processing plant (Nuttall 1998b). Any meat that is sold is surplus and the money 
earned is essential for the economic viability of the hunter's household. Although 
some hunters do see the incentive to earn money as overriding other concerns such 
as sharing, for the most part when hunting is done to satisfy a market demand 
beyond the local community or regional economy, then the customary ideology of 
subsistence and notions of sharing and giving are disrupted and threatened... 
While I have argued that kinship does not determine or control the social 
organisation of commodity production, the ideology of subsistence and sharing 
sustains, renews and brings into being kinship relations. Kinship has certain 
dividends and entails moral obligation, and people choose, and wish to sustain, the 
relations they see as rich and meaningful to them. Now that the incentive for 
economic production in modern Greenland is increasingly market-driven, rather than 
framed by kinship, economic gain makes for social loss. " (Nuttall 2000,55-58) 
Nuttall's account demonstrates that national and even international economic factors 
can impact social bonds at the local level. We have seen how such changes in local 
social patterns can lead to isolation of individuals in minimal social environments such 
as the `nuclear family', and thus fundamentally alter norms of social bonding patterns in 
a society, and ultimately, cultural conceptions of social bonding. 
Another form of outside influence on a culture's social bonding norms is by direct 
interaction between different cultures and the accompanying diffusion of concepts and 
symbols. Weismantel illustrates this in describing the interplay between a westernised 
view of social bonding, where `real kinship' is founded on blood ties, and an indigenous 
Ecuadorian view of social bonds, as formed by processes of nurture. She describes an 
interaction between a man who is caring for a young child and a district nurse on a 
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social call. Weismantel describes the nurse as "a young woman from Quito assigned to 
the parish for a year of "rural service" required by the government of all health 
professionals" who is "utterly out of place in the indigenous culture of the parish. " She 
describes the interaction; 
"The man served the child hot soup, and sat back beaming, happily watching him 
empty the bowl. "He was an orphan, a poor boy, so I brought him here to live with 
me as my son, " he explained. "Where he was living, there wasn't enough to eat. " 
The nurse was horrified; she gestured to him frantically to lower his voice. "Don't 
talk like that in front of the boy, " she whispered. "He's very young; maybe, if he's 
lucky, he'll forget about his own parents and grow up believing you're his real 
father. " Iza, puzzled and offended, responding by raising his voice instead of 
lowering it. "I am going to be his father, " he said irritably. "Aren't I feeding him 
right now? " 
The nurse's urgent need to hide the fact of adoption is based upon the assumption 
that in the absence of a "blood" tie, the relationship between man and child is 
fundamentally a pretense. The family as she envisions it is both biological and social 
in origin. If biological reproduction takes place outside of the social bond of 
marriage, an illegitimate child is the result: a "natural" son. But with Iza's attempt to 
establish a bond with a child whose mother he did not impregnate, it is the parent 
who becomes illegitimate: in the nurse's eyes, Iza could never be the "real" father of 
this child... 
From an Indigenous perspective, insistence on the primacy of biological kinship is 
one of a large set of beliefs and practices that governmental and religious workers 
attempt to impose on local people. The bourgeoisie find fault with the indigenous 
and Afro-Ecuadorian cultural traditions for failing to delimit the nuclear family, a 
failing they characterize as an impediment to development and an indication of a 
fundamental incompatibility with modernity. " (Weismantel 1995,690) 
Weimantel's analysis returns us to Schneider's central point. It should not be assumed 
that Euro-American notions of the correct form of `kinship' relationships are 
universally applicable. Caution is required in bringing one society's cultural values, 
either as anthropologists, social commentators or otherwise, to other societies. 
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